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citation codes
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  • Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930.
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code,
  • Rule 97(2) of the Bihar Service Code
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 97
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930.
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code,
  • Rule 97(2) of the Bihar Service Code
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 97
Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — Letters Patent Appeal (Vijay Kumar Tiwari v. The State of Bihar)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, who was serving as a Forest Ranger at Bhim Bandh, was placed under suspension by an order dated 10.06.1999 and subjected to departmental proceedings. Charges were framed against him (the opinion states "The following charges were framed against him:" but the specific charges are not set out in the provided text). The Inquiry Officer conducted a departmental inquiry and, by a report dated 19.09.2000, “substantially exonerated” the petitioner.

The disciplinary authority disagreed with the Inquiry Officer and imposed punishments by order dated 19.04.2001. The petitioner challenged that order by filing Writ C.W.J.C. No. 14310 of 2002; the writ petition was allowed by order dated 08.07.2003, which set aside the punishment and directed that if the disciplinary authority disagreed with the Inquiry Officer’s findings, it must record reasons and communicate them to the employee to enable a show-cause response.

The petitioner retired from government service effective 31.01.2003. The disciplinary authority then issued a show-cause notice dated 30.09.2003 indicating reasons for disagreement and proposing two punishments (the notice is referred to in the opinion; the precise text of the two proposed punishments is not provided in the excerpt). After considering the petitioner’s response, the disciplinary authority passed an order dated 05.01.2004 scaling down the proposed punishments and directing that the petitioner shall be deprived of salary except for subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.

The petitioner challenged the 05.01.2004 order by filing Writ C.W.J.C. No. 4371 of 2004; this writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge by order dated 06.01.2006. The present appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the Patna High Court challenges the Single Judge's dismissal of that writ petition and the upholding of the deprivation of salary beyond subsistence allowance for the suspension period.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether deprivation of salary beyond subsistence allowance for the period of suspension is a form of punishment that can be lawfully inflicted under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930 (and related Bihar Service Code provisions).
  2. Whether an employee can be deprived of salary for the period of suspension under Rule 97(2) of the Bihar Service Code only after service of a show-cause notice, and whether the procedural requirements were satisfied in this case.
  3. Whether the show-cause notice dated 30.09.2003 (which proposed certain punishments) lawfully permitted the disciplinary authority to impose the specific punishment ultimately imposed (deprivation of salary except subsistence), given that the penalty finally inflicted differed from the punishments initially proposed in the notice.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Deprivation of salary beyond subsistence allowance is not a punishment under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930, and therefore cannot lawfully be inflicted as a disciplinary punishment.
  • Rule 97(2) of the Bihar Service Code permits deprivation of salary for the period of suspension only after issue of a show-cause notice; in the appellant's case a proper show-cause notice was not served (or the requirements were not met).
  • The show-cause notice dated 30.09.2003 proposed two specific punishments, whereas the punishment actually imposed was completely different — this frustrated the purpose of the show-cause procedure.
  • The appellant relied on reported decisions including Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (AIR 1998 SC 2713), Mahabir Prasad v. State of Bihar (1988 P.L.J.R 82), and Basishtha Prasad Sinha v. The State of Bihar (1993 (1) P.L.J.R 604) in support of his contention that deprivation without appropriate opportunity to be heard or without adherence to procedural requirements was impermissible.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The State supported the impugned action and submitted that the petitioner was not entitled to full wages because he had not been fully exonerated; the disciplinary authority found certain acts to be irresponsible (for example, not getting a revised estimate approved) and therefore the deprivation of salary was justified.
  • The disciplinary authority, after the High Court's earlier direction, recorded reasons for disagreement and issued a show-cause notice dated 30.09.2003; accordingly the procedure prescribed by law had been complied with prior to imposing punishment.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 2713 Where a disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of an Inquiry Officer, the authority must give the delinquent employee an opportunity of hearing before recording its conclusions. The Court observed that the disciplinary authority had earlier erred by not recording reasons or issuing show-cause notice, an error which the High Court corrected. Subsequently the authority recorded reasons and issued a show-cause notice dated 30.09.2003. The Court concluded that the Punjab National Bank principle did not render the present action invalid in view of the corrective steps taken.
Mahabir Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1988 P.L.J.R. 82 Addressed the validity of an order depriving an employee of salary (beyond subsistence) where the employee was not heard; reliance upon Supreme Court authority (M. Gopalkrishna Naidu) as to requirement of opportunity to be heard. The appellant relied on this decision to argue invalidity of salary deprivation without a hearing. The Court found Mahabir Prasad inapplicable because in the present case the deprivation was inflicted as punishment and a show-cause notice had in fact been issued on 30.09.2003.
Basishtha Prasad Sinha v. The State of Bihar, 1993 (1) P.L.J.R. 604 Considered a situation where the petitioner was acquitted/exonerated and a show-cause notice contemplated deprivation of salary for the suspension period. The Court distinguished that case on its facts: there the employee had been acquitted and exonerated; in the present case the petitioner was not wholly exonerated. Accordingly Basishtha Prasad Sinha was held not to be applicable.
M. Gopalkrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 240 Principle that depriving an employee of monetary benefits without giving opportunity to be heard is invalid (as cited in Mahabir Prasad). The Court noted that the Mahabir Prasad reliance on M. Gopalkrishna Naidu was not applicable here because the present case involved a punitive deprivation following issuance of a show-cause notice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining (a) the findings of the Inquiry Officer, (b) the conduct of the disciplinary authority and the corrective order of the High Court, (c) the subsequent show-cause notice, and (d) whether the punishment imposed was permissible under the relevant rules.

