AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 16
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)
  • The Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 2005
  • The relevant Act
  • Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 2 of Lord Cairn's Act, 1858
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2018 INSC 16
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)
  • The Land Acquisition Act
  • Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 2005
  • The relevant Act
  • Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
  • Section 2 of Lord Cairn's Act, 1858
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondents 2–6 executed an agreement to sell dated 19-4-1989 in favour of Krishan Lal (predecessor of the present appellants) for their 5/16th share in Khasra Nos. 430 and 431 measuring 0-22-57 hectares. The entire sale consideration of Rs 90,000 was paid and possession was delivered, after which the plaintiff constructed three shops on the land. On 8-7-1991 the same respondents executed a gift deed of the suit land in favour of Respondent 1 (Defendant 6).

Krishan Lal filed Civil Suit No. 148 of 1991 seeking a declaration that the gift deed was void and for specific performance of the 1989 agreement. The trial court (31-3-1999) declared the gift deed void and decreed specific performance; the first appellate court dismissed Defendant 6’s appeal on 17-12-2001.

Defendant 6 filed Regular Second Appeal No. 117 of 2002 before the Himachal Pradesh High Court. During its pendency, the land was acquired under a Section 4 notification dated 22-12-2005 and an award dated 10-6-2008 granted compensation—recorded in the name of Defendant 6 because of the revenue entries.

The High Court, holding that specific performance had become impracticable due to acquisition, modified the decree to refund Rs 90,000 with 9 % interest from the date of suit. The plaintiff’s legal heirs appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after compulsory acquisition of the suit land, the decree for specific performance could be sustained.
  2. If specific performance was no longer feasible, what monetary relief the plaintiff was entitled to—simple refund of Rs 90,000 or the compensation payable for the acquired land and constructed shops.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The High Court erred in limiting relief to a refund; the plaintiff, not Defendant 6, was entitled to the land acquisition compensation because the gift deed had been declared void and specific performance decreed by the lower courts.

Respondents 2–6’s Arguments

  • Supported the High Court’s modification but conceded that, as the gift deed stood void, Defendant 6 had no right in the land.
  • Suggested that the compensation should be shared equally between the plaintiff and Respondents 2–6.

No one appeared on behalf of Respondent 1 (Defendant 6).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 647 Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act permits courts to award compensation in substitution for specific performance when performance has become impossible without the plaintiff’s fault; compensation may equal the land-acquisition award. Relied on as an analogous fact situation to justify substituting specific performance with a decree for compensation payable out of the acquisition award.
Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal, (1996) 4 SCC 593 Grant of specific performance is discretionary; equity, justice and fairness must guide relief. Invoked to support an equitable apportionment of compensation between the contracting parties rather than mere refund of the price.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court accepted that, due to the compulsory acquisition, executing the decree for specific performance was no longer possible. It examined Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which authorises compensation in lieu of performance, and applied the ruling in Jagdish Singh holding that a plaintiff blameless for the impossibility may receive the acquisition compensation.

Observing that compensation of about Rs 10,03,743 (excluding amounts for the three shops) had been determined in favour of Defendant 6, the Court noted that Defendant 6’s title had already been declared void, leaving that defendant with no legitimate claim to any part of the award. Considering equity and the conduct of the original vendors (Respondents 2-6), the Court fashioned an equitable remedy:

  • Rs 10 lakhs from the acquisition compensation is payable to the appellants (legal heirs of the plaintiff).
  • The balance of compensation, if any, is payable to Respondents 2-6.
  • If compensation has already been disbursed to Defendant 6, that defendant must return Rs 10 lakhs to the appellants and the remainder to Respondents 2-6; if not yet disbursed, the disbursal shall follow the above allocation directly.

Thus, the High Court’s direction for a simple refund was held inadequate and inequitable in light of Section 21 and the precedent governing compensation when specific performance becomes impossible.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment modified.

The appellants are awarded Rs 10 lakhs out of the compensation payable for the acquired land; Respondents 2-6 receive the remaining amount; Defendant 6, having no title, must refund any corresponding sums already received. The decision ensures that a purchaser who has paid full consideration and obtained possession is compensated equitably when subsequent acquisition renders specific performance impossible. The ruling applies established principles and does not announce a new legal doctrine.

