K.B Asthana, J.:— This is a plaintiff's appeal from the concurrent decree of dismissal of a suit brought for declaration that he continued to be in service as Lekhpal with all the emoluments attached to the said office. The defendant in the suit was the State of Uttar Pradesh who was impleaded through the Collector of Azamgarh. It appears that on some report having been sent to the authorities complaining against the conduct of the plaintiff, who was serving as Lekhpal in Halka Suhan Tappa Attarra, Tahsil Phoolpur, of district Azamgarh in the years 1959–60, an investigation was made by the Sub-Divisional Officer concerned. As a result of the said investigation the plaintiff was served with a notice by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Phoolpur on April 14, 1960 containing the following charge:

“That you executed a lease of five acres in the name of your wife, Smt. Parvati Devi, five acres in the name of your father, Sri Jogendranath and two acres in the name of your nephew Sri Ranjit contrary to the provisions of Z.A and L.R Rules and Act of Gram Samaj Manual, thereby you played fraud, contravened Government Servants' Conduct Rules and conducted gross misconduct in performance of your duties.”

2. The plaintiff was required to submit an explanation by April 30, 1960. The plaintiff obtained extension of time and submitted an explanation some-time in May 1960. He denied the charge and sought for a hearing. The Sub-Divisional Officer fixed various dates for hearing and the plaintiff examined himself and another witness. A provisional order dated July 7, 1960 was then made by the Sub-Divisional Officer holding that the plaintiff was guilty of the breach of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules and asked him to explain why he should not be dismissed from service. The plaintiff submitted an explanation and a final order was then passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on July 29, 1960 ordering the removal of the plaintiff from service as Lekhpal.

3. The plaintiff filed an appeal to the Collector which was dismissed and a revision against the appellate order to the Commissioner also proved futile. The plaintiff then commenced the action in the Civil Court by filing the suit which has given rise to this appeal. The plaintiff's case was that he was a permanent Lekhpal and due to his inability to oblige certain influential persons by doing illegal acts he incurred their displeasure and on false complaints proceedings were drawn up against him. His case further was that a vague charge was served upon him which did not disclose any breach of rules of conduct and that he was not afforded fair opportunity by the Sub-Divisional Officer to defend himself. He also pleaded that the Sub-Divisional Officer ultimately found him guilty on a charge which he was never asked to meet or defend. In the plaint various grounds were disclosed questioning the validity of the proceedings leading to the vitiation of the order of dismissal. The plea raised was that the order of dismissal being null and void the plaintiff was entitled to be treated as continuing in service as Lekhpal. On behalf of the State some technical pleas namely that the suit was barred by Section 80 C.P Code, and by Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and that it was not maintainable on account of Section 233 of the Land Revenue Act were raised. On merits it was pleaded that the Sub-Divisional Officer gave full opportunity to the plaintiff to defend himself; that the charge was definite and precise and no prejudice was caused to the plaintiff; that the action taken against the plaintiff was bona fide and was not malafide as alleged and that the Sub-Divisional Officer correctly gave the finding on the evidence before him that the petitioner was guilty of the breach of Government Servants' Conduct Rules and of other provisions of the law and the rules applicable to him regulating his conduct as a Government servant.

4. On the pleas of the parties the learned Second Additional Munsif who tried the suit framed the appropriate issues. The main issue with which I am concerned in this appeal was issue No. 1 which was to the effect. Whether the plaintiff was wrongfully removed from the service without necessary compliance of the rules and provisions of law as applicable to him? On the other issues arising out of the technical pleas raised in the written statement no controversy remains between the parties as these issues were decided against the defendant by the courts below. The trial court rejected the plea of the plaintiff based on malafides. The learned Munsif on a consideration of the entire material on record on issue No. 1, which was the main issue recorded a finding to the effect that the plaintiff was not wrongfully removed from service. The suit of the plaintiff was dismissed. On appeal the finding recorded by the learned Munsif was affirmed by the learned Additional Civil Judge of Azamgarh who dismissed the appeal.

