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citation codes
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  • Jammu and Kashmir Registration Soceities Act, 1898.18.
  • Consitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. This Article
  • S. 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985,
  • Registration of Co-operative Societies Act
  • Rule 2(2) the Central Government
  • SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT 1860
  • provisions of sub-section (3)
  • Rule 2(1)(i) of the Rules
  • Rule 20(ii)
  • Rule 10(f)
  • Rule 10(g)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Jammu and Kashmir Registration Soceities Act, 1898.18.
  • Consitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. This Article
  • S. 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985,
  • Registration of Co-operative Societies Act
  • Rule 2(2) the Central Government
  • SOCIETIES REGISTRATION ACT 1860
  • provisions of sub-section (3)
  • Rule 2(1)(i) of the Rules
  • Rule 20(ii)
  • Rule 10(f)
  • Rule 10(g)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — A.P. Misra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was a Government of India employee appointed initially as Assistant Linguist (joined 1 May 1969) and later selected and confirmed as Senior Linguist (joined July 1973). In 1980 Kendriya Hindi Shikshan Mandal (the "Mandal"), an autonomous society registered under the Societies Registration Act, advertised posts for the Kendriya Hindi Sansthan (the "Sansthan"). The petitioner applied and was selected for the post of Reader in the Sansthan; he accepted the appointment and joined on deputation on foreign service terms on 19 November 1982 for an initial two-year period, which the Mandal and the parent department extended yearly up to 18 November 1986.

Before expiry of deputation the Sansthan invited the petitioner to opt for either return to his parent department or resignation for permanent absorption. The petitioner chose absorption and sent a "technical resignation" to the parent department. The Department of Culture informed the Sansthan it had no objection in principle to permanent absorption but that terms and conditions would follow after the Governing Council decision. Subsequently a Central Government Inquiry Committee considered the selection, and the parent Department of Education (Ministry of Human Resources Development) decided on 17 December 1987 that the petitioner could not be absorbed; the Governing Council (meeting 15 December 1987 as per respondents' account) approved repatriation and the Mandal issued the impugned order dated 20/21 December 1987 directing the petitioner to return to his parent department. The petitioner challenged these orders by writ petition in the High Court, amended to implead the Secretary, Ministry of Personnel, and sought quashing of the 17 December 1987 Central Government decision and the Mandal's order directing repatriation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, who joined the Sansthan on deputation but was selected and worked there on probation and thereafter, had been permanently absorbed in the Sansthan.
  2. Whether the Mandal/Sansthan — a society registered under the Societies Registration Act — was an "instrumentality or agency of the Government" and thus a "State" within Article 12 of the Constitution, amenable to writ jurisdiction.
  3. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the petition in view of Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, particularly because the petitioner remained an employee of the Central Government on deputation.
  4. Whether the Central Government's decision (and consequential action by the Mandal) of 17 December 1987 was vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice or involved the imposition of a stigma requiring quashing.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that his appointment as Reader was by regular selection following advertisement and therefore he should not have been treated as merely on deputation; having completed probation and later extensions, accepted an option for absorption and submitted a technical resignation, he ought to be deemed permanently absorbed.
  • He relied on a Government Office Memorandum dated 31 March 1987 (Ministry of Personnel, P.G. & Pensions) which, he claimed, provided that if a Government employee does not return to the parent department during/after deputation period he will be deemed permanently absorbed in the autonomous body on expiry of deputation.
  • He further argued that the 17 December 1987 order of the Department of Education was based on an inquiry report never disclosed to him and was issued without giving him an opportunity; therefore it violated principles of natural justice and caused stigma, relying on precedents concerning natural justice.

Respondents' Arguments (Mandal and Sansthan)

  • The Mandal and Sansthan argued that the petitioner was on deputation throughout and remained an employee of the parent department until that department either accepted his resignation or the Governing Council formally approved permanent absorption along with parent department action; there was no such final acceptance or relieving order.
  • They asserted the selection was irregular: the petitioner did not satisfy eligibility conditions but was allowed to interview and given relaxation without recorded reasons; interested parties challenged the selection, leading to an Inquiry Committee constituted by the Government of India whose findings contributed to the decision for repatriation.
  • They also raised a preliminary objection that as a society under the Societies Registration Act the Mandal was not a statutory authority and ordinarily not amenable to writ jurisdiction; if any violation of bye-laws or contract occurred, the remedy lay in a suit.

