R.N Misra, J.:— Petitioner no. 1 is a registered firm and petitioners 2 to 5 are its partners and they are engaged in manufacture of Bidi. Ordinarily Bidi rollers are riot permanent employees of any particular manufacturing concern and many takes it as a side employment. The Minimum Wages Act, 11 of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was brought into the Statute Book with a view to making provision for fixation of minimum rates of wages to be paid in respect of scheduled employments. Tobacco manufactory including bidi-making is a scheduled employment. Under Section 5 of the Act, procedure for fixation and revision of minimum wages has been laid down. Subsection (1) provides:—
“In fixing minimum rates of wages in respect of any scheduled employment for the first time under this Act or in revising minimum rates of wages so fixed, the appropriate Government shall either-
(a) appoint as many committees and sub-committees as it considers necessary to hold enquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation or revision as the case may be, or
(b) by notification in the Official Gazette publish its proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and specify a date, not less than two months from the date of the notification, on which the proposals will be taken into consideration.”
2. Government issued a notification revising the minimum rates of wages for the employees of Bidi Manufactory purporting to act on the recommendation of the Committee and the Advisory Board on August 7, 1973, and directing that the minimum wages so fixed would be operative from 1st August, 1973. The petitioners challenged the tenability of the said notification by filing a writ application before this Court in O.J.C no. 936 of 1973 and by judgment dated 14th of January, 1975, reported in I.L.R 1975 Cuttack 308 (Town Bidi Factory v. State of Orissa), this Court quashed the notification fixing minimum wages and directed its re-fixation in accordance with law. The State Government thereafter proceeded to take action under section 5(1)(b) of the Act for revision of the minimum rates of wages and by notification dated 14th of August, 1975, Government invited representations, objections or suggestions in connection with the proposals published in the State Gazette in the matter of fixation of minimum rates of wages. Petitioners like many others made representations. They also claimed an opportunity to be heard in support of their stand and wanted that a discussion should take place where the views could be exchanged. Petitioners allege that without any discussion and giving consideration to the representations, Government by notification dated 26th of September, 1975, revised the minimum rates of wages (vide Annexure-3). The notification indicates that the same was issued after due consultation with the State Minimum wages Advisory Board. Petitioners further allege that section 7 of the Act provides for constitution of the Advisory Board and read with section 9, it was obligatory that the particular Board should have representative of the trade itself. In the absence of such representation, the constitution of the Board was bad and therefore the Advisory Board was non-est in law. The opposite party has filed a counter affidavit through its Under Secretary in the relevant department and has sought to justify the notification in question.
3. On hearing learned counsel for parties, we are of the view that three questions mainly arise for consideration:—
(1) Whether the notification u/s 5(1)(b) of the Act was in order, or on account of any defect it is liable to be quashed?
(2) Were the petitioners entitled to a hearing before re-fixation of the minimum wages? and
(3) Are the petitioners entitled to challenge the ultimate notification fixing the minimum rates of wages on account of the Advisory Committee not having been properly constituted?
4. We shall proceed to examine the correctness of each of these questions.
Question No. 1
Whether the notification under section 5(1)(b) of the Act was in order, or on account of any defect it is liable to be quashed?
(4) As already pointed out, section 5(1)(b) of the Act requires that a notification in the State Gazette should be published together with proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and the State Govt.
5. is to specify any date, not less than two months from the date of the notification on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration. The relevant notification ran thus:
“SRO No. 568/75.—The following proposals made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 read with clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948) and in consultation with the Advisory Board, for revising the minimum rates of wages as specified in column (2) of the schedule annexed hereto, payable to the categories of employees employed in the employment of tobacco (including Bidi and Gudakhu making) manufactory, specified in the corresponding entries in column (1) of the said schedule for the whole State of Orissa are hereby published, as required by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the said Act for information of all persons likely to be affected thereby and notice is hereby given that the said proposals shall be taken into consideration on or after the expiry of two months from the date of publication of this notification in the Orissa Gazette.
Any representation, objection or suggestion which may be received from any person with respect to the said proposals before the expiry of the period specified above will be considered by the State Govt”
6. Mr. Basu for the petitioners contends that in the absence of a date mandatorily required to be notified, the notification is bad and relies upon two decisions in support of his stand. In the case of Vasudevan v. State of Kerala (1), the relevant notification ran thus:—
“……Notice is given that the proposal will be taken into consideration after two months from the date of publication of this notification and that any representation that may be received from any person with respect to the said proposal before the expiry of the above period will be considered by the Govt.”
