Satish Chandra, J.:— The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is the outcome of an attempt on the part of some members of the North Eastern Railway Mazdoor Union to take control of its affairs. This Union is a Trade Union. Its objects extend to the States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The Union has branches in both the States. Its membership extends in both of them. Under the constitution of this Union all the employees of the North Eastern Railway except those belonging to class I and class II services are eligible to become its members. The petitioner claimed to be a member of this union. It appears that this Union was registered with the Registrar, Trade Unions, Uttar Pradesh, in 1955. Since then the Union has been intimating to the Registrar, Trade Unions, Uttar Pradesh, the changes in the names of its office-bearers as and when they occurred and has been submitting other returns as required by the Trade Unions Act, 1926, to the same authority. It appears that a conference of the Union was held at Bareilly in August, 1965, at which respondents nos. 4 to 9 were elected as office bearers. They in due course intimated this fact to the Registrar. Some other persons challenged the claim of the respondents to be duly elected. The Registrar appears to have made some investigation into the validity of the elections and then come to the conclusion that the respondents were the duly elected office bears. He accordingly entered the respondents' names in the relevant register as the office bearers of the Union by an order passed on 18th May, 1966. Sri Baswan Singh and others filed a writ petition in this Hon'ble Court No. 1941 of 1966 challenging the validity of the order passed on 21st May, 1966. That petition was dismissed on 1st March, 1967, by Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.B Asthana on the ground that it had become infructuous. Against that decision a special appeal (No. 122 of 1967) was filed and is pending decision in this Court. The present petition also challanges the validity of the same order passed on 21st May, 1966.
2. For the petitioner it has been alleged that the U.P Trade Unions Regulation, 1927, framed by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh, were inapplicable to the North Eastern Railway Mazdoor Union and the sections of the Registrar under those regulations were without the authority of law. He should, therefore, be restrained from acting those regulation. The petitioner also wants that the Union of India be directed to frame relevant regulations for the Mazdoor Union. To appreciate this submission the relevant provisions have to be seen. Sec. 2 of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926, defines “the appropriate Government” to mean in relation to Trade Unions, whose objects are not confined to one State, the Central Government, and in relation to other Trade Unions, the State Government. Under Sec. 3 the appropriate Government is to appoint a person to be the Registrar of Trade Unions. Trade Unions can get itself registered under the Trade Unions Act by making an application to the Registrar. Under Sec. 8 the Registrar is to register the Trade Union by entering in a register, to be maintained in such form as may be prescribed, the particulars relating to the Trade Union contained in the statement accompanying the application for registration. Under Sec. 28 a general statement of all receipts and expenditure of every registered Trade Union during the year ending on the 31st day of March and of its assets and liabilities has to be sent to the Registrar together with the general statement. A statement showing all changes of officers made by the Trade Union during the year is also to be sent to the Registrar. Sec. 29 provides that the appropriate Government may make regulations for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act. The regulations are also to be made for matters which have to be or may be prescribed. Acting under Sec. 29 the Central Government framed regulations and promulgated them on 16th June, 1938. The Central Government had also created the post of the Registrar of Central Trade Unions. By a notification dated 16th January, 1941 (published in the gazette of India dated January 18, 1941, Part 1, page 108 second volume). The Central Government made the following orders:—
“No. L-3006—In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 124 of the Government of India Act 1935, the Governor General in Council in pleased, with effect from the 1st April 1941, to entrusted to the Government of each Province, with its consent, the functions of the Central Government under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 (XVI of 1926) in relation to Trad Unions whose objects are not confined to and whose head office is situated in, the Province.”
3. Thereafter by a notification No. L-300(1) and (2) dated 4th July, 1941, the Central Government cancelled the Centre Trade Unions Regulation, 1938, with effect from 31st March, 1941. The post of the Registrar of Central Trade Union was also abolished. Thereafter the State Government of Uttar Pradesh by a notification No. 189(L)(4)/XVIII-42/38 dated 13th July, 1944, directed that “in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 29 of the Indian Trade Unions Act 1926 (XVI of 1926), the Governor is pleased to order that the regulations published under Government Notification No. 1659.XVIII-681, dated September 15, 1927, shall apply also to Trade Unions whose head-offices are situated within the United Provinces but whose objects are not confined to the United Provinces”. After the coming into force of the Constitution of India, the Central Government on 26th February, 1952, by a notification passed the following order:—
“In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 258 of the Constitution and in supersession of the notification of the Government of India in the late Department of Labour No. L-3006, dated the 16th January, 1941, the President hereby entrusts with effect from 1st March, 1952, to the Government of each part A State, except the Government of Orissa and the Government of each Part B State, except the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, with their consent, the functions of the Central Government under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 (XVI of 1926), in relation to trade unions whose objects are not confined to and whose head office is situated in that State”.
4. On 12th February, 1964, the State Government added a new regulation entitled regulation 17A to the U.P Trade Unions Regulations, 1927.
