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  • Sub-S.(2) of S. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947). Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 6
  • provisions of S. 4 of that Act, S. 8, Cl. (3) of Central Act XLVI of 1952
  • S. 161 I.P.C and S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • 1958, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, II of 1958,
  • (1) of S. 8 of the Central Act XLVI of 1952.
  • 1950 the West Bengal Special Courts Act
  • (2) of S. 8 of Act XLVI of 1952
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Cites
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Sub-S.(2) of S. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947). Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 6
  • provisions of S. 4 of that Act, S. 8, Cl. (3) of Central Act XLVI of 1952
  • S. 161 I.P.C and S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1947
  • 1958, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, II of 1958,
  • (1) of S. 8 of the Central Act XLVI of 1952.
  • 1950 the West Bengal Special Courts Act
  • (2) of S. 8 of Act XLVI of 1952
Smart Summary

Full Bench Opinion Summary — Application of S. 350 CrPC to Special Judges under Central Act XLVI of 1952

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused, who was the Deputy Post Master, Erode in May 1953, was prosecuted for allegedly accepting a bribe on 8th May 1935. The charges were brought under S. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and S. 5(1)(d) read with S. 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The trial began before a Special Judge (Mr. Krishnan Nambudripad), who examined several prosecution witnesses and questioned the accused under S. 342 Cr. P. C. After further cross-examination, that Special Judge was transferred and succeeded by another Special Judge (Mr. Manjapra Balakrishna Menon).

On 27th August 1956, the accused filed an application purportedly under S. 350 Cr. P. C. requesting that prosecution witnesses be resummoned and reheard. The Public Prosecutor opposed the application. The succeeding Special Judge dismissed the application, proceeded to conclude the trial, convicted the accused and sentenced him to six months' simple imprisonment.

On appeal, counsel for the accused (Mr. V. T. Rangaswami Aiyangar) contended that the Special Judge's failure to grant the accused's application under S. 350 vitiated the proceedings and rendered the conviction bad. Because of conflicting authorities (In re Vaidyanathan and Gopal Prasad v. State), the matter was referred upwards, ultimately to a Full Bench of the High Court to decide whether S. 350 Cr. P. C. forms part of the procedural law applicable to trials before Special Judges appointed under Central Act XLVI of 1952.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is S. 350 of the Criminal Procedure Code part of the procedural law applicable to the trial of an accused person by a Special Judge appointed under the provisions of Central Act XLVI of 1952?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Counsel for the accused (Mr. V. T. Rangaswami Aiyangar) argued that the Special Judge's refusal to grant the accused's application under S. 350 Cr. P. C. (to have witnesses resummoned and reheard) vitiated the proceedings and therefore the conviction was bad.

Respondent's / Prosecution's Position

  • The Public Prosecutor opposed the accused's application in the trial court to resummon and rehear the witnesses. The opinion does not provide a detailed exposition of further prosecutorial arguments before the Full Bench.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Vaidyanathan The decision held that S. 350 Cr. P. C. was applicable to Special Judges under Act XLVI of 1952 and that the prosecution had no right to claim a de novo examination; a succeeding Special Judge should, in that case, resummon witnesses (i.e., S.350 applies as the Special Judge follows the procedure prescribed for Magistrates). The Full Bench examined that decision and expressly disagreed with it, stating that "the principle of law laid down therein is not correct." The Court reversed the view that S.350 applied to Special Judges in virtue of the Act as it stood then.
Gopal Prasad v. State This decision took an opposite view to In re Vaidyanathan: it held that if a Special Judge is to be treated as a Magistrate for procedural purposes, the Special Judge had discretion to resummon witnesses and hold a de novo trial; appellate courts should not interfere with that discretion unless it was a wholly wrong exercise. The Full Bench considered this conflicting authority and noted the contrary stance; ultimately the Full Bench declined to follow Gopal Prasad on the core question and concluded that S.350 did not apply to Special Judges under Act XLVI of 1952 (as enacted before the 1958 amendment).
Gurusami Thevar v. State Principle cited: the ordinary rule in criminal trials that judgment should be delivered only by the person who has heard the whole of the evidence in the case. The Court relied on this principle as the basic rule of criminal procedure, noting that S.350 is an exception to it. The Full Bench emphasized that such an exception should not be extended to Special Judges unless the legislature had clearly and explicitly provided for it.
Tarada Baladu v. Queen Illustrated the rationale for S.350: where magistrates change frequently, the Code permits a Magistrate to pronounce judgment on partly recorded evidence; absence of such provision for Sessions Judges meant successor-concluded trials were void in that context. The Court used this precedent to explain the limited and specific reasons behind S.350 (i.e., accommodation for frequent Magistrate changes and less serious nature of magistrate-triable cases) and to argue against extending that provision to Special Judges without express legislative words.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench undertook a structured legal analysis, which proceeded as follows (based on the text of the opinion):