5. Sri K.C Saksena, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff appellant, urged that the finding recorded by the courts below were legally erroneous inasmuch as they failed to appreciate that the findings recorded by the disciplinary authorities against the plaintiff were based upon a misreading and misconstruction of rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956 and the findings being arrived at without understanding the real nature of the offence under that rule, the punishment awarded was beyond their power or at any rate was not legally justified and the Civil Court had jurisdiction to interfere. This is how I have understood the main argument advanced by Sri Saksena in support of the appeal. Some anciliary arguments were also made, as for instance, that Rule 24 of the Government Servants Conduct Rules was not applicable as also rule 14 of Chapter 21 of the Land Revenue Manual which also seems to have influenced the mind of the punishing authority. Sri Yuddhishtir, holding the brief—of the Standing Counsel, contended that the power and jurisdiction of the Civil Court in a matter of this nature is very limited and it can set aside the order of punishment only on the ground that the proceedings were not taken strictly in accordance with the rules of procedure or that the principles of natural justice were violated. He submitted that the civil court cannot substitute its own judgment on the facts and the law applicable to the disciplinary enquiry and howsoever erroneous and harsh it may appear to be the order of punishment cannot be interfered with.

6. The problem which arises in this case on the arguments raised at the bar is by no means simple of solution. I have with some care perused the record and have also heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length. I am conscious that the power and jurisdiction of the civil courts in the matter with which I am concerned in the instant case is limited to such errors which either affect the power and jurisdiction of the punishing authority or vitiate the procedure followed by that authority under the rules or the whole proceedings appeared to be so arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice that the result arrived at cannot be allowed to stand. The question that arises in this case, I confess, does not squarely fall in any of the propositions adumbrated above. What is involved in the argument of the learned counsel of the plaintiff appellant is that being under a misconception as to the true scope of rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules 1956 and having made a wrong approach to it, the Sub-Divisional Officer erroneously arrived at the conclusion that the facts as found by him showed that the said rule was contravened and the plaintiff conducted in a manner which amounted to a breach of that rule. There is no doubt in my mind that on such an argument having been found to be sustainable or tenable this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution would be amply justified in quashing the proceedings and the order of punishment, by issuing a writ in the nature of certiorari. The problem then reduces itself to this that if circumstances are made out for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and an order of Administrative Authority or Tribunal punishing a Government servant can be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution by an appropriate writ or direction, then can the subordinate civil court in a suit brought properly before it grant a declaration on finding that the order of punishment was vitiated due to a patent error of law? In my judgment it has the power and jurisdiction to do so. In all disputes in which civil rights of a citizen are involved the civil Court will have jurisdiction if a suit is brought for the enforcement of these rights as such a suit would relate to a matter of civil nature unless it is shown that the cognizance of such a suit is either expressly or impliedly barred. This is what Section 9 of the C.P Code lays down. It is now well settled that where an administrative authority or tribunal, on a misconstruction or mis-interpretation of the law or the rules applicable, takes action and passes orders affecting the rights of a citizen, such an action or order would be deemed to fall outside the rules or the law applicable to the subject matter and would not be regarded as an action or order under those rules or law. The only remedy open then to a citizen is to approach a civil court for the appropriate relief. There is no doubt that under our Constitution it is open to a citizen to directly approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and seek an appropriate writ. May be, in this case the plaintiff was advised that as questions of fact were involved he better seek a remedy by way of suit. Merely because the plaintiff filed a suit, I do not think that his matter can be dealt differently than otherwise how it would have been dealt had he come directly to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. Since I do not find that the suit filed by the plaintiff was expressly or impliedly barred, the only question then that remains to be considered is whether the finding recorded by the punishing authority and the order of removal based thereon are patently erroneous. The plaintiff will be entitled to succeed in this appeal if it were shown that the finding of the courts below on issue No. 1 which was the main issue in the suit is legally erroneous.

7. It appears that the punishing authority as well as the courts below proceeded on the basis as if the charge against the plaintiff was that he got executed leases from the Land Management Committee in favour of his father, wife and nephew in the village in which he was serving as Lekhpal without obtaining previous permission of the appropriate authorities. It would be seen that the charge actually framed was:— “That you executed a lease of five acres in the name of your wife………. and so on.” However, in the preliminary order the Sub-Divisional Officer modified the language and substituted the word “obtained” for the word “executed”. The charge, therefore, was that “you obtained a lease of five acres………………..”. Some argument was made by Sri Saksena on behalf of the plaintiff appellant that since the charge originally served on the plaintiff was not only vague but misleading he was prejudiced and the modification made by the Sub-Divisional Officer in the preliminary order will not have the effect of removing that defect. I do not think this argument on behalf of the appellant has much substance, the simple res-son being that the plaintiff appellant in the disciplinary proceedings itself when he went up on appeal and then in revision made no grievance on that score. He understood what was alleged against him.