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    Urmila Devi And Others v. Deity, Mandir Shree Chamunda Devi Through Temple Commissioner And Others

    Ashok Bhushan, J.— Leave granted. This appeal has been filed by the plaintiff through legal heirs questioning the judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Mandir Shri Chamunda Devi v. Krishan Lal 2012 SCC OnLine HP 6844 which appeal was filed by Respondent 1 (Defendant 6 in the suit). The High Court by the impugned judgment has modified the decree of specific performance of contract granted by two courts below into a decree ordering Respondents 2 to 6 to pay a sum of Rs 90,000 with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the suit.

    2. The brief facts of the case which are necessary to notice for deciding the appeal are: Respondents 2 to 6 executed an agreement to sell dated 19-4-1989 in favour of Krishan Lal, the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants for sale of their 5/16th share in Khasra Nos. 430 and 431 equal to 0-22-57 hectares for consideration of Rs 90,000. Respondents 2 to 6 received full consideration of Rs 90,000 and handed over possession to the plaintiff. The plaintiff after getting possession constructed three shops in the suit land. Respondents 2 to 6 executed a gift deed in favour of Respondent 1 of the suit land on 8-7-1991. When in spite of the respondents having received the entire sale consideration the sale deed was not executed and with mala fide intention the gift deed was executed in favour of Respondent 1, Civil Suit No. 148 of 1991 was filed by Krishan Lal. Written statements were filed by Defendants 1 to 5 jointly and separate written statement was filed by Defendant 6 who is Respondent 1 in the present appeal.

    3. It was admitted to all defendants that the suit land has been gifted in favour of Defendant 6 by gift deed dated 8-7-1991. The execution of agreement to sell was not disputed and the receipt of total sale consideration was also not denied. The trial court decreed the suit vide its judgment and order dated 31-3-1999. The trial court declared that gift deed executed by Defendants 1 to 5 in favour of Defendant 6 is null and void to the extent they relate to the donor's 5/16th share in the suit land that was agreed to be sold by them to the plaintiff, decree of specific performance was granted in favour of the plaintiff against Defendants 1 to 5. The appeal was filed by Defendant 6 only against the judgment of the trial court which was also dismissed by the first appellate court vide its judgment dated 17-12-2001. Defendant 6 filed regular second appeal in the High Court being RSA No. 117 of 2002. During pendency of the second appeal in the High Court Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 22-12-2005 was issued for acquisition of suit land. An award dated 10-6-2008 was also given for the land as well as three shops which were constructed in the suit land. The name of Defendant 6 being recorded in the revenue records compensation was awarded in favour of Defendant 6.

    4. Before the High Court a submission was raised on behalf of Defendant 6 that the land has been acquired during the pendency of regular second appeal, the decree of the specific performance cannot be maintained. The High Court agreeing with the submission of Defendant 6 modified the decree by ordering Respondents 2 to 6 to pay a sum of Rs 90,000 to the plaintiff with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the suit. The plaintiff through legal heirs aggrieved by the said judgment has come up in this appeal.

    5. The learned counsel for the appellants in support of the appeal contends that the High Court erred in law in ordering the refund of Rs 90,000 in favour of the plaintiff whereas the plaintiff (appellants) was entitled to receive the amount of compensation of land which was received by Defendant 6 consequent to the acquisition of land. Defendant 6 had no right in the land in dispute as the gift deed had been declared null and void. It was the plaintiff (appellants) who was entitled to receive the compensation. The High Court having not interfered with the finding of the courts below that gift deed was void as well as the plaintiff was entitled for decree of specific performance of the contract, it was plaintiff (appellants) who was entitled to receive compensation consequent to the acquisition of the suit land.

    6. The learned counsel appearing for Respondents 2 to 6 supports the judgment and decree of the High Court and he, however, does not dispute that judgment and decree of the courts below declaring the gift deed dated 8-7-1991 as void having not been interfered with, Defendant 6 has no right in the suit land. The learned counsel for Respondents 2 to 6, however, submits that compensation determined consequent to the land acquisition be appropriated equally between the plaintiff as well as Defendants 1 to 5.

