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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 214
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code
  • Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Section 340(1) of the Code
  • Constitution of India (implied)
  • Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 105
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the said Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 214
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code
  • Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Section 340(1) of the Code
  • Constitution of India (implied)
  • Indian Penal Code (IPC)
  • Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 105
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)
  • Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the said Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Two plaintiffs obtained a decree in Civil Suit No. 4 of 1993 on 7-12-2001. Their legal heirs filed Execution Case No. 1 of 2003, while the legal heirs of the defendants filed Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2004 challenging the decree. One appellant, Shaba Manju Velip, died on 2-3-2005, but no substitution application was filed. On 18-7-2006 the appellants applied to withdraw the appeal; on 20-6-2006 the decree-holders had applied to withdraw execution proceedings, which were allowed on 21-7-2006.

In 2007, the present appellant (legal heir of a decree-holder) filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 95 of 2007 under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC alleging that respondent-advocate N. M. Dessai forged the thumb impression of the deceased Shaba Manju Velip on the withdrawal application. On 31-7-2008 the District and Sessions Judge ordered an inquiry and directed that a complaint be filed under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC.

The respondent successfully appealed: by judgment dated 6-10-2009, the High Court of Bombay at Goa (Narayan M. Dessai v. Vishnu Chandru Gaonkar, 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 1572) set aside the Sessions Judge’s order and quashed the complaint. The present appeal challenges that High Court decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alleged forgery, committed before the document was filed in court, falls within the bar of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC such that only the court could initiate prosecution.
  2. Whether the appellant, having invoked Section 195(1)(b)(ii) before the lower courts, could contend before the Supreme Court that the matter was really governed by Section 195(1)(b)(i).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court wrongly relied on Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar and the Constitution Bench decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, both of which interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii); the present allegations, according to the appellant, actually fall under Section 195(1)(b)(i).
  • The Sessions Judge correctly found a prima facie case of forgery and therefore rightly ordered an inquiry and complaint under Section 195(1)(b).

Respondent's Arguments

No one appeared for the respondent in the Supreme Court proceedings; hence no arguments were recorded.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC is attracted only when the offence is committed after the document is produced or tendered in evidence; forgery before filing is outside its scope. Relied on to hold that the alleged forgery, having occurred before the document entered court custody, could not be prosecuted through a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(ii).
Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 (Constitution Bench) Affirmed the principle in Sachida Nand Singh; clarified statutory scheme of Section 195 and “custodia legis” requirement. High Court and Supreme Court both applied this decision to affirm that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) did not apply.
Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533 Earlier contrary view on the scope of Section 195(1)(b)(ii). Cited only to note that it was overruled by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah.
Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd., 1963 1 WLR 929 (HL) Statutory interpretation principle: avoid constructions leading to unreasonable or mischievous results. Referenced in Sachida Nand Singh; used illustratively in the Court’s discussion of proper statutory construction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Supreme Court observed that at every earlier stage—including the appellant’s own application (Criminal Misc. No. 95 of 2007) and the Sessions Judge’s order—the request was explicitly for action under Section 195(1)(b)(ii). The appellant could not now recast the matter as falling under clause (b)(i).

2. Relying on the Constitution Bench ruling in Iqbal Singh Marwah, the Court reiterated that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) applies only to offences committed while the document is in the court’s custody. Because any alleged forgery occurred before the withdrawal application was filed, the statutory bar did not arise.

3. The Court further noted that both the execution proceedings and the appeal had been voluntarily withdrawn, causing no prejudice to the decree-holders. None of the appellants in the withdrawn appeal had complained against their advocate; only the present respondent (a decree-holder) invoked Section 195.

4. In light of these facts and the binding precedents, the Court agreed with the High Court that the Sessions Judge lacked jurisdiction to order a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) and that continuation of such proceedings would be improper.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed; the judgment of the High Court quashing the Sessions Judge’s order and the resultant complaint is affirmed.

Implications: The decision reinforces the principle that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC is confined to offences committed after a document enters the court’s custody and prevents parties from using the provision to initiate criminal proceedings for acts occurring earlier. No new legal precedent is set, but the ruling affirms and applies existing Supreme Court jurisprudence, thereby discouraging misuse of Section 195 to settle private grievances.