8. Here I may deal with another argument made on behalf of the appellant to show that the proceedings were vitiated. It was submitted that the sub-divisional Officer examined the witness against the plaintiff in the disciplinary enquiry in the absence of the plaintiff and did not afford any opportunity to him to cross-examine those witnesses. To my mind this would be a serious defect. But on the facts as established on the record it has been found that the Sub-Divisional Officer did not rely upon any such witness in holding the plaintiff guilty as none of these witnesses said anything against the plaintiff at the enquiry. This circumstance, therefore, has rightly been held by the court below not to vitiate the proceedings.

9. The main contention which remains now to be considered is whether the Sub-Divisional Officer when awarding the punishment to the appellant as also the appellate authority and the revisional authority, fell into any error in their approach in regard to the substance of the charge and the finding that the plaintiff was guilty was vitiated on account of the wrong approach made to the provisions of rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956. Before 1 proceed to examine the provisions of the said rule, I may refer to another rule on which some emphasis was laid by the Sub-Divisional Officer in his preliminary and as well as final order. That rule was rule 14 of Chapter 21 of the Land Records Manual which prohibited the Patwaris from cultivating any land within their Halqua. It ran as follows:—

“A Patwari is forbidden to cultivate any land on any tenure, either personally or through other members of his family and either within his Halqa or outside it, unless he has obtained the written permission of the Assistant Collector Incharge of the Sub-Division. Such permission shall ordinarily be given unless the Assistant Collector Incharge of the Sub-Division considers that it will interfere with the Patwari's discharge of his duties.”

10. That rule, in so far it goes, injuncts the Patwaris to cultivate any land within their Halqa. That rule, however, was deleted in 1958 when Lekhpals Service Rules came into force. The rigour of the prohibition has been considerably modified and the new restriction which is contained in rule 25 of the Lekhpal's Service Rules is couched in a language which in nature is almost permissive not prohibitive. It runs as follows.

“25. Restrictions on Lekhpals. The members of this service may cultivate land in their halqas with the written permission of the Collector of the district to which they are posted. Such permission will ordinarily be given unless the Collector considers that it will interfere with the discharge his official duties.”

11. It is unfortunate that the Sub-Divisional Officer did not seem to be aware that the old rule 14 which he referred to was no longer in force when the acts complained of were alleged to have been committed by the plaintiff as a Lekhpal. Further I do not see much relevancy in referring to old rule 14 or the new rule 25 of the Lekhpals Service Rules as the charge against the plaintiff was not of having cultivated or got having some land cultivated in his halqa. The charge against him was that he obtained leases in the name of his wife, father and nephew. Sri Saksena for the appellant quite legitimately submitted that the Sub-Divisional Officer allowed his mind to be prejudiced against the plaintiff by referring to a repealed rule of conduct and then coming to a conclusion against him. The preliminary findings and the final order of punishment does not clearly indicate as to which rule of conduct applicable to the Government servants had been violated by the plaintiff. This lack of precision on the part of the punishing authority indeed served as a handle to Sri Saksena to make an argument that the Sub-Divisional Officer based his order wholly on the alleged breach of the old rule 14 of Chapter 21 of the Land Records Manual regulating the conduct of Patwaris. I do not think it would be safe to judge the validity of the punishment awarded to the plaintiff merely on such an approach. A fair reading of the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer does indicate that he had in his mind Rule 24 of the Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956.

12. Sri Yudhishtar, the brief holder of the Standing Counsel, contended that the plaintiff was guilty of the breach of rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1958 and it was to the breach of that rule that the punishing authorities applied their minds.

13. I would now proceed to find out whether in interpreting and in construing the said rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules and applying it to the facts and circumstances established against the plaintiff, the punishing authority committed any such error of law which can be said to amount to an error apparent on the face of the record. I have already observed in the earlier part of this judgment that on the same grounds on which this Court can interfere and grant relief in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution, hi a suit a subordinate civil court can also grant the necessary relief by a decree to an aggrieved Government servant.

