Sapru, J.:— This is an application for a writ of mandamus or such other writ direction or order as this Court might deem necessary and it has been presented to this Court by Shri Ram Niwas who was until lately the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Kashipur in the district of Naini Tal and who has, by an order of Government dated February 24, 1951, been removed from that office by Government. Shri Ram Niwas was elected Chairman of the Municipal Board in 1946. Apparently there was some dissatisfaction with his work and on a requisition being sent to the District Magistrate for discussing a no-confidence motion, the District Magistrate of Naini Tal directed the convening of a meeting of the Board under the Chairmanship of the District Judge. That meeting was held on November 16, 1950. It was presided over by the District Judge and a vote of no-confidence was passed against the applicant. In accordance with the terms of Section 8 of the Municipalities Act, a copy of that resolution was sent by the District Judge to the District Magistrate who forwarded it in due course to the Provincial Government. No copy of the proceedings of the meeting were, however, supplied to the applicant. Nevertheless, the Provincial Government passed an order removing the applicant from his office of Chairman on February 24, 1951. The grievance of the applicant is that the procedure laid down by Section 87-A(2) and (11) of the Municipalities Act was not strictly followed in his case. According to him the procedure that was followed was in accordance with another Act, viz., the U.P Municipalities Transitory Provision Order of 1949. It is urged that Order was not a valid Order as Section 336-A had been declared to be ultra vires the legislature by a Bench of this Court. Undoubtedly if the Executive Government knew that the section had been declared ultra vires, its action would be highly improper for the power of interpreting laws belongs exclusively to this Court. In exercising this power, it can be corrected either by the Supreme Court or by a larger bench of this Court. It is not for the Executive Government to determine whether the view which this Court has taken in regard to the interpretation of any particular law or Act is or is not correct. To say this is not to suggest that the Executive Government has not the power or the right of moving the legislature for a change in the law, should it think that the policy that it is pursuing requires it, in view of any interpretation given to it by this Court. What we mean to say is that during the interregnum, i.e, during the period that the law is changed or interpreted differently by the Supreme Court or, if the matter has been referred to a larger bench, by a larger bench of this Court, and a decision of this Court interpreting that law is given in a certain manner, the duty of the Executive Government is to Act in accordance with the interpretation of the law as given by this Court. There is no evidence, however, in this case whatever that the action of the Executive Government in acting contrary to a decision of this Court was deliberate. There is nothing to show on the record that the attention of the Executive Government was ever drawn to the ruling of this Court on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the applicant. We cannot assume that the Executive Government of Uttar Pradesh deliberately or knowingly flouted the authority of this Court so far as the interpretative power is concerned.
2. The judgment of this Court declaring Section 336-A of the Municipalities Act invalid proceeded upon the basis that section authorised what is generally known as delegated legislation.
3. The question of delegated legislation has been considered very carefully in a recent Full Bench case of this Court in Suryapal Singh v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh 1951 A.L.J 365.. We may be permitted to quote from the judgment of that Full Bench.
These considerations lead us to the further conclusion that if the power of delegation possessed by a legislature is of a more limited character than we have stated earlier, there are nevertheless certain classes of legislation which a legislature must have power to entrust to another authority. Such classes will include—
(1) Conditional legislation, that is to say, legislation complete in itself but the taking effect of which or of some provision of which is made dependent upon the determination of certain conditions or circumstances by some other authority;
(2) The power to modify or adapt, within restricted limits, the application of a law in order that it may be brought or kept in conformity with the intention of the legislature. Within this class falls the power to vary a statutory classification such as a list of dangerous drugs or the minimum safety standards for aircraft. Such legislation may be called ‘adaptation legislation.”
(3) Power may be conferred on a local or other territorial authority to make rules and regulations for local self-government or for other local purposes. This power is well established and the necessity for it is obvious.
(4) A power to enact supplementary legislation which does not fall under the other three headings but which is necessary to give effect to the broad principles laid down in the enabling Act.
4. We may point out that since this judgment was pronounced the matter of delegated legislation came up before the Supreme Court on a reference by the President of India under Article 143. We find that, broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has taken the same view of delegated legislation as the Full Bench of this Court in the passage quoted above. The position to-day is that by an order passed under the U.P Act XIV of 1951 orders which were invalid have been validated. We think that the legislature could retrospectively validate the orders.
5. Mr. Pandey has invited our attention to the fact that the Act seeks to validate orders which at the time that they were passed were invalid. His argument is that the legislature has no power to retrospectively validate orders which at the time that they were passed were invalid. To accept any such argument would be to impose a limitation on the powers of the legislature such as could never have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution to place. It is well-known that statutes, such as Acts of indemnity, validate acts which at the time that they were done were invalid. To hold that the legislature has no power to give retrospective effect to Acts passed by it, as is claimed by Mr. Pandey, would be to hold that it could never pass Acts of Indemnity. Such position could never have been contemplated by the Constituent Assembly when it was framing the Constitution.
6. For the reasons given above, we find that there is no force in this application. It is accordingly dismissed; but, in the special circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs.
7. In our opinion, the application raises no such question of the interpretation of the Constitution or the law relating to it as to merit our granting a certificate.
8. The opposite-parties are relieved of the undertaking they gave to this Court in regard to the holding of elections.
9. The injunction order is discharged.
10. Order Discharged.