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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short the Act)
  • Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1/1964).
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.6.
  • KERALA HIGH COURT ACT 1958
  • Section 106 of Act 1/1964
  • Section 106 of Act 1/64,
  • Section 115 C.P.C
  • Rent Control Act
  • Section 11(2)(b)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short the Act)
  • Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1/1964).
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.6.
  • KERALA HIGH COURT ACT 1958
  • Section 106 of Act 1/1964
  • Section 106 of Act 1/64,
  • Section 115 C.P.C
  • Rent Control Act
  • Section 11(2)(b)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The matter concerns a dispute over a shed (the "petition schedule shed") and proceedings for eviction under Section 11(2)(b) and Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 ("the Act").

Procedural history (as provided in the opinion): - The first respondent (original petitioner) instituted proceedings under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Act seeking eviction. The trial court allowed eviction under Section 11(2)(b) but refused relief under Section 11(3). - The first respondent appealed (R.C.A No. S/1983) and the appeal was allowed. - The tenant (revision petitioner) then filed revision before the District Judge which was dismissed. - The tenant filed revision under Section 115 CPC before this Court (C.R.P No. 1719 of 1985 - G). The Division Bench (Kalliath, J. being one) allowed that revision, set aside the District Judge's order and remanded the matter to the trial court. - After remand, additional evidence (PW-2) and exhibits (Exts. C1, C2) were produced; the tenant was examined as CPW-1. The Rent Controller dismissed the petition. The first respondent then obtained an order in R.C.A No. 40 of 1989 from the District Judge, which is the subject of this revision.

The factual matrix includes: respondents 1 and 2 obtained property by partition in 1959; second respondent (mother of first respondent) executed Ext. A5 settlement releasing rights in favour of the first respondent; Ext. A1 is a rent deed by which the deceased husband of the revision petitioner took the shed on lease (dated 21-4-1969). The revision petitioner says rent was paid up to December 1978 (to second respondent); the first respondent asserted rent ceased after September 1976 and claimed the shed must be demolished for convenience and security of her residence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the first respondent is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (i.e., whether a bona fide need for demolition existed).
  2. Whether an earlier order (including an order rendered under Section 20 of the Act and subsequent orders) is void because a revision under Section 115 CPC against such an order is not maintainable (i.e., whether orders rendered by courts lacking jurisdiction in the specific procedural sense are void and effective).
  3. Whether the revision petitioner could claim benefit under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1/1964) given the dates and purposes of the lease and construction.

Arguments of the Parties

First Respondent's Arguments

  • Sought eviction under Section 11(2)(b) and Section 11(3) of the Act; alleged that the shed had to be demolished for the convenience and security of her residence.
  • Asserted that rent was in arrears after September 1976 (notice Ext. A4 reflects demolition for convenience and security).
  • In submissions, suggested traffic had increased and the open plot posed risk, and asserted need to construct a boundary wall (reasons given in evidence and notices).

Revision Petitioner (Tenant)'s Arguments

  • Denied arrears of rent from October 1976; maintained rent was paid until December 1978 to the second respondent (mother of first respondent).
  • Claimed benefit under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1/1964), asserting lease and construction by deceased husband; the genuineness of Ext. A1 rent deed was not denied.
  • Contended continued lawful use of the shed (cycle repairing and related activities) and denied that such use threatened the first respondent's peaceful residence; relied on judgment in A.S 58/1985 (Ext. A6) where injunction was limited to sub-letting and alteration.

