Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 read with clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948)
  • MINIMUM WAGES ACT
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5 read with sub-section (2)
  • sub-section (2) and of clause (b) of sub-section (1)
  • provisions of section 5(1)(b)
  • section (2) of section 5
  • Board.18. Section 9
  • section 5(1)(b)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 read with clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948)
  • MINIMUM WAGES ACT
  • clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5 read with sub-section (2)
  • sub-section (2) and of clause (b) of sub-section (1)
  • provisions of section 5(1)(b)
  • section (2) of section 5
  • Board.18. Section 9
  • section 5(1)(b)
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion by R.N. Misra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are a registered firm engaged in bidi manufacture (petitioner no.1 is the firm; petitioners 2–5 are partners). The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 applies to tobacco manufactory including bidi-making. The State Government issued a notification on 7 August 1973 revising minimum wages (operative from 1 August 1973). Petitioners challenged that notification in Writ O.J.C. No. 936 of 1973; by judgment dated 14 January 1975 (reported in I.L.R. 1975 Cuttack 308 — Town Bidi Factory v. State of Orissa) this Court quashed the earlier notification and directed re-fixation in accordance with law.

The State then proceeded under section 5(1)(b) of the Act and issued a notification dated 14 August 1975 inviting representations (specifying that proposals would be taken into consideration after two months). Petitioners made representations and sought an opportunity for discussion/hearing. They allege that without any discussion and without considering the representations, the Government issued a final notification dated 26 September 1975 revising minimum wages (the impugned notification), which stated it was issued after consultation with the State Minimum Wages Advisory Board. Petitioners further alleged that the Advisory Board was not properly constituted because it lacked representation of the trade (bidi manufacturers), and therefore was non est in law. The State filed a counter-affidavit justifying the notification.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notification under section 5(1)(b) of the Minimum Wages Act was in order, or on account of any defect liable to be quashed?
  2. Whether the petitioners were entitled to a hearing before re-fixation of the minimum wages?
  3. Whether the petitioners were entitled to challenge the ultimate notification fixing minimum wages on account of the Advisory Board not having been properly constituted?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Basu)

  • The notification under section 5(1)(b) was defective because it did not specify a definite date (not less than two months from publication) on which the proposals would be taken into consideration; reliance was placed on Vasudevan v. State of Kerala and Narottamdas Harjiwandas v. P.B. Gawarikar to show non-compliance with section 5(1)(b).
  • The petitioners were entitled to a hearing (they sought an opportunity to be heard and a discussion where views could be exchanged).
  • The Advisory Board was not properly constituted because it lacked representation from the bidi trade; therefore any consultation said to have been made with that Board was invalid and the final notification could be challenged.

Respondent / State (as presented in the opinion)