14. It is necessary now to refer to certain facts as established on record. Resolutions by the Land Management Committee of the village were passed sanctioning leases of plots of land respectively in favour of Smt. Parvati Devi, the wife of the plaintiff, Jogendra Nath, the father of the plaintiff, and Ranjit, nephew of the plaintiff. The plaintiff as the Lekhpal was ex-officio the Secretary of the Land Management Committee of the village. As the Secretary he got the necessary formalities completed in the execution of the leases by the President. It is not disputed before me that one of the necessary formalities was to obtain the sanction of the Sub-Divisional Officer before formally executing and attesting the leases. This will show that it was in the knowledge of the plaintiff that a lease of certain land of the Gaon Sabha was granted in the name of his wife, another lease of some other land in the name of his father, Jogendranath, and yet a third lease of yet some other land in the name of his nephew, Ranjit. Sri Saksena, learned counsel for the appellant, did not challenge this but submitted that mere knowledge on the part of the plaintiff, as the Lekhpal of the area, that the leases were granted by the Gaon Sabha in the name of his wife, father and nephew, would not bring his conduct within the mischief of rule 24 of Government Servant's Conduct Rules, 1956.

15. Sri Saksena also faintly argued that rule 24 of the Government Servant's Conduct Rules, 1956 was not applicable at all to the case of the plaintiff. He submitted that since the Governor of Uttar Pradesh had framed separate rules under Article 309 known as Lekhpals Service Rules and these rules would be deemed to be exhaustive on all the matters with regard to the Lekhpals, it is only the breach of any provisions of these rules that would amount to misconduct by a Lekhpal. I do not think there is any force in this submission. Rule 32 of the Lekhpals Service Rules itself provides that except as provid ed by the Lekhpals Service Rules, the pay, leave, allowances, pension and other conditions of service shall be regulated by rules made by the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, are rules framed under Article 309 of the Constitution and applied to all persons appointed to public service and posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Sri Saksena conceded that the plaintiff is also covered by the definition of Government servant as given in Government Servants' Conduct Rules. These rules, therefore, will also apply to the plaintiff in addition to the Lekhpals Service Rules.

16. Clause (1) of rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956 is as follows:—

“No Government servant shall, except with the previous knowledge of the appropriate authority, acquire or dispose of any immovable property, by lease, mortgage, purchase, sale, gift or otherwise, either in his own name or in the name of any member of his family.”

17. It is not disputed by Sri Saksena that the wife, father, and the nephew of the plaintiff would be the members of his family within the meaning of that rule. The real contention of Sri Saksena is that the grave-men of the charge in the said rule is the acquisition by the Government servant of any immovable property by lease either directly in his name or in the name of any member of his family. Learned counsel submitted that acquisition by a member of the family of the Government servant of any immovable property for himself or herself even with the knowledge and co-operation of the Government servant will not bring the Government servant within the mischief of the said rule. I find great force in this contention. It is the acquisition by the Government servant on which the restriction is placed. The rule does not restrict the acquisition by a member of the family of the Government servant. It is well established in India that benami transactions relating to immovable property are legally recognised. It is to cover the benami transactions that it has been enacted in the said rule that no Government servant shall acquire in the name of any member of his family any immovable property by lease, mortgage or sale. What is implied in this rule is that the interest in the immovable property which is the subject matter of a transaction by lease, mortgage or sale vests in the Government servant. Sri Saksena, I think, is on strong ground when he contended that if the title or interest remains with the member of the family of the Government servant and the transaction of transfer was not intended to convey any interest to the Government servant, then even if the transaction in the name of a member of the family of a Government servant is brought about by active co-operation of the Government servant, nothing in the said rule would affect him. Sri Saksena submitted that neither the divisional officer nor the Collector in appeal nor the Commissioner in revision in the disciplinary proceedings applied their mind to this aspect nor did they record any finding that the leases in question were actually granted to the plaintiff, ostensibly in the names of his wife, father or nephew and it was the plaintiff in whom the legal rights of a lessee vested and it was the plaintiff who was the real beneficiary. That the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Collector in appeal and the Commissioner in revision did not correctly appreciate that the scope of rule 24 is obvious from the record. The Sub-Divisional Officer in his preliminary order and as well as the final order thought that rule 24 prohibited the obtaining of leases by the members of the family of the Government servant and since the leases were obtained in the name of the wife, father and the nephew, respectively, the plaintiff, was guilty. In his order the Sub-Divisional Officer after referring to rule 24 observed as follows:—

‘From the above discussion it is clear that neither the Lekhpal nor his family can get any lease executed in their favour without having obtained prior permission from the authorities concerned.”