5. In view of these changes in the legal position, the North Eastern Railway Mazdoor Union applied for its registration under the Trade Unions Act to the Registrar, Trade Unions, Uttar Pradesh, because its head office was situate at Gorakhpur within this State. Since then the annual changes in the office bearers were apparently sent to the Registrar, Trade Unions, Uttar Pradesh, and were noted by him. Now that the disputes have arisen. The petitioner raises the contention that the Registrar, Trade Unions, Uttar Pradesh, has no jurisdiction over this Union. The appropriate Government for a trade union like the North Eastern Railway Mazdoor Union, whose objects extend to more than one State, would be the Central Government. A Registrar appointed by the Central Government alone will have jurisdiction over this Union. Such a Union would be governed by the regulation framed by the Central Government alone. For the respondents this submission was traversed on the plea that in 1941 the Central Government entrusted its functions under the Trade Unions Act to the State Government. Thereafter the State Government also became the appropriate Government and the regulations framed by it were applicable to this Union. The same position continues because after the Constitution, the Central Government again entrusted its functions to the State Government under Article 258(1) of the Constitution. The petitioner joined issue on this and submitted that either under Sec. 124(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, or Article 258(1) of the Constitution, only the executive functions of the Central Government could be entrusted to State Government. The power to frame regulations conferred by Sec. 29 of the Trade Unions Act was legislative in its true nature and character. Such a power was not an executive function of the Central Government. It could not be entrusted to the State Governments. It is true, so the submission continues, that after the entrustment, the State Government become the appropriate Government for a Union like the North Eastern Railway Mazdoor Union, it could appoint a Registrar to exercise the powers and functions conferred upon him by the act in relation to this Union; but, both under Sec. 8 as well as Sec. 28 of the Trade Unions Act, the Registrar can exercise his powers only in the manner “prescribed” in respect of many of its essential features. These matters can be prescribed only by regulations, in view of the definition of the word “prescribed” given by Sec. 2 clause (c) of the Act According to clause (c), “prescribed” means prescribed by regulations made under this Act. The State Government did not possess the power to frame regulations in relation to such a Union. Hence the Registrar, Uttar Pradesh, could not effectively act either under Sec. 8 or under Sec. 38 in relation to such a Union. The impugned action of the Registrar dated 18th May, 1966, was consequently without any authority at law.
6. The vital question which arises for consideration is the nature of the powers which can be entrusted by the president on a State Government under Sec. 124(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Article 258(1) of the Constitution. A Division Bench of this Court in Amir Khan v. State A.I.R 1950 Alld. 423. with reference to Sec. 124(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, held that it was open to the Governor-General to entrust even legislative functions to the Provincial Government. The provisions of Article 258(1) of the Constitution are in the same terms as Sec. 124(1) of the Government of India Act. Both the provisions are in pari materia. The Division Bench decision would equally apply to Article 258(1) of the Constitution. According to it the President could validly entrust to the State Governments the legislative functions of the Union.
7. The question whether Article 258(1) of the Constitution contemplated the entrustment of legislative functions as well was raised before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jayanti Lal Ararat Lal v. F.N Rana A.I.R 1964 S.C 648.. The majority (Gajendragadkar, Shah and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.) held that for the purpose of that case it was not necessary to decide whether under Article 258(1) only executive functions could be entrusted, because by the notification involved in that case, the power exercisable by the appropriate Government under Sec. 55 of the Land Acquisition Act to frame rules under the Act, had not been entrusted. They held that whether such a function can be entrusted does not call for an examination in this case. The minority (Subbarao and Wanchoo, JJ.) however went into this aspect of the question. They after an elaborate discussion of the provisions and all consequences that are likely to follow if it were held that the functions other than executive could also be entrusted, held that only executive functions and none other could be entrusted to the State Governments under Article 258(1). They specifically held that the decision of this Court in Amir Khan's case with respect to Sec. 124(1) of the Government of India Act, which is pari materia with Article 258(1) of the Constitution, must be incorrect.
8. In paragraph 34 the minority opinion observed that if this entrustment were to be extended to functions other than executive, some startling results would follow. If legislative functions could be entrusted, it would mean that the power given to the President to promulgate ordinance in certain circumstances could also be entrusted. Similarly, powers conferred on the President by Articles 98(3), 101(2), 118(3) and 309 to make rules, under Article 320 to make regulations, by Article 357 to exercise legislative powers when a proclamation has been made under Article 356, by Articles 372 and 372A to provide for adaptations, can all be entrusted. Such a startling result could not have possibly been intended by the Constitution makers. They, therefore, held that when Article 258(1) of the Constitution speaks of entrustment of functions in relation to the powers of the President, it extends only to executive functions. It not only delimits the field within which the entrustment can be made but it also delimits the nature of the functions to be entrusted, namely those functions must be executive.
9. The minority viewpoint, that startling consequences will follow, was rejected by the majority opinion. The majority held that Article 258(1) deals with functions which are vested in the Union and which are exercisable by the President on behalf of the Union: it does not authorise the President to entrust to any other person or body the powers and functions with which he is by the express provisions of the Constitution as President Invested. They observed:— (Para. 12).