  • The State filed a counter-affidavit through the Under Secretary seeking to justify the impugned notification. The opinion records that the State justified the notification, but does not set out detailed opposing arguments in the text beyond that general justification.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Opinion
Town Bidi Factory v. State of Orissa (I.L.R. 1975 Cuttack 308) The Court previously quashed an earlier notification fixing minimum wages and directed re-fixation in accordance with law. The opinion records this prior quashing as the reason the State proceeded under section 5(1)(b) to re-notify proposals.
Vasudevan v. State of Kerala Held that a notification which merely states proposals will be taken into consideration "after two months" without specifying a date does not comply with section 5(1)(b); specification of a date is mandatory to protect the right to make representations up to that date. The Court noted this decision supports petitioners' counsel (Mr. Basu), but ultimately declined to follow its strict result in the present facts, distinguishing it on scheme and purpose grounds.
Narottamdas Harjiwandas v. P.B. Gawarikar (M.P. High Court) Held that clause (b) of section 5(1) read with subsection (2) requires specification of a date not less than two months, and that provision is mandatory so representation rights cannot be curtailed. The opinion acknowledges this decision supports petitioners' contention but states it cannot accept that conclusion here and explains why the Court prefers a different view (see reliance on Full Bench decisions).
Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh & Others Authority cited for the proposition that there is no universal rule to determine whether statutory provision is absolute or directory; depends on scope, object and nature of the provision. Referenced by other authorities discussed; used as part of the legal background in deciding whether specification of a date is mandatory or could be treated as directory.
H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi Same general principle as Jagan Nath regarding analysis of whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory. Referenced as supporting authority; canvassed in the discussion of whether the date-specification requirement is mandatory.
Hari Vishnu v. Ahmadishaque Same general principle on mandatory/directory character of statutory provisions. Referred to in the reasoning about mandatory versus directory statutory obligations.
K.T. Appannath v. State of Mysore Considered s.5(1)(b) and the question whether specification of a date is mandatory; emphasised consideration of scope, object and nature of statutory provision. Cited as part of a line of authority showing different approaches; the opinion aligns with the view that the specification requirement must be read in light of the statute's purpose.
Malayalam Plantations Ltd. v. The State of Kerala (Full Bench) Full Bench construed section 5(1)(b): specification of a date is to give notice to those who may file representations and secure reasonable time; absence of the specific date is not fatal where the right to file representations for the statutory two months is preserved; the section does not entitle anyone to insist proposals be taken up for consideration on that exact date. The Court expressly sided with the Full Bench view, treating Malayalam Plantations as overruling or displacing the strict lines in Vasudevan/Narottamdas for present purposes, and relied on it to find the impugned notification valid because representations were invited and actually filed.
Chanda(r)a Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore (Mysore High Court and later S.C. Constitution Bench) High Court view that fixing minimum wages is administrative (not quasi-judicial); Supreme Court Constitution Bench affirmed that procedure under the Act (representation) was adequate and reasonable opportunity had been given; natural justice must be informed by statute. The Court relied on the Supreme Court Constitution Bench passage to hold that the statutory scheme (hearing by representation under s.5(1)(b)) satisfied requirements of natural justice and that petitioners were not entitled to a personal hearing beyond representations.
A.K. Karaipak v. Union of India Observation that the dividing line between administrative and quasi-judicial powers is thin and that principles of natural justice may apply to administrative powers, but what particular rules apply depends on the statute and context. Quoted in the opinion's discussion of natural justice and the character of the power to fix minimum wages; supports the proposition that natural justice requirements depend on statutory framework.
Edward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar v. State of Ajmer Discusses legislative intent behind the schedule of employments and the need to include trades based on facts; relied upon by Mr. Basu to argue for trade representation on advisory bodies. The Court recorded that Mr. Basu relied on this decision, but did not accept that it required a representative from the particular trade on the Advisory Board for purposes of s.7/s.9.
Bhikusa Yammsa Kshatriva v. Sangamner Akola Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union Supreme Court held that the Advisory Board under s.7 is to coordinate committees and advise Government generally; it is not required to consist of representatives of any particular scheduled industry. The opinion treated this Supreme Court pronouncement as directly applicable and dispositive on the point, rejecting Mr. Basu's contention that the Advisory Board must include a bidi industry representative and holding that challenge to the notification on that ground must fail.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed three main questions (validity of the s.5(1)(b) notification, entitlement to a hearing, and challenge based on Advisory Board constitution) and examined each in turn.

Question 1 — Validity of the s.5(1)(b) notification:

  • The Court observed that section 5(1)(b) requires publication of proposals and specification of a date not less than two months from notification on which proposals will be taken into consideration; subsection (2) extends the right to make representations up to the date specified.
  • Counsel for petitioners relied upon authorities (Vasudevan and Narottamdas) that treated specification of a date as mandatory. The Court reviewed those authorities but declined to adopt their strict conclusion in the present facts.
  • The Court analysed the legislative scheme: two alternative procedures exist under s.5 — (a) appointment of committees where Government has no proposals and seeks enquiries, and (b) publication of Government proposals where representations may be made. The scheme contemplates hearing by way of representations, not necessarily personal hearings.
  • The Court held the statutory requirement to specify a date is directed to secure the two-month period for representations. Where the notification effectively secures that period (e.g., by indicating representations are to be made within two months and that consideration will follow after expiry of that period), the purpose of the provision is satisfied.
  • The Court relied on the Full Bench of the Kerala High Court in Malayalam Plantations, which interpreted section 5(1)(b) to mean that omission of a specific date is not fatal provided the right to make representations for the statutory period is preserved; the Full Bench refused to invalidate notifications merely because proposals were not taken up for consideration on the specified date.
  • Applying that reasoning and noting that petitioners had in fact made representations, the Court concluded the impugned notification could not be quashed on the ground that no specific date was mentioned. Accordingly the first question was answered against the petitioners.