  1. Framing the central question: the Court precisely formulated the issue as whether S. 350 Cr. P. C. is part of the procedural law applicable to Special Judges constituted under Central Act XLVI of 1952.
  2. Examination of S. 350 Cr. P. C.: the Court recounted the historical content of S. 350 — prior to its 1955 amendment it gave an accused an absolute, unqualified right to demand resummoning and rehearing of witnesses when a succeeding Magistrate took over; the 1955 amendment curtailed that right and vested discretion in the succeeding Magistrate.
  3. Analysis of Central Act XLVI of 1952: the Court closely read the Act, particularly S. 8 and its subsections. It observed:
    • Sub-S. (1) allows Special Judges to take cognisance without committal and directs that they shall follow the Cr. P. C. procedure for trial of warrant cases by Magistrates (which might suggest some magistrate-like status for some purposes).
    • Sub-S. (2) places the Special Judge, for purposes of tendering pardons in certain cases, on a footing comparable to a Sessions Judge.
    • Sub-S. (3) provides that where the Code is not inconsistent with the Act, the Code applies and, for those purposes, the Special Judge shall be deemed a Court of Session trying cases without a jury.
    • Sub-S. (4) confers on Special Judges sentencing powers akin to a Sessions Judge.
  4. Conclusion from statutory analysis: the Court concluded that a Special Judge cannot be neatly categorized as either a Magistrate or a Sessions Judge in all respects — the Act assigns different attributes for different purposes. Thus, the mere statement that the Special Judge "shall be deemed" a Court of Session for some purposes did not settle the question whether S. 350 (a Code provision specially applicable to certain courts) applied.
  5. Consideration of fundamental criminal principle: the Court emphasized the well-established principle (citing Gurusami Thevar v. State) that normally a judgment should be delivered by the person who has heard the whole of the evidence. S. 350 is an exception tailored to magistrate-tried cases and should not be extended beyond its intended scope without clear legislative language.
  6. Legislative history and comparative statutes: the Bench examined prior and parallel legislative measures (1942 Ordinances and the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950) which in some instances expressly dispensed with a de novo trial on transfer. The Full Bench noted that where legislatures intended to dispense with a de novo trial they did so expressly; the absence of such express provision in Central Act XLVI of 1952 should be taken as indicating that the legislature did not intend to extend S. 350 to Special Judges.
  7. Evaluation of conflicting authority: the Court considered the conflicting precedents (In re Vaidyanathan and Gopal Prasad v. State). After analysis the Full Bench rejected the view in In re Vaidyanathan and held that S. 350 did not apply to Special Judges as constituted under the Act (i.e., the principle in In re Vaidyanathan was not correct, according to this Bench).
  8. Consequential application to the present case: because the trial judge (the successor Special Judge) had convicted on evidence partly recorded by his predecessor (and had only further-cross-examined P.W.8), the Full Bench held that under the law as it stood prior to the 1958 amendment the conviction based on partially recorded evidence by two Special Judges was void.
  9. Post-decision legislative change noted: the Full Bench observed that, subsequent to its hearing but prior to the delivery of the Full Bench judgment, the Criminal Law Amendment Act (II of 1958) came into force (27 February 1958) and amended S. 8(3) of Central Act XLVI of 1952 to provide specifically that S. 350 Cr. P. C., "so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge" and for that purpose a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate. The Court recorded this legislative development in the opinion.
  10. Discretion on retrial: having found the conviction void, the Full Bench considered whether to remit the case for further trial under the amended law (i.e., to permit the present judge to exercise the now-statutory discretion under S.350 as amended). The Court concluded, after consideration, that the ends of justice did not require a retrial in the circumstances and therefore set aside the conviction and sentence but ordered no retrial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench held that S. 350, Criminal Procedure Code, does not apply to Special Judges constituted under Central Act XLVI of 1952 (as the Act stood before the 1958 amendment). Consequently, a conviction based on evidence partly recorded by one Special Judge and partly recorded by his successor was void.

