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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 246
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 161 or 162 of the Code
  • Section 482 of the Code
  • The Code
  • Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 408, 409, 420, 467, 468, 473 and 477 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 246
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 161 or 162 of the Code
  • Section 482 of the Code
  • The Code
  • Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 408, 409, 420, 467, 468, 473 and 477 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Vidyodaya Trust, a public charitable trust running educational institutions in Kerala, became the centre of two competing criminal proceedings:

  • 17-10-2001: Respondent 2 (a trustee) lodged a private complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulam, alleging that the appellant (Chief Executive Trustee), Respondent 3 (the Treasurer) and three bank officials conspired to siphon off about ₹42 lakh from the Trust. An FIR in Crime Case No. 817 of 2001 was registered for offences under Sections 408, 409, 420, 467, 468, 473 and 477 read with Section 34 IPC.
  • The police later filed a final report dated 6-2-2003 stating that no case was made out against the appellant and the three bank officials, leading to their discharge. Respondent 2 filed a protest petition (CC No. 28 of 2004) seeking cognizance against the appellant and Respondent 3.
  • Subsequent counter-FIR: The appellant lodged FIR No. 5 of 2002 at North Police Station, Ernakulam, against Respondent 3 alone under Sections 406, 409, 465, 467 and 471 IPC, alleging that Respondent 3 misused his position to defraud the Trust. The police filed Charge-sheet No. 166 of 2002, which became CC No. 2682 of 2002 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate (JMFC-II), Ernakulam.
  • Respondent 3 sought quashing of this second FIR and charge-sheet by filing Criminal M.C. No. 2641 of 2007 under Section 482 CrPC. The appellant, in turn, filed Criminal M.C. No. 1732 of 2004 seeking to quash proceedings initiated against him in the first FIR.
  • 27-5-2014: A Single Judge of the Kerala High Court dismissed the appellant’s Criminal M.C. No. 1732 of 2004 but allowed Respondent 3’s Criminal M.C. No. 2641 of 2007, thereby quashing FIR No. 5 of 2002, Charge-sheet No. 166 of 2002 and all consequential proceedings (CC 2682/2002).
  • The appellant challenged that part of the High Court’s order before the Supreme Court. A separate SLP concerning his own discharge became infructuous and was dismissed on 6-3-2018; the present appeal concerns only the order quashing the second FIR against Respondent 3.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in quashing FIR No. 5 of 2002, Charge-sheet No. 166 of 2002 and CC No. 2682 of 2002 in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.
  2. More broadly, whether a subsequent FIR lodged by a different complainant, presenting a counter-version of the same incident, is barred when an earlier FIR on the incident already exists.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent 3’s Arguments (before the High Court, reiterated in the Supreme Court)

  • He could not be subjected to two separate criminal trials on the same facts and for the same offences in different courts.
  • Therefore, the later FIR (No. 5 of 2002) and the corresponding charge-sheet should be quashed as an abuse of the court’s process.

The opinion does not detail the appellant’s specific submissions beyond his challenge to the High Court’s order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 Illustrative categories for exercising inherent power to quash criminal proceedings. Cited by the High Court; Supreme Court noted this relied on general principles but did not govern the specific counter-FIR issue.
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 Scope and limits of Section 482 CrPC. Relied on by the High Court; treated as laying down general quashing principles, not decisive of the counter-complaint question.
R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 Grounds on which criminal proceedings may be quashed. Also invoked by the High Court; Supreme Court found it inapposite to the present controversy.
Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 (3-Judge Bench) Counter-complaint by a different complainant regarding the same incident is permissible; prohibition on multiple FIRs does not bar rival versions. Treated as the governing authority; Supreme Court applied its ratio to hold the second FIR maintainable.
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181 Earlier view on multiplicity of FIRs; discussed in Upkar Singh. Referred to indirectly through Upkar Singh; Supreme Court emphasised that Upkar Singh clarified the limits of T.T. Antony.
Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2013) 5 SCC 148 Reiterated that rival versions of the same incident can result in a permissible counter-FIR. Quoted to reinforce that “rival versions … do take different shapes and in that event, lodgment of two FIRs is permissible.”