Central Government's Argument

  • The Central Government (through its counsel) argued that Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 ousted the High Court's jurisdiction over service matters of Central Government employees and vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) for matters relating to recruitment and conditions of service of Union employees — thus disputes concerning the petitioner's service with the Central Government could not be adjudicated by the High Court under Article 226.
  • They contended that deciding whether the 31 March 1987 Government Office Memorandum applied to the petitioner required adjudication of whether the petitioner was still on deputation — a pure service matter falling squarely within the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra — 1971 (2) SLR 345 Authority relied on by petitioner concerning the need for opportunity / natural justice where reversion or adverse action is proposed. The petitioner relied upon this case (and others) to argue that the Central Government's order was passed without giving opportunity and thus illegal. The Court noted these authorities were relied upon for the natural justice point but observed that the question of natural justice could only be decided after resolving the issue of jurisdiction under the Administrative Tribunals Act.
C. Thiruvian Pillai v. State of Kerala — 1976 (2) SLR 571 Relied on by the petitioner for principles regarding stigma and natural justice when a government employee is reverted. The Court recorded that the petitioner placed reliance on this authority as part of his submission that the Central Government order caused stigma and was without hearing; however, it deferred resolution of the natural justice issue pending determination of jurisdictional questions.
Harpal Singh v. State of U.P. — 1988 UPLBEC 213 (SC) Another authority cited by the petitioner in support of the contention that reversion without opportunity may attract quashing. The Court noted the reliance but reserved any decision on the merits pending jurisdictional determination under S.14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act.
Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain — (1976) 2 SCC 58 : AIR 1976 SC 888 Establishes that a body registered under a statute (or affiliated to a university) is not necessarily a statutory body; distinction between statutory and non-statutory/autonomous bodies. The Court reproduced and relied on this reasoning to explain the proper test: whether a body owes its existence to statute or is merely governed by statutory provision. The principle was used as part of the analysis whether the Mandal was a "State" under Article 12.
Dipak Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instruction — (1987) 2 SCC 252 Reiterates the distinction between bodies created by statute and bodies governed by statute; clarifies the relevant test for being a statutory body. The Court cited this case to support the view that the question whether a registered society is a "State" under Article 12 depends on factual assessment, not merely registration; it formed part of the legal backdrop to examine the Mandal's memorandum, rules and government control.
Hari Shankar Srivastava v. State of U.P. — 1987 SPLBEC 44 States that a school or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act cannot generally be said to be "other authority" or "State" within Article 12. The Court recorded this proposition as part of the authorities but observed that whether a registered society is an instrumentality of the Government must be decided on facts; it therefore proceeded to factually assess the Mandal's constitution and link to the Central Government.
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib — (1981) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487 Sets out the relevant test: whether a corporation/organisation is an instrumentality or agency of the Government (the "why" it was brought into existence and the extent of government control), which determines whether it is an "authority" under Article 12. The Court relied heavily on Ajay Hasia's test, examined the Mandal's Memorandum, Rules and Bye-laws for pervasive government control (appointments, approvals, financial control, auditing, power to issue binding directions), and concluded that the Mandal/Sansthan were instrumentalities of the State and thus "State" under Article 12.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two major strands: (A) whether the Mandal/Sansthan was amenable to writ jurisdiction as "State" under Article 12, and (B) whether the High Court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitioner's challenge given the Administrative Tribunals Act.

A. Article 12 / Whether Mandal is "State"

The Court examined established authorities distinguishing statutory bodies from those merely governed by statute (Vaish Degree College; Dipak Kumar Biswas) and the Ajay Hasia test for instrumentality/agency of the Government. It conducted a factual analysis of the Mandal's Memorandum of Association, Rules and Bye-laws produced in court. The Court highlighted several specific clauses evidencing pervasive Central Government control:

  • Approvals required from Central Government for transfer/disposal of immovable property and for rules/bye-law changes.
  • Government involvement in appointment of members, including Minister/Deputy Minister as Chairman and Government nominees in the Governing Council; provision for Government to appoint additional members.
  • Requirements to obtain Central Government concurrence for rules and bye-laws, and that the Mandal must follow directions issued by the Central Government.
  • Financial controls: deposit and investment of funds subject to Central Government approval; obligation to forward annual accounts to Central Government; audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General or his authorised person.
  • Power of the Central Government to review work and hold enquiries and to issue binding directions upon receipt of reports; provisions concerning disposal of assets on winding up to be determined by Central Government.

Based on these documentary features demonstrating control over management and finances and binding directions from the Central Government, the Court concluded that the Mandal (and Sansthan) were instrumentalities of the State and therefore "State" within Article 12. Consequently, the Mandal was amenable to writ jurisdiction, subject to limitations imposed by the Administrative Tribunals Act.

B. Jurisdiction under Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985

The Court analyzed Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and related provisions. It noted:

  • S.14 invests the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) with jurisdiction over service matters of persons appointed to public services of the Union, and S.14(2)/(3) permits extension by notification to local authorities and to corporations or societies owned or controlled by the Government.
  • No notification under S.14(2) had been issued by the Central Government in respect of the Mandal, so the CAT's jurisdiction had not been explicitly extended to the Mandal's employees generally; absent such notification the High Court's jurisdiction in respect of employees directly appointed by the society would remain.
  • However, the Court distinguished two classes of employees associated with such bodies: (i) employees appointed by the society/local authority/corporation (for whom High Court jurisdiction survives absent S.14(2) notification), and (ii) employees on deputation from the Central Government (for whom S.14 operates regardless and excludes High Court jurisdiction because they remain in the service of the Union until final absorption or relieving action by the parent department).

Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court emphasized documentary proof that the petitioner had joined the Sansthan expressly on deputation terms (offer acceptance with a rider, parent department's forwarding letter of no objection, and an official relieving letter specifying deputation for two years and subsequent extensions up to 18 November 1986). Although the petitioner had sought absorption and sent a technical resignation, there was no conclusive decision by the Governing Council effecting final absorption nor any order by the parent department accepting resignation or terminating his service with it. The Department of Culture's letter of 31 August 1987 stated only that it had no objection in principle but that terms and conditions would await the Governing Council's decision; it did not finalize absorption.

The Court further observed that the impugned Mandal order of 20/21 December 1987 derived from and was executed pursuant to the Central Government decision of 17 December 1987. Therefore the core grievance of the petitioner really challenged an order by the parent department (Central Government) affecting his service — a matter falling within the CAT's exclusive jurisdiction under S.14. Because the petitioner remained a Central Government employee on deputation, the High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the challenge to the parent department's order; the appropriate forum was the Central Administrative Tribunal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition was DISMISSED.

Implications and practical consequences:

  • The Court held that the Kendriya Hindi Shikshan Mandal and the Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, on the facts shown (Memorandum, Rules and Bye-laws and Government control), are instrumentalities of the State and thus fall within Article 12; therefore writs under Article 226 can, in principle, be issued against them (subject to statutory limitations).
  • However, because the petitioner remained an employee of the Central Government on deputation and there was no final absorption or relieving order by the parent department, the petitioner's challenge effectively concerned a service matter of the Central Government. Under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 such service matters fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal; hence the High Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the petitioner's challenge to the parent department's decision.
  • The direct effect for the parties is that the High Court dismissal leaves the petitioner to pursue his remedy, if any, before the Central Administrative Tribunal in respect of service matters of the parent department. The Court ordered that costs shall be borne by the parties. The Court did not purport to set aside or make any final determination on the merits of the natural justice/stigma allegations; those matters remain for the appropriate forum (CAT) if within its jurisdiction.
  • No novel general rule was laid down beyond applying established tests (Ajay Hasia et al.) to the facts; the Court's findings are fact-specific to the Mandal/Sansthan's constitution and relationship with the Central Government.

Disposition: Petition dismissed. Costs shall be borne by the parties.

    Dr. Shree Krishan v. Union Of India And Others

    A.P Misra, J.:— The petitioner was appointed by the Government of India on the post of Assistant Linguist in anthropological. Survey of India at Shillong where he joined the post on May 1, 1969. Thereafter, he.was selected through Union Public Service Commission for the post of Senior Linguist which he joined in July 1973, at Calcutta and was confirmed on that post. According to the petitioner, in the year 1980, Kendriya Hindi Shikshan Mandal, Agra (hereinafter referred to as Mandal) advertised the posts, of Professors, Readers and Lecturers for appointment in the Kendriya Hindi Sansthan. The Government employees were required to send their applications through proper channel of their departments. It is not in dispute that the said Mandal is an autonomous body registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, with its registered office at Agra. It has its own Memorandum of Association rules and Byelaws. The Ministry of Education, Government of India, for the development and propagation of Hindi as an all India Language, as envisaged under Art. 351 of the Constitution of India established the aforesaid Mandal. The main object of the mandal is to establish and to Carry on the administration and management of the Central Institutive of Hindi, i.e Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra (hereinafter referred to as Sansthan). The petitioner in pursuance of the aforesaid advertisement applied for the post of Reader in the said Sansthan. The petitioner was thereafter selected by the selection committee, which was finally approved by the Governing Council of the Mandal and offer of appointment was sent by the Secretary of the Mandal to the petitioner and the petitioner accepted the offer of appointment. According to the petitioner, Senior Administrative Officer, Anthropological Survey of India Calcutta, forwarded the acceptance letter dated 18.6.1982 sent by the petitioner to the Mandal along with his letter dated June 23, 1982 stating that there is no objection to the petitioner joining the post in the Mandal on foreign service terms on deputation referred to in that letter. Thereafter, the petitioner was relieved by the parent department and joined the post of Reader on 19th November, 1982 in the Mandal on deputation on foreign service initially for a period of two years. The petitioner's period was subsequently extended each year by the mandal with the approval of the parent department and was extended up to 18th November, 1986. Thereafter, on 29th October, 1986, the Registrar of the Sansthan asked the petitioner whether the would like to go back to his parent department after expiry of the deputation period, or would like to resign from the post of Senior Linguist and to get permanently obsorbed on the post held by him in the Sansthan. The petitioner also sent a letter dated 29th December, 19816, to the parent department submitting his technical resignation from the post of Senior Linguist to facilitate his absorption by the Mandal in the Sansthan. The Department of Culture, Ministry of Human Resources Development, under which Anthropological Survey of India functions, informed the Director of the Sansthan that the Department had no objection to the permanent absorption of the petitioner in the Sansthan, but the lerms and conditions of the permanent absorption will be communicated only after the decision of the Governing Council of the Sansthan is conveyed to the department.

