K.C Agrawal, J.:— This is a tenant's writ petition filed against an order of the First Additional District Judge, Jhansi, dated December 4, 1978, accepting an appeal of the landlord Bhagwan Das, Respondent 3, under Section 22 of U.P Act XIII of 1972.
2. An application for release of house No. 103, Sadar Bazar, Jhansi, of which the petitioner was a tenant, was filed by the landlord Bhagwan Das Gupta on the ground of his personal requirement. The landlord alleged that he has a large family consisting of himself, his wife, his Tal, five sons, four daughters and two daughters-in-law, and that the accommodation in his possession of houses Nos. 105 and 106, Sadar Bazar, was insufficient. The landlord alleged that when he had let out the disputed house to the aforesaid tenant, his family was small but now it had increased and, therefore, he Deeded the disputed house for his family members.
3. The application was contested by the tenant on the ground that the need of the landlord was not bona fide, and that the same had been filed with an ulterior motive to get the vacant possession of the house and to let out the same at enhanced rent. The tenant alleged that apart from the two houses in which the landlord was residing with his family members, there were three other houses Nos. 142, 143 and 144-A with the landlord which were in his occupation and, as such, the application was liable to be rejected. The tenant also claimed that there was house No. 104, which was adjoining the house of the landlord, and if the landlord really required additional accommodation, he should have filed an application for release in respect of the aforesaid house No. 104. The Prescribed Authority rejected the application, but on appeal the application was allowed. The appellate authority found that the need of the landlord was bona fide. It held that the accommodation left with the landlord was insufficient for his big and growing family. Plea of the tenant that the landlord had three other houses 142, 143 and 144-A was repelled on the ground that house No. 142 was a small Kachcha house consisting of only one room, and that the house was being used as a store for keeping tools of tractors etc. As regards the other two houses of the landlord, namely, houses 143 and 144-A, the landlord proved that it was only one house, though had been separately numbered, and the accommodation consisted of only two rooms, one Verandah, and one kachcha Kotha, the whole of which was roofed with Khaprail. These accommodations were insufficient to meet the requirements of the landlord. There was yet another house No. 115, in respect of which the tenant claimed that the landlord could occupy the same. About the said house, the finding arrived at by the appellate authority was that the same was a shop, and that the front portion had been let out to one Dr. Bansal, whereas the back portion consisting of one room and a courtyard was with the landlord. The back portion was insufficient for She purposes of residence.
4. Apart from the finding that the need of the landlord was bona fide, the appellate authority also found that the tenant was the owner of two houses situate at Jhansi, and that one of the newly built houses had been sold by him on 18-2-1975, after he had been called upon by the landlord to vacate the house let out to him.
5. On these findings, the appeal was allowed, and the application of the petitioner for release was accepted. The appellate authority, however, imposed a condition of offering houses Nos. 142, 143 and 144-A to the petitioner tenant.
6. Aggrieved by the appellate judgment, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition.
7. The first contention of the petitioner's counsel that the appellate authority since had not given any finding about the sufficiency of the accommodation of the landlord, the judgment given by it was erroneous, is not acceptable. The appellate authority gave a clear finding that the accommodation with the landlord was insufficient and that for his large and growing family, additional accommodation was required. For giving this finding, the appellate authority discussed the entire evidence of the parties. It was, therefore, incorrect to say that the finding about the insufficiency of the accommodation with the landlord had not been given.
8. The second submission was that the appellate authority was led away by extraneous consideration of the status of the landlord and granted the release application merely on that basis by being overwhelmed by the same. The submission is not correct. The appellate authority took into account the number of the family members of the landlord's family and also the number of rooms and other accommodations available with him. In that connection, the appellate authority also mentioned the status of the landlord and found not only on the ground of the status but also on the ground of shortage of accommodation that the need of the landlord was bona fide. The status was not a wholly irrelevant consideration.
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner also urged that since according to the own finding of the appellate authority, houses Nos. 143 and 144-A were Kachcha and were not habitable, the appellate authority should not have allowed the application of the landlord on the ground that these two houses could be made available to the tenant. A fair reading of the judgment of the appellate authority would indicate that the finding was that the need of the landlord was bona fide, and that he was likely to suffer greater hard ship if the application was rejected. In order to accommodate the tenant, the appellate authority directed the landlord to offer houses Nos. 142, 143 and 144-A to the tenant. These houses are adjoining each other. It, therefore appears to me that the judgment of the appellate authority is not liable to be quashed on his ground. If, however, the petitioner does not think that these houses are habitable and fit for residence, it is open to him not to occupy the same.