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    Vishnu Chandru Gaonkar v. N.M. Dessai .

    Ashok Bhushan, J.— This appeal has been filed questioning the judgment and order dated 6-10-2009 of the High Court of Bombay at Goa in Narayan M. Dessai v. Vishnu Chandru Gaonkar 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 1572 by which judgment, the criminal appeal filed by the respondent Shri Narayan M. Dessai has been allowed setting aside the order of District and Sessions Judge dated 31-7-2008 directing for filing a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC.

    2. The facts which are necessary to be noted for deciding this appeal are: a regular Civil Suit No. 4 of 1993 was filed by two plaintiffs, namely, Laximan Rama Gaonkar and Janu Narayan Gaonkar impleading two defendants, namely, Kusta Naga Gaonkar and Shri Suresh Kust Gaonkar. The appellant in this appeal is legal heir of original Plaintiff 2, Janu Narayan Gaonkar. Suit No. 4 of 1993 was decreed by the judgment and decree dated 7-12-2001. An application for execution of decree was filed by the legal heirs of the plaintiffs on 7-12-2003. Legal heirs of the original defendants filed Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2004 questioning the judgment and decree dated 7-12-2001. One of the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2004, namely, Shaba Manju Velip (one of the legal heirs of original defendants Kusta Naga Gaonkar) died on 2-3-2005. No application to bring his legal heirs on record was filed by the appellants. The application to withdraw Execution Case No. 1 of 2003 filed for execution of the decree in Civil Suit No. 4 of 1993 was filed by the plaintiff's advocate on 20-6-2006. The application for withdrawal of Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2004 was filed on 18-7-2006, which was allowed on 18-7-2006 itself. Execution Case No. 1 of 2003 was also allowed to be withdrawn on 21-7-2006.

    3. On 29-11-2007, the appellant filed an application under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC making allegations against the respondent, who was counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2004 that he committed offence in verifying and forging thumb impression of dead appellant, namely, Shaba Manju Velip. By the order dated 31-7-2008, the learned District and Sessions Judge found that it is a fit case for inquiry under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) and directed for inquiry and registering a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(ii). The respondent preferred an appeal before the High Court against the order of the District and Sessions Judge dated 31-7-2008. The High Court vide its impugned judgment 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 1572 allowed the appeal and quashed the order of the District Judge dated 31-7-2008 as well as the complaint filed pursuant thereto. Aggrieved against the judgment of the High Court, the appellant has filed this appeal.

    4. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court relying on the three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493, which has been approved by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370, has allowed the appeal filed by the respondent whereas the above judgments of this Court, wherein reference was made to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC, which were not applicable in the facts of the present case, since allegations made in the complaint filed by the appellant were referable to Section 195(1)(b)(i). It is submitted that the District and Sessions Judge has rightly considered all facts and circumstances and directed for filing of complaint against the respondents under Section 195(1)(b). No one has appeared on behalf of the respondent in spite of service.

    5. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

    6. It is useful to extract Section 195(1) CrPC, which is to the following effect:

    “195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of public servants, for offences against public justice and for offences relating to documents given in evidence.—(1) No court shall take cognizance—
    (a)(i) of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 188 (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or
    (ii) of any abetment of, or attempt to commit, such offence, or
    (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit such offence,
    except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate;
    (b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, Sections 193 to 196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any court, or
    (ii) of any offence described in Section 463, or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476, of the said Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court, or
    (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause (ii),
    except on the complaint in writing of that court, or by such officer of the court as that court may authorise in writing in this behalf, or of some other court to which that court is subordinate.”

    7. From the facts which are on the record, there is no dispute that Appeal No. 91 of 2004 was filed by several appellants, out of which one of the appellants was Shaba Manju Velip, who died on 2-3-2005. The application for withdrawal of the appeal was filed on 18-7-2006. It is further to be noted that one Vimal Shaba Velip, who was one of the respondents before the High Court, took it upon herself to say that the thumb impression, which was put as of Shaba Manju Velip was put by her, since her husband Shaba Manju Velip also used to sign along with her, in good faith, she put her thumb impression. The respondent N.M. Dessai came with the case that he having been informed that talks of settlement amongst the Gaonkars is going on and they are intending to withdraw the execution application filed by them. He, as per instructions of his client, drafted and handed over the application for withdrawing Appeal No. 91 of 2004 to one Suresh K. Gaonkar to obtain the signatures of the remaining respondents. He further came with the case that he was not aware of death of Shaba Manju Velip or alleged forged thumb impression of Shaba Manju Velip on the application.