“The power to promulgate Ordinances under Article 123, to suspend the provisions of Articles 268 to 279 during an emergency; to declare failure of the Constitutional machinery in States under Article 356; to declare an financial emergency under Article 360; to make rules regulating the requirement and conditions of service of persons appointed to posts and services in connection with the affairs of the Union under Article 309—to enumerate a few out of the various powers—are not powers of the Union Government; these are powers vested in the President by the Constitution and are incapable of being delegated or entrusted to any other body or authority under Article 258(1)”.
10. Then, Shah, J. speaking for the majority, went on to observe:—
“The plea that the very nature of these powers is such that they could not be intended to be entrusted under Article 258(1) to the State or officer of the State, and therefore that clause must have a limited content, proceeds upon an obvious fallacy. Those powers cannot be delegated under Article 258(1) because they are not the powers of the Union, and not because of their special character”.
11. Shah, J. then mentioned a large number of other powers vested in the President which were purely executive in nature and held that they do not fall within Article 258(I), and could not be entrusted.
12. The majority thus rejected one line of reasoning which had so deeply influenced the minority Judges. Could, under these circumstances, the minority opinion be held to be a declaration of law by the Supreme Court, under Article 141 of the Constitution?
13. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ranchhoddas Atama Ram v. Union of India A.I.R 1961 S.C 935. sheds some light on this problem. In that case it was held that the observations made by the Supreme Court in three earlier decisions, that the maximum penalty that a Custom Officer could impose was Rs. 1,000/-, was not a declaration of law, because:
“the question was never required to be decided in any of those cases and could not, therefore, be found or treated as decided by this Court.”
14. These observations provide a permissible method of determining whether the Supreme Court has declared the law on a given point. The test seems to be that normally the Supreme Court will not be treated as having declared the law on a subject, if it was not required to be decided. In Jayantilal's case the majority expressly ruled that it was not necessary to examine the question whether legislative functions could be entrusted, because it did not arise for decision. That being the majority opinion the position in law would be that the Supreme Court did not declare the law on that point.
15. The minority opinion not being the law declared by the Supreme Court, will not nullify Division Bench decision of this Court. Sitting singly, the Division Bench decision is binding on me.
16. Assuming, however, that the minority opinion of the Supreme Court is binding, the position will be that only the executive functions of the Central Government under the Trade Unions Act were entrusted to the State Government. The State Government could hence exercise the powers of appointing a Registrar for a Union whose objects extend to more than one State. The Registrar so appointed could validly exercise the various functions conferred on him by the Act. The regulation making power conferred by Sec. 29 of the Act can, however, not be exercised by the State Government in relation to such a trade union, and for such a union, the Registrar could not act under, or enforce, the regulations framed by the State Government. There are no regulations made by the Central Government. The position would be that there are no regulations on matters left by the Act to be prescribed by regulations.
17. Under Sec. 8 the Registrar has to Register the Trade Union by entering the particulars in a register to be maintained in such form as may be prescribed. The form can be prescribed by regulations. If there are no regulations, the position will be that the form has not been prescribed. It will hence be impossible for the Registrar to comply with this part of Sec. 8.
18. Sec. 8 confers jurisdiction on the Registrar to registrar a Trade Union. The form in which the register is to be maintained relates to the procedure for registering the Trade Union. The jurisdiction to register is not dependent upon the prescription of the form of the register. The requirement of maintaining the register in the prescribed form is merely directory. Even if it was mandatory, it is clear that it is not a condition precedent for the exercise of the jurisdiction by the Registrar. If it is impossible to comply with this part of the procedure, its compliance can in law be dispensed with, see Pramesh Chandra Gupta v. The Registrar, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad 1955 A.L.J 105 F.B.. The Registrar can in that situation maintain the register in any suitable form, including, at his choice, the form prescribed by the regulations framed by the State Government. Action under Sec. 8 will not, merely on that account, be invalid.
19. Under Sec. 28(2) a statement of change of officers made by the Trade Union during the year together with a copy of the rules of the Trade Union corrected upto date, have to be sent to the Registrar. This statement is required by sub-sec. (2), to accompany the general statement mentioned in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 28. The general statement is to be prepared in such form and with such particulars as may be prescribed. Even if the statement mentioned in sub-sec. (1) cannot be prepared because the necessary forms and particulars have not been prescribed, compliance with sub-sec. (2) can still be made. In a situation where the general statement cannot possibly be prepared or made, that requirement of sub-sec. (2), having become impossible of performance, will be liable to be dispensed with. The Trade Union will nonetheless be liable to prepare the statement mentioned in sub-sec. (2) and the Registrar would be within his powers in receiving it and acting according to it. Mere mention of the relevant regulation in the statement or order will not make it invalid. The impugned order of the Registrar in entertaining and acting in accordance with such a statement, was not either without the authority of law or outside his jurisdiction.
20. The petition hence fails and is dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.
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