    2. According to the petitioner, in view of the aforesaid facts “his deputation period having expired on 19th November, 1986 and the petitioner had been working on the permanent post of Reader in the Sansthan the petitioner is to be permanently absorbed on the post of Reader. The petitioner further relied on G.O by Virtue of which Ministry of Personnel P.G & Pensions (Department of Pension and Pensioner's Welfare) dated 31st March, 1987 (annexure 16 to the petition). According to it, in case a Government employee does not return to his parent department during or after the sanctioned deputation period he will be deemed to have been permanently absorbed in the autonomous body on the date of expiry of deputation period. The contention is that the petitioner, who surprisingly received the impugned order dated 20/21st December, 1987 issued by the Acting Director/Secretary of the Mandal by virtue of which it was communicated to the petitioner that the Education Department. Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India, on the 17th December, 1987, has decided that the petitioner cannot be permitted to be absorbed in the Sansthan and he was directed to be returned to the parent department. In view of this, the petitioner was relieved from his services in the Sansthan from the afternoon of 21st December, 1987, so that he may immediately join his parent department. During the pendency of the Writ petition, the petitioner realising that the foundation for his being relieved from the post of Reader in the Sansthan was the order dated 17th December, 1987, passed by the Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India, he made two applications one for-impleadment of the Secretary, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pension, Government of India, as opposite party No. 4 and the other for adding additional grounds and prayer in the writ petition for quashing the aforesaid order, which-is annexure as Annexure I to the supplementary counter affidavit. This Court by means of order dated 21st May, 1988 allowed both the applications and accordingly Secretary, Ministry of Personnel Public Grievances and Pension, Government of India, was impleaded as opposite party No. 4 and two grounds and prayer were also added in the writ petition. Sri N.B Singh, Senior Standing Counsel for the Union of India accepted notice on behalf of the newly added respondent No. 4 and he prayed for and was granted time up to 4th July, 1988 to file a reply. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, viz. Sansthan and the Mandal respectively, in which it is stated that the Mandal is a society.registered under the Societies Registration Act and was established to administer and manage the administration and management of the Central Institute of Hindi, viz. Kendriya Hindi Sansthan, Agra. The case of these respondents are* that the memorandum of association and rules framed for the Mandal and its byelaws make out that it is the society and is neither a department of the Government nor an authority as contemplated by Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. Further, since the impugned order was passed by the Mandal, which is a society, is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction and, therefore, no relief could be granted to the petitioner. Apart from the aforesaid preliminary objection it was further averred that even though the petitioner did not fulfil the eligibility conditions for his posting as Reader in the Sansthan was called for the interview on the basis of recommendations of the screening committee. The selection committee or the screening committee did not record any reasons for granting of relaxation to the petitioner which indicates that selection of the petitioner as Reader of Sansthan was irregular and not in accordance with the advertisement. Subsequent to the said selection it seems that some interested persons challenged the selection of the petitioner and the matter was reviewed. Hence, a two member Enquiry Committee was constituted by the Government of India to look into the matter. Thereafter, the matter of permanent absorption of the petitioner was placed in the meeting of the Governing Council on the 15th December, 1987 and the Governing Council on the basis of the findings of the Enquiry Committee and advice given by the Department of Personnel to the Ministry approved the action for repatriation of the petitioner to his parent department.

    3. On the aforesaid facts the petitioner challenged the order dated 20, 21st December, 1987 (Annexure 17 to the writ petition) and also by way of amendment challenged the aforesaid order dated 17th December, 1987 issued by the Depart ment of Education, Government of India, with a further direction not, to interfere with the functioning of the petitioner on the post of Reader in the Sansthan.

    4. The main contention of the petitioner is, even though he initially joined the Sansthan on deputation but since his appointment was through selection committee after it being properly advertised and his appointment being on probation for two years and he having completed the said period with satisfaction his service stood absorbed in the Sansthan. Even otherwise, when his probation period was extended beyond two years by two further extensions of one year each and the Sansthan desiring the petitioner to exercise its option and he having accepted to be absorbed in the Sansthan and he having sent his technical resignation to the parent department his services should be deemed to have been absorbed in the Sansthan. Lastly, it was contended, in any case in view of aforesaid G.O dated 31st March, 1987, issued by the Ministry of Personnel, P.G and Pension, Govern ment of India, the petitioner stood permanently absorbed in the Sansthan.

    5. The petitioner also made some attempt to show that he was directly recruited on the said post which was by way of regular selection and, therefore, there should be no question of his being sent on deputation and thus the parent department had no right to call back the petitioner from the Sansthan.

    6. On behalf of the respondents the aforesaid arguments of the petitioner were repelled. It was urged, that from the various documents annexed by the petitioner himself and the averments made therein it is clear that the petitioner was on deputation and unless either his parent department relieved him from the service by accepting the resignation of the petitioner or even otherwise after the decision of the Governing Council of the Mandal accepting his permanent absorption he would continue to be in the service of the parent department, Government of India. Merely working satisfactorily during all the period on probation either for two years or subsequent extended period would not amount to absorption unless there was final acceptance of such an option by the Governing Council after obtaining the approval of the Parent department of his being finally relieved from there. In the present case, there was neither any approval by the Governing Council nor any order by the parent department relieving the petitioner from service, therefore, there could not be any deemed absorption as contended by him. So far as the G.O dated 31st March, 1987, is concerned that would be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, firstly, it was issued subsequent to 18th November, 1986, which was the last date approved by the parent department for deputation and secondly, so far as the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned there was no communication from the parent department of petitioner being relieved and thus dispute, if any, would be between the petitioner and the parent department Government of India. Finally, it was contended that since respondents Nos. 2 and 3 is a society registered the Societies Registration Act no writ petition would lie under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India and if there is any violation of any bye law or contract of service, the petitioner may file a suit for the same.