Second Respondent's (Mother of First Respondent) Position

  • Questioned the validity/effect of Ext. A5 settlement; maintained Ext. A5 did not take effect.
  • Denied the need alleged by the first respondent to demolish the shed; pointed out entitlement to one-half of the rent under Ext. A5 and that she resides in the house.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai ((1987) 1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203) Held that a revision under Section 115 CPC against an order under Section 20 of the Rent Control Act is not maintainable; discusses limits of High Court revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. The court read paragraph 24 of this judgment and considered whether an order rendered under those circumstances would be void for want of jurisdiction; used it as a starting point for whether the earlier order was void.
Jetha Bai & Sons. Cochin v. Sundar das Rathenai ((1988) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1988 SC 812) Reaffirmed Aundal Ammal's position and held there is no conflict between Aundal Ammal and Shyamaraju Hegde; discussed the scope of High Court powers including reference to Article 227. The Court relied on Jetha Bai to show that Aundal Ammal's view remained binding and to note that Article 227 powers of the High Court remain exercisable; used this in assessing whether the remand order was void and whether the Court could exercise revisional scrutiny under Section 20 of the Act.
Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. V. Bhat (1987 Supp SCC 321 : AIR 1987 SC 2323) Held (under the Karnataka Rent Control Act) that an order of the District Judge under Section 50(2) of that Act is open to challenge before the High Court under Section 115 CPC. Cited as a contrasting authority; the Court noted the existence of that decision when explaining why Jetha Bai reconciled the decisions and reaffirmed Aundal Ammal's principles.
Sigma Agencies (P.) Ltd. v. P. V. Thomas (AIR 1991 Kerala 102) Held that an order passed under Section 115 CPC against an order under Section 20 of the Act is not void. The Court referred to this decision to support the proposition that so long as the court has jurisdiction over person and subject matter, the order would not be void and thus the remand was not inherently void.
Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan (A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655) Discussed the revisional power of the High Court under a provision (Section 15(5) of an earlier Rent Act) similar to Section 20 of the Kerala Act; held High Court's revisional power is wide and can examine legality or propriety of subordinate orders. The opinion quoted and relied on Moti Ram to show that revisional power under provisions similar to Section 20 permits the High Court to examine propriety and legality, thereby justifying revisional interference where appropriate.
Raman and Raman Ltd. v. Government of Madras (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 463) and Ching Chong Sine v. Puttay Gowder (A.I.R. 1968 Madras 152) Discussed the implication of the word "propriety" and affirmed that a revisional court can arrive at a conclusion different from the subordinate court on the same facts. The Court relied on these authorities to support its conclusion that, under Section 20, it could examine whether the appellate authority's finding on bona fide need was appropriate and, if not, reach a different conclusion on the same evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's decision proceeded in two main strands: (A) jurisdictional/precedential analysis regarding the effect of prior remedial orders and (B) factual appraisal of bona fide need under Section 11(3) of the Act.

A. Jurisdictional and precedential analysis

  1. The court acknowledged an earlier sequence of orders including remand by this Court in C.R.P No. 1719 of 1985, and the subsequent proceedings after remand (examination of PW-2, production of Exts. C1, C2, and CPW-1's evidence).
  2. The court considered whether an order rendered under the Act could be void if challenged by revision under Section 115 CPC, having regard to Aundal Ammal (which held such revision not maintainable). The question was whether such earlier orders were rendered without jurisdiction and therefore void.
  3. The court read paragraph 24 of Aundal Ammal and then took into account Jetha Bai which reaffirmed Aundal Ammal and clarified there is no conflict with Shyamaraju Hegde. The court noted the continuing scope of Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.
  4. The court further relied on Sigma Agencies to conclude that so long as the court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the order is not void; participation of the parties after remand supports that the remand order was not void.
  5. Conclusion of this strand: the remand and subsequent proceedings were not void for lack of jurisdiction, and the court could properly examine the matter within the limits set by the remand.