10. At this place it may be worthwhile to mention a circumstance which strongly weighs against the petitioner and which had been taken into account for deciding the question of hardship to be suffered by him on account of acceptance of the application made by the landlord under Section 21 of U.P Act XIII of 1972. The said circumstance is that after the notice dated February 32, 1975, asking the petitioner to vacate the disputed house had been served on the petitioner, he sold away one of his newly constructed houses on 18-2-1975. He had sold another house on 13-6-1974. The explanation offered by the petitioner in the courts below was that since he required money for his business, he was compelled to sell them. This explanation was not accepted by the appellate authority. It rejected the application by observing:
“These facts show that the tenant sold away these newly built houses knowing that the landlord needs the disputed house. There is no cognet evidence on behalf of the tenant to show that he urgently needed money for investment in his business and for that reason he sold away his two houses.”
11. Similar explanation has been given in paragraph II of the writ petition. The finding of the appellate authority that the explanation given was not trustworthy is one of fact. It was upto the appellate authority to accept the explanation or not to have done so. The finding of the court below holding that the balance tilted in favour of the landlord is not erroneous. Every court since is constituted for the purpose of doing justice according to law. It is not possible to accept the contention of the petitioner's learned counsel that only because the petitioner is a tenant, the case should be decided in his favour. The object of the Act may be to regulate eviction, but that does not deprive a landlord to get a release order of his house made in his favour even if he satisfies the requirements laid down for that purpose in Section 21 of the Act. It is not correct to argue that in every event the application of a landlord has to be rejected, and that the plea of a tenant howsoever frivolous it maybe, should be accepted irrespective of the fact that the need of the landlord is bona fide. Simply because a person happens to be a landlord, the lav cannot be interpreted against him.
12. After the judgment was reserved and was listed for delivery on December 10, 1979, an application was filed on behalf of the petitioner raising new points in support of the writ petition which had not been taken either in the writ petition or argued before me. Considering the interest of justice, I allowed the application. Through this application, the petitioner attempted to raise some factual controversies as well, apart from those of laws Counsel for the petitioner, however, made a statement before me on 10-12-1979 that he would confine his arguments only to legal aspects taken in the said application.
13. The argument advanced by the petitioner's counsel was that since U.P Act Kill of 1972 did not apply to cantonments in U.P, the application filed by the landlord under Section 21 of U.P Act XIII of 1972 was not maintainable and, as such, the order of release made by the appellate authority under the aforesaid section was a nullity.
14. For appreciating the point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner, a brief reference to the history of the legislation may be relevant. When the U.P (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Ordinance, 1946, was promulgated on October 1, 1946, it applied to cantonment areas as well. The same position continued when the Ordinance became an Act. When, however, the U.P (Amendment) Act 44 of 1948 was enforced, the cantonment areas were excluded from the Act, as it was felt that the Act might impede speedy action under the Cantonments (House Accommodation) Act, 1923. Thereafter, a numer of representations were made by the residents of cantonments for extending the protection available to tenants in U.P to cantonment areas as well. These representations found favour with the Government with the result that U.P Ordinance 5 of 1949 was promulgated oil September 26, 1949. The Ordinance could not be transformed into an Act and so the cantonment areas again went outside the purview of the Act.
15. In the meantime, the question whether the State Legislature was competent to enact laws with regard to cantonments was raised in Smt. Ahmedi Begam v. District Magistrate, Agra.1 In this case, the High Court took the view that the State Legislature was incompetent to regulate accommodations lying in the cantonments, which was a Central subject. This led to the passing of U.P Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952 (Act 10 of 1952), (hereinafter referred to as Act 10 of 1952). This Act was enacted to provide for the control of rent of house accommodations in cantonments in Uttar Pradesh and to prevent eviction of tenants therefrom. Act 10 of 1952 was in force in Uttar Pradesh when the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as Act 46 of 1957) was enacted by the Parliament to provide for the extension to cantonments of laws relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodations. As already stated above, the main difficulty realised was that since the regulation of relationship between landlords and tenants in respect of house accommodations situated in cantonments was central subject, the laws enacted by State Legislatures were not applicable to those areas. This led to the enactment of Act 46 of 1957. This is illustrated from the “Statement of Objects and Reasons” given in Gaz. Ind. Extra. 1957 Part II, S. 2, page 831. It says:
“Under Article 246 of the Constitution read with Entry S. of the Union List, the power to make laws with respect to rent control in cantonment areas now belongs exclusively to Parliament. Before the Constitution came into force, this power belonged to the legislature of the formed Provinces and State………….”