    7. On behalf of the Central Government learned Chief Standing Counsel urged that in view of S. 14 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, so far as any matter relating to the service of the petitioner with the Central Government is concerned this Court could have no jurisdiction to go into the points raised by him and it would only lie to the Administrative Tribunal coustituted under it. It was contended, in fact, the order which is the subject matter of challenge in the present writ petition is an order passed by the parent department (Central Government) directing the petitioner to revert to its parent department is question relating to the service of the petitioner and the Central Government having full powers to pass such an order which if the petitioner disputes could not be raised before this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The question whether the G.O dated 31st March, 1987, of which benefit has been sought by the petitioner would be applicable to the petitioner or not would depend on the question whether he was still on deputation, or was in the service of the Central Government or not and its interpretation inherently leads to the adjudication of decision to the service of the petitioner of the Central Government and this Court could not have jurisdiction to decide the same.

    8. After perusing of the various affidavits filed in the present writ petition and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties we are of opinion that there was no question of automatic absorption of the petitioner in the Sansthan. It is pertinent to mention, before accepting the post of Reader after selection the petitioner sent a letter dated 8th June, 1982, to the Secretary of the Mandal (Annexure 3 to the petition) wherein the offer of the post of Reader in the Sansthan was accepted with a rider that the points mentioned in the letter be considered before sending the appointment letter and the points referred to therein was that he also mentioned in his application form and made it clear before the interview board that he would join the Sansthan on deputation terms as applicable for a permanent Government servant laid down in Chapter XII of the Fundamental Rules. The parent department thereafter forwarded the acceptance letter of the petitioner to the Mandal on 23rd June, 1982 that it hasno objectiont the petitioner's joining the post in Mandal on foreign service terms on deputation. Even subsequently the parent department issued an official letter dated 16th November, 1982 (Annexure 6 to the petition) relieved the petitioner to join on the said post specifying on deputation on foreign service for a period of two years. Thereafter, his deputation period was extended twice, the last date of which was 18th November, 1986. Thus, it is clear the petitioner continued on deputation. However, it seems before the expiry of the period of deputation, the Registrar of the Sansthan wrote a letter dated 29th October, 1986 asking the petitioner as to whether he would like to go to his parent department after expiry of the deputation period or would like to resign from the post of Senior Linguist and to get permanently absorbed on the post held by him in the Sansthan. The petitioner no doubt thereafter sent a letter dated 10th November, 1986, addressed to the Director of the Sansthan giving his option for absorption. In furtherence of the same he also wrote on 29th December, 1986, to the parent department that he decided to get himself permanently absorbed on the post of Reader in the Sansthan and he further stated that he had submitted his technical resignation from the substance post of the Senior Linguist with a further request to accept his technical resignation, so that the Sansthan may finalise his permaner absorption. Then, on 31st August, 1987, a letter sent by the Department of Culture, Ministry of Human Resource Development, was sent to the Director of the Sansthan that the Department has no objection to the permanent absorption of the petitioner, but the terms and conitions of permanent absorption will be communicated only after the decision of the Governing Council of the Sansthan is conveyed to the department. One thing is clear from this letter that neither the Governing Council of the Sansthan has made any decision nor the terms and conditions of the permanent absorption existed till this date. Thus, it cannot be doubted that the petitioner is still continuing in the service of the parent department and his final, absorption was not made. It is in this light it becomes necessary to know the happenings which are going on behind the field which led into passing of the impugned order dated 20/21st December, 1987, passed by the Governing Counsel of the Mandal. By reading the said order it reveals that the said order was passed in view of the decision dated 17th December, 1987, of the Department of Education, Ministry of Human Resources Development, Government of India. The said order inherently speaks of the decision of the parent department to bring him back to it and not to absorb in the Sansthan. This led into the amendment of the present writ petition by the petitioner and as aforesaid the petitioner also challenged the aforesaid order dated 17th December, 1987, passed by the Government of India. In continuation of the same as per counter affidavit of the respondents 2 and 3 the Governing Council of the Mandal on 18th May, 1987, decided that since the case for permanent absorption of the petitioner in the Sansthan is under consideration of the Department of Culture and this could be considered in the next meeting after the decision is taken by the Department of Culture in the next meeting on the 31st July, 1987. This matter was withdrawn by the Secretary of the Mandal on the plea that they had not received the concurrence of the Department of Culture so far as the matter was then placed in the meeting on the 15th December, 1987. It is significant that it was specifically stated in the counter affidavit on behalf of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 that on this date the Governing Council on the basis of the finding of the Inquiry Committee and the advice given by the Department of Personnel to the Ministry approved the action for repatriation of the petitioner to his parent department. It was on account of this decision of the Governing Council the impugned order dated 20/21st December, 1987, was issued by the Acting Director/Secretary. This fact reveals that the Governing Council passed the resolution in terms of the advice from the parent department of the Government of India. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 further in paragraph 10 of the counter affidavit took the stand that on a complaint by some interested person a two-member Inquiry Committee was constituted by the Government of India to look into the matter and thereafter on the basis of the findings of the Inquiry Committee the Governing Council as aforesaid took the decision on the 15th December, 1987.