Direct consequences in the present case (as stated in the opinion):

  • The conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court were set aside.
  • The Court exercised its discretion not to order a retrial and therefore directed that no further trial be held in the case.

Legislative development noted by the Court:

On 27 February 1958 the Criminal Law Amendment Act (II of 1958) amended S. 8(3) of Central Act XLVI of 1952 to state expressly that S. 350 Cr. P. C. shall, so far as may be, apply to proceedings before a Special Judge and that a Special Judge shall, for those purposes, be deemed to be a Magistrate. The Full Bench's declaration of the law that S. 350 did not apply was made before that amendment came into force; the Court nevertheless set aside the conviction under the law as it then stood and ordered no retrial.

Broader implications: The opinion stresses that S. 350 is an exception to a fundamental criminal-law principle (that judgment should be delivered by the person who has heard the whole evidence) and that such exceptions should not be extended beyond their clear statutory scope without explicit legislative language. Beyond the direct effect on the parties in this specific case (setting aside the conviction and declining retrial), the Full Bench's ruling corrected the earlier judicial view in In re Vaidyanathan and clarified the law as it stood prior to the 1958 amendment. The opinion does not purport to create effects beyond those expressly discussed.

V.C.S

This summary has been prepared strictly from the content of the provided Full Bench opinion and does not add or infer facts or legal holdings that are not explicitly contained in that opinion.

    T.A. Fernandez, In Re

    (Delivered by Balakrishna Ayyar, J.)

    In May 1953 the accused was the Deputy Post Master, Erode. On the charge that he had on 8th May 1935 accepted a bribe of Rs. 25 from P. W. 1, the accused was prosecuted under S. 161, I. P. C. and S. 5 (1) (d) read with S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

    The case was first heard by Mr. Krishnan Nambudripad, the then Special Judge of Coimbatore. He examined P. Ws, 1 to 8 and questioned the accused under S. 342 Crl. P. C. Thereafter P. Ws. 1 to 4 and 6 and 7 were further cross-examined. At this stage Mr. Krishnan Nambudripad was transferred and he was succeeded by Mr. Manjapra Balakrishna Menon. When he took up the case—that was on 27th August 1956—the accused filed an application purporting to be under S. 350, Crl.P.C praying that the prosecution witnesses be resummoned and reheard. The application was opposed by the Public Prosecutor. The Special Judge dismissed the application. Thereafter he concluded the trial and convicted the accused and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for six months.

    During the arguments in the appeal which the accused preferred Mr. V. T. Rangaswami Aiyangar his learned Advocate, raised the point that the failure of the Special Judge to grant the application of the accused vitiated the entire proceedings and that for that reason the conviction was bad.

    In view of the conflict of decisions on this point between In re Vaidyanathan(1), and Gopal Prasad v. State(2), the learned Judge who was hearing the appeal referred the matter to a Bench which in its turn referred it to a Full Bench.

    The question we have to decide may be thus formulated:

    Is S. 350, Crl.P.C part of the procedural law applicable to the trial of an accused person by a Special Judge appointed under the provisions of (Central) Act 46 of 1952?

    It may be explained at once that before it was amended in 1955, S. 350, Crl.P.C conferred on an accused person, who was being tried by a Magistrate, the right to demand that the witnesses be resummoned and reheard.

    “Whenever any Magistrate, after having heard and recorded the whole or any part of the evidence in an inquiry or a trial, ceases to exercise jurisdiction therein, and is succeeded by another Magistrate.”

    This right of his was absolute and unqualified. The amendment made in 1955 considerably cut down that right. The accused lost his right to insist, as a matter of course, that any witness should be resummoned and reheard. It was left to the discretion of the Magistrate to decide whether it was necessary in the interests of justice to resummon and rehear any witness.