Question 2 — Entitlement to a hearing:

  • The Court examined whether the petitioners were entitled to an oral/personal hearing beyond the statutory opportunity to make written representations.
  • It cited the Mysore High Court decision and the subsequent Supreme Court Constitution Bench decision in Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, which recognised that while the distinction between administrative and quasi-judicial powers is nuanced, the Act's scheme provides for hearing through representations and their consideration.
  • The Court held that the statutory scheme under s.5(1)(b) contemplates an opportunity of hearing through representations and their consideration, and that this satisfied the relevant requirements of natural justice as applicable under the statute. Therefore petitioners were not entitled to insist on an actual/personal hearing beyond this mechanism.

Question 3 — Validity of notification because Advisory Board not properly constituted:

  • The Court reviewed sections 7 and 9: s.7 provides for an Advisory Board to coordinate committees and advise the Government; s.9 requires committees and Boards to consist of persons representing employers and employees in scheduled employments, equal in number, and independent persons up to one-third, one independent member to be Chairman.
  • Counsel argued (relying on Edward Mills and the petitioners' own previous case) that the Advisory Board should include a representative of the bidi trade and that omission of such a representative invalidated the consultation.
  • The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Bhikusa Yammsa Kshatriva, which held that the Advisory Board's function is general coordination and advice and it is not required to contain representatives of any particular scheduled industry; detailed investigations are for committees/sub-committees. Therefore absence of a bidi trade representative on the Board did not render the Board or its consultation invalid.
  • Applying Bhikusa, the Court rejected the petitioners' challenge based on alleged improper constitution of the Advisory Board.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court concluded that all of the petitioners' contentions failed and DISMISSED the writ application. The Court directed that both parties bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: the impugned notification dated 26 September 1975 (revising minimum wages) was upheld in the present proceedings and the writ petition dismissed; parties must bear their own costs before the Court.
  • The Court's reasoning adopted the Full Bench view in Malayalam Plantations regarding the interpretation of s.5(1)(b): specification of a date in the notification is intended to secure the two-month representation period and omission of a specific date is not necessarily fatal if the statutory opportunity to make representations is preserved (and representations were in fact made).
  • The Court held that the statutory mechanism of hearing by written representation under s.5(1)(b) satisfied requirements of natural justice in this context, relying on the Supreme Court's analysis in Chandra Bhawan.
  • On the Advisory Board point, the Court applied Bhikusa to hold that the Advisory Board is not required to include representatives of any particular scheduled industry (such as bidi manufacturers) and that challenge on that ground fails.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new, sweeping precedent beyond its application of the authorities cited; its decision rests on application and preference for the Full Bench reasoning in Malayalam Plantations and the Supreme Court authorities discussed.

End of summary — all statements above are drawn exclusively from the provided opinion text.

    M/S. Town Bidi Factory And Others v. State Of Orissa

    R.N Misra, J.:— Petitioner no. 1 is a registered firm and petitioners 2 to 5 are its partners and they are engaged in manufacture of Bidi. Ordinarily Bidi rollers are riot permanent employees of any particular manufacturing concern and many takes it as a side employment. The Minimum Wages Act, 11 of 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was brought into the Statute Book with a view to making provision for fixation of minimum rates of wages to be paid in respect of scheduled employments. Tobacco manufactory including bidi-making is a scheduled employment. Under Section 5 of the Act, procedure for fixation and revision of minimum wages has been laid down. Subsection (1) provides:—

    “In fixing minimum rates of wages in respect of any scheduled employment for the first time under this Act or in revising minimum rates of wages so fixed, the appropriate Government shall either-

    (a) appoint as many committees and sub-committees as it considers necessary to hold enquiries and advise it in respect of such fixation or revision as the case may be, or

    (b) by notification in the Official Gazette publish its proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and specify a date, not less than two months from the date of the notification, on which the proposals will be taken into consideration.”