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found that the High Court committed a jurisdictional error by quashing the second FIR without applying the settled law governing counter-complaints. Its reasoning unfolded as follows:

  1. Identification of governing precedent: The Court held that the determinative authority is the three-Judge Bench decision in Upkar Singh, later affirmed in Surender Kaushik, which expressly permits a second FIR embodying a rival version by a different complainant.
  2. Distinction from impermissible multiple FIRs: The prohibition is against successive FIRs by the same complainant to improve or supplement the original version. It does not bar a counter-complaint filed by another person implicated in the incident.
  3. Application to the facts:
    • The first FIR (Crime 817/2001) was lodged by Respondent 2 against five accused.
    • The second FIR (No. 5 of 2002) was lodged by the appellant alone and targeted Respondent 3, alleging a different role and different offences.
    • The second FIR therefore constituted a legitimate counter-version and was not an attempt by the same complainant to re-litigate the same allegations.
  4. Error in High Court’s approach: The High Court relied only on general quashing jurisprudence (Bhajan Lal; R.P. Kapur; Madhu Limaye) without analysing the specific doctrine of counter-FIRs laid down in Upkar Singh and Surender Kaushik. This omission led to a jurisdictional mistake.
  5. Consequential directions: Having restored CC No. 2682 of 2002, the Supreme Court directed the Magistrate to proceed expeditiously, complete the trial within one year, and to consider the evidence against all persons, including the appellant, uninfluenced by observations in the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is ALLOWED; the Kerala High Court’s order dated 27-5-2014 in P. Sreekumar v. Mohan Prasad, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 8926, quashing FIR No. 5 of 2002, Charge-sheet No. 166 of 2002 and CC No. 2682 of 2002, is set aside. CC No. 2682 of 2002 is restored to the file of JMFC-II, Ernakulam for trial on the merits.

Implications: The decision re-affirms that a counter-FIR presenting a rival version of the same incident by a different complainant is maintainable and not hit by the rule against multiple FIRs. While no new legal principle is created, the judgment strengthens the authoritative status of Upkar Singh and guides subordinate courts on the proper application of Section 482 CrPC when confronted with competing FIRs.

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    P. Sreekumar v. State Of Kerala And Others

    Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.— Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 27-5-2014 passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulum in P. Sreekumar v. Mohan Prasad 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 8926 whereby the High Court allowed the petition filed by the accused-Respondent 3 herein and quashed the FIR (Annexure II), charge-sheet (Annexure III) and all consequent proceedings arising therefrom pending as CC No. 2682 of 2002 on the file of JFCM II, Ernakulum.

    2. The facts involved in the case lie in a narrow compass so also the issue involved in the appeal is a short one. The facts are mentioned hereinbelow.

    3. There is one public charitable Trust by name Vidyodaya Trust (hereinafter referred to as “the Trust”) having its office at S.N. Junction, Palarivattom in the State of Kerala. The Trust is engaged in the educational activities and runs educational institutions in the State of Kerala.

    4. The appellant herein is one of the Chief Executive Trustees of the Trust whereas Respondent 2 herein is one of the trustees and Respondent 3 was a Treasurer of the Trust at the relevant time.

    5. On 17-10-2001, Respondent 2 (trustee) filed a private complaint against the appellant, Respondent 3 (Treasurer) and three bank officials of the bank in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulum (CC No. 15877 of 2001) under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Annexure P-14).

    6. In the complaint, it was inter alia alleged that the appellant-Respondent 3 and three bank officials conspired together to defraud the Trust and to give effect to their conspiracy managed to siphon off around Rs 42 lakhs of the Trust from its bank accounts by manipulation and forging the accounts books and several documents of the Trust.

    7. Pursuant to the aforesaid complaint, an FIR in Crime Case No. 817 of 2001 for the offences punishable under Sections 408, 409, 420, 467, 468, 473 and 477 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) was registered wherein the appellant-Respondent 3 and three bank officials were named as accused persons in relation to commission of the alleged crime.

    8. The aforesaid incident also led to filing of FIR No. 5 of 2002 by the appellant (Chief Executive Trustee) against Respondent 3 (Treasurer of the Trust) in North Police Station, Ernakulum under Sections 406, 409, 465, 467 and 471 IPC. It was inter alia alleged therein that Respondent 3 was the person, who indulged into the fraud and forgery and he managed to take away the money belonging to the Trust by misusing his post. Pursuant to this FIR, Respondent 3 (Treasurer of the Trust) was arrested and later enlarged on bail.

    9. Thereafter, the police made investigation in relation to FIR No. 5 of 2002 and submitted Charge-sheet No. 166 of 2002 (Annexure P-17).