The salient points of the Court's step-by-step reasoning are:

  • The Inquiry Officer had largely given the petitioner the benefit of doubt and effectively exonerated him on the principal allegations. Nevertheless, the Inquiry Officer did record factual observations (the opinion records that the main charge concerned payment at higher rates to daily wagers without prior permission; certain other findings about fire-lines are referenced but the full text of those findings is not included in the provided excerpt).
  • The disciplinary authority initially disagreed with the Inquiry Officer but failed to record its reasons and failed to provide a show-cause opportunity; the High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 14310 of 2002 (order dated 08.07.2003) set aside the punishment on that procedural ground and directed the authority to proceed afresh and to record reasons and give an opportunity of hearing.
  • Thereafter the disciplinary authority issued a show-cause notice dated 30.09.2003 that set out reasons for disagreement and proposed two punishments (the exact proposed punishments are not fully set out in the opinion excerpt). The petitioner replied to the show-cause notice.
  • After considering the petitioner’s response, the disciplinary authority passed the order dated 05.01.2004, scaling down the proposed punishments and directing deprivation of salary beyond subsistence allowance for the period of suspension. The authority also treated the period of suspension as valid for pension and post-retirement benefits (i.e., a lenient stance as to service consequences).
  • The Court held that because the petitioner was not “wholly exonerated” within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code, the disciplinary authority was entitled to impose an appropriate punishment; the Court explained that deprivation under Rule 97 can be ordered where the employee is not fully exonerated, whereas the stricter requirement of issuing a show-cause before ordering deprivation beyond subsistence may be implicated when the employee is otherwise fully exonerated (the opinion's language links the applicability of sub-rule (2) and the need for show-cause to the scope of exoneration).
  • The Court accepted that the disciplinary authority took a lenient view (scaling down the punishment, treating suspension as valid for pension), and observed that a disciplinary authority may impose a smaller punishment than those proposed in a show-cause notice. The Court therefore saw no procedural unfairness in imposing the scaled-down punishment actually inflicted.
  • The Court distinguished the precedents relied upon by the appellant (Mahabir Prasad, Basishtha Prasad Sinha and the like) on their factual differences, and observed that the Punjab National Bank principle (that a delinquent must be heard before a disciplinary authority records conclusions adverse to an Inquiry Officer's findings) had been satisfied after the High Court's earlier direction because reasons were recorded and a show-cause notice issued on 30.09.2003.

On this basis the Court concluded that there was no infirmity in the impugned order and that the appeal did not deserve to be allowed.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effects and immediate consequences:

  • The order of the disciplinary authority dated 05.01.2004 — directing that the petitioner shall be deprived of salary except subsistence allowance for the period of suspension — is upheld.
  • The disciplinary authority's treatment of the period of suspension as valid for pension and post-retirement benefits (a lenient consequence for service continuity) is acknowledged by the Court.
  • There is no order as to costs in the appeal.