B. Factual appraisal on Section 11(3) bona fide need

  1. The court examined the pleadings, evidence and commissioner’s report Ext. C2 describing location and construction: the shed faced Kottappuram High School Road, is about 9 feet from the first respondent’s house, three sides enclosed by wooden planks with folding shutters on the western side, and nearby structures (an erumadam shop of Lalu and Bhima Hotel).
  2. The court noted Ext. A1 (rent deed dated 21-4-1969) shows lease for cycle repairing; commissioner noted electroplating occurring; CPW-1 (revision petitioner) swore cycle repairing continued after husband's death. There was no effective denial of the genuineness of Ext. A1.
  3. The court analyzed competing notices: Ext. A2 (by second respondent) sought surrender on ground of arrears and desire to demolish to construct a new building; Ext. A4 (by first respondent) relied on demolition for convenience and security. The court treated the inconsistency as significant when testing bona fides.
  4. The court highlighted the absence of detailed evidence demonstrating how the shed's existence threatens security or convenience: PW-1 (husband of first respondent) only stated convenience as a ground without particulars, and there was no empirical evidence of increased traffic or risk in PWs' evidence or Ext. C2.
  5. The court gave weight to the second respondent's objection (she lives in the house and is entitled to one-half rent under Ext. A5) which contradicted the first respondent's alleged need; demolition would defeat second respondent's financial right.
  6. The court observed that there were other adjacent encroachments/structures (erumadam shop and Bhima Hotel) recorded by the commissioner and no evidence of any effective action to remove them; this undermined the genuineness of the asserted need.
  7. The court reiterated the legal proposition that "mere desire or wish" does not equal "need" under Section 11(3) and that bona fides is inferred from surrounding circumstances; on the evidence, the circumstances did not support, and in fact went against, the asserted bona fide need.
  8. The court found that certain important circumstances were not considered by the appellate authority and that under Section 20 of the Act this Court had power to examine findings of fact for illegality, irregularity or impropriety; it was justified in reaching a different conclusion from that of the lower tribunal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is allowed. The court held that the first respondent failed to establish a bona fide need under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, and accordingly the order of the appellate authority allowing eviction was set aside.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The appellate authority's order permitting eviction under Section 11(3) is set aside; the first respondent is not successful in proving bona fide need to demolish the shed.
  • There will be no orders as to costs (the Court expressly ordered no costs).
  • The decision is directed at the rights of the parties in this litigation (tenant's occupation and landlord's claim); the opinion emphasizes factual deficiencies in the landlord's proofs rather than establishing a broad new rule of law. The Court exercised its revisional jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Act to correct factual and legal improprieties in the appellate decision.

Note: The opinion reviews and applies existing authorities on jurisdiction and the scope of revisional power; it does not assert that it is creating a new legal precedent beyond application of cited authorities to the facts before the Court.


End of summary — all content above is a faithful extraction and synthesis of material explicitly contained in the provided opinion.

    Kallyani Sulochana v. Saradamma And Others

    Manoharan, J.:— The first counter petitioner - tenant in R.C.P No. 15 of 1979 is the revision petitioner. The first respondent who was the petitioner in the said R.C.P instituted the proceedings under Section 11(2)(b) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short ‘the Act’) for eviction. Trial court allowed eviction under Section 11(2)(b) and refused the prayer under Section 11(3) of the Act. First respondent preferred R.C.A No. S/1983 before the Appellate Authority, the Subordinate Judge. The appeal was allowed. Revision petitioner - tenant filed revision before the District Judge; that was dismissed. Against the order of the District Judge the revision petitioner filed revision under Section 115 C.P.C before this court as C.R.P No. 1719 of 1985 - G. One of us (Kalliath, J.) allowed the revision set aside the order of the District Judge and remanded the matter to the trial court.

    2. After remand PW-2 was examined and Exts. C1 and C2 were marked on the first respondent's side; and the revision petitioner-tenant was examined as CPW-1. Rent Controller dismissed the petition. Against the said dismissal the first respondent preferred R.C.A No. 40 of 1989 before the District Judge, Kollam; that was allowed. This revision is directed against the said order of the District Judge. The property in which the petition schedule shed is situated was obtained by respondents 1 and 2 as per a partition in 1959. Second respondent is the mother of the first respondent. She executed Ext. A5 settlement by which she released her right in favour of the first respondent. First respondent's husband let out the petition schedule shed to the deceased husband the revision petitioner as per Ext. A1 rent deed. The petitioner alleged that rent was paid only up to September 1976. She also contended, the shed has be demolished for the convenience and security of her residence. Revision petitioner denied the allegation of arrears of rent from October 1976 and maintained that rent till December 1978 was paid to the second respondent the mother of the first respondent. She also contended that her deceased husband obtained lease of the land for constructing shed and constructed the same; she claimed benefit under Section 106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (Act 1/1964). She denied the need alleged by the first respondent. Second respondent, mother of the first respondent in her objection questioned the validity of Ext. A5. She maintained that Ext. A5 did not take effect and denied the need alleged by the petitioner.