    The Special Judges who tried this case functioned under (Central) Act XLVI of 1952. It is as well to analyse the main features of that Act. The preamble recites that it was enacted to provide for the more speedy trial of certain offences. These offences include those punishable under Ss. 161, 165 and 165-A of the Penal Code, and, under Sub-S.(2) of S. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947). Sub-Sec. (1) of S. 6 empowers the State Government to appoint as many Special Judges as may be necessary. Sub-Sec (2) provides that no person shall be appointed as a Special Judge unless he is, or has been, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge. S. 7 specifies what classes of cases these Special Judges may try. Then follows S. 8 to which we shall presently return. S. 9 provides among other things that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from the decision of a Special Judge as if hewere a Court of Session trying cases without a jury. S. 10 provides that all cases triable by Special Judges under S. 7 which, immediately before the commencement of the Act, were pending before any Magistrate shall be forwarded for trial to the Special Judge having jurisdiction over such cases.

    S. 8 contains four Sub-sections. The first sub-section makes provision in respect of two matters. It provides that a Special Judge may take cognisance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial. It also provides that in trying accused persons the Special Judge shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code. 1898, for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. If this Sub-section had stood alone one would have been tempted to say that the Special Judge is placed in the same position as a Magistrate.

    Sub-S. (2) confers on the Special Judge the power to tender a pardon in certain cases, and provides that for the purposes of Ss. 339 and 339-A Criminal Procedure Code, a pardon so tendered shall be deemed to have been tendered under S. 338 of that Code. S. 338 Criminal Procedure Code runs:

    “At any time after commitment, but before judgment is passed, the Court to which the commitment is made, may…… tender, or order, the Committing Magistrate or the District Magistrate, to tender a pardon on the same condition to such person.”

    It is obvious, therefore, that S. 338 does not in terms apply to Magistrates Sub-S. (2) of S. 8 of Act XLVI of 1952 thus places a Special Judge in this particular respect on the same footing as a Sessions Judge.

    Sub-sec (3) of S. 8 begins:

    “save as provided in Sub-Sec. (1) or Sub-Sec. (2)” and then, it goes on to say that to the extent to which the Code of Criminal Procedure is not inconsistent with the Act the provisions of the Code shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge. The Sub-section continues:

    “for the purposes of the said provisions the Court of the Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors.”

    and it ends:

    “the person conducting prosecution before a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.”

    It will be noticed that the provisions of Sub-Secs. (1) and (2) of S. 8 place a Special Judge in the same position as a Magistrate for certain purposes and in the same position as a Session Judge, for certain other purposes. Sub-sec. (3) expressly states that a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Sessions Jndge. Sub-S. (4) in effect confers on a Special Judge the same powers of punishing a convicted person as a Sessions Judge has.

    Now, if we can say that a Special Judge is a Magistrate, we shall be justified in concluding that S. 350 Criminal Procedure Code applies to proceedings before him. But, on the other hand if we conclude that a Special Judge is not a Magistrate, then S. 350 Criminal Procedure Code, will not be applicable to proceedings before him. The analysis that has so far been made of the provisions of Act XLVI of 1952 will show that a Special Judge is neither a Magistrate nor a Sessions Judge. Judged by the classification of Courts in S. 6 Criminal Procedure Code he occupies an anomalous position; but then S. 6 itself provides for “Courts constituted under any law other than the Code” in addition to the five classes of Criminal Courts which are enumerated. For certain purposes the Special Judge has the powers of a Sessions Judge; for certain purposes he also stands in the position of a Sessions Judge in relation to the High Court; but, for certain other purposes he has to act as a Magistrate has got to do. An analysis of the Act, therefore yields only negative results. It is not therefore surprising that there has been a conflict of judicial opinion on this matter.

    In In re Vaidyanathan. a Bench of this Court observed:

    “We are definitely of opinion that when Sub-S, (3) of S. 8 of the Act says that “the Court of the Special Judge ‘shall be deemed’ to be a Court of Session”, it certainly is not in fact a Court of Session. The Court is that of a Special Judge whose procedure in the trial of such cases shall be the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of warrant oases, in which case S. 350 of the Code is definitely applicable. If that is so, there is no provision by which the Public Prosecutor can ask the Court to recall and re-examine the witnesses already examined.”

