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  • Section 15(1) of the Cochin Trade Mans Act, 19 of 1119.
  • Rule 30, Trade Marks Rules 1122
  • Trade Marks Rules, 1122
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
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  • Section 15(1) of the Cochin Trade Mans Act, 19 of 1119.
  • Rule 30, Trade Marks Rules 1122
  • Trade Marks Rules, 1122

    Pavunny Ouseph v. The Registrar Of Trade Marks .

    Koshi, J.:— This is an appeal against an order of the Registrar of Trade Marks (Cochin), refusing to reject as out of time an opposition to the appellant's application for the registration of a lable containing the words “The Kalan Ayurvedic Pharmacy.” The appellant's application for registrartion was made in January own & after the necessary preliminary investigations, the Registrar of Trade Marks directed the application to be advertised as accepted, under Section 15(1) of the Cochin Trade Mans Act, 19 of 1119. Under the Trade Marks Rules, 1122 the advertisement is to be made in the Trade Marks Journal. The appellant's application was advertised at p. 2 of 1949 May issue of the said Journal. S. 15(2) of the Act provides that any person may, within the prescribed time from the date of the advertisement of an application, give notice in writing in the prescribed form to the Registrar of opposition to the application. Rule 30, Trade Marks Rules 1122 prescribes that the time within which a notice of opposition to the registration of a trade mark may be given, shall be four months from the date of advertisement of the application for registration, in the journal. On 24-11-1949 one K.K Pavunny, Proprietor, Kalan Ayurveqic Oushadhasala filed notice of opposition to the appellant's application with the authorities & due notice was given to the appellant of the same as required by S. 15(3). His counter statement was also called for. The appellant, while giving intimation to the Registrar that he will within the time allowed by law file his counter, raised a preliminary objection that the opposition was filed long out of time & that he was therefore under S. 16 of the Act entitled to have his application registered. This preliminary objection was overruled by the Registrar & the operative portion of the order overruling it reads as follows:

    “In view of the late publication of the Trade Marks Journal the opposition filed by Mr. K.K Pavunni was considered to be in time. Your petition is therefore hereby dismissed. You are requested to file your counter statement at an early date.”

    2. The present appeal is against this order.

    3. The sole respt. to the appeal is the Registrar of Trade Marks. The person who gave notice of opposition is not made a party to the appeal.

    4. The appeal is opposed on behalf of the Registrar by the learned Advocate-General. An affidavit sworn to by the Administrative Officer, Trade Mark Registry, Bombay, is filed in Court to explain how 1949 May issue of the Trade Marks Journal happened to be published late & not when the said issue was actually published. According to that affidavit in the years 1948 & 1949 there was considerable delay in the printing of the journal & though 1949 May issue was not printed in June (1949) its publication was delayed until 9-8-1949 as the March issue was received from printers only in July 1949. The affidavit further show's that copies of the May Issue along with those of April, June & July issues were dispatched to subscribers only on 9-8-1949. The appellant has, no doubt, filed a counter-affidavit, but it does not contain any material on the strength of which we would be justified in not accepting as true the facts set out in the affidavit filed on behalf of the respt. An intimation which the appellant received from the Additional Registrar of Trade Marks, Cochin State, under date 20-7-1949 was produced to show that the publication of the journal was made earlier than the date mentioned in the Administrative Officer's affidavit. That intimation is in these terms:

    “The above application has been advertised as accepted at p. 2 of the Trade Marks Journal, Vol. No. III, dated 1-5-1949. Cuttings of the above advertisement from the journal are enclosed for ready reference.”

    5. This, in our opinion, does not in any sense go against or disprove the facts set out in the affidavit referred to. That printing was over as early as middle of June is admitted in that affidavit. It was the despatch of the issue to the subscribers that was delayed till August 1949. There was nothing preventing the Office of the Trade Marks Registry from sending a few cuttings or even a few copies of the journal to the Additional Registrar of Trade Marks, Cochin State, at Trichur. The fact that the appellant got one or two cuttings of the advertisement on or about 20th July will not show that the advertisement required of by law had taken place at least then or earlier.

    6. The object of advertising that an application for the registration of a Trade Mark has been received by the Registrar is obviously to let the public know about it & to invite opposition to it, if any. That object will be served only when the journal is distributed among the subscribers or otherwise made available to the public & not when it is got printed or few copies or cuttings distributed among the subordinate offices of the Trade Marks Registry or among the applicants for registration. The relevant file called for at the instance of the appellant from the Office of the Additional Registrar of Trade Marks, Trichur, shows that it has all along been the practice of the Trade Marks Registry to count the four months' time prescribed by R. 30 from the date of despatch of the journal containing the advertisement to the subscribers. This practice commends itself to us as embodying a common sense interpretation of the rule prescribing the period of time within which opposition should be filed. There is therefore, in our opinion, no merit whatever in the present complaint against the Registrar's refusal to regard the opposition as out of time. When the publication of the advertisement was only on or about 9-8-1949, the time for giving notice of opposition extended up to 8-12-1949 & a notice filed in November 1949 can by no stretch of imagination be held to be not within time.

    7. The appellant sought to make out that what the Registrar did was to exercise his power to extend the time & that in so doing he has failed to comply with the provisions of the relevant rule, namely, R. 77. There is really no extension of time at all in this case. What has happened is that the Registrar decided that the four months' period allowed by R. 30 should be taken to have commenced only when the particular issue containing the advertisement was despatched to the subscribers. This is in conformity with the practice the Trade Marks Registry was all along following. The file referred to earlier shows that in view of this the Registrar did not even think it necessary to go into the grounds mentioned in the notice of opposition for extending the time to file it. There is therefore no point either in this argument.

    8. The appeal must hence fail, but before parting with it we owe it to the learned Advocate-General to mention that he raised two preliminary objections to the maintanability of the appeal. One was that it was not properly constituted as to parties & the other was that the order complained of was not a “decision” within the meaning of S. 72 of the Act or R. 85 as to entitle the party aggrieved by the order to prefer an appeal to this Court. The latter raises a very wide question & as we felt that there is absolutely no substance in the appeal we have thought it unnecessary to express any opinion about it here. As for the former objection, we have no hesitation to state that the person who gave notice of the opposition is a necessary party & an appeal without him on the record is not one properly constituted. However, in view of S. 72(2), we are not, as at present advised, prepared to say that the Registrar is not a proper party. With these few words regarding the preliminary objections raised before us, for reasons, stated earlier, we dismiss the appeal with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 50/-

    9. Appeal dismissed.

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    Pavunny Ouseph v. The Registrar Of Trade Marks .
    (Sep 11, 1950)