    3. As regards the claim under Section 106 of Act 1/64, before remand the Rent Controller passed an order referring the said question to the Land Tribunal for adjudication. The first respondent preferred R.C.A 13/1980, before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kollam. The order appealed against was set aside. It will be noted that under Section 106 of Act 1/1964 the lease of the land must be for commercial or industrial purpose and the tenant should have constructed building for such commercial or industrial purpose before the 2th May 1967. The genuineness of Ext. A1 rent deed is not denied by the revision petitioner. Ext. A1 rent deed is dated 21-4-1969 and this same is with respect to the building. Therefore, evidently the revision petitioner cannot claim the benefit under Section 106 of Act 1/1964. Apart from the same, the remand judgment of this court would show that the only ground that survived for consideration after the remand was the one under Section 11(3) of the Act. In judgment in R.C.A 5/1983 it is stated that the order under Section 11(2)(b) was got vacated by the tenant as per Section 11(2)(c) of the Act.

    4. Now the question for consideration is whether the first respondent is entitled to an order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act. After remand the jurisdiction of the court would be circumscribed and limited by the remand judgment. As has already noted, a revision under Section 20 of the Act before the District Judge against the judgment in R.C.A No. 5/1983 which allowed eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act was dismissed. The order of the District Judge was set aside by this court by the order in C.R.P No. 1719 of 1985-G and the matter was remitted. In the light of the decision in Aundal Ammal v. Sadasivan Pillai. ((1987) 1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203) which held that revision under Section 115 CPC against an order under Section 20 of the Act is not maintainable the question that would arise is whether the said order is void as one rendered without jurisdiction. If it is void the judgment in R.C.A 5/1983 allowing the prayer of the land-lord under Section 11(3) of the Act which was confirmed by the District, Judge in the order in revision would be effective.

    5. So long as the court has got jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter there would be no inherent lack of jurisdiction; consequently an order rendered by the court would not be void. In this context it is necessary to read paragraph 24 of the judgment in Aundal Ammal's case ((1987) 1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203). Therein it is observed:

    “It must, however, be emphasised that we are not dealing in this appeal with the constitutional powers of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution nor are we concerned with the powers of the High Court regulating appeals under the Kerala High Court Act, 1958. We are concerned in this case whether the High Court, in view of the scheme of the Act, had jurisdiction to interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

    6. The same question as to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C to revise an order passed under Section 20 of the Act again arose for consideration in the decision in Jetha Bai & Sons. Cochin v. Sundar das Rathenai ((1988) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1988 SC 812). The question that arose was whether there was a conflict between the views expressed in Aundal Ammal's case ((1987) 1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203) and the decision in Shyamaraju Hegde v. U.V Bhat (1987 Supp SCC 321 : AIR 1987 SC 2323). The later decision arose under Karnataka Rent Control Act wherein it was held that an order of the District Judge under Section 50(2) of the said Act is open to challenge before the High Court under Section 115 of the C.P.C Jetha Bai's case ((1988) 1 SCC 722 : AIR 1988 SC 812) reaffirmed Aundal Ammal's case ((1987) 1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203) holding that there is no conflict between the decisions in Aundal Ammal's case ((1987) 1 SCC 183 : AIR 1987 SC 203) and Shyamaraju Hegde's case (1987 Supp SCC 321 : AIR 1987 SC 2323). In paragraph 17 of the judgment it is observed:

    “Incidentally, we may also point out that the Legislature has not taken away and indeed it cannot take away the power of superintendence of the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution over all courts and Tribunals which are within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises its jurisdiction”.

    7. The point to be noted is, it is not a case where the High Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person. Under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and person and consequently the order of remand is not void particularly when the parties have participated in the proceedings after remand. In the decision in Sigma Agencies (P.) Ltd. v. P.V Thomas (AIR 1991 Kerala 102) it is held that an order passed under Section 115 CPC against as order under Section 20 of the Act is not void.

    8. After remand PW-2, the Commissioner filed Ext. C1 report and Ext. C2 mahazar. What is alleged in para 4 of the petition is that the shed has to be demolished for the security and convenience of the residence of the first respondent in the building situated in the property. Under Section 20 of the Act though re-appreciation of the evidence as such is not called for, the pleadings and evidence have to be examined to satisfy the legality, regularity or propriety of the order of the lower authorities. It will be necessary in this context to note the location of the petition schedule shed and also the building. Ext. A5 settlement describes the property in which the shed is situated to measure 10 cents and 463 Sq. links. In Ext. C2 mahazar the commissioner gives the details as to the location and relative position of the petition schedule shed and the building in which the first respondent resides. National High way is on the north of the said plot and Kottappuram High School Road is on the west. The petition schedule shed is situated in the north and faces the Kottappuram High School Road. In paragraph 3 of Ext. C2 it is stated that immediately on the north of the shed there is an ‘erumadam’ shop of one Lain, son of Kunju Panickan and on the north of the petitioner's house is Bhima Hotel. Ext. C2 states that the house in which the petitioner resides is situated about 9 feet away from the south eastern corner of the shed. The nature of the shed also is described by the Commissioner. He states that, the three side of the shed is enclosed by the wooden planks and the western side which faces the road is having folding shutters.