7. The Court was of the view:—
“All that the notification says is that the proposals will be taken into consideration after two months from the date of the publication of the notification and that any representation that may be received before the expiry of the said period will be considered by the Govt. This is certainly not compliance with the provisions of section 5(1)(b) which directs that the notification should specify a date not less than two months from the date of the notification on which the proposals will be taken into consideration. It has to be noted that under section (2) of section 5 the right to make representations extends to the date specified in the notification under section 5(1)(b) and that that right cannot be confined to a date anterior to it. In other words, it is not possible for the Govt. to say that they will receive representations up to a particular date and that the proposals will be taken into consideration not on that date but on some date thereafter.
8. The next case pressed into service by Mr. Basu is a Bench decision of the M.P High Court in the case of Narottamdas Harjiwandas v. P.B Gawarikar Inspector, Minimum Wages, Assistant Labour Commissioner's office Jabalpur (2). The notification in this case ran thus:—
“……All representations in this behalf may be addressed to the Secretary to Govt. in the Labour Department, M.P Bhopal, within a period of two months from the date of the publication of this notification.
These proposals together with representations, if any received within the period specified above shall be taken into consideration as per sub-section (2) of the said section after a period of two months from the date of the publication of this notification”.
9. Dixit, C.J spoke for the Court thus:—
“In our judgment, this contention must prevail. The language of sub-section (2) and of clause (b) of sub-section (1) is too plain to require any elucidation for coming to the conclusion that after the publication of the proposals under clause (b) any person affected thereby has a right to make a representation any time before the date specified in the notification under clause (b) and that this date must be one not less than two months from the date of the notification.
This provision about the specification of a date so as to enable the person concerned to make a proper representation is clearly mandatory. As has been pointed out by the S.C in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh & Others (3), H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi (S) (4) and Hari Vishnu v. Ahmadishaque (S) (5), there is no rule of universal application for determining whether a provision in a statute is absolute or directory.
The question in each case has to be decided on a consideration of the scope and object of the provision, its nature and consideration of justice and convenience. At the same time it is well settled that where a statutory provision creates or grants a right, privilege or immunity and regulates the manner of its exercise, it must be construed as mandatory (see Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, te???th edition p. 376 and Crawford's Statutory Constructions p. 526).
Now, it cannot be denied that clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5 read with sub-section (2) gives to a person affected by the proposals published under clause (b) a right to make representation upto a date specified in the notification which must be one not less than two months from the date of the notification. This right cannot be taken away or curtailed by holding that the provision about the specification of a date is directory and that it is sufficient if there is substantial compliance therewith.”
10. These two decisions undoubtedly support Mr. Basu's proposition. With respect however we are not in a position to accept the conclusions indicated in these two decisions. In our opinion, two alternate procedures have been provided in the matter of fixation and revision of minimum rates of wages. Where the State Government did not have any proposals of their own and it is necessary in their view that enquiries should be held and advice obtained in the matter of fixation of rates of minimum wages, action is contemplated under clause (a) and Committees and sub-committee as appropriate for the occasion are to be constituted. Where however Government have proposals in their hands action is contemplated under clause (b) and the proposals are outright notified for circulation and representations are intended to be received against the proposals. The scheme contemplates that the right to represent must be available for two months from the date of notification and for that purpose a date beyond two months from the date of notification is to be fixed in the notification on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration. As we shall presently show, the scheme under the Statute does not contemplate of a personal hearing and the mode of hearing is by representation only. That being so, in the specification of a date, there is no particular charm. The Statute requires a date to be specified to ensure that the two months period for making of representation may not be affected.
11. A Bench of the Mysore High Court in the case of K.T Appannath v. State of Mysore by its Chief Secretary to Government (6), while considering the provision of S. 5(1)(b) of the Act dealt with both the decisions referred above and observed;—
“As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh & Others (7), H.B Rishbud v. State of Delhi (8) and Hari Vishnu Kamanath v. Ahmad Ishaque (9), (the same authorities as quoted in one of the earlier cases) there can be no rule of universal application for the determination of the question whether a provision in a statute is imperative or merely directory, the question in each case being one to be decided on a consideration of the scope, object and nature of the statutory provisions.”
12. The object, the scope and nature of the provisions of S. 5(1)(b) is to afford to the persons likely to be affected by the proposals published under its provisions an opportunity to make represen???tions in respect thereof if such opportunity has been made available and afforded, even though a specific date was not mentioned in the notification by which the proposals were published and it was stated that the date on which the proposals would be taken into consideration would be fixed after the expiry of two months from the date of publication, it would be going altogether too far for any one to suggest that there was an infringement of an imperative statutory provision so as to justify the annulment of the eventual decision. In a recent Full Bench decision, the Kerala High Court in the case of Malayalam Plantations Ltd. v. The State of Kerala (10), had occasion to deal with the provisions of section 5(1)(b) with the particular reference to specification of a date. The court also examined its earlier Bench decision in Vasudevan's case? (Supra.) and the M.P decision already referred to. The notification for examination by the Full Bench ran thus:—
“Notice is hereby given that the said proposals will be taken up for consideration on or after 1.5.72 and that any representation that may be received from any person with respect to the said proposal before the expiry of the above date will be considered by Govt.”