16. In fact, in Indu Bhushan Bose v. Ram Sundri Devi 1969 2 SCC 289, the controversy relating to the competence of the State Legislature to cannot a law relating to the regulation of relationship of landlord and tenant regarding houses situated in cantonment areas, came up for consideration. The Supreme Court held that:
“So that the effect of Entry 3 of List I is that on the subject of relationship between landlord and tenant in so far as it arises in respect of house accommodations situated in cantonment areas, Parliament alone can legislate and not the State Legislatures.”
17. Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 conferred power on the Central Government to extend to cantonments laws relating to control of rent and regulation of house accommodations. As the interpretation of Section 3 is involved in this case, it is advantageous to quote Sub-section (1) of Section 3 at this place. It reads:
“The Central Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, extend to any cantonment with such restrictions and modifications as it thinks fit, any enactment to the control of rent and eviction of houses which is force…in the State in which the cantonment is situated.”
18. At the place where asterisks have been shown the words were “on the date of the notification”. These were omitted by Section 3 of the Central Act 22 of 1972. The amendment was given retrospective effect as it laid down that the omission shall be deemed always to have been so.
19. So far as U.P is concerned. It may be noted that since Act 10 of 1952 was already in force, the Central Government could not issue a notification under Section 9 applying U.P Act III of 1947, which was in operation in areas other than cantonments. As the power to repeal an Act was legislative function, the Central Government could not repeal Act 10 of 1952 and apply U.P Act III of 1947. This could be done only by Parliamentary legislation. This controversy as to whether the repeal was a legislative function was the subject matter of decision in Raj Narain Singh v. Chairman, Patna Administration Committee Patna.3 In Paragraph 24 of the said judgment, Bose, J., has summarised the law laid down in Delhi Laws case.4 The relevant portion of the summary made by the learned Judge for our purposes is extracted below:
“Where the authorisation was to repeal laws already in force in the area and either substitute nothing in their place or substitute other laws, central or provincial with or without modification.
This was held to be ultra vires by a majority of four to three.”
20. In order to achieve the object of applying the U.P Act III of 1947 to cantonments areas by issuing a notification under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1937, it was thus essential that Central Act 10 of 1952 was repealed by a Parliamentary Act. This was done by enacting U.P Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction (Repeal) Act, 1971 (Act 68 of 1971), hereinafter referred to as Act 68 of 1971). The object of passing the aforesaid Act, is given in the preamble, was:
“…………to provide for the repeal of the U.P Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952.”
21. This Act has in all three sections. Section 2 of the said Act reads as under:
“On and from the date on which the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (United Provinces Act III of 1947) is extended by notification under Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957 (46 of 1957) to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the U.P Cantonments (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1952, Act 10 of 1952) shall stand repealed.”
22. This section provided that with effect from the date on which a notification applying U.P Act III of 1947 was extended, the Central Act 10 of 1952 shall stand repealed. The Parliament took the basic legislative decision to conform the laws in the cantonments to the laws of the areas other than cantonments. In other words, this was done to give effect to the policy of uniformity in its most complete and accurate form.
23. Upon Act 68 of 1971 having been passed, the Central Government issued a notification dated April 3, 1972, extending to the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh, the U.P Act III of 1947. Soon thereafter, however, as the U.P Act III of 1947 had been repealed by passing U.P Act XIII of 1972, the Central Government thought of issuing another notification applying U.P Act XIII of 1972 to the cantonments in U.P This was done by S.R.O No. 259. The relevant portion of the aforesaid notification issued on 1-9-1973, subsequently gazetted on 29-9-1973, is reproduced below:
“In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Cantonments (Extension of Rent Control Laws) Act, 1957, (Act 46 of 1957), and in supersession of the notification of the Government of india in the Ministry of Defence, No. S.R.O 8, dated 3rd April, 1972, the Central Government hereby extends to all the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P Act XIII of 1972) as in force on the date of this notification, in the State of Uttar Pradesh with the following modification, namely…………”
24. Since the modifications are not material for our purposes, the same are not being mentioned in this judgment. This completes the legislative history. As a result of the notification dated 1st September, 1973, the U.P Act XIII of 1972 became applicable to cantonments in U.P The rights and obligations of the parties, namely, landlords and tenants and others, have to be regulated in accordance with, this law. The consequence was that there is a complete uniformity in the whole of U.P in the matter of laws relating to regulation of relationship between landlords and tenants.