    9. From all the aforesaid facts it is further relevant that the basis of the order passed by the parent department (Central Government) on the 17th December, 1987, prima facie seems to be founded on the report of the aforesaid Inquiry Committee and that order of the Central Government was, in fact, the basis of, the order passed by the Governing Council of the Mandal.

    10. It is on account of this the learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since the petitioner was never made aware of any inquiry committee and that decision having been arrived at by the Central Government on the 17th December, 1987, suffers from patent illegality as the said order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and thus is illegal and void ab initio. Secondly, if that was the basis of the order passed by the Governing. Council even the impugned order dated 20/21st December, 1987 cannot be sustained. While chal: lenging the order of the Central Government as aforesaid it was contended that even a person, who is on deputation, if his services are reverted casting stigma on him without giving an opportunity the order is liable to be quashed. Reliance was placed on the cases: K.H Phadnis v. State Of Maharashtra† ., 1971 (2) SLR 345, C. Thiruvian Pillai v. State of Kerala, 1976 (2) SLR 571 (Kerala) and Harpal Singh v. State of U.P, 1988 UPLBEC 213 (SC).

    11. However, the question whether the impugned order of the Central Government casts stigma or whether principles of natural justice on the facts and circumstances of this case has been violated could only be decided after the decision of the question whether this Court has any jurisdiction to decide the dispute which has been raised in the present case by the petitioner in view of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which we shall be dealing subsequently.

    12. The preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 in the present case is that since the Mandal is a, society registered under the Societies Registration Act no writ could be issued to it. For this, reliance was placed in the case Vaish Degree College v. Lakshmi Narain, (1976) 2 SCC 58 : AIR 1976 SC 888. as follows:—

    “The Executive Committee of a Degree College which is registered under the Registration of Co-operative Societies Act and is affiliated to the Agra University…is not a statutory body merely because it is affiliated to the University or is regulated by the provisions of the University Act or the statutes made thereunder. By co-opting…the Managing Committee does not lose its independent status but continue to remain a non-statutory and autonomous body.”

    13. In Dipak Kumar Biswas v. Director of Public Instruction, (1987) 2 SCC 252) : [1987 (3) SLR 65 (SC)] the following passage of the case Vaish Degree College (supra) was reproduced:

    “It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountain head of its powers. The question in such case to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provision it cannot be said to be a statutory body”.

    14. In Hari Shankar Srivastava v. State of U.P, 1987 SPLBEC 44 it was laid down:—

    “But a school or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act cannot be said to be other authority or State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India”.

    15. The proposition as urged by the learned counsel for the respondents and in view of the aforesaid decisionals well settled, however the question still remains and it has to be decided by the Courts on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a statutory corporation or a registered society registered under the Societies Registration Act was an agency or instrumentality of the Government and whether it was authority and was “State” as envisaged under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. If on the facts of each case the Court is able to arrive at the conclusion that either the corporation or a society registered under the Societies Registration Act is an agency or instrumentality of the Government then the Court could always examine the act of such Corporation or Society whether the order passed is fair or is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the respondent No. 2 is a registered society under the Societies Registration Act. Again it cannot be disputed that if such a society is not constituted under any Statute and it could not be treated to be a statutory authority. The question in the case, therefore, is whether this registered society is an agency or instrumentality of the Government or not.

    16. In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, (1981) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1981 SC 487 : [1980 (3) S.L.R 467 (S.C) it has been laid down:—

    “It is immaterial for determining whether a Corporation is an authority whether the Corporation is created by a'statute or under a statute. The test is whether it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and as to how it is created. The inquiry has to be not as to how the juristic person is born but why it has been brought into existence. The Corporation may be a statutory corporation created by a statute or it may be a Government company or a company formed under the Companies Act or it may be a society registered under the Soceities Registration Act or any similar statute. Whatever be its genetical origin, it would be an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Art. 12 if it is an instrumentality or agency of the Government and that would have to be decided on a proper assessment of the facts in the light of the relevant factors. The concept of instrumentality or agency of the Government is not limited to a Corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or society and in a given case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of the relevant factors, whether the company or society is an instrumentality-or agency of the Government so as to come within the meaning of the expression ‘authority’ in Art. 12”.

