Rama Jois, J.:—
In this revision petition presented under section 50(1) of the Karnataka House Rent Control Act, 1961 (the Act for short) which has been referred to a Division Bench under Section 9 of the Karnataka High Court Act, the following question of law arises for consideration:
Whether, on an application made by a Landlord under proviso (h) to section 21(1) of the Act, which enables the recovery of possession of a premises from the tenant if it is bona fide and reasonably required by the landlord for occupation ‘by himself’, an order for recovery of possession could be made if it is made out that the premises is required for the residence of his major son?
2. The facts of the case in brief are as follows: The respondent is the owner of the premises No. 147, situate in 6th Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore. The petitioner is a tenant in the said premises. The respondent made an application before the Court below inter alia under clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act, praying for an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the ground that it was required for accommodating his two sons.
3. The Court below, after considering the evidence adduced on behalf of the respondent, recorded a finding to the effect that the requirement of the respondent was reasonable and bona fide. On the question of comparative hardship also, the Court below recorded a finding that the respondent would be put to greater hardship if the prayer for eviction was not granted. In the result, the Court below made an order on 31st October 1977 directing the petitioner to deliver vacant possession. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner-tenant has presented this revision petition.
4. Sri Venkatakrishna, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, urged the following contentions:
(i) The order made by the lower Court was contrary to the provisions of Section 21(1)(h) of the Act in that in view of the definition of the word ‘family’ given in Section 3(ff) of the Act, an order for eviction could be made on the ground set out in Section 21(1)(h) of the Act, if only the land-lord required the premises for his personal occupation or members of the family as defined in Section 3(ff) of the Act which does not include independent and major sons, for the purpose of whose residence the recovery of possession was sought for in this case; and
(ii) the finding of fact recorded by the Court below in favour of the respondent was perverse.
5. Sri Santhosh Hegde, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, per contra, submitted as follows: The expression “himself” used in Section 21(1)(h) of the Act was wide enough to include the bona fide requirement of the major sons of the land-lord. The definition of the word ‘family’ given in Section 3(ff) of the Act cannot be invoked as that word has not been used in Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. The finding recorded by the Court below about the reasonable and bona fide requirement of the respondent was based on the evidence on record and there was no ground for interfering with the said finding.
6. In view of these rival contentions, the question of law, set out first arises for consideration.
7. The relevant part of Section 21 of the Act reads as follows:
“Protection of Tenants against eviction.—(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or other authority in favour of the land-lord against the tenant;
Provided that the Court may on an application made to it, make an order for the recovery of possession of a premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:—
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(h) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust, that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust”.
The above provision empowers the Court to order recovery of possession in the occupation of a tenant, in favour of the landlord, if the latter makes an application stating that the premises is reasonably and bonafide required for occupation by himself and adduces satisfactory evidence in support of such claim. The question for consideration in this case is: what is the true meaning that should be given to the word ‘himself’ used in clause(h)?. The provision had come up for interpretation before this Court in the case of Aprameya Iyengar v. Ramaswamy . 1968 1 Mys. L.J 592.. The petitioner-landlord in that case wanted to recover possession of the premises for the occupation of his sister. The question for consideration was whether such ground fell within the purview of clause (h). After referring to a decision of the Bombay High Court in the institute of Radio Technology v. Panduranga Babu Rao . 1963 2 All. E.R 336. 47 Bombay L.R 825, in which the expression ‘his own occupation’ used in Section 11 of the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1939 for the purpose, same as the one for which the expression ‘himself’ is used in Section 21(1)(h) of the Act, was interpreted by the Bombay High Court, and agreeing with that interpretation, Somnath Iyer, J. (as he then was) proceeded to state as follows:—
“I fully concur in this statement of the law. I have no doubt that I should understand the expression ‘occupation by himself’ occurring in Section 21(1)(h) of the new Act in the same way in which the expression ‘his own occupation’ was construed by Divatia, J. The history of that clause, its language and its purpose demonstrate that its aim is to create a right to recover possession even when the premises are not required for the landlord's personal occupation, if, they are required for the occupation of the landlord himself.