18. What I have quoted above clearly shows that the approach made by the Sub-Divisional Officer was that rule 24 restricted the obtaining of leases by members of the family of the Lekhpal. I have already shown above that is not what the said rule means. That there has thus crept an error apparent on the record of the disciplinary proceedings cannot be doubted. The punishment which has Deen awarded to the plaintiff is based on the finding that he had the knowledge of the obtaining of leases by his wife, father and nephew without the prior permission of the appropriate authority and since the obtaining of leases by members of his family was restricted, he was guilty or the breach of rule 24. The Sub-Divisional Officer did not at all apply his mind to the question whether it was the plaintiff who acquired any interest in the immovable property through the leases in the name of the members of his family. Sri Saksena rightly submitted that the plaintiff has been punished on a conduct which did not amount to the breach of rule 24 of Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956. In other words, his argument was that there was no evidence to support the finding that the plaintiff committed the breach of that rule. It is, clear to my mind that the punishing authority under a misconception as to the true meaning of rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, held the plaintiff guilty of the breach of its provision without applying its mind whether on established facts and circumstances his conduct was covered by the mischief of that rule. That is to say, the Sub-Divisional Officer, the Collector and the Commissioner, who dealt with the matter at the various stages, having failed to appreciate the true scope of rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956, in punishing the plaintiff acted beyond their jurisdiction under an erroneous impression that the facts as established were sufficient to bring the conduct of the plaintiff within the mischief of that rule thus they had jurisdiction to punish him.

19. Indeed the reference to the relevant rules framed under the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the Gaon Samaj Manual by the Sub-Divisional Officer while discussing the duties of the plaintiff as Lekhpal instead of incriminating him, tend to exculpate him. Paragraph 23 of the Uttar Pradesh Gaon Samaj Manual referring to rule 115 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act lays down that Lekhpals shall be the Secretary of the Land Management Committee and shall under the guidance and supervision of the Chairman be responsible for the maintenance of the accounts, forms and registers of the Committee and in all matters pertaining to the work of the Committee he shall act under the directions of the Chairman. Then para 24 based on Section 122 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act says that Lekhpal is not a member of the Land Management Committee. This would show that a Lekhpal, as a Secretary of the Land Management Committee cannot take part in the deliberations and discussions and therefore, he cannot influence the Land Management Committee in taking decisions. Para 25 lays down the duties of the Lekhpal and one of his duties is to get the leases granted by the Land Management Committee duly executed and registered or attested within the prescribed period.

20. I do not see how the plaintiff can be blamed if as the Secretary of the Land Management Committee he got the leases duly executed or attested which leases were granted by the Land Management Committee to his wife, father and nephew. Simply because the plaintiff as Lekhpal was ex officio Secretary of the Land Management Committee and he carried out his duties as enjoined by the Gaon Samaj Manual in getting the leases executed in the name of his wife, father and nephew, he would not be guilty of any breach of the provisions of rule 24 of the Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956. It is not the case and it was never the case before the Sub-Divisional Officer in the disciplinary proceedings, that under the said three leases actually the transfer of interest took place in favour of the plaintiff and the legal rights of a lessee vested in him, that is to say, the transactions were benami and the real beneficiary of those transactions was the plaintiff.

21. Even if it be assumed that the plaintiff acquired the lands through leases in the name of members of his family he would not be guilty of the breach of rule 24 of Government Servants' Conduct Rules, 1856 as the Sub-Divisional Officer, who was the appropriate authority sanctioned the transactions before formal execution of the leases which will amount to prior permission of the appropriate authority within the meaning of that rule. As a result of the discussion above, I have arrived at the conclusion that the findings recorded by the court below to the effect that the order of removal of the plaintiff from service as a Lekhpal was not vitiated and the civil court could not interfere, is legally erroneous.

22. I set aside the judgment and decree of the court below, allow the appeal and decree the plaintiff's suit in terms of the first relief claimed in the plaint with costs throughout.