Broader implications: The Court distinguished earlier decisions relied upon by the petitioner on their facts and affirmed that where a delinquent employee is not wholly exonerated, a disciplinary authority may lawfully impose deprivation of salary under the applicable rule framework after following the corrective procedural steps (recording reasons and issuing show-cause). The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond its factual application and does not purport to set a new binding precedent.

    Vijay Kumar Tiwari v. State Of Bihar

    S.K Katriar, J.

    This appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court of Judicature at Patna has been preferred by petitioner of C.W.J.C No. 4371 of 2004 (Vijay Kumar Tiwari v. The State of Bihar), and raises grievance with respect to the order dated 6.1.2006, whereby the writ petition has been dismissed, and the order of the respondent authorities to the effect that the petitioner shall be deprived of his salary except the subsistence allowance for the period of suspension, has been upheld.

    2. A brief statement of facts essential for the disposal of the appeal may be indicated. The petitioner was, at the relevant point of time, functioning as Forest Ranger at Bhim Bandh. He was placed under suspension by order dated 10.06.1999 (Annexure-1), and was subjected to a departmental proceeding. The following charges were framed against him:

    The petitioner participated in the departmental proceedings. The learned inquiry officer submitted his report dated 19.9.2000, whereby he was substantially exonerated of the charges. The learned disciplinary authority disagreed with the inquiry report, and inflicted punishments on the petitioner by his order dated 19.4.2001 The petitioner challenged the same by preferring C.W.J.C No. 14310 of 2002, which was allowed by order dated 8.7.2003 (Annexure-9), whereby the order of punishment was set aside, and the learned disciplinary authority was given liberty to proceed afresh from the stage ahead of submission of the inquiry report. In other words, the learned Single Judge held that, if the learned disciplinary authority intended to disagree with the findings of the learned inquiry officer, he was required to record reasons in support of the disagreement which had to be communicated to the delinquent employee to enable him to show cause. The petitioner in the meanwhile retired from the services of the Bihar Government w.e.f 31.1.2003 The learned disciplinary authority issued show-cause notice dated 30.9.2003 (Annexure-10), wherein he indicated his reasons for disagreement with the findings recorded by the learned Inquiry Officer, calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why the punishments indicated therein be not inflicted on him. The proposed punishments are indicated as follows:

    The petitioner had shown cause on a consideration of which the learned disciplinary authority passed the impugned order dated 5.1.2004 (Annexure-12), whereby the proposed punishment has been scaled down, and is stated that the petitioner shall not be entitled to his salary beyond subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.

    3. The petitioner challenged the order of punishment dated 5.1.2004, by preferring the present C.W.J.C 4371 of 2004 which has been dismissed by order dated 6.1.2006 The learned Single Judge has held as follows:

    “On the other hand, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the petitioner is not entitled for full wages as he has not been fully exonerated as is evident from the impugned resolution wherein the competent authority has found his action in not getting the revised estimate approved as his irresponsible act. However, the competent authority decided not to make any recovery of the alleged excess amount as obviously the Government itself has come with the notification regarding the revised wages payable to the labourer. But, insofar as the action of the petitioner is concerned, the same has been found to be irresponsible as he did not get the estimate revised. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, revision of estimate was not his duty/responsibility. However, he has not been able to show either with reference to any Rule, Government decision or even from the pleadings that it was not the responsibility of the petitioner to get the revised estimate approved. Under such circumstances, I find it difficult to hold that the case of the petitioner is covered by sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 and that he is entitled for full pay and allowances for suspension period.

    This Court, thus, finds no infirmity in the impugned order. Writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.”

    (emphasis added)

    4. While expressing grievance with respect to the order of the learned Single Judge, learned counsel for the appellant submits that deprivation of salary beyond subsistence allowance for the period of suspension is not a punishment under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1930. It cannot, therefore, be inflicted by way of punishment. He next submits that an employee can be deprived of his salary for the period of suspension in terms of Rule 97(2) of the Bihar Service Code only after a show-cause notice is issued to him, which has admittedly not been served. He submits in the same vein that the show-cause notice dated 30.9.2003 (Annexure-10) proposed two punishments indicated hereinabove, whereas completely different punishment has been inflicted on him. The whole purpose of show cause notice is frustrated. He relies on the following reported judgments:

    (i) A.I.R 1998 S.C 2713 (Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra.