The construction that the occupation of which that clause speaks, is the personal physical occupation of the land-lord cannot be sound and is too artificial to merit acceptance. It defeats the purpose of the Act and produces the oppressive consequences that possession cannot be recovered when the premises are required for the occupation of the parents or wife or children or a dependant of the land lord whose profession, a vocation or the like compels a plurality of establishments.
If Section 21(1)(h) does not therefore insist on the personal occupation of the land-lord, and, its scope is not expressly limited to the requirement of the members of his family as it was by the old Act, it should be given a meaning which makes it operate evenly, and, in a just and reasonable way. While the construction to be placed on its language should not expose the tenant to the jeopardy of an eviction on fanciful grounds, it should not denude the statute of the efficacy which its language and object portray. On such interpretation, its provisions extend to a requirement for occupation of persons whose occupation in substance is the land-lord's own.”
Thereafter, his Lordship referred to a decision of the Court of Appeal of England in Riches v. Wilson in which Willmer, L.J interpreting the expression ‘himself’ used in paaragraph (h) of Schedule-I to the English Rent and Mortgage Interest restrictions (Amendment Act 1933) had held “quite plainly the expression ‘himself’ must include all the normal ‘emanations’ of himself” and concluded as follows:
“So, the test by the application of which I should decide this case is whether it could be said that when the sister lives in the premises, the land-lord himself lives there through his sister. If he does, the sister's occupation is the occupation of the landlord ‘by himself’ and the house hold would then be a common house hold. If that be the true position, the land-lord should get an order for possession.”
On the facts of the case, however, his Lordship, came to the conclusion that the occupation of the Sister of the land-lord in that case could not be regarded as landlord's occupation.
8. The interpretation placed on Section 21(1)(h) of the Act in the above case was followed in the case of Govindarajulu v. Savithramma . 1969 1 Mys. L.J 58. and in the case of Gopal… v. Kuppuswamy…. . 1970 2 Mys. L.J 324..
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that the expression ‘himself’ used in clause (h) of Section 21(1) of the Act, must be understood having due regard to the definition of the word ‘family’ contained in Section 3(ff) of the Act introduced subsequently by amending Act 66/1976. It reads:
‘family’ in relation to a person means the wife or husband of such person and his or her dependent children.”
The argument is fallacious because the word ‘family’ does not find a place in Section 21(1)(h) of the Act. When a word is defined in the definition Section of an enactment, that meaning should be given to that word wherever it is used in that Act. Even this is subject to an exception that a different meaning could be given if the context so requires. But, what the learned counsel for the petitioner wants us to do is, to import the meaning given to the word ‘family’ in Section 3(ff) of the Act in order to restrict the meaning of the word ‘himself’ used in Section 21(1)(h) of the Act, though the word ‘family’ is not at all used in clause (h). The submission, in our opinion, is bereft of any merit.
10. Alternatively, the construction sought to be placed on the word ‘himself’ by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that it only refers to the landlord in person or his dependants, who reside with him and not separately. Such a construction, in our view, is too technical and artificial as it would rob the provision of its real intention and purpose and it does not merit acceptance. Under variety of circumstances, the actual occupation of the premises by another has to be regarded constructively as the occupation by the landlord ‘himself’ or the occupant has to be regarded as an ‘emanation’ of the landlord himself. It is not possible to state exhaustively all the circumstances in which the physical occupation of a person other than the land-lord would have to be regarded as occupation by the landlord himself. A few illustrations, however, would bring home the point. For instance, the occupation of the premises by a person who is economically dependant on the landlord, the occupation of the premises by a major son or daughter including a married daughter whose residence in the premises is genuinely desired by the landlord, the occupation by a servant whose assistance is considered essential by the landlord, the occupation of the premises out of necessity by those who are kith and kin of the landlord for the purpose of their education or medical treatment as the case may be as genuinely desired by the lanlord, would have to be regarded as occupation by the landlord himself. We respectfully agree with the interpretation placed on Section 21(1)(h) of the Act in the case of Aprameya Iyengar which was followed in the two subsequent cases of Govindarajulu(4) and Gopal5.