    10. So far as Crime Case No. 817 of 2001 arising out of Complaint Case No. 15877 of 2001 is concerned, it was registered against the appellant-Respondent 3 and three bank officials for commission of the offences punishable under Sections 408, 409, 420, 467, 468, 473 and 477 read with Section 34 IPC. The police made investigation in this case and filed their final report on 6-2-2003 stating therein that no case was made out against the appellant and three bank officials (described in the report as Accused 2, 3, 4 and 5). These four accused were, therefore, discharged from Crime Case No. 817 of 2001 (Annexure P-18).

    11. Respondent 2 i.e. the trustee, however, felt aggrieved by the final report dated 6-2-2003, filed a protest petition (CC No. 28 of 2004) before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ernakulum and prayed therein for taking cognizance of the offences mentioned in the final report. The Chief Judicial Magistrate issued summons to the appellant and Respondent 3 to appear before the Court on 22-7-2004.

    12. Respondent 3 filed Criminal MC No. 2641 of 2007 before the High Court of Kerala seeking to quash the final report filed in Crime Case No. 5 of 2002 pending in the Court of JMFC II at the instance of the appellant against him.

    13. In his application, Respondent 3, in substance, contended that he cannot be made to face two trials on the same set of facts and for the same offences in two different courts. He, therefore, prayed that so far as Crime Case No. 5 of 2002 filed by the appellant against him and the charge-sheet filed therein are concerned, the same are liable to be quashed.

    14. In the meantime, two criminal miscellaneous applications under Section 482 of the Code were filed in the High Court of Kerala being Criminal MC No. 1732 of 2004 and Criminal MC No. 2641 of 2007.

    15. So far as Criminal MC No. 1732 of 2004 is concerned, it was filed by the appellant herein wherein he sought quashing of the proceedings pending against him in the Court of Judicial First Class Magistrate Court II, Ernakulum (Crime Case No. 5 of 2002) in relation to Complaint Case No. 2682 of 2002.

    16. So far as Criminal MC No. 2641 of 2007 is concerned, it was filed by Respondent 3 against the appellant challenging the FIR/charge-sheet filed against him by the appellant (CC No. 2682 of 2002) in the Court of JMFC II, Ernakulum.

    17. By the impugned order 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 8926, the Single Judge of the High Court dismissed Criminal MC No. 1732 of 2004, which was filed by the appellant, and declined to quash the proceedings challenged therein. It was observed by the Single Judge, “it is not possible to quash the complaint at this stage”.

    18. So far as Criminal MC No. 2641 of 2007 is concerned, the Single Judge, by the same impugned order, allowed the said criminal MC and quashed the FIR and the charge-sheet filed pursuant thereto.

    19. The appellant, felt aggrieved by the dismissal of his petition (Criminal MC No. 1732 of 2004) by the High Court, filed two SLPs being SLP (Crl.) No. 6319 of 2014 and the present SLP in this Court against the order by which the High Court had quashed the FIR/charge-sheet filed against Respondent 3 and had allowed Criminal MC Application No. 2641 of 2007.

    20. This Court, on 6-3-2018 SLP (Crl.) No. 6319 of 2014, dismissed the appellant's SLP No. 6319 of 2014 as having become infructuous because during its pendency, the appellant and other three bank officials were discharged by the competent court from the case. The appellant, therefore, did not pursue the SLP.

    21. With these background facts, the question for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the High Court (Single Judge) was justified in allowing Criminal MC No. 2641 of 2007 filed by Respondent 3 and thereby was justified in quashing the FIR/charge-sheet filed against Respondent 3 and all consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR/charge-sheet pending as CC No. 2682 of 2002 on the file of JMFC II, Ernakulum.

    22. Heard Mr Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Ms Liz Mathew, learned counsel for Respondent 1 and Respondent 2, who appeared in person.

    23. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and Respondent 2, who appeared in person, we are inclined to allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order passed in P. Sreekumar v. Mohan Prasad 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 8926.

    24. The question, which fell for consideration before the High Court, was that if two FIRs are filed in relation to the same offence and against the same accused, whether the subsequent FIR was liable to be quashed or not.

    25. The Single Judge placed reliance on three decisions of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 and R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866, 1960 Cri LJ 1239 and quashed the second FIR/charge-sheet under Section 482 of the Code.

    26. In our view, the High Court had committed jurisdictional error in quashing the subsequent FIR/charge-sheet, which was filed at the instance of the appellant against Respondent 3 without adverting to the law on the subject.