    8. The facts fairly indicate that the application when it was presented in the Court in Appeal No. 91 of 2004 for withdrawal of the appeal, signatures/thumb impressions of the appellants were already obtained on the said application, which was handed over to the respondent in this appeal for filing in the Court. On the same date i.e. 18-7-2006, the Court allowed the application permitting withdrawal of the appeal.

    9. Criminal Misc. Application No. 95 of 2007 for initiating action under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC was filed by the appellant after the said withdrawal of the appeal. Copy of Application No. 95 of 2007 has been filed as Annexure P-4. It is useful to quote prayer in the application, which is to the following effect:

    “The applicant, therefore, prays that in view of above an enquiry may be conducted and the written complaint be made as per the provision contemplated under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Code in order to prosecute and take further action against the respondents above as per the provision of law.”

    10. The application was allowed by the District Judge vide the order dated 31-7-2008 where the District Judge had directed for inquiry to be conducted in terms of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC; it is useful to quote paras 18 and 19 of the order of the District Judge, which is to the following effect:

    “18. Though Respondent 9 has canvassed that he was totally unconnected with any of such transactions, such a plea would not lie in his mouth when he was representing the said appellants and one of whom was Shaba, since deceased, and instrumental in seeking the withdrawal of the appeal also at his instance as late as on 18-7-2006 despite Shaba being dead on that day. Therefore, on the basis of the material on record, it is apparent that an offence of forgery under Section 463 IPC has allegedly been committed to withdraw the appeal misrepresenting the deceased as living and the execution of the sale deeds in respect of the very same property on the following day and a day thereafter. The application so filed in Court would be “a document” in the context of the Evidence Act and evidence.
    19. I am, therefore, satisfied that this is a fit case where inquiry is required to be conducted in terms of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC and initiate complaint against the respondents for appropriate action as per law.”

    11. The two judgments of this Court, which have already been noticed by the High Court need detailed reference.

    12. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493, had occasion to consider Section 195(1)(b)(ii) and Section 340(1) CrPC. Interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(ii), the following was laid down in paras 8, 11 and 23:( & 501)

    “8. That apart it is difficult to interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) as containing a bar against initiation of prosecution proceedings merely because the document concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in the court. Any such construction is likely to ensue unsavoury consequences. For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document is detected and the forgerer is sure that he would imminently be embroiled in prosecution proceedings he can simply get that document produced in any long-drawn litigation which was either instituted by himself or somebody else who can be influenced by him and thereby pre-empt the prosecution for the entire long period of pendency of that litigation. It is a settled proposition that if the language of a legislation is capable of more than one interpretation, the one which is capable of causing mischievous consequences should be averted. Quoting from Gill v. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd. (1963) 1 WLR 929 (HL) Maxwell has stated in his treatise (Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 105) that ‘if the language is capable of more than one interpretation we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to unreasonable result and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonably practicable result.’ The clause which we are now considering contains enough indication to show that the more natural meaning is that which leans in favour of a strict construction, and hence the aforesaid observation is eminently applicable here.
    ***
    11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section 340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affecting administration of justice has been committed in respect of a document produced in court or given in evidence in a proceeding in that court. In other words, the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis.
    ***
    23. The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court. Accordingly we dismiss this appeal.”

    13. It is also relevant to note that observations have been made by this Court that forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, the same cannot be treated as one affecting administration of justice. In para 12, the following has been held: (Sachida Nand case (1998) 2 SCC 493)

    “12. It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the court and long before its production in the court, could also be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the court records.”

