1. Appellant is the decree holder in O.S No. 62/77 laid against Uppalapati Pattabhi Ramayya and 11 others, and the principal debtor being one M. Lakshmaiah Choudary. The suit was filed to recover the debt due from M. Lakshmaiah Choudary. Thereafter, a compromise decree for a of Rs. 40,000/- was passed against them. The appellant filed I.A No. 1509/77 on June 31, 1978 under Order 21 Rule 52 and Order 21 Rule 46-A C.P.C to pass a decree against the respondent garnishee which was ordered on August 31, 1978, without issuing notice. For execution thereof E.P No. 159 of 1978 was filed under Order 21 Rules 43, 66 and 64 C.P.C for attachment of the moveable properties belonging to the respondent. It was effected on October 26, 1979 but the property was kept in the custody of the respondent on executing a bond for their production. Thereafter, a counter was filed by the respondent in the Court below stating that amount—due and payable by the respondent to M. Lakshmaiah Choudary contractor is only a sum of Rs. 7,329-70 paise and that the decree passed under Order 21 Rules 46 and 46-B is not binding on them since no notice was issued before passing the order. The said available amount was deposited to the credit of the suit. Both the contontions were found favour with the executing court with the result the E.P was dismissed. As against that the present appeal has been filed.
2. Sri Adinaravana Rao, learned counsel representing Sri G. Narayana Rao, very persuasively pleaded that the approach adopted by the Court below is clearly illegal. It is argued that though the order in I.A No. 1509 of 1977 was made without notice to the respondents, nonetheless it is a decree passed on the original side Having allowed the decree to become final, it is no longer open to the respondents to resist the same in execution. If the respondents are aggrieved against the order, the appropriate remedy was by way of appeal or an application to set aside the same and when recourse to that procedure having been resorted to the executing court cannot go behind the decree and accept the contention of the respondents. He draws the analogy of an exparte decree made under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C The appellant would be left with no remedy against the garnishee after the decree was allowed to become final. The question, therefore, is whether the executing Court can entertain an objection by the garnishee regarding the non-binding nature of the decree made under Order 21 Rule 46-B C.P.C To appreciate this point, it is necessary to consider the relevant rules. Order 21 Rule 46 C.P.C reads thus:
“O. 21 R. 46:— Attachment of debt, share and other property not in possession of judgment debtor—(1) In the case of …
(a) a debt not secured by a negotiable instrument,
the attachment shall be made by a written order prohibiting—
(i) in the case of the debt, the creditor from recovering the debt and the debtor from making payment thereof until the further order of the Court”.
3. The other clauses are not relevant for this case. Hence omitted. Rule 46-A, which posits issue of notice to the garnishee, reads thus:
“46-A Notice to Garnishee: (1) The Court may in the case of a debt (other than a debt secured by a mortgage or a charge) which has been attached under rule 46, upon the application of the attaching creditor, issue of notice to the garnishee liable to pay such debt, calling upon him either to pay into Court the debt due from him to the judgment-debtor or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the decree and costs of execution, or to appear and show cause why he should not do so.”
4. Clauses (2) and (3) are not relevant for this case. Hence omitted. The charging rule to fasten liability is Rule 46-B which reads as under:
“46-B: Order against garnishee: Where the garnishee does not forthwith pay into Court the amount due from him to the judgment-debtor or so much thereof as is sufficient to satisfy the decree and the costs of execution, and does not appear and show cause in answer to the notice, the Court may order the garnishee to comply with the terms of such notice, and on such order, execution may issue as though such order were a decree against him.”
5. Order 21 Rule 46-C C.P.C provides the Court with procedural machinery to decide the questions when the garnishee disputes his/her/its liability. A combined reading of the above provisions would manifest that on an application made by the decree holder seeking prohibition or recovery of a debt other than a debt secured by mortgage or a charge, a notice may issue to the garnishee. An application under sub-rule (1) of Rule 46-A shall be made on affidavit verifying the facts alleged and stating the grounds on which he had the belief that the garnishee is indebted to the judgment-debtor. Pursuant to the notice, under Rule 46-B the garnishee should appear in the Court. If he does not forthwith pay into the Court the amount due from him to the judgment-debtor or so much thereof as is sufficient to satisfy the decree and costs of the execution does not appear or show cause in answer to the notice, the Court is empowered to order the garnishee to comply with the terms of such notice and such an order may be executed as if it were a decree against the garnishee. In case he appears and disputes the liability, then it is the duty of the Court to determine the liability and it shall be tried as if it were an issue in the suit and upon the determination of such an issue, the Court shall make such order or orders as the circumstances warrant. On such a determination if any amount is paid, under Rule 46-F it becomes a valid discharge of the garnishee as against the judgment-debtor. Keeping in view all these statutory amendments brought in by the Amendment Act of 1976, the question at issue is what is the meaning of the word ‘may’ used in Order 21 Rule 46-A?