    2. Government issued a notification revising the minimum rates of wages for the employees of Bidi Manufactory purporting to act on the recommendation of the Committee and the Advisory Board on August 7, 1973, and directing that the minimum wages so fixed would be operative from 1st August, 1973. The petitioners challenged the tenability of the said notification by filing a writ application before this Court in O.J.C no. 936 of 1973 and by judgment dated 14th of January, 1975, reported in I.L.R 1975 Cuttack 308 (Town Bidi Factory v. State of Orissa), this Court quashed the notification fixing minimum wages and directed its re-fixation in accordance with law. The State Government thereafter proceeded to take action under section 5(1)(b) of the Act for revision of the minimum rates of wages and by notification dated 14th of August, 1975, Government invited representations, objections or suggestions in connection with the proposals published in the State Gazette in the matter of fixation of minimum rates of wages. Petitioners like many others made representations. They also claimed an opportunity to be heard in support of their stand and wanted that a discussion should take place where the views could be exchanged. Petitioners allege that without any discussion and giving consideration to the representations, Government by notification dated 26th of September, 1975, revised the minimum rates of wages (vide Annexure-3). The notification indicates that the same was issued after due consultation with the State Minimum wages Advisory Board. Petitioners further allege that section 7 of the Act provides for constitution of the Advisory Board and read with section 9, it was obligatory that the particular Board should have representative of the trade itself. In the absence of such representation, the constitution of the Board was bad and therefore the Advisory Board was non-est in law. The opposite party has filed a counter affidavit through its Under Secretary in the relevant department and has sought to justify the notification in question.

    3. On hearing learned counsel for parties, we are of the view that three questions mainly arise for consideration:—

    (1) Whether the notification u/s 5(1)(b) of the Act was in order, or on account of any defect it is liable to be quashed?

    (2) Were the petitioners entitled to a hearing before re-fixation of the minimum wages? and

    (3) Are the petitioners entitled to challenge the ultimate notification fixing the minimum rates of wages on account of the Advisory Committee not having been properly constituted?

    4. We shall proceed to examine the correctness of each of these questions.

    Question No. 1 Whether the notification under section 5(1)(b) of the Act was in order, or on account of any defect it is liable to be quashed? (4) As already pointed out, section 5(1)(b) of the Act requires that a notification in the State Gazette should be published together with proposals for the information of persons likely to be affected thereby and the State Govt.

    5. is to specify any date, not less than two months from the date of the notification on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration. The relevant notification ran thus:

    “SRO No. 568/75.—The following proposals made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 3 read with clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of section 4 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948) and in consultation with the Advisory Board, for revising the minimum rates of wages as specified in column (2) of the schedule annexed hereto, payable to the categories of employees employed in the employment of tobacco (including Bidi and Gudakhu making) manufactory, specified in the corresponding entries in column (1) of the said schedule for the whole State of Orissa are hereby published, as required by clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5 of the said Act for information of all persons likely to be affected thereby and notice is hereby given that the said proposals shall be taken into consideration on or after the expiry of two months from the date of publication of this notification in the Orissa Gazette.

    Any representation, objection or suggestion which may be received from any person with respect to the said proposals before the expiry of the period specified above will be considered by the State Govt”

    6. Mr. Basu for the petitioners contends that in the absence of a date mandatorily required to be notified, the notification is bad and relies upon two decisions in support of his stand. In the case of Vasudevan v. State of Kerala (1), the relevant notification ran thus:—

    “……Notice is given that the proposal will be taken into consideration after two months from the date of publication of this notification and that any representation that may be received from any person with respect to the said proposal before the expiry of the above period will be considered by the Govt.”

    7. The Court was of the view:—

    “All that the notification says is that the proposals will be taken into consideration after two months from the date of the publication of the notification and that any representation that may be received before the expiry of the said period will be considered by the Govt. This is certainly not compliance with the provisions of section 5(1)(b) which directs that the notification should specify a date not less than two months from the date of the notification on which the proposals will be taken into consideration. It has to be noted that under section (2) of section 5 the right to make representations extends to the date specified in the notification under section 5(1)(b) and that that right cannot be confined to a date anterior to it. In other words, it is not possible for the Govt. to say that they will receive representations up to a particular date and that the proposals will be taken into consideration not on that date but on some date thereafter.

    8. The next case pressed into service by Mr. Basu is a Bench decision of the M.P High Court in the case of Narottamdas Harjiwandas v. P.B Gawarikar Inspector, Minimum Wages, Assistant Labour Commissioner's office Jabalpur (2). The notification in this case ran thus:—

    “……All representations in this behalf may be addressed to the Secretary to Govt. in the Labour Department, M.P Bhopal, within a period of two months from the date of the publication of this notification.

    These proposals together with representations, if any received within the period specified above shall be taken into consideration as per sub-section (2) of the said section after a period of two months from the date of the publication of this notification”.