    14. A contrary earlier view having expressed by another three-Judge Bench in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh (1996) 3 SCC 533, being not in accord with the view expressed by this Court in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493, the same was referred to a Constitution Bench for resolving the conflict. The Constitution Bench vide its judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370, has resolved conflict and approved three-Judge Bench judgment in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493. In para 33, the following was laid down: (Iqbal Singh case (2005) 4 SCC 370)

    “33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh (1998) 2 SCC 493 has been correctly decided and the view taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodia legis.”

    15. The learned counsel for the appellant before us has pressed only one submission i.e. the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370 was a case, which interpreted Section 195(1)(b)(ii), to which there cannot be any dispute but present was a case of offence under Section 195(1)(b)(i). Hence, the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court was not applicable and the High Court committed error in relying on the Constitution Bench judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah (2005) 4 SCC 370.

    16. The submission which has been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant before us has to be stated to be rejected due to the reason that before the Sessions Court as well as before the High Court, the appellant has alleged an offence under Section 195(1)(b)(ii). A copy of Application No. 95 of 2007 has been annexed as Annexure P-4. The prayer made therein as extracted above clearly prays for complaint to be made as per the provisions contemplated under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC. Even the order of the District Judge, which was the basis in favour of the appellant on 31-7-2008 has also directed for inquiry and initiating complaint in terms of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC, which has also been extracted above for ready reference. There being specific case of the appellant in his complaint as well as in order passed by the District Judge in his favour, it is not open for the appellant now to turn round and claim that allegations are covered under Section 195(1)(b)(i).

    17. There is one more reason due to which the above submission cannot be accepted. The Constitution Bench elaborately noticing the statutory scheme under Section 195 has held that where offence has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or given in the evidence in court, the same is neither covered under clauses (a), (b)(i) or (b)(ii). In para 10, the Constitution Bench made the following observations: (Iqbal Singh case (2005) 4 SCC 370)

    “10. The scheme of the statutory provision may now be examined. Broadly, Section 195 CrPC deals with three distinct categories of offences which have been described in clauses (a), (b)(i) and (b)(ii) and they relate to (1) contempt of lawful authority of public servants, (2) offences against public justice, and (3) offences relating to documents given in evidence. Clause (a) deals with offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188 IPC which occur in Chapter X IPC and the heading of the Chapter is — “Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public Servants”. These are offences which directly affect the functioning of or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to offences in Chapter XI IPC which is headed as — “Of False Evidence and Offences Against Public Justice”. The offences mentioned in this clause clearly relate to giving or fabricating false evidence or making a false declaration in any judicial proceeding or before a court of justice or before a public servant who is bound or authorised by law to receive such declaration, and also to some other offences which have a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice (Sections 205 and 211 IPC). This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section 195 viz. that the offence should be such which has direct bearing or affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of a public servant or has a direct correlation with the proceedings in a court of justice, the expression “when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court” occurring in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean commission of such an offence after the document has actually been produced or given in evidence in the court. The situation or contingency where an offence as enumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier and later on the document is produced or is given in evidence in court, does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with the scheme of Section 195 CrPC. This indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates a situation where the offences enumerated therein are committed with respect to a document subsequent to its production or giving in evidence in a proceeding in any court.”

    18. It is further to be noted that the execution application, which was filed by the decree-holder was also withdrawn. It is further relevant to notice that the appeal, which was filed by the judgment-debtor was withdrawn by the judgment-debtor, which in no manner had impaired the interest of the appellant, who was legal heir of the decree-holder. It is also on the record that legal heirs of the decree-holders have also withdrawn their execution application, which has attained finality. None of the appellants, who had filed Appeal No. 91 of 2004 before the High Court has initiated any proceeding against the present respondent N.M. Dessai, who was their advocate. It is only the appellant, who was the respondent in Appeal No. 91 of 2004, who has filed a complaint under Section 195. The High Court having taken into consideration entire facts and circumstances have rightly come to the conclusion that present is not a case where any complaint could have been proceeded under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC.

    19. We thus fully endorse the view of the High Court that present is not a case where any complaint could have been proceeded with under Section 195(1)(b)(ii). We thus do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.

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    Vishnu Chandru Gaonkar v. N.M. Dessai .
    (Mar 6, 2018)