6. For the service of notice or summons, Order 5 C.P.C provides an elaborate procedure providing adequate safeguards in effecting notice on the defendant or the respondent, as the case may be. Order 21 Rule 46-A gives power to the Court to issue notice to the garnishee but couched the language as ‘may’. When a statute create a duty, one of the first questions for judicial consideration, is what is the sanction for its breach or the mode for compelling the performance of the duty. This question usually resolves itself into an enquiry whether the provision is mandatory or directory viz., whether absolute or, discretionary. If it is directory, the Court cannot interfere to compel performance or the act does not entail with invalidity. But if the act is mandatory, disobedience entails legal consequences which may take the shape of a public or private remedy obtainable in accordance with law. It is, however, a well recognised canon of construction that where power is given to a Court or a public officer for the purpose of being used for the benefit of persons to be affected upon the performance of which they are entitled to call for its exercise, the power ought to be exercised to effectuate the purpose for which it was given. Though the word ‘may’ appears to be an enabling word, when the object of the power is to affect a legal right, it must be construed to be mandatory and has its substitute as ‘shall’.
7. In Macdougall v. Paterson (1) (1851) 11 C.B 755 at 773 Jervis, C.J held that “when a statute confers an authority to do a judicial act in a certain case, it is imperative on those so authorised to exercise the authority when the case arises and its exercise is duly applied for by a party interested and having the right to make the application. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the word ‘may’ is not used to give a discretion, but to confer a power upon the Court and Judge and the exercise of such power depends not upon the discretion of the Court or Judge, but upon the proof of the particular case out of which such power arises.’
8. Order 21 Rules 46-A to F have been brought on statute by Amendment Act of 1976 which form an integrated whole to have inter-play of avoiding multiplicity of proceeding and inexpensive expedition to the decree-holder in executing his decree. This could be done on the Court satisfying that the garnishee is due to judgment debtor of a sum not secured by mortgage or charge and is liable to pay the same to the judgment debtor so as to enable the decree-holder to seek his decree executed against garnishee, a remedy provided for the first time. Though adequate safeguards have been provided by making the liability conclusive on the garnishee land to discharge him from liability of the judgment debtor it, would be done only on determination after giving opportunity as envisaged under these rules. When considered from this perspective, I have no hesitation to hold that the word ‘may’ be construed to be ‘shall’ and it is mandatory to issue a notice to garnishee before passing a decree under Order 21 Rule 64-B
9. The reason is obvious. An order made pursuant to the notice becomes a decree under Rule 46-B and the ??? is entitled to execute is the ??? garnishee is the judgment debtor. An order passed without notice will entail with civil consequences to the garnishee with monetary liability. It is now well settled that an order without notice is a nullity and a party against whom such an order has been made, can ignore the order as it is a void order and can be raised at any stage even in execution. True, as contended by Sri Adinarayana Rao, that an exparte decree passed under Order 9 Rule 13 C.P.C is operative and binding on the parties so long as it is not reversed by the appellate Court or it does not lie in the mouth of the defendant to go behind the decree and contest its legality in execution proceedings. In my view that analogy cannot be extended to the case of a third party, viz., a garnishee. It is true in an appropriate case the remedial forum provided against an order passed under O. 21 Rule 46-B C.P.C can be availed of. But, the question is whether the executing Court can go behind the decree when the order was obtained behind the back of the garnishee without notice to him in the manner prescribed in the Code. It is for the first time a liability is sought to be fastened on the garnishee by virtue of a decree passed under Order 21 Rule 46-B C.P.C But an order without notice is a nullity and void and it is open to a garnishee to assail its correctness when he first became aware of it when the decree is sought to be executed and the Executing Court is bound to consider the same instead of relegating him to appellate forum. Otherwise, serious consequences would follow. A decree holder can obtain an order against a third party without notice claiming that the garnishee is due to the judgment debtor of the suit debt and recover his debt from the third party without prior determination of liability as enjoined under Rule 46-C of Order 21 C.P.C The claims of the garnishee would be at great jeopardy. The object of introducing Rule 46-C manifests that on a notice issued, the garnishee has a statutory remedy of placing before the Court of his non-liability and the Court has to try it as an issue in the suit, so that the garnishee is bound by the order to be passed under Order 21 Rule 46-B. This procedure would be reduced to nothing and the Rule 46-C be rendered surplusage. Though Sri Adinarayana Rao may be justified in saying that the appellant would be left with no remedy to proceed against the garnishee, but in view of the discussion made earlier it becomes inevitable to conclude that a decree obtained behind the back of the garnishee cannot bind the garnishee and the executing Court is bound to enquire into, during execution. The only amount available with the respondent due to the judgment-debtor is Rs. 7,329-70 paise which was already credited to the credit of the E.P Accordingly, I hold that the decree against the respondent is a nullity. The respondent-garnishee is not bound by the decree. The executing Court is perfectly legal in dismissing the E.P as against the respondent.
10. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, but without costs.