    9. Dixit, C.J spoke for the Court thus:—

    “In our judgment, this contention must prevail. The language of sub-section (2) and of clause (b) of sub-section (1) is too plain to require any elucidation for coming to the conclusion that after the publication of the proposals under clause (b) any person affected thereby has a right to make a representation any time before the date specified in the notification under clause (b) and that this date must be one not less than two months from the date of the notification.

    This provision about the specification of a date so as to enable the person concerned to make a proper representation is clearly mandatory. As has been pointed out by the S.C in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh & Others (3), H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi (S) (4) and Hari Vishnu v. Ahmadishaque (S) (5), there is no rule of universal application for determining whether a provision in a statute is absolute or directory.

    The question in each case has to be decided on a consideration of the scope and object of the provision, its nature and consideration of justice and convenience. At the same time it is well settled that where a statutory provision creates or grants a right, privilege or immunity and regulates the manner of its exercise, it must be construed as mandatory (see Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, te???th edition p. 376 and Crawford's Statutory Constructions p. 526).

    Now, it cannot be denied that clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 5 read with sub-section (2) gives to a person affected by the proposals published under clause (b) a right to make representation upto a date specified in the notification which must be one not less than two months from the date of the notification. This right cannot be taken away or curtailed by holding that the provision about the specification of a date is directory and that it is sufficient if there is substantial compliance therewith.”

    10. These two decisions undoubtedly support Mr. Basu's proposition. With respect however we are not in a position to accept the conclusions indicated in these two decisions. In our opinion, two alternate procedures have been provided in the matter of fixation and revision of minimum rates of wages. Where the State Government did not have any proposals of their own and it is necessary in their view that enquiries should be held and advice obtained in the matter of fixation of rates of minimum wages, action is contemplated under clause (a) and Committees and sub-committee as appropriate for the occasion are to be constituted. Where however Government have proposals in their hands action is contemplated under clause (b) and the proposals are outright notified for circulation and representations are intended to be received against the proposals. The scheme contemplates that the right to represent must be available for two months from the date of notification and for that purpose a date beyond two months from the date of notification is to be fixed in the notification on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration. As we shall presently show, the scheme under the Statute does not contemplate of a personal hearing and the mode of hearing is by representation only. That being so, in the specification of a date, there is no particular charm. The Statute requires a date to be specified to ensure that the two months period for making of representation may not be affected.

    11. A Bench of the Mysore High Court in the case of K.T Appannath v. State of Mysore by its Chief Secretary to Government (6), while considering the provision of S. 5(1)(b) of the Act dealt with both the decisions referred above and observed;—

    “As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh & Others (7), H.B Rishbud v. State of Delhi (8) and Hari Vishnu Kamanath v. Ahmad Ishaque (9), (the same authorities as quoted in one of the earlier cases) there can be no rule of universal application for the determination of the question whether a provision in a statute is imperative or merely directory, the question in each case being one to be decided on a consideration of the scope, object and nature of the statutory provisions.”

    12. The object, the scope and nature of the provisions of S. 5(1)(b) is to afford to the persons likely to be affected by the proposals published under its provisions an opportunity to make represen???tions in respect thereof if such opportunity has been made available and afforded, even though a specific date was not mentioned in the notification by which the proposals were published and it was stated that the date on which the proposals would be taken into consideration would be fixed after the expiry of two months from the date of publication, it would be going altogether too far for any one to suggest that there was an infringement of an imperative statutory provision so as to justify the annulment of the eventual decision. In a recent Full Bench decision, the Kerala High Court in the case of Malayalam Plantations Ltd. v. The State of Kerala (10), had occasion to deal with the provisions of section 5(1)(b) with the particular reference to specification of a date. The court also examined its earlier Bench decision in Vasudevan's case? (Supra.) and the M.P decision already referred to. The notification for examination by the Full Bench ran thus:—

    “Notice is hereby given that the said proposals will be taken up for consideration on or after 1.5.72 and that any representation that may be received from any person with respect to the said proposal before the expiry of the above date will be considered by Govt.”

