The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Ramaswami, J.:— This is an appeal against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court, dismissing Writ Petition No. 2755 of 1979, filed by the appellant praying for a mandamus directing the Government to reconsider their order in G.O Ms. No. 1631, dated 27 December 1978, declining to refer the dispute of the petitioner for adjudication and dispose of the dispute in accordance with law. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition agreeing with the Government that the enquiry by the management is not vitiated in any manner and that the reasoning given by the Government in the impugned order was valid and cannot be interfered with. The appellant is a driver in the Pallavan Transport Corporation, Ltd., which is a Government of Tamil Nadu undertaking. It appears that on 26 July 1976, the bus which he was driving met with an accident in Coonur High Road when a pedestrain boy aged 6 years was hit by the bus. The appellant was prosecuted for rash and negligent driving in a Criminal Court and the Criminal Court acquitted him, finding him not guilty of rash and negligent driving. However, the transport corporation initiated departmental enquiry and finding him guilty of rash and negligent driving, ordered the removal of the appellant from service. On receipt of conciliation failure report, the Government refused to refer the dispute relating to non-employment for adjudication in G.O.Ms No. 1631, dated 27 December 1978. It is against this order the writ petition has been filed. The Government order declining to refer the dispute for adjudication read as follows:
“The Government have examined the conciliation report of the Labour Officer first cited in regard to an industrial dispute raised by S. Chellaperumal, driver, against the management of Pallavan Transport Corporation, Ltd., Madras 2, over the issue of his non-employment and they pass the following orders:
It is seen that this is a case of rash and negligent driving. Moreover, the worker had a number of accidents before. The management also conducted a proper enquiry before terminating the service of the worker. For these reasons, the Government consider that there is no case to refer the issue in dispute for adjudication.”
Learned counsel for the appellant relied on two recent judgments of the Supreme Court in support of his contention that neither the Government can go into the merits of the dispute nor can it decline a reference on any ground other than the non-existence of an industrial dispute. In Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, [1985—(II) L.L.N 280], considering the scope of S. 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, the Supreme Court after holding that while exercising the power under S. 10 of the Act, the function performed by the appropriate Government is an administrative function, and not a judicial or a quasi-judicial function, observed in Para. 7, at page 284:
“If the Government performs an administrative act while either making or refusing to make a reference under S. 10(1), it cannot delve into the merits of the dispute and take upon itself the determination of lis. That would certainly be in excess of the power conferred by S. 10. Section 10 requires the appropriate Government to be satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. This may permit the appropriate Government to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons not for justice or industrial peace and harmony. Every administrative determination must be based on grounds relevant and germane to the exercise of power. If the administrative determination is based on the irrelevant, extraneous or grounds not germane to the exercise of power, it is liable to be questioned in exercise of the power of judicial review. In State of Bombay v. K.P Krishnan, [A.I.R 1960 S.C 1223], it was held that a writ of mandamus would lie against the Government if the order passed by it under S. 10(1) is based or induced by reasons which, as given by the Government are extraneous, irrelevant and not germane to the determination. In such a situation, the Court would be justified in issuing a writ of mandamus even in respect of an administrative order. May be, the Court may not issue a writ of mandamus, directing the Government to make a reference but the Court can after examining the reasons given by the appropriate Government for refusing to make a reference come to a conclusion that they are irrelevant, extraneous or not germane to the determination and then can direct the Government to reconsider the matter.”