25. Sri S.P Gupta, counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that since legally as well as constitutionally the Central Act 10 of 1952 has not been repealed and is still in force, therefore, the rights of the parties are governed by the aforesaid Act. In support of this argument, counsel urged that Central Act 10 of 1952 was a special Act for the cantonments in the State of U.P whereas Act 46 of 1957 was a general Act for the cantonments in India, hence according to the accepted rule of construction, namely, that subject matter of prior special statute is excepted from the subsequent general statute for the same subject matter, the Central Act 46 of 1937 did not apply. The necessary consequence, according to the petitioner's learned counsel, was that the Central Govt. did not have any authority and power to issue a notification under Section 3 of the Act 46 of 1957 applying U.P Act III of 1947 and thereafter superseding the same and applying U.P Act XIII of 1972, in this connection, counsel contended that since the Central Act 46 of 1957 did not provide that it would apply to all cantonments in India, the necessary consequence was that the area covered by the Special Act 10 of 1952 was excluded from the purview of the former.
26. The submission has no merit. Act 46 of 1957 had a different object to achieve and could not be termed as a general law on the same subject on which Act 10 of 1952 had been enacted. Section 3 lays down that by issuing a notification under it, the Central Government could apply the State law relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodations which is in force in the State in which the cantonment is situated. It does not contain any provision dealing with the subject matter concerning the relationship of landlords and tenants. It has no provision giving the grounds on which a tenant is liable to eviction. In fact, a notification under Section 8 of the aforesaid Act can be issued only when there is no law applicable to a particular State providing for the protection of tenants from improper eviction. It is not correct to argue that a notification under Section 3 applying the State law to cantonment areas could be issued irrespective of the fact that at the time when this Act was applied there was a law already in operation. For its applicability, the existence of an Act or law on the date of enforcement of Central Act 46 of 1957 is, however, not material.
27. In fact, the question that a general provision should yield to a special provision does not arise for decision in the present case. The maxim “Generalia spesiliabus non derogant” is quite well known. The rule or principle behind this maxim has been explained in Mary Seward v. The Owner of the Vera Cruz 1884 10 A.C 59 at page 68., in this case, the view taken was that a subject specially dealt with by earlier legislation is not indirectly repealed, altered or derogated merely by force of such general words inasmuch as it is logical to presume that when a legislature has not repealed or modified the former Special Act he former Act will continue in force.
28. Sri S.P Gupta, counsel appearing for the petitioner, cited a number of authorities, English and Indian, in support of the above proposition. The proposition being that general provisions should yield to special provisions. In his submission, as already pointed out above, the Central Act 10 of 1952 was a Special Act, dealing with a specific subject, namely, the conditions on which a tenant of a house situated in a cantonment was liable to be evicted. He may be right in this contention that it is impossible to conceive that Parliament sought to abrogate the rights of a tenant by passing Act 46 of 1957. But in this case, however, as already pointed out this controversy does not arise. In the instant case, the provisions of U.P Act XIII of 1972 were applied by superseding the notification under which U.P Act III of 1947 had been brought into operation in U.P As a result of the supersession of the earlier notification, the U.P State did not have any legislation regulating the relationship of landlords and tenants of the accommodations situated in cantonments. By the supersession of the earlier notification No. S.R.O 8/72, the field became vacant for regulating the relationship of landlords and tenants. In such an event, a notification under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 could be issued applying U.P Act XIII of 1972. There was no law in operation at the time of the issuance of this notification. As such, there is no question of a conflict or applying the principle that a general provision should yield to a special provision.
29. Sri S.P Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner citei a number of decisions, Indian and English, in support of the principle stated above. Since in my opinion, there is no controversy involved in the present case with respect to the applicability of the aforesaid principle, I need not refer to all of them. Reference may, however, be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in U.P State Electricity Board v. Hari Shanker Jain.6 In this case. Industrial Employment (Standing Order) Act was found to be a special Act dealing with a specific subject, namely, the conditions of service enumerated in the Schedule the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act being general in nature, the former Act would prevail over Section 79(c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act in regard to matters to which the industrial Employment (Standing orders) Act applied. The Supreme Court applied the rule that general provision must yield to a specific provision. The present is not a case attracting the aforesaid proposition that would amount to pressing the rule too far.
30. Great emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner to argue that since the Central Act 46 of 1957 does not lay down that it shall apply to all the cantonments in india, the operation of the Central Act with respect to the cantonments situated in U.P should be deemed to be excluded. Counsel urged that since the operation of Act 46 of 1947 was excluded altogether, the Central Government had no power to issue a notification under Section 3 of the said Act. In support of his argument, learned counel referred to Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, pages 377 and 388. Particular reference was made to the facts and law extracted from the judgment in R. v. Poor Law Commissioner 1838 6A and E1-93.