    13. The Full Bench observed:—

    “As we see the section, besides publishing the proposal the further requirements are (1) the appropriate Govt. has to specify a date on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration 2) such date shall not be less than 2 months from the date of the notification (3) The final notification is to be after considering all representations received by the Govt. before the date specifed by the Govt. (4) The appropriate Govt. is to consult with the Advisory Board constituted under section 7 of the Act. Though the Govt. is required to specify the date on which the proposals are to be taken into consideration, there is no express mention of any further requirement that once such date is so specified the Govt. is obliged to take up for consideration the proposals published by it on that date Itself and not at any time thereafter. The right of those likely to be affected by the proposals to file representations at any time before the date specified in the notification and the duty or the Govt. to consider such representations before finally deciding upon the question of fixing or revising the minimum wages appear to us to be the main content of the procedural requirement of section 5 when resort is made to the procedure prescribed u/s 5(1)(b). Of course, there is the further requirement that the Advisory Board should be consulted…. To us it appears that the specification of the date is for a different purpose. It is only by way of imitation to those who may be interested in filing representations that they should do so before a particular date and to secure to them a reasonable time for that purpose the minimum period is specified in the section. In cases where the right to file representation is not restricted in the notification to a period of less than the 2 months prescribed in the section there cannot be a violation of section 5(1)(b). We do not think that the section enables any person to contend that notwithstanding the specification of a date within which the representations have to be filed the notification revising/fixing minimum wages would be bad if the proposals are not taken up for consideration on the date specified. Nor does the section, according to us, provide for a right to file representations till the moment the proposals are actually taken up for final decision. There must necessarily be an interval between the last moment for filing the representations and the final decision, the length of the interval depending upon the nature of the representations, the necessity for deliberation on such representations, the time taken for the proceedings of the Advisory Board and the period that the Govt. would usually take for reaching a final decision on such matters……”

    14. The Full Bench continued to say:—

    “The appellants did file representations too through their admitted representative the Association of Planters of Kerala. One fails to understand how, in these circumstances, the appellants can have a grievance that the notifications finally issued under section 5(2) are bad on account of non-specification of a proper date as required by section 5(1)(b). Such a contention cannot have any relevance, at any rate, in a case where there can be no scope for grievance, as for instance where the persons likely to be aggrieved are really seen to have filed representations. To contend otherwise would be to take too technical a view not warranted by the scheme of the provision. De hors any decision on the point we would find no reason to doubt the validity of the impugned notifications on the ground that a specific date has not been mentioned in the notifications….”

    15. The Full Bench virtually overruled the ratio relied upon by Mr. Basu in Vasudeven's case (Supra) and did not accept the statement of the legal position made by Dixit, C.J in Narrottamdas case (Supra) We are inclined to agree with the view indicated by the Full Bench. True it is that the impugned notification did not specify the date, but it categorically indicated that the representations should be made within two months from the date of the notification and the representations were to be considered after the expiry of the 2 months period. The purpose for which the statutory provision has beenmade has thus been effectively worked out particularly as the petitioners have actually made a representation. The first question raised by Mr. Basu must, therefore, fail.

    Question no. 2. Were the petitioners entitled a hearing before re fixation of the minimum wages? 5. In the case of Chandrabhavan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore Labour and Municipal Administration,

    16. Banglore (11), by its Secretary, Department of a Division Bench took the view that fixation of rates of minimum wages does not amount to determination of the rights of the parties and is not a quasi judicial act but is merely an administrative act. Though the Govt. is expected to take into consideration the diverse aspects of a S???. employment in reaching a conclusion as to what rates should be determined as minimum wages, it is not required, either expressly or impliedly, by the Act to act judicially in reaching such a conclusion. That being the true character of fixation of minimum wages, p???inciple of natural justice does not come into play. So long as the procedure provided by the Act is followed, the decision of the Govt. cannot be assailed as being violative of principles of natural justice. To come to this conclusion, they had relied upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court. It is unnecessary to widen the discussion on this point as the decision of the Mysore High Court referred to above was subjected to appeal before the S.C and by their judgment in the case of Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging, Bangalore v. State of Mysore (12), a Constitution Bench of the S.C has settled the legal position. We may quote a passage from the Supreme Court decision now:—

    “It was urged on behalf of the hotel owners that the power conferred to fix the minimum wage on the appropriate Govt. under section 5(1) is a quasi judicial power and in exercising that power, it was incumbent on the appropriate Govt. to observe the principles of natural justice. The Govt. having failed to observe those principles the fixation of wages made is liable to be struck down. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to go into the question whether the power given under the Act to fix minimum wages is a quasi judicial power or an administrative power. As observed by this Court in A.K Karaipak v. Union of India (13), the dividing line between an administrative power and quasi judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. It is further observed therein that principles of natural justice apply to the exercise of the administrative powers as well. But those principles are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice, if any, should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the framework of the law under which the inquiry is held and the constitution of the tribunal or body of persons appointed for the purpose.