    9. Ext. A1 rent deed would show that the shed was taken on lease for the purpose of conducting cycle repairing. Commissioner also noted that the work of electro plating was being conducted. In the objection by the revision petitioner she maintained that, even after the death of her husband cycle repairing is being conducted. CPW-1 the revision petitioner would swear that the cycle repairing has not been stopped. The first respondent instituted Ext. A6 suit for injunction against the revision petitioner alleging that the revision petitioner was using the premises for purposes other than for which it was let out and she is attempting to induct strangers. Trial court dismissed the suit. Appeal by the first respondent was partly allowed. Ext. A6 is the copy of the judgment in A.S 58/1985. The court held, positive covenant to carry on a business does not carry with it a negative covenant not to carry on business of any other kind. The injunction was granted only against sub-letting and altering the building. Thus the revision petitioner uses the premises only for lawful purposes. There is no allegation to the effect that the conduct of the revision petitioner is such that the same constitutes a threat to the peaceful residence of the first respondent. In fact there is absolutely no allegation as to how the existence of the shed or its user by the revision petitioner would infringe on the security or the residence of the first respondent and her family. All that is alleged is, for the convenience and the security of the residence of the first respondent demolition of the shed is necessary. Even PW-1, the husband of the first respondent did not give any ground or detail as to how the existence of the shed is a security risk so far as the residence of the first respondent is concerned. PW-1 only said that for the convenient residence of his family the shed has to be demolished. Ext. A2 is the copy of the notice issued by the second respondent to the revision petitioner. She is entitled to receive one-half of the rent as per Ext. A5. Ext. A4 is the copy of notice issued by the first respondent. Ext. A2 calls upon the revision petitioner to surrender the building on the ground that she has kept arrears and that she wants to demolish the shed for constructing a new building in modern fashion, whereas in Ext. A4 notice sent by the first respondent what is stated is, the shed has to be demolished for the convenience and security of the residence of the first respondent. In testing the bona fides of the need of the first respondent the inconsistency in Exts. A2 and A4 as to the purpose for which demolition is required is of importance. This is particularly so as even PW does not say the basis for alleged apprehension of the first respondent.

    10. What is suggested is, a boundary well is to be constructed on the north and the west of the plot wherein the said shed and residential building of the first respondent is located and for that purpose the shed has to be demolished. According to the first respondent traffic has increased and there is risk in keeping the plot open. There is no data in the evidence of PWs. 1 and 2, and Ext. C2 to support such a claim. Ext. C2 mentions fence seen errected in a portion. The ground urged should not be a ruse for eviction. The need should be genuine. It is not as if boundary wall cannot be raised without demolishing the shed.

    11. One other important aspect to be noted in this connection is, as per Ext. A5 the second respondent is entitled to reside in the house and also is entitled to receive one-half rent. PW-1 admits that the second respondent is residing along With them in the house. The second respondent in her objection said, there is no need to demolish the shed for the convenience or security of the residence in the building. In assessing the bona fides of the first respondent as to the alleged need the objection by the second respondent is of paramount importance since she is entitled to reside in the building and is admittedly residing in the building. The contention by the second respondent that there is no need to demolish the shed on the ground alleged by the first respondent would thus go against the bona fides of the first respondent. In this connection it is not of little importance to note that demolition of the shed for the alleged purpose would defeat the right of the 2nd respondent to receive one half of the rent.