31. In my view, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no substance. Section 3 confers power on the State Government to extend any enactment relating to the control of rent and regulation of house accommodations in the State to any cantonment. The word “cantonment” has been defined in Section 2 of the said Act. It lays down that this word” Cantonment” means any place declared to be a cantonment under Section 3 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, This Act, therefore, applies to all cantonments which have been so declared under Section 33 of the Cantonments Act, 1924. The fact that since there was already a law relating to the regulation of landlords and tenants was in existence in 1957 at the time when the Act was passed, did not mean that the same could not be made applicable later. The Act, as already pointed out above, had been designed to achieve the object of protecting the tenants from improper evictions. For this purpose, the Central Government had been authorised to extend the relevant Rent Control laws of any State to the cantonments situated in that State by notification in the gazette of India. There is nothing to suggest that the States where the Rent Control laws enacted by the Parliament were already in force, that a notification under Section 3 could not be issued. The power to issue a notification under Section 3 did not depend on the contingency that there must not have been any Rent Control laws at the time when Act 46 of 1957 was in force. The argument, therefore, that the cantonments, where the rent control laws were in force, were excluded from the operation of the Central Act 46 of 1957, is not acceptable to me. The principle of law stated by Craies relied upon by the petitioner's learned counsel is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The territory of U.P was not excluded expressly or impliedly from the operation of Act 46, 1957.
32. The next submission made was that there was no provision in the Central Act 46 of 1957 authorising the Central Government to repeal or to bring about the repeal of Act 10 of 1952, hence without such power, the Central Government could not repeal Act 10 of 1952. I have already stated above that the power of repaal being a legislative function, the same could be done only by the Parliament itself. It is for this purpose that the Parliament passed Act 68 of 1971. The preamble of the said Act, extracted above, would reveal that the sole purpose of the aforesaid Act was to repeal Act 10 of 1952. The Parliament realised the difficulty which the Central Government could have faced for issuing a notification under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 and to get over the said difficulty, Act 68 of 1971 was passed. This repealed Act 10 of 1252, deferring its operation to the date on which the notification under Section 3 of date on which the notification under Section 3 of Central Act 46 of 1957 was issued, applying U.P Act III or 1947. This was done with a view to provide continued protection from eviction to tenants. If the Parliament could have made a provision for the repeal of Act 10 of 1952, with immediate effect, in such an eventually the protection available to tenants under Act 10 of 1952 would not have been available as the said Act would have immediately ceased to perate. For this purpose the actual operation of the repeal was deferred till the issuance of the notification under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957. The competence of the Parliament to pass this Act has not been a subject matter of controversy before me. The Parliament was entitled under Entry 3 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to make such a law. What is required to legislate a law on a subject is the power to do so. How will that power be exercised is a matter for the Parliament to decide. The Parliament is supreme in this matter, and that if a certain legislation has been passed by it, the same cannot be held to be ultra vires of its power to enact it simply on the ground that the same thing could be done by another way than the one in accordance with which it has been exercised.
33. This leads me to the consideration of the next argument which depends on the interpretation of the expression ‘any cantonment’ used in Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957. Counsel contended that the aforesaid expression occurring therein does not and cannot, include each and every cantonment in India. The word ‘any’ does not always mean each and every, for this proposition, counsel relied upon two decisions of the Supreme Court reported in Commissioner of income Tax v. Smt. Sodra Devi A.I.R 1957 S.C 832. and R.M.D Chamarbaugwall v. Union of India.9 In the former case, the Supreme Court was called upon to interpret the word “any individual” used in Section 16(3) and Section 16(3)(a) of the income Tax Act, whereas in the latter decision the controversy was relating to the interpretation of the expression “any” used in Section 2(d) of the Prize Competitions Act. Taking into account the context in which the expression “any” was used in Section 2(d) of the said Act, the Supreme Court observed that the word “any” did not include within itself all competitions. Similarly, in the former case, the view was that words “any Individual” were restricted in their connotation to mean only the male of the species and do not include the female of the species. After a consideration of the two judgments, I find that what is material for interpreting a word is the context. The word “any” has several meanings. The meaning to be assigned to it has to be given on the basis of its context. Any meaning given in ignorance of the context is likely to result in rendering the provision redundant and meaningless. In Chief Inspector of Mines v. K.C Thapar,10 the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the meaning of the word “any” used in the Mines Act. The Supreme Court held:
“If One examines the use of the words ‘any one’ in common conversation or lecture, there can be no doubt that they are not infrequently used to mean every one—not one, but all. Thus, we say “any one cans see that this is wrong” to mean “every one can see that this is wrong”. “Any one may enter” does not mean that only the person may enter but all of them may enter.”
34. It is well settled that a word can have many meanings to find out the exact connotation of a word in a statute, we must look to the context in which it is used, the context would quite often provide the key to the meaning and the sense it should carry. Its setting would give colour to it and provide a due to the intention of the legislature to use it. A word, as said by Holmes, is not a crystal, transparent and uncharged, it is the skin of a living though and may vary greatly in colour and content according to the time in which it is used ((1977) 1 SCC 155 : A.I.R 1976 S.C 2602).