11. In the light of the discussion as above, we answer the question of law set out first in the affirmative.
12. We should, however, strike a note of caution and make it clear that when the ground for eviction sought to be made out in any given case is, that the premises is required for the residence or occupation of a person other than the landlord, the Court should be more circumspect in finding out as to whether, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence adduced, such occupation could be regarded as occupation by the landlord himself or it is only a ruse to get an order of eviction. Besides, the degree of relationship or dependence; the circumstances under which the landlord's claim for the premises arises and put forward; the intrinsic tenability of the claim having regard to the realities of life and the social mores and the like have all to be put into the scales and go into the judicial verdict. In a given case, even the requirement of an adult, economically independent son, might, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case, become the requirement of the landlord father See K. Nagappa v. T.D Krishnasa . A.I.R 1971 A.P 243., Shankar Shaw… v. Anukul Ch. Bose…. . 71 C.W.N 174., Ananta Ojah… v. Hazi Osimuddin Sadagar…. . A.I.R 1952 Assam 132. Motilal Pannalal…Defendant- v. Kailash Narain…Plaintiff-. . A.I.R 1960 M.P 134.. In another set of circumstances, the requirement of such a major son may not so qualify. See Kumbhar Pragji Bechar… v. Parekh Harilal Jasjivan…Opponent. . A.I.R 1974 Guj. 84.. It all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Thus, such question would be a question of fact to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case.
13. (1) Coming to the merits of the case, the facts pleaded by the respondent in his petition for seeking recovery of possession were as follows: He was residing in a small premises belonging to him at Munireddypalya in the city of Bangalore. It had only three appartments. His eldest son, who had been employed in the Department of Town Planning and was working at K.G.F had since been transferred to the City of Bangalore. His second son also got married. There were in all 13 members in the family and it was humanly impossible for the respondent to accommodate all of them in that house. He wanted to accommodate his first son and second son in the premises which was in the occupation of the petitioner.
(2) The respondent gave evidence before the Court and spoke to the facts stated in the petition. He also stated that the number of members in his family had increased to 17.
(3) No convincing evidence was adduced by the petitioner to show that the claim of the respondent was not reasonable or bona fide and no material information which militated against the case put forward by the respondent was also elicited in cross-examination. The circumstance that the petitioner and his son were living together under one roof was also not disputed.
(4) The Court believed the evidence given by the respondent and accepted his plea. On the question of comparative hardship also, the Court applied its mind and came to the conclusion that greater hardship would be caused to the respondent if eviction was not ordered. We do not find any infirmity in the finding recorded by the Court below.
14. The only question which remains for consideration is about the time that should be granted to the petitioner to vacate the premises. From the order of the Court below, it is seen that in the premises in question, the petitioner is conducting some of the classes of a School which he is running. The petition for eviction was made as early as in the year 1975 and the order had been made on the petition on 31st October 1977 directing the petitioner to deliver possession by the end of June, 1978. This order had been stayed by this Court during the pendency of the revision petition. The learned counsel for the respondent fairly submitted that as the petitioner is holding classes in the building, he would not execute the order till the end of April, 1982, by which time the current academic year would have come to an end. The said submission is recorded.
15. In the result, we make the following order:
(i) The revision petition is dismissed;
(ii) The respondent, however, shall not be entitled to execute the decree for eviction till the end of April, 1982; and
(iii) The parties to bear their own costs.
Order on an oral application made for grant of certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Immediately after the pronouncement of the order in the above case, learned counsel for the petitioner made an oral application under Article 134A of the Constitution for grant of certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court against the order under Art. 133 of the Constitution.
In our opinion, the case does not involve any substantial question of law general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Oral application is rejected and certificate prayed for is refused.