13. The Full Bench observed:—
“As we see the section, besides publishing the proposal the further requirements are (1) the appropriate Govt. has to specify a date on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration 2) such date shall not be less than 2 months from the date of the notification (3) The final notification is to be after considering all representations received by the Govt. before the date specifed by the Govt. (4) The appropriate Govt. is to consult with the Advisory Board constituted under section 7 of the Act. Though the Govt. is required to specify the date on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration, there is no express mention of any further requirement that once such date is so specified the Govt. is obliged to take up for consideration the proposals published by it on that date Itself and not at any time thereafter. The right of those likely to be affected by the proposals to file representations at any time before the date specified in the notification and the duty or the Govt. to consider such representations before finally deciding upon the question of fixing or revising the minimum wages appear to us to be the main content of the procedural requirement of section 5 when resort is made to the procedure prescribed u/s 5(1)(b). Of course, there is the further requirement that the Advisory Board should be consulted…. To us it appears that the specification of the date is for a different purpose. It is only by way of imitation to those who may be interested in filing representations that they should do so before a particular date and to secure to them a reasonable time for that purpose the minimum period is specified in the section. In cases where the right to file representation is not restricted in the notification to a period of less than the 2 months prescribed in the section there cannot be a violation of section 5(1)(b). We do not think that the section enables any person to contend that notwithstanding the specification of a date within which the representations have to be filed the notification revising/fixing minimum wages would be bad if the proposals are not taken up for consideration on the date specified. Nor does the section, according to us, provide for a right to file representations till the moment the proposals are actually taken up for final decision. There must necessarily be an interval between the last moment for filing the representations and the final decision, the length of the interval depending upon the nature of the representations, the necessity for deliberation on such representations, the time taken for the proceedings of the Advisory Board and the period that the Govt. would usually take for reaching a final decision on such matters……”
14. The Full Bench continued to say:—
“The appellants did file representations too through their admitted representative the Association of Planters of Kerala. One fails to understand how, in these circumstances, the appellants can have a grievance that the notifications finally issued under section 5(2) are bad on account of non-specification of a proper date as required by section 5(1)(b). Such a contention cannot have any relevance, at any rate, in a case where there can be no scope for grievance, as for instance where the persons likely to be aggrieved are really seen to have filed representations. To contend otherwise would be to take too technical a view not warranted by the scheme of the provision. De hors any decision on the point we would find no reason to doubt the validity of the impugned notifications on the ground that a specific date has not been mentioned in the notifications….”
15. The Full Bench virtually overruled the ratio relied upon by Mr. Basu in Vasudeven's case (Supra) and did not accept the statement of the legal position made by Dixit, C.J in Narrottamdas case (Supra) We are inclined to agree with the view indicated by the Full Bench. True it is that the impugned notification did not specify the date, but it categorically indicated that the representations should be made within two months from the date of the notification and the representations were to be considered after the expiry of the 2 months period. The purpose for which the statutory provision has beenmade has thus been effectively worked out particularly as the petitioners have actually made a representation. The first question raised by Mr. Basu must, therefore, fail.
Question no. 2.
Were the petitioners entitled a hearing before re fixation of the minimum wages?
5. In the case of Chandrabhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore Labour and Municipal Administration,
16. Banglore (11), by its Secretary, Department of a Division Bench took the view that fixation of rates of minimum wages does not amount to determination of the rights of the parties and is not a quasi judicial act but is merely an administrative act. Though the Govt. is expected to take into consideration the diverse aspects of a S???. employment in reaching a conclusion as to what rates should be determined as minimum wages, it is not required, either expressly or impliedly, by the Act to act judicially in reaching such a conclusion. That being the true character of fixation of minimum wages, p???inciple of natural justice does not come into play. So long as the procedure provided by the Act is followed, the decision of the Govt. cannot be assailed as being violative of principles of natural justice. To come to this conclusion, they had relied upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to widen the discussion on this point as the decision of the Mysore High Court referred to above was subjected to appeal before the S.C and by their judgment in the case of Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore (12), a Constitution Bench of the S.C has settled the legal position. We may quote a passage from the Supreme Court decision now:—
“It was urged on behalf of the hotel owners that the power conferred to fix the minimum wage on the appropriate Govt. under section 5(1) is a quasi judicial power and in exercising that power, it was incumbent on the appropriate Govt. to observe the principles of natural justice. The Govt. having failed to observe those principles the fixation of wages made is liable to be struck down. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to go into the question whether the power given under the Act to fix minimum wages is a quasi judicial power or an administrative power. As observed by this Court in A.K Karaipak v. Union of India (13), the dividing line between an administrative power and quasi judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. It is further observed therein that principles of natural justice apply to the exercise of the administrative powers as well. But those principles are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice, if any, should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons appointed for the purpose.