35. Lord Denning also has said in his book “The Discipline of Law” at page 9;
“Beyond doubt the task of the lawyer and of the judges is to find out the intention of Parliament. In doing this, you must, of course, start with the words in the statute: but not end with them as some people seem to think. You must discover the meaning of the words.”
36. Looking at the context, it appears to me that the word “any” has been used in the sense of all and its scope and applicability cannot be confined only to those cantonments where the Rent Control Laws were not enforced on the date on which Central Act 46 of 1957 came into force.
37. What is the sequence of the context has been dealt with by Reed Dickerson in his book on the “Interpretation and Application of Statutes”, 1975 Edition, page 105. At page 111, the learned author says:
“The most useful, indeed also indespensible, function of context is to narrow the range of reference of otherwise over general words. Without it, all but the simplest communications would be intolerable long. Consider Wittgenstain's famous example; some one says to me, “Shew the children a game”. I teach them gaming that dice, and the other says “I did not mean that sort of game.”
38. A word, therefore, cannot be read in insolation and if it is read without context it will begin with a very wide area of meaning, for it may occur in many hundreds of situations and may be used as a label for scores of objects but by means of the practical contexts in which it is used, we can whittle fit down to the meaning which must have been intended to convey.
39. Counsel, thereafter, urged that even the rule of harmoneous construction requires that the two Statutes should be construed in a manner that no repugnancy and conflict is created between them. Elaborating his submission, counsel urged that it was obvious that while Central Act 46 of 1957 was being enacted the Parliament knew that Central Act 10 of 1952 was applicable in the cantonments in the State of Uttar Pradesh. This demonstrated that the Parliament did not contemplate the repeal of Act 10 of 1952 by or under the provisions of the Central Act 46 of 1957, According to counsel's submission, the only way to harmonise is to read the two Statutes together and to hold that the Central Act 46 of 1957 did not apply to the cantonments in Uttar Pradesh. I have already held above that there is no inconsistency between the two Acts and, therefore, there is no occasion for applying the principles of harmoneous construction to the facts or the present case. The question of harmoneous construction arises when an enactment has two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other. It is in order to give effect to both that an occasion in apply the aforesaid provision applies. But, as such a contingency does not arise in the present case, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no help.
40. Sir S.P Gupta next urged that as a notification under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 could not be issued in respect of the cantonments applying the State Law in U.P, the Central Government did not have power to enlarge the scope of Act 46 of 1957 by passing Central Act of 1971. The power to pass the 1971 Act, as already observed above, was derived by the Parliament from the Legislative Entry 3 of Scheduled I. For enacting the said law it was not required to look to Act 46 of 1957.
41. with the above, the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that since the Central Act of 1971 did not enlarge the scope of Central Act 46 of 1957 to make it applicable to the enactments in Uttarr Pradesh the notification issued by the Central Government applying U.P Act III of 1947 was invalid. In this regard, the further submission was that as the aforesaid Notification was void, the Central Government could not issue any further notification applying U.P Act XIII of 1972. The submission is devoid of substance. I have already held above that the Central Government had the power to repeal Act 10 of 1952 and to apply the provisions of Act 46 of 1957 to the cantonments in Uttar Pradesh. That being so, the Central Government had power to issue the notification applying U.P Act III of 1947 to the cantonments and thereafter to supersede the said notification and to apply U.P Act III of 1972 by issuing another notification under Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957. It is wrong to say that the notification issued under Section 3 applying the two Acts, viz., U.P Act III of 1947 and thereafter U.P Act III of 1972, was invalid and that Act 10 of 1952 is still in operation. Act 10 of 1952 had been repealed by the Parliament. After the repeal, the Central Government had power to issue notifications applying U.P Act III of 1947 and thereafter U.P Act XIII of 1972.
42. In Kartar Singh v. Piara Ram,11 a writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the validity of Section 14 of Act 10 of 1952 on the ground that it imposed unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. During the pendency of the above writ petition. Act 10 of 1952 was repealed, and the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition by observing that since the impugned statutory provisions stood repealed, the writ had become in fructuous. This case is an authority to counter the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that Act 10 of 1952 is still in force. The Supreme Court held that the Act had been repealed and was not in existence.