    (ii) 1988 P.L.J.R 82, paragraph 3, Mahabir Prasad v. State of Bihar.

    (iii) 1993 (1) P.L.J.R 604 paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 (Basishtha Prasad Sinha v. The State of Bihar.).

    5. Learned Government advocate has supported the impugned action.

    6. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. It is correct to state that the learned Inquiry Officer had exonerated the petitioner. The main charge against the petitioner is that he paid at higher rates to the Daily Wagers without prior permission of the authorities. The learned Inquiry Officer concluded that:

    He further found with regard to putting up fire line that

    The learned Inquiry Officer, therefore, gave benefit of doubt to the petitioner, and stated that he may be exonerated. This had led to the order of punishment dated 19.4.2001 (Annexure-6), which was set aside by the High Court by order dated 8.7.2003, passed in C.W.J.C No. 14310 of 2002, on the ground that the learned disciplinary authority had not recorded reasons for disagreement with the learned Inquiry Officer, nor the same were conveyed to the petitioner along with show-cause notice. This was followed by show-cause notice dated 30.9.2003, proposing two-fold punishments indicated hereinabove leading to the order of punishment.

    7. It is evident on a plain reading of the show-cause notice dated 30.9.2003, that the reasons for disagreement as well as the findings of the learned Single Judge set out hereinabove, the petitioner has not been fully exonerated. It was, therefore, open to the learned disciplinary authority to inflict an appropriate punishment on him. Two-fold punishments proposed to be inflicted on him were indicated in the show-cause notice dated 30.9.2003 It appears to us that the learned disciplinary authority took a lenient view of the matter, and inflicted on him smaller punishment by way of deprivation of salary for the period of suspension except the subsistence allowance. Once it is held that the petitioner was not wholly exonerated within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 97 of the Bihar Service Code, it goes without saying that no show-cause notice was needed, and deprivation can be ordered in terms of Rule 97. Part or whole of the salary for the period of suspension beyond subsistence allowance for the period of suspension can be ordered for after show cause notice only if the delinquent employee were fully exonerated. The learned disciplinary authority indeed took a lenient approach, and treated the period of suspension valid for purpose of pension and post-retirement benefits. In fact, show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 30.9.2003 Law is well settled that the Court can always grant a smaller relief contained in the larger relief though not specifically prayed for, Similarly, in the present situation, it is open to the learned disciplinary authority to inflict a smaller punishment if bigger punishment(s) were proposed. We, therefore, do not find fault with the impugned order.

    8. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the following portion of the judgment in Mahabir Prasad v. The State of Bihar (supra):

    “Mr. Tarkeshwar Dayal, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner did not challenge the validity of the order of censure. Learned counsel however, submitted that the order of the State Government that the period of suspension would be treated as on duty for the purposes of pension and gratuity but the petitioner would not get anything more than the subsistence allowance already received by him during the period of suspension is invalid, because the petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard before the said order was passed. In support of this contention, learned counsel relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in M. Gopalkrishna Naidu v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 240). There is substance in the contention of learned counsel.”

    The judgment is inapplicable to the present case because the petitioner has been deprived of rest of his salary by way of punishment and for which show-cause notice had been issued.

    9. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Basishtha Prasad Sinha (supra), that the petitioner of that writ petition had been acquitted in the criminal case, and exonerated in the departmental proceeding. It was held in that background of facts that the show-cause notice indicated deprivation of salary for the period of suspension. The judgment for the reasons indicated hereinabove is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    10. It has been held in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank v. Kunj Behari Misra (supra) that, in case the learned disciplinary authority disagrees from the findings of the learned Inquiry Officer, he must give opportunity of hearing to the delinquent employee before recording its conclusions. The learned disciplinary authority in the present case had indeed made the mistake of not recording his reasons/disagreement, nor issuing show-cause notice to the delinquent employee on the earlier occasion, which position was corrected by the High Court after the earlier writ petition was disposed of. Thereafter, the learned disciplinary authority did record reasons for disagreement, and indeed issued show-cause notice to the delinquent employee on 30.9.2003 The judgment is inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    11. We, therefore, do not find any merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

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    Vijay Kumar Tiwari v. State Of Bihar
    (Jan 12, 2009)