    17. Thus, it is clear it is not relevant whether a corporation or a society has been created under a statute or not but the question is whether the society is the agency or instrumentality of the Government or not. In Ajay Hasia's case (supra) the fact which was taken into consideration was deep and pervasive presence of the government in the activity of the society. That was also a case of a society registered under Jammu and Kashmir Registration Soceities Act, 1898.

    18. Looking from the aforesaid angle, we examined the Memorandum of Association, Rules & Bye-laws of the Mandal (Society), which was produced before us. Paragraph 3(1)(i) thereof provides “that” no immovable property of the Mandal shall be transferred or disposed of in any manner whatsoever without the approval of the Central Government” Paragraph 3(ii) provides that it can “make rules and bye-laws for the conduct of the affairs of the Mandal, and to amend, vary or rescind them from time to time with the concurrence of the Central Government”. “Under Paragraph 3(v) the function of the Mandal will be to deposit all moneys credited to the fund in such banks or to invest in such a manner as the Mandal may with the approval of the Central Government decide; “Under paragraph 3(vii) the function will be to maintain proper accounts and other relevant records and prepare an annual statement of accounts including the balance sheet in such form as may be prescribed by the Central Government”. Paragraph 3(viii) provides that the function of the Mandal will be “to forward annually to the Central Government the accounts of the Mandal certified in the manner that may be prescribed by the Central Government”. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Memorandum of Association are reproduced below:—

    “5. The Central Government may appoint one or more persons to review the work and progress of the Mandal and to hold enquiries into affairs thereof and to report thereon; in such manner as the Central Government may stipulate. Upon receipt of any such report the Central Government may take such action and issue such directions as it may consider necessary in respect of any of the matters dealt with in the report, of the Mandal, as the case may be and the Mandal shall be bound to comply with such directions.

    6. If no winding up or dissolution of the Mandal, there shall remain, after the satisfaction of all the debts and liabilities, any property whatsoever, the same shall not be paid to or distributed among the members of the Mandal or any of them but Shall be dealt with in such manner as the Central Government may determine”.

    19. Paragraph 7 provides for constitution of the Mandal, which indicates that apart from the Chairman there are two members who are representatives of the Central Government and others are the nominees of the Central Government, which includes two members of the Lok Sabha and one member of the Rajya Sabha. Similarly, Rule 2(1)(i) of the Rules of the Mandal provides that “the Minister/Deputy Minister of Education and Culture in the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare shall be the Chairman of the Mandal” and it gives guidelines as to which of the other person should be included in the nomination by the Central Government as member of the Mandal. Under Rule 2(2) the Central Government may at any time appoint any other person or persons to be members of the Mandal”. Rule 10(f) provides, that no alteration or addition to any rules shall be made without the approval of the Government of India. Under Rule 10(g) the powers and functions of the Mandal shall be to frame bye-laws, subject to the approval of the Govt. of India, for all or any of the following matters provided thereunder. Under Rule 10(i) pdwers and functions will be to ensure compliance with such directives/instructions as may be received from the Government of India from time to time. Rule 11 under the leading “Governing Council” provides that to expenditure other than that as provided or in the budget shall be incurred without the approval of the Government of India. Under Rule 18, it is provided that the Mandal shall submit annually within 6 months of the closing of the previous financial year to the Central Government in the Ministry of Education a report on the Working of the Mandal together with the audited statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure to the previous year and the budget estimates for the ensuing year. According to Rule 20(ii) the accounts of the Sansthan will be audited annually by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India or by any person authorised by him in his behalf.

    20. From a perusal of the aforesaid Memorandum of Association, Rules and Bye-laws of the Mandal we are of the opinion that it is abundantly clear that the society in the present case is fully controlled by the Government of India both in the management and in the financial matters and the society is bound by the directions issued by the Central Government. In view of this there is no hesitation for us to come to the conclusion that this society (Mandal and Sansthan) is the instrumentality of the State and would thus be a “State” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India.

    21. In view of the aforesaid it cannot be argued that no writ could be issued by this Court to this society of course, subject to the limitations by the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

    22. However, the question still remains as to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition on the facts and circumstances of this case.

    23. The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was passed by the Trial Court in pursuance to the powers given by Art. 323-A of the Constitution of India, which was added in a new Part XIV-A by the Consitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976. This Article provides for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government. By the aforesaid Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, in relation to the aforesaid matters even the powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution was taken away and for the exercise of the said power the Administrative Tribunals were created and thus the aforesaid service matters were taken outside the jurisdiction of the courts except the Supreme Court. Under S. 3(q) “service matters” have been defined as follows:—

    “in relation to a person, means all matters relating to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government……………”

    24. Under S. 14 from the appointed day, the Central Administrative Tribunal has been invested with jurisdiction, power and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all courts except the Supreme Court in relation to:—

    (a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a Civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being in either case, a post filled by a civilian.

    (b) all service matters concerning—

    (i) a member of any All-India Service or

    (ii) a person (not beingra member of an All-India Service or a person referred to in clause (e) appointed to any civil of the Union or any civil post under the Union: or”.

    25. Sub-section (2) and (3) of S. 14 of the Act make it clear that the Central Government by notification may apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and to corporations or societies owned or controlled by Government not being a local or other authority or corporation or society controlled or owned by a State Govern ment.