    27. In our opinion, the law on the subject which governs the controversy involved in the appeal is no more res integra and settled by the decision of this Court (three-Judge Bench) in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash (2004) 13 SCC 292 and also by the subsequent decisions.

    28. Their Lordships after examining all the previous case-laws on the subject laid down the following proposition of law in the following words speaking through N. Santosh Hegde, J.: (Upkar Singh case (2004) 13 SCC 292)

    “23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T. Antony case (2001) 6 SCC 181 is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimated right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code.
    24. We have already noticed that in T.T. Antony case (2001) 6 SCC 181 this Court did not consider the legal right of an aggrieved person to file counterclaim, on the contrary from the observations found in the said judgment it clearly indicates that filing a counter-complaint is permissible.
    25. In the instant case, it is seen in regard to the incident which took place on 20-5-1995, the appellant and the first respondent herein have lodged separate complaints giving different versions but while the complaint of the respondent was registered by the police concerned, the complaint of the appellant was not so registered, hence on his prayer the learned Magistrate was justified in directing the police concerned to register a case and investigate the same and report back. In our opinion, both the learned Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the same is hit by Section 161 or 162 of the Code which, in our considered opinion, has absolutely no bearing on the question involved. Section 161 or 162 of the Code does not refer to registration of a case, it only speaks of a statement to be recorded by the police in the course of the investigation and its evidentiary value.”

    29. The aforesaid principle was reiterated by this Court (two-Judge Bench) in Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P. (2013) 5 SCC 148 in the following words:

    “24. From the aforesaid decisions, it is quite luminous that the lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident. The concept of sameness has been given a restricted meaning. It does not encompass filing of a counter-FIR relating to the same or connected cognizable offence. What is prohibited is any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of the case under the Code, for an investigation in that regard would have already commenced and allowing registration of further complaint would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint. As is further made clear by the three-Judge Bench in Upkar Singh (2004) 13 SCC 292, the prohibition does not cover the allegations made by the accused in the first FIR alleging a different version of the same incident. Thus, rival versions in respect of the same incident do take different shapes and in that event, lodgment of two FIRs is permissible.”

    30. Keeping the aforesaid principle of law in mind when we examine the facts of the case at hand, we find that the second FIR filed by the appellant against Respondent 3 though related to the same incident for which the first FIR was filed by Respondent 2 against the appellant-Respondent 3 and three bank officials, yet the second FIR being in the nature of a counter-complaint against Respondent 3 was legally maintainable and could be entertained for being tried on its merits.

    31. In other words, there is no prohibition in law to file the second FIR and once it is filed, such FIR is capable of being taken note of and tried on merits in accordance with law.

    32. It is for the reasons that firstly, the second FIR was not filed by the same person, who had filed the first FIR. Had it been so, then the situation would have been somewhat different. Such was not the case here; second, it was filed by the appellant as a counter-complaint against Respondent 3; third, the first FIR was against five persons based on one set of allegations whereas the second FIR was based on the allegations different from the allegations made in the first FIR; and lastly, the High Court while quashing the second FIR/charge-sheet did not examine the issue arising in the case in the light of law laid down by this Court in the two aforementioned decisions of this Court in Upkar Singh (2004) 13 SCC 292 and Surender Kaushik (2013) 5 SCC 148 and simply referred the three decisions of this Court mentioned above wherein this Court has laid down general principle of law relating to exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code.

    33. In the light of the foregoing discussion and the four reasons mentioned above, we are unable to agree with the reasoning and the conclusion of the High Court and are, therefore, inclined to set aside the impugned order.

    34. The Magistrate will now proceed to try and decide the case on merits and while doing so, he will be free to examine all the issues arising in the case from all the angles in the light of the evidence that will be adduced by the parties.

    35. If the Magistrate finds that the material brought on record against any person(s) including the appellant herein in the evidence indicating the involvement of any such person(s) in commission of the alleged offences, he will be free to proceed against any such person(s) in accordance with law and bring the proceedings to its logical end uninfluenced by any of our observations.

    36. Let the trial before the Magistrate concerned be over, as directed above, within a year as an outer limit.

    37. With these observations and directions, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order passed in P. Sreekumar v. Mohan Prasad 2014 SCC OnLine Ker 8926 is set aside. As a result, CC No. 2682 of 2002 on the file of JMFC II, Ernakulum is restored to its file for being tried on merits in accordance with law.

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    P. Sreekumar v. State Of Kerala And Others
    (Mar 19, 2018)