Taking into consideration the provisions of the Act, the objective behind the Act, the purposes intended to be achieved and the high authority on whom the power is conferred, we have no doubt that the procedure adopted was adequate and effective. We have equally no doubt that reasonable opportunity had been given to all the concerned parties to represent their case……”
17. The statute contemplates of a hearing through representation and its consideration. The legal position is settled beyond doubt that natural justice in a given case would be what the contents of the Statute permit. It is clear that the scheme u/s 5(1)(b) contemplates of an opportunity of hearing through representation. The content of the statute has thus been satisfied and petitioners are not entitled to make grievance of not having been afforded an actual hearing.
Question no. 3.
Are the persons entitled to challenge the ultimate notification fixing the minimum rates of wages on account of the Advisory Committee not having been properly constituted?
6. Petitioners contend that since the notification fixing the rates of wages states that the Advisory Board had been consulted, it was appropriate that the Advisory Board should have been constituted as provided by the Act. Section 7 of the Statute provides:—
“For the purpose of coordinating the work of committees and sub committees appointed u/s 5 and advising the appropriate Govt. generally in the matter of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages, the appropriate Govt. shall appoint an Advisory Board.”
18. Section 9 provides:—
“Each of the committees, sub-committees and the Advisory Board shall consist of persons to be nominated by the appropriate Govt. representing employers and employees in the sch. employments, who shall be equal in No. and independent persons not exceeding one third of its total number of members, one of such independent persons shall be appointed the Chairman by the appropriate Govt.”
19. Reliance was placed by Mr. Basu on the decision of the S.C in the case of Edward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar v. State of Ajmer (14) where the Court observed:—
“The legislature undoubtedly intended to apply this Act not to all industries but to those industries only where by reason of unorganised labour or want of proper arrangements for effective regulation of wages or for other causes the wages of labourers in a particular industry were very low. It is with an eye to these facts that the list of trades has been drawn up in the Sch. attached to the Act but the list is not an exhaustive one and it is the policy of the legislature not to lay down at once and for all time, to which industries the Act should be applied. Conditions of labour vary under different circumstances and from State to State and the expediency of including a particular trade or industry within the schedule depends upon a variety of facts which are by no means uniform and which can best be ascertained by the person who is placed in charge of the administration of a particular State.”
20. According to Mr. Basu, if this be the purpose of the Statute it is necessary that a person from the trade should have been on the Advisory Board. He relies on petitioners own case (14a) where with reference to a Committee u/s 5(1)(a) of the Act, this Court observed that such representation as claimed by the petitioners was appropriate. Mr. Basu's contention, however, fails in view of what the S.C directly stated in the case of Bhikusa Yammsa Kshatriva v. Sangamner Akola Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union, (15).
21. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Court observed:—
“In regard to the contention that the Notification dt. April 19, 1955 was invalid because in the formation of the committees u/s 5 and the Advisory Committees u/s 6 provisions of the Act were contravened, no argu???ents were advanced and none could be advanced. It appears that the committee were formed consistently with the provisions of section 9 under the chairmanship of a retired officer with considerable judicial experience and the advisory committee appointed u/s 6 also consisted of three representatives of employers and three representatives of employees presided over by a chairman having experience of industrial disputes. It was urged however that in the Advisory Board there was no representative of the employers in the Bidi industry. But the function of the Advisory Board u/s 7 is to co-ordinate the work of the committees and sub-com-mittees u/ss 5 and 6 and to advise the Govt. generally in the matter of fixing and revising the minimum rates. The function of the Board is not to make any detailed investigation in any particular industry. That investigation is contemplated to be made by the committee and the Advisory Committee. The Act does not require that the Board should consist of representatives of any particular scheduled industry. The Board is to consist of representatives of employers and employees in the scheduled employments, and such a Board was constituted…….”
22. In view of these weighty observations of the S.C Mr. Basu's point that the Advisory Board had not been duly constituted in the absence of a representative of the Bidi manufacturers must fail.
23. All the contentions of Mr. Basu having failed, the writ application fails. We direct its dismissal, but would require both the parties to bear their own costs before us.