    26. Keeping in view of the aforesaid provisions it has not been urged that the Central Government has issued any notification under S. 14(2) of the Act in respect of the society, respondent No. 2 and thus the jurisdiction of the High Court would not be affected in the absence of any such notification so far as the employees who are in the service of the society are concerned. Under S. 14(3) the Central Administrative Tribunal also gets, jurisdiction even in respect, of local or other authority or corporation only if a notification is issued under sub-section (2). Thus, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has so far.not been extended to the employees of the Mandal and thus in terms the power and jurisdiction of the High Court has not been excluded by means of the aforesaid Act.

    27. The next question which inevitable arises in the present case is about the jurisdiction of this Court in respect of the employees of the Central Government who are on deputation to the society. If notification would have been issued there was no difficulty of the employees who would have been embraced and would have come under the umbrella of the Central Administrative Tribunal. It is significant (that) S. 14 leave no exception to the employees of the Union or persons holding civil post under the Union and even to a post connected with defence or in the defence service being in either case, post filled by a civilian concerning their service matters. Thus, so far as the persons continuing in the employment of Union there is no doubt that the jurisdiction of the High Court has been excluded from the appointed date and it is only the Central Administrative Tribunal who could exercise jurisdiction to decide in respect of all their service matters. In view of this there would always be two classes of employees to any local or other authority or corporation or society under the aforesaid Act, one who are appointed directed by such authority as aforesaid and the other who come on deputation from the Central Government holding any civil service under the Union or civil post under the Union. In the first class of cases in the absence of notification under S. 14(2) of the Act this Court would continue to exercise its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, and in the later class of cases the jurisdiction of this Court stands excluded be virtue of S. 14(2).

    28. An employee on deputation continuing to hold lien on his parent department and on his being sent to the local body, corporation or society he continues to function under the rules of such local authority, corporation or society but always subject to authority of the parent department to call him back whenever it desires. This position would continue till a final absorption is made of such employee in the local body corporation or society and the parent body approves of such absorption and delinks his service from the parent department. In other words, he is still under the employment of the parent department (Central Government) and any order passed by the Union or the Central Government affecting any of his rights would relate and would be concerning service matters of such an employee. Thus even a local body, corporation or society though covered under S. 14 where a notification under S. 14(2) of the Act has not been issued all its employees who are on deputation from the Central Government holding civil post under the Union or from any civil service of the Union the jurisdiction has been exclusively vested in the Central Administrative Tribunal and the jurisdiction of this court has been excluded. However, the other.employees of any local body or any corporation or society where a notification under S. 14(2) of the Act has not been issued the jurisdiction of this Court still continues. Even those who are on deputation so far as the order passed by the authority where the employee has gone on deputation if it does not come in conflict or does not affect any matter relating to service in the parent department (Central Government) will also be amendable to the jurisdiction of this Court.

    29. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner's appointment in the Mandal was on deputation and there was no order of final absorption by the Governing Council of the Mandal, nor any order of the parent department (Central Government) either accepting the resignation of the petitioner or relieving him or ending his service from the parent department. Thus, the petitioner would be deemed to be continuing in the service of the parent department (Central Government) and any matter relevant or concerning his employment in the service, which the petitioner wants to challenge could only, be done before the Central Administrative Tribunal. In the present case, we have seen the impugned order dated 20/21st December, 1987 which is a communication of the decision of the Governing Council dated 15th December, 1987 was founded and passed on the order of the parent department that the petitioner be no absorbed in the Sansthan and be relieved as Reader and be sent back to its parent department. This, in fact, is pith and substance which emerges from the clusture of facts which have been stated by means of various affidavits in this case. It cannot be disputed even as per Memorandum of Association Rules Bye-laws, direction of the Central Government is binding on the Mandal and the Governing Council had merely acted in obedience of the order passed by the parent department. Thus, in fact, the grievance of the petitioner is the order passed by the parent department (Central Government). Even question raised by the petitioner that the impugned order dated 17th December, 1987, which was challenged by means of amendment that it is illegal and void as the said order was passed on the basis of some inquiry report without giving any opportunity: amounts to challenging the order passed by his parent department over which this Court could have no jurisdiction. Similarly, challenging the impugned orders on the basis of aforesaid notification dated 31st March, 1987, in effect challenges the order passed by the parent department by virtue of which he has been asked to return to the parent department. Even if it could be said for argument sake for which we are not expressing any opinion that the notification dated 31st March, 1987 would amount to petitioner's deemed absorption in the Sansthan, but this interpretation came in conflict with the order passed by the parent department in whose service he is still continuing and that order could not be challenged before this Court but could only be challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal.

    30. In view of the aforesaid, we are clearly of the opinion that the question raised in the present writ petition inherently relates to the question relating to the service matter of the petitioner of his parent department (Central Government) over which this Court has no jurisdiction and on this ground the present writ petition fails. In the result this writ petition is dismissed. However, on facts and circumstances of this case the costs shall be borne by the parties.

    31. Petition dismissed.

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