    The facts of that case were as follows: One Vaidyanatha Iyer was prosecuted under S. 161, I. P. C., before a Sub Magistrate who framed charges against him and posted the case for further hearing to 12th August 1952. Meantime Act 46 of 1952 came into force, and by virtue of S. 10 of that Act the case was transferred to the file of the Special Judge. On 18th February 1953 Mr. S. Varadarajulu Naidu, the Special Judge, took up the case for hearing and examined certain witnesses. He was then transferred and his successor Mr. Rajabadar Odayar took up the trial. The prosecution then applied for a de novo hearing. The accused opposed the application. Nonetheless Mr. Rajabadar Odayar decided to hear the case afresh. Against that order the accused came up in revision. The Court held that S. 350 of the Code applied, that the prosecution had ho right to claim a de novo examination and allowed the application.

    An exactly contrary view was taken in Gopal Prasad v. State. In that case the Special Judge had decided to try the case de novo. The accused challenged the decision by means of a revision petition. The Court examined the decision in In re Vaidyanathan, and dissented from it. Imam, C.J, observed:

    “With great respect to the learned Judges, as at present advised, I cannot accept the view expressed by them………If the Special Judge in the present case is a Court of Session, then it seems to me that the Special Judge could not in law act upon evidence already recorded by the Special Magistrate. On the other hand, if it is assumed that the view taken by their Lordships of the Madras High Court is correct then one must proceed on the assumption that the Special Judge is a Magistrate and that the provisions of S. 350, Crl. P. C., would be applicable.”

    With reference to S. 350, Crl. P. C., as it was amended, the learned Chief Justice proceeded:

    “Even so S. 350, Cl. (1) does authorise a succeeding Magistrate to resummon the witnesses and to recommence the enquiry or trial held by his predecessor. In the present case the Special Judge decided to resummon the witnesses and to hold his trial independent of any evidence recorded by the Special Magistrate. It was within his discretion, if he is to be treated as a Magistrate, to do so and unless this Court was satisfied that it was a wholly wrong exercise of his jurisdiction, this Court cannot, in my opinion, interfere with his discretion in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction.”

    Das, J., expressed a similar opinion.

    It is clear to us that a just conclusion cannot be reached unless the question is examined in its wider and more fundamental aspects. The ordinary rule in criminal matters is that the judgment may be delivered only by the person who has heard the whole of the evidence in the case. This principle is well established and has been firmly and consistently enforced. Vide Gurusami Thevar v. State. The only exception is that created by S. 350, Crl. P. C., which empowers a Magistrate to dispose of a case on evidence heard in part by himself and in part by his predecessor or predecessors. Even so, as the section stood before it was amended in 1955, it gave the accused person an unqualified right to demand a de novo enquiry or trial. That provision is evidence of the reluctance of the legislature to depart from the old familiar and cardinal principle of law to which we have just referred. If, at the time the legislature placed Central Act 46 of 1952 on the Statute Book, it intended to create a breach in so ancient a rule, one would expect it to have used explicit language to that effect.

    In 1942 several Ordinances affecting criminal Court were promulgated. Of these Ordinance No. II of 1942 constituted various special criminal Courts. The main provision of S. 6 (1) of that Ordinance is practically identical with Sub-S. (1) of S. 8 of the Central Act XLVI of 1952. Subsequently another Ordinance No. LXI of 1942, was promulgated, Sub-Cl. (3) of Cl. 3 of which runs as follows:

    “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, when a case is transferred under Sub-S. (1) or Sub-S. (2), the Special Judge or Special Magistrate to whom the case is transferred shall not be bound to resummon or rehear the witnesses or any of them unless he is satisfied that such a course is necessary in the interests of justice.”

    In other words, it was specifically provided that a de novo enquiry was not necessary.

    In 1950 the West Bengal Special Courts Act was passed. That Act, like Central Act XLVI of 1952, eliminated the committal procedure and substituted the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. It contained a special provision dispensing with de novo trial on the transfer of a case from one special Court to another.

    When, with these precedents before it the Legislature omitted to pay in Central Act XLVI of 1952 that it would not be necessary to hold a de novo trial in those cases where there has been a change in the personnel of the Special Judge trying a case, one should be justified in concluding that it did not want to take away the right of the accused to insist that the judgment shall be rendered only by the person who has heard the whole of the evidence in that case. Except where the legislature has used manifestly plain words, or where from the context such appears to be the necessary intention of the Legislature, we do not feel we shall be justified in creating an exception to a principle so salutary and ancient.