Again, in the same judgment, with reference to the effect of the amendment of the Act introducing S. 11A, the Supreme Court further observed in Para. 9, at page 284:
“It confers power on the Tribunal not only to examine the order of discharge or dismissal on merits, as also to determine whether the punishment was commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct charged. In other words, S. 11A confers power on the Tribunal/Labour Court to examine the case of the workman whose service has been terminated either by discharge or dismissal qualitatively in the matter of nature of enquiry and quantitatively in the matter of adequacy or otherwise of punishment. The workman questioned the legality and validity of the enquiry which aspect the Tribunal in a quasi-judicial determination was required to examine. A bare statement that a domestic enquiry was held in which charges were held to be proved, if it is considered sufficient for not exercising power of making a reference under S. 10(1) almost all cases of termination of services cannot go before the Tribunal. And it would render S. 2A of the Act denuded of all its content and meaning. The reasons given by the Government would show that the Government examined the relevant papers of enquiry and the Government was satisfied that it was legally valid and that there was sufficient and adequate evidence to hold the charges proved. It would further appear that the Government was satisfied that the enquiry was not based against the workman and the punishment was commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct charged. All these relevant and vital aspects have to be examined by the Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating upon the reference made to it. In other words, the reasons given by the Government would tantamount to adjudication which is impermissible. That is the function of the Tribunal and the Government cannot arrogate to itself that function. Therefore, if the grounds on which or the reasons for which the Government declined to make a reference under S. 10 are irrelevant, extraneous or not germane to the determination, it is well settled that the party aggrieved thereby would be entitled to move the Court for a writ of mandamus. See Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1617]. It is equally well settled that where the Government purports to give reasons which tantamount to adjudication and refuse to make a reference, the appropriate Government could be said to have acted on extraneous, irrelevant grounds or grounds not germane to the determination and a writ of mandamus would lie calling upon the Government to reconsider its decision. In this case, a clear case for grant of writ of mandamus is made out.”
In that case, the reasons given by the Government in Para. 9, at page 284 of 1985 — II L.L.N read:
“The Government does not consider your case to be fit for reference for adjudication to the Tribunal as it has been learnt that your services were terminated only sifter charges against you were proved in a domestic enquiry.”
Ultimately, the writ petition in that case was allowed and mandamus was issued to the Government to exercise the powers under S. 10 on relevant considerations germane to the decision. In another recent decision of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Government of India, [1985 — I L.L.N 589], the management of the Syndicate Bank imposed the punishment of stoppage of three increments to one of its workmen. An industrial dispute was raised by the Syndicate Bank Staff Union and the Central Government declined to refer the dispute to an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication on the ground that the charges of this conduct against the worker were proved in a duly constituted departmental enquiry and the penalty was imposed following the required procedure. While setting aside this order declining to refer the dispute, the Supreme Court made the following observations in Para. 1, at page 590:
“It would not be right for the Government of India to refuse to make the reference on the ground that the charges of misconduct against the worker were proved during a duly constituted departmental inquiry and penalty was imposed on the worker after following the required procedure. If such a ground were permissible it would be the easiest thing for the management to avoid a reference to adjudication and to deprive the worker of the opportunity of having the dispute referred for adjudication even if the order holding the charges of misconduct proved was unreasonable or perverse or was actuated by mala fides or even if the penalty imposed on the worker was totally disproportionate to the offence said to have been proved. The management has simply to show that it has held a proper inquiry after complying with the requisite procedure and that would be enough to defeat the worker's claim for adjudication. Such a situation cannot be countenanced by law. We must, therefore, set aside the order, dated 2 April 1981, passed by the Government of India, declining to make a reference of the industrial dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal. We would direct the Government of India to consider the question of making reference of the industrial dispute for adjudication without taking into account the aforesaid irrelevant ground which seems to have prevailed with them in declining to make a reference.”…
In Balakrishnan (N.) v. Government of Tamil Nadu (by Secretary, Labour and Employment Department, Madras), [1987 — I L.L.N 580], one of us had to consider similar question. The impugned order in that case also was similar to the one which we are now considering. After a consideration of the above two judgments of the Supreme Court and also the other decisions relevant on the question, by order, dated 10 December 1986, Writ Petition No. 831 of 1981 was allowed and the order of the Government was set aside on the ground that it is not open to the Government while considering the question under S. 10 of the Act to give any finding on the dispute, as if it were adjudicated upon and that the only jurisdiction of the Government was to determine prima facie whether an industrial dispute exists or the claim is frivolous or bogus or put forth for extraneous and irrelevant reasons and not for industrial peace and harmony. The impugned order in this case could not be considered as having been decided on relevant considerations having regard to industrial peace and harmony and hence it is liable to be set aside. We accordingly allow the writ appeal, set aside the impugned order of the Government and direct the first respondent to dispose of the dispute raised by the workman under S. 10 of the Act in the light of this judgment and the decision rendered in Writ Petition No. 831 of 1981 on 10 December 1986 report in 1987—(I) L.L.N 580 (vide supra), within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of the judgment. There will, however, be no order as to costs.