1. The simple point that arises for consideration in this Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is whether Order 41, rule 6(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply even after sale in execution is held and even after a petition for stay of execution on appeal has been rejected.
2. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: The appellant before me brought a suit for maintenance in O.S No. 81 of 1951 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Gudivada, against the respondent herein. This suit was decreed. Against the judgment and decree in the said suit, the respondent preferred an appeal to this High Court which is now pending. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent filed a petition C.M.P No. 8230 of 1953 for stay of execution of the decree of the lower Court which application was rejected on the merits by an order of this Court dated 19th October, 1953. As stay of execution of the maintenance decree in favour of the appellant had been rejected, the appellant brought the properties of the respondent to sale in execution of the decree in her favour. The sale was held and just when it was about to be confirmed, the present application out of which the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal arises, I.A’. No. 362 of 1954, was put in under Order 41, rule 6(2), Civil Procedure Code, praying for stay of the sale proceedings in execution of the decree. The learned Subordinate Judge allowed the application and directed the applicant (respondent herein) to furnish security for a sum of Rs. 2,250 an amount which is supposed to represent according to the Subordinate Judge, the profits on the property sold, apparently for the purpose of safeguarding the interests of the auction-purchaser.
3. The order of the learned Subordinate Judge directing stay of execution of the decree in favour of the appellant herein pending the appeal before this Court, when on merits this Court had refused to grant the stay, is clearly without jurisdiction and illegal. When an appeal is preferred, it is the appellate Court that becomes seised of the entire matter and it is the appellate Court that is competent to deal with all matters pertaining to the appeal including any incidental, interlocutory or ancillary matters such as stay of execution, pending disposal of the appeal, etc. Order 41, rule 5(1), Civil Procedure Code, makes the position very clear. Order 41, rule 5(2) gives power to the Court which passed the decree to pass tentative orders before the expiration of the time allowed for appealing therefrom, and in the nature of things, the jurisdiction conferred under clause (2) of rule 5 vanishes the moment the appeal is filed. Similarly, power is given to the Court of the first instance to take security for the restitution of any property which may be or has been taken in execution of the decree or for the payment of the value of such property and for the due performance of the decree or order of the appellate Court. Similarly clause (2) of rule 6 is an additional provision which provides that a Court which had made an order for the sale of immoveable property in execution of a decree against which an appeal is pending should stay the sale on such terms as it deems fit pending the disposal of the appeal.
4. Powers exercisable either by a Court which had passed the decree under rule 6(1) or by a Court which had made an order for the sale of immoveable property under rule 6(2) could only be exercised provided the matter had not been considered earlier by the appellate Court; so that where an appellate Court had refused to order stay of execution of the decree against which an appeal is pending before it, pending disposal of that appeal, the Court which passed the decree as well as the Court which had made the order for the sale of immoveable property in execution of that decree must in law, be deemed to have become functus officio and could not exercise the powers contemplated by the two sub-rules of rule 6. To hold otherwise would mean that while the appellate Court considers that there was no justification for stay of execution of the decree pending the disposal of the appeal,_and that the decree-holder should have the full benefit of the decree by way of execution, notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, the Subordinate Court could by making its own order nullify the effect of the order of the appellate Court and grant a relief to the judgment-debtor which had been expressly negatived and refused by the appellate Court. It is an elementary rule of interpretation of statutes that they should not be interpreted in such a way as to result in conflict of jurisdictions and particularly a conflict between a superior Court and a Subordinate Court.
5. In the view I have taken, it is unnecessary to consider whether had the matter been open to the executing Court, that is, in a case where the appellate Court had not considered the matter and passed orders one way or the other, the Court selling immoveable property in execution of the decree under appeal, could make an order under Order 41, rule 6(2), Civil Procedure Code, even after the sale is held. But since the question has been raised before me, I feel it necessary that the matter should not be left in any doubt.
6. When a certain provision of law gives a power to a Court to pass a certain order, that power has got to be exercised within the limits and limitations laid down by the provisions which conferred the power or provided for it. In this case since a Court executing a decree, could only act within the four corners of Order 41, rule 6(2), the requirements of the rule must be satisfied before that power could be exercised. Order 41, rule 6(2), Civil Procedure Code, is as follows:—
“Where an order has been made for the sale of immoveable property in execution of a decree, and an appeal is pending from such decree, the sale shall, on the application of the judgment-debtor to the Court which made the order, be stayed on such terms as to giving security or otherwise as the Court thinks fit until the appeal is disposed of.”
7. It may be seen from this that it is only when an order has been made for the sale of immoveable property in execution of the decree against which an appeal is pending, the judgment-debtor could make an application for the stay of the holding of the sale, and it is only then that the Court could make an order staying the holding of the sale. Once that stage is allowed to pass, and the judgment-debtor did not apply to the Court under Order 41, rule 6(2), Civil Procedure Code, in time but allowed the sale to be held, the stage at which the powers under rule 6(2) could be exercised has passed and no order could be made thereunder thereafter. There is a good deal of difference between the stage before the sale is held and the stage after the sale is held; for in the latter stage, the rights of third parties would come in, and there are bound to be other complications. It is for this reason that the subrule advisedly fixed the time when the application should be made, that is, when an order has been made for the sale of immoveable property. The learned Sub-ordinate Judge is clearly wrong in thinking that the expressions “Order for sale” in Order 41, rule 6(2), Civil Procedure Code, includes the holding of the sale and the confirmation thereof.
8. The order of the lower Court is, therefore, unjustified, illegal and without jurisdiction and must be set aside. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout.
9. Appeal allowed.