    Let us consider the matter from another point, what is the reason for the exception created by S. 350, Crl. P.C 7 It is hardly necessary to say that cases tried by Magistrates are usually less serious in nature than those tried by Courts of Session. It is a reasonable inference that S. 350 was not intended to be applied to very grave offences. Now, by passing the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Act XLVI of 1952 the Legislature thought fit to make it plain that it considered offences under S. 161 I.P.C and S. 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act to be very grave ones. The manifestation of such an intention would make one hesitate to make S. 350 applicable to such cases. The basic reason for S. 350, Crl.P.C appears in the decision in Tarada Baladu v. Queen. What happened there was this:

    “The trial of this case was commeneed before Mr. Happell, Officiating Agent, and with one exception all the witnesses were examined. The case was adjourned and endeavours were made to obtain the presence of persons named by the accused as witnesses. During the adjournment Mr. Garstin resumed his appointment, and having examined one fresh witness concluded the trial.”

    A Bench of this Court observed:

    “We are compelled to pronounce the proceedings void. It is only in view of the necessarily frequent changes in the office of Magistrate the Criminal Procedure Gods provides specially that a Magistrate may pronounce judgment on evidence partly recorded by his predecessor and partly by himself, but there is no such provision in the case of Sessions Judges. The conviction must be set aside and new trial directed.”

    The desire to achieve a just balance between the interests of the accused, an expeditious trial and the frequency of changes in the personnel of the Courts of Magistrates, which itself was linked up with the needs of executive administration, led to the enactment of S. 350, Crl.P.C and its continuance thereafter. What we emphasise is that without such an express provision in the Code, the normal rule would have applied even in the Courts of Magistrates that the entire oral evidence should have been heard by the Judicial Officer before he could pronounce judgment in a criminal case. What has been expressly made by S. 350 applicable only to a limited class of criminal Courts out of those enumerated in S. 6 Crl. P. C., cannot be extended without the sanction of the lesislature, express or necessarily implied. There was no such extension to the Courts of the Special Judges constituted under Act XLVI of 1952. Legislative practice also is against any such extension; it cannot be done by a process of interpretation.

    With all respect to the learned Judges who decided In re Vaidyanathan, we are of opinion that the principle of law laid down therein is not correct.

    We answer in the negative the question formulated by us and set out earlier.

    The papers will be returned to the Bench which referred the question.

    This appeal coming on for final hearing after the expression of the Opinion of the Full Bench, before Somasundaram and Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, JJ. the Court delivered the following

    JUDGMENT

    (Delivered by Somasundaram, J.)

    (31-3-1958)

    The Full Bench has delivered judgment holding that S. 350 Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to a Special Judge under the provisions-of Central Act XLVI of 1952. The Full Bench heard the appeal on the 19th of February 1958 and delivered the judgment on the 4th of March 1958. On the 27th of February 1958, the Criminal Law Amendment Act, II of 1958, came into force, whereby under the provisions of S. 4 of that Act, S. 8, Cl. (3) of Central Act XLVI of 1952 was amended as follows:

    “(3-A): In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Sub-S. (3), the provisions of S. 350, Crl. P. C., 1898, shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge and for the purposes of the said provisions a Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate,”

    Before this Act came into force, the Full Bench has declared the law that S. 350, Crl. P. C., does not apply to the Special Judge. The conviction, therefore, based on evidence partly recorded by one Special Judge and partly recorded by the successor is void. It has, therefore, to be set aside.

    In the proceedings before the trial Court, the Judge who convicted the accused, further cross examined only P. W. 8 All the other evidence recorded was before his predecessor. Under the judgment of the Full Bench this further cross-examination and the judgment of the succeeding Judge will be void. The question is whether in the present circumstances of the case we should send back the case for a further trial by asking the present Judge to deal with it according to law, that is, by asking him to exercise his discretion under S. 350 as now amended and made applicable to Special Courts. Having given our careful and anxious consideration, we think that the ends of justice do not require that in the present case that procedure should be allowed to be followed. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence but order no retrial in the case.

    V.C.S

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    Comments

    T.A. Fernandez, In Re
    (Mar 4, 1958)