43. Counsel, thereafter, contended that Section 2 of the Central Act of 1971 at the most conferred power of applying U.P Act III of 1947 to cantonments in Uttar Pradesh and the same having been done by the notification dated 3-4-1972, the Central Government did not have power to supersede that notification and to issue another notification under Section 3 itself applying U.P Act XIII of 1972. He argued that the power conferred by Section 3 had been exhausted and could not be exercised again and again for the same purpose which had been achieved by issuing the notification dated 3-4-1972. On this reasoning, counsel contended that the irresistible conclusion must be that the notification of the Central Government dated 1-9-1973/29-9-1973 extending U.P Act XIII of 1972 to the cantonments in Uttar Pradesh was ultra vires. In support of his argument, counsel referred to the authorities of the Supreme Court reported in Naraindas v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1974 4 SCC 788 and S.D.O Sadar v. Shambhoo Narain Singh.13
44. I am not impressed by this argument as well. Section 3 conferred power on the Central Government to issue notification applying the State Law to the cantonments. It is the settled rule of construction that power to issue a notification includes the power to add to, amend, vary or rescind notifications from time to time. There it nothing in Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 indicating that the power could be exercised only once and not from time to time as the power to issue notification under Section 3 would also include the power to supersede it and to issue another notification for the same purpose for which the earlier notification had been issued. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, which contains the rule of construction, makes a provision to that effect. This, of course, is subject to the context and subject matter of the particular statute to which it is being applied. There is nothing in the context of the present statute which may warrant an inter predation that once a notification under Section 3 had been applied, the said notification cannot be superseded and another notification for the same purpose for which the earlier and had been issued, could not be made. The nature of the power contained is not such that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act could be held to be inapplicable. If for the interpretation of Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957, Section 21 of the General Clauses Act was not applied, the result would be that the notification issued once would become applicable for all times to come, Such a position may destroy the purpose for which the power of applying State Laws has been conferred on the Central Government. The power of superseding, varying or amending the earlier notification from time to time should be held to be included in Section 3 to suit the changing situations.
45. In Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu end Kashmir.14 the Supreme Court had an occasion to deal with the question of power of making orders under Article 370 of the Constitution. It held that the said provision applied and, therefore, the Central Government had the power of making orders from time to time. The power to make orders from time to time clearly includes the power to supersede the earlier notification and to issue another in its place. The principle thus sought to be taken help of by the petitioner's learned counsel that with the issuance of the notification dated 3-4-1972 applying U.P Act III of 1947, the power to issue another notification was exhausted, cannot be accepted. The cases of the Supreme Court cited by the learned counsel are distinguishable and need not be referred to.
46. It is also not correct to argue that by issuing the notification dated 29-9-1973, the Central Government had assumed the legislative function by itself. The power to legislative includes the power to delegate. Of course, the Legislature cannot delegate its power to repeal a law or even to modify it in essential features. In the instant case, the Central Government did not repeal U.P Act III of 1947 when it issued the notification dated 29-9-1972, superseding the earlier notification dated 3-4-1972 and applying U.P Act XIII of 1972. The act of issuing notification dated 29-9-1973 was within its permissible jurisdiction and as it does not amount to delegation of essential legislative function, the submission of the learned counsel made to that effect cannot be accepted.
47. Sri S.P Gupta next referred to Section 3 of Act 46 of 1957 and urged that the words “which is in force on the date of notification” would only empower the Central Government to apply the law or the Act which in operation on the date of enforcement of Act 46 of 1957. He urged that Section 3 does not permit to issue a notification in respect of a future law. This, according to the learned counsel, if accepted would amount to abdication of essential legislative function conferred by Article 245 of the Constitution on a subordinate authority, and, hence, would render the notification ultra vires the Constitution.
48. Before dealing with the question of abdication. I would prefer to dispose of the argument raised on the interpretation of Section 3. It is ture that initially the Act contained the words “which is in force on the date of notification”, but the words “on the date of notification” were thereafter omitted by Act 22 of 1972. The provision omitting the aforesaid words was given retrospective effect. The obvious result was that these words would never be deemed to be in the statute. Consequently, the argument built by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the interpretation of the aforesaid words does not stand.
49. At this place, another argument, which was made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that since U.P Act XII of 1972, was not specially extended by amending Act 46 of 1957, therefore, the Central Government did not have power to issue notification applying the same to be dealt with. In support of this argument, the counsel referred to Section 4 of Act 46 of 1957 and urged that the fact that the legislature did not make any provision extending U.P Act XIII of 1972 to cantonments in U.P, demonstrated that the Parliament did not want the said U.P Act to be applied in Uttar Pradesh. This argument also is without merit. From the “Statement of objects and Reasons” given in the Bill, it would be seen that there was a special reason for enacting Section 4 for applying the provisions of Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 1955, to the cantonments of Mhow. It would be noticed from the Statement of Objects and Reasons that a large number of eviction cases had been filed by the landlords by taking advantage of the non-existense of any Rent Control Law in the cantonment area, and in order to protect the tenants from improper evictions, a Central legislation became necessary to provide for the application of the State Act of 1955 to Mhow. The cantonment of Mhow had a special feature which has been explained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons. It is not necessary for me to repeat those reasons here. Suffice to point out that making a provision for Mhow could not abrogate the power conferred by Section 3 of the aforesaid Act.