    Taking into consideration the provisions of the Act, the objective behind the Act, the purposes intended to be achieved and the high authority on whom the power is conferred, we have no doubt that the procedure adopted was adequate and effective. We have equally no doubt that reasonable opportunity had been given to all the concerned parties to represent their case……”

    17. The statute contemplates of a hearing through representation and its consideration. The legal position is settled beyond doubt that natural justice in a given case would be what the contents of the Statute permit. It is clear that the scheme u/s 5(1)(b) contemplates of an opportunity of hearing through representation. The content of the statute has thus been satisfied and petitioners are not entitled to make grievance of not having been afforded an actual hearing.

    Question no. 3. Are the persons entitled to challenge the ultimate notification fixing the minimum rates of wages on account of the Advisory Committee not having been properly constituted? 6. Petitioners contend that since the notification fixing the rates of wages states that the Advisory Board had been consulted, it was appropriate that the Advisory Board should have been constituted as provided by the Act. Section 7 of the Statute provides:—

    “For the purpose of coordinating the work of committees and sub committees appointed u/s 5 and advising the appropriate Govt. generally in the matter of fixing and revising minimum rates of wages, the appropriate Govt. shall appoint an Advisory Board.”

    18. Section 9 provides:—

    “Each of the committees, sub-committees and the Advisory Board shall consist of persons to be nominated by the appropriate Govt. representing employers and employees in the sch. employments, who shall be equal in No. and independent persons not exceeding one third of its total number of members, one of such independent persons shall be appointed the Chairman by the appropriate Govt.”

    19. Reliance was placed by Mr. Basu on the decision of the S.C in the case of Edward Mills Co. Ltd. Beawar v. State of Ajmer (14) where the Court observed:—

    “The legislature undoubtedly intended to apply this Act not to all industries but to those industries only where by reason of unorganised labour or want of proper arrangements for effective regulation of wages or for other causes the wages of labourers in a particular industry were very low. It is with an eye to these facts that the list of trades has been drawn up in the Sch. attached to the Act but the list is not an exhaustive one and it is the policy of the legislature not to lay down at once and for all time, to which industries the Act should be applied. Conditions of labour vary under different circumstances and from State to State and the expediency of including a particular trade or industry within the schedule depends upon a variety of facts which are by no means uniform and which can best be ascertained by the person who is placed in charge of the administration of a particular State.”

    20. According to Mr. Basu, if this be the purpose of the Statute it is necessary that a person from the trade should have been on the Advisory Board. He relies on petitioners own case (14a) where with reference to a Committee u/s 5(1)(a) of the Act, this Court observed that such representation as claimed by the petitioners was appropriate. Mr. Basu's contention, however, fails in view of what the S.C directly stated in the case of Bhikusa Yammsa Kshatriva v. Sangamner Akola Taluka Bidi Kamgar Union, (15).

    21. In paragraph 8 of the judgment, the Court observed:—

    “In regard to the contention that the Notification dt. April 19, 1955 was invalid because in the formation of the committees u/s 5 and the Advisory Committees u/s 6 provisions of the Act were contravened, no argu???ents were advanced and none could be advanced. It appears that the committee were formed consistently with the provisions of section 9 under the chairmanship of a retired officer with considerable judicial experience and the advisory committee appointed u/s 6 also consisted of three representatives of employers and three representatives of employees presided over by a chairman having experience of industrial disputes. It was urged however that in the Advisory Board there was no representative of the employers in the Bidi industry. But the function of the Advisory Board u/s 7 is to co-ordinate the work of the committees and sub-com-mittees u/ss 5 and 6 and to advise the Govt. generally in the matter of fixing and revising the minimum rates. The function of the Board is not to make any detailed investigation in any particular industry. That investigation is contemplated to be made by the committee and the Advisory Committee. The Act does not require that the Board should consist of representatives of any particular scheduled industry. The Board is to consist of representatives of employers and employees in the scheduled employments, and such a Board was constituted…….”

    22. In view of these weighty observations of the S.C Mr. Basu's point that the Advisory Board had not been duly constituted in the absence of a representative of the Bidi manufacturers must fail.

    23. All the contentions of Mr. Basu having failed, the writ application fails. We direct its dismissal, but would require both the parties to bear their own costs before us.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    M/S. Town Bidi Factory And Others v. State Of Orissa
    (Aug 3, 1977)