    12. The other circumstances also do not support the alleged need. In Ext. C-2 the Commissioner notes immediately on the north of the petition schedule building there is an erumadam shop of Lalu, son of Kunju Panickan and another building, Bhima Hotel. Though it was asserted by the learned counsel for the first respondent that Bhima Hotel has already been surrendered, there is nothing in evidence to support the same. The Commissioner visited the property on 14-1-1987 and he noted the existence of Bhima Hotel in Ext. C2. On 14-1-1987 when the Commissioner visited the property he saw the erumadam shop of Lalu; he mentioned the shop in Ext. C2. In the cross-examination of CPW-1 suggestion is to the effect one Sreedharan trespassed into a portion of the property and constructed an erumadam shop, that for recovery the first respondent instituted O.S 327 of 1979 and that the same was delivered over in 1984. CPW-1 pleaded ignorance of the same. What is to be noted is, the suggestion is with respect to the alleged trespass by one Sreedharan, construction of shed by him and his eviction in 1984. On 14-1-1987 when the Commissioner visited the property he noted an erumadam shop of Lalu, son of Kunju Panicken. Evidently the decree and the delivery with respect to which reference was made in the cross-examination of CPW-1 cannot be in relation to the erumadam shop noted by PW-2 in Ext. C2. There is nothing in evidence to show that any step was taken for eviction of Lalu and Bhima Hotel. That also is a circumstance which has to be taken into account in assessing the bona fides of the alleged need.

    13. Mere desire or wish cannot be equated with the “need” mentioned in Section 11(3) of the Act. Bona fides being a condition of mind may not be capable of direct evidence and hence should be a matter for inference from attending circumstances. The circumstances not only do not bring out any need, but would go against the alleged need.

    14. Certain aspects and circumstances adverted to by us have certainly escaped the consideration of the appellate authority. The further question is whether we should interfere with the judgment of the appellate authority exercising the power granted to this Court under Section 20 of the Act. The width and scope of Section 20 of the Act need not be discussed here, since it is now well settled in law that this Court has got the power to examine the findings of fact of the lower authorities to satisfy ourselves whether the impugned judgment suffers from the vice of illegality irregularity or impropriety envisaged under Section 20 of the Act. The word ‘propriety’ has not been defined in the Act. It is capable of variety of meanings. In the Oxford English Dictionary, it has been stated to mean fitness; appropriateness; aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstance or conditions; conformity with requirements, rules, or principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy.”

    15. In A.I.R 1960 S.C 655 (Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan) Gajendragadkar, J. observed when dealing with the question of revisional power of the High Court under section 15(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (3 of 1949) a provision similar to Section 20 of the Act thus:—

    “Mr. Bindra has argued that the High Court was in error, in coming to its own conclusion as to whether the requirement of S. 13(3)(a)(iii) has been satisfied. As we have already pointed out the finding of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority was that the claim made by respondent 1 that he required the shop for the purpose of reconstruction was not bona fide. The High Court has reversed this conclusion and Mr. Bindra challenges the correctness or the propriety of the said conclusion. The revisional power conferred upon the High Court under S. 15(5) is wider than that conferred by S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under S. 15(5) the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made by the authorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under S. 13(3)(a)(iii). The High Court no doubt has accepted the appellant's argument that the requirement in question must be bona fide but it has observed that there was no legal evidence on which it could be said that the landlord's requirement was not bona fide”.

    16. The implication of the word ‘propriety’ has been considered by the Supreme Court in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. Govt. of Madras (A.I.R 1965 S.C 463). Referring to the decisions reported in A.I.R 1960 S.C 655 and A.I.R 1956 S.C 463, the Madras High Court in the decision reported in A.I.R 1968 Madras 152 (Ching Chong Sine v. Puttay Gowder) observed that the revision court has power to come to a conclusion different from that arrived at by the subordinate court on the same set of circumstances. In the case at hand, we have already said that certain important circumstances and aspects have not been considered at all and we feel that we are also fully justified in taking a different conclusion from the facts adverted to by the appellate authority in regard to the question of bona fides required under Section 11(3) of the Act. We are of opinion that it will result in failure of justice, if we allow the decision to stand holding that we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the judgment after finding that the decision of the appellate authority is neither appropriate nor suitable to the circumstances surfaced from the evidence in the case. Further, we feel that the judgment lacks justness and accuracy. We have no hesitation to hold that, the first respondent is not successful in proving her case of bona fide need. Consequently the order of the appellate authority is liable to be set aside and the revision is to be allowed.

    17. In the result the revision is allowed; but in the circumstance, there will be no orders as to costs.

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    Kallyani Sulochana v. Saradamma And Others
    (May 28, 1991)