50. The only other point that now remains to be examined is about abdication. Counsel contended that since the legislature did not know about the future laws which could be passed by the State Legislatures, it could not be said to have intended to apply future laws as well. He urged that, on the correct interpretation, one must hold that the legislature could only think of applying the law as it stood at the time of enactment of Act 46 of 1957. Any other interpretation would result in abdication of the legislative power and being not permissible by Articles 245 and 246 would be ultra vires the Constitution. In support of this submission, counsel relied off the decision of the Supreme Court in B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory Of Pondicherry of Pondicherry.15
51. The question of abdication was considered by the Supreme Court in a later decision reported in Gwalior Rayon Mills Limited v. Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax.16 In this case, the Supreme Court concluded by saying that:
“There can be no doubt that Parliament can repeal the provisions of Section 8(2)(b) adopting the higher rate of tax fixed by the appropriate State Legislature in respect of inter state sales. If Parliament can repeal the provision, there can be no objection on the score that Parliament has abdicated its legislative function. It retains its control over the financial position and the rate intact. In other words, so long as Parliament can repeal the provisions of Section 8(2)(b) adopting the higher rate of tax by the State Legislatures, it has not abdicated its legislative functions. As already stated, this point has been expressly decided by the Privy Counsel in (1967) 1 A.C 141.”
52. In the instant case, the principle of abdication did not apply. The Parliament had empowered the Central Government to apply the Provincial Rent Control Law to cantonment areas which may be applicable to the State where the cantonments may be situated. This was necessitated to protect the tenants from improper evictions. By applying the same law to cantonments, which was applicable to other areas, the Parliament intended to achieve complete uniformity on the same subject. In my opinion, therefore, making provision for automatic application of future laws of the State Legislature on that subject could not be held to be unconstitutional on the ground of abdication.
53. In Shama Rao's case (supra), the Pondicherry Legislature had abdicated its legislative functions in the matter of Sales Tax Legislative functions in the matter of Sales Tax Legislation and surrendered the same in favour of the Madras Legislature. As the Pondicherry Legislature had completely abdicated its functions regarding that enactment, consequently it was observed by their Lordships that the Pondicherry General ales Tax Act was void and still-born. The above observations are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In fact in Gwalior Rayon's case (supra) itself, the Supreme Court stated in paragraph 63 that:
“We think that the principle of the ruling in 67 (2) S.C.R 650 : A.I.R 1967 S.C 1480 (supra) must be confined to the facts of the case. It is doubtful whether there is any general principle which precludes either Parliament or a State Legislature from adopting a law and the future amendments to the law passed respectively by a State Legislature or Parliament and incorporating them in its legislation.”
54. The last point raised was regarding the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority to decide the case. Counsel challenged the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority on two grounds. The first was that as the Prescribed Authority, before whom the proceedings were filed, has not pointed out in respect of the cantonment areas of the town of Jhansi, he had no authority to decide the same. The second was that the power had been conferred by the original Act No. XIII of 1972 on a Magistrate First Class, having experience of not less than three years as such and authorised by the District Magistrate. Counsel contended that as. In the instant case, the authorisation was not by the District Magistrate but by the District Judge, the Prescribed Authority could not entertain the application. Admittedly. U.P Act No. XIII of 1972 has undergone several amendments and now under the Amended Act, there is no dispute that the Prescribed Authority could decide the application. Counsel, however, urged that the amendments would not apply to the present case. I do not consider it necessary to go into this question. Admittedly, the point had not been raised by the petitioner either before the Prescribed Authority or the appellate authority. The petitioner waited for the judgment of the Prescribed Authority to go in his favour and when now that the judgment went against him, he raised the same in the High Court. No one is entitled to have relief under Article 22 of the Constitution as of right. To permit the petitioner to raise this point in the High Court and to annual the entire proceedings would be against the principles of justice. The petitioner did not even raise this controversy in the appeal, which authority, admittedly, had jurisdiction to decide it. To permit the petitioner to raise this point now would result in furitless duplication of trial and encourage careless practice by Advocates and promote multiplicity of proceedings. Accordingly, I decline to permit the petitioner to raise the said ground; For these reasons, the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioner is granted three months' time from today either to vacate the premises or to comply with the direction of the appellate authority and to take possession of the alternative accommodation given to him.