    7. No one has appeared on behalf of Respondent 1 (Defendant 6).

    8. We have considered the submissions of the parties and perused the records.

    9. From the facts and material on record, it is undisputed that agreement to sell was executed by Defendants 1 to 5 in favour of the plaintiff and entire sale consideration of Rs 90,000 was received and possession was delivered in the year 1989 itself. The plaintiff constructed three shops on the suit land. The plaintiff's case that to defeat the rights of the plaintiff a gift deed dated 8-7-1991 was executed by Defendants 1 to 5 in favour of Defendant 6 has been accepted by the courts below which have declared the gift deed as null and void. The decree for specific performance was granted by the trial court, it was confirmed by the first appellate court. The suit land was acquired and compensation was determined in favour of Defendant 6 whose name was recorded in the revenue records. No objection can be taken to the view of the High Court that consequent of the acquisition of suit land under the land acquisition proceedings decree of specific performance granted in favour of the plaintiff could not have been maintained.

    10. The limited question which needs to be answered in the present appeal is as to what relief the appellant-plaintiff were entitled in the event the decree of specific performance was required to be modified by an alternate decree.

    11. Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 empowers the Court to award compensation in certain cases. Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act is as follows:

    “21. Power to award compensation in certain cases.—(1) In a suit for specific performance of a contract, the plaintiff may also claim compensation for its breach, either in addition to, or in substitution of, such performance.
    (2) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific performance ought not to be granted, but that there is a contract between the parties which has been broken by the defendant, and that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for that breach, it shall award him such compensation accordingly.
    (3) If, in any such suit, the court decides that specific performance ought to be granted, but that it is not sufficient to satisfy the justice of the case, and that some compensation for breach of the contract should also be made to the plaintiff, it shall award him such compensation accordingly.
    (4) In determining the amount of any compensation awarded under this section, the court shall be guided by the principles specified in Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
    (5) No compensation shall be awarded under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such compensation in his plaint:
    Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such compensation in the plaint, the court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just, for including a claim for such compensation.
    Explanation.—The circumstance that the contract has become incapable of specific performance does not preclude the court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this section.”

    12. This Court had the occasion to consider Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act in context of a case which arose almost on similar facts in Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh (1992) 1 SCC 647. In the above case also suit was filed for specific performance on the basis of a contract to sell dated 3-7-1973, the suit was dismissed by the trial court as well as the first appellate court. However, the High Court in second appeal reversed 1991 SCC OnLine All 273, AIR 1992 All 174 the finding of the courts below and held that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the contract and was entitled for decree. In the above case also during the pendency of the second appeal before the High Court, proceedings for compulsory acquisition of the land were initiated and the land was acquired. Question arose as to whether the plaintiff was entitled for the amount of compensation received in the land acquisition proceedings or was entitled only to the refund of the earnest money. The High Court in the above case has modified the decree of the specific performance of the contract with decree for a realisation of compensation payable in lieu of acquisition. In para 13 of the judgment the directions 1991 SCC OnLine All 273, AIR 1992 All 174 of the High Court were extracted which is to the following effect: (Jagdish Singh case (1992) 1 SCC 647)

    “13. The High Court issued these consequential directions:
    ‘If the decree for specific performance of contract in question is found incapable of being executed due to acquisition of subject land, the decree shall stand suitably substituted by a decree for realisation of compensation payable in lieu thereof as may be or have been determined under the relevant Act and the plaintiff shall have a right to recover such compensation together with solatium and interest due thereon. The plaintiff shall have a right to recover it from the defendant if the defendant has already realised these amounts and in that event the defendant shall be further liable to pay interest @ 12 per cent from the date of realisation by him to the date of payment on the entire amount realised in respect of the disputed land.’ ”

    13. In the above context, this Court proceeded to examine the ambit and scope of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act. This Court came to the opinion that when the contract has become impossible with no fault of the plaintiff, Section 21 enables the Court to award compensation in lieu of the specific performance. Paras 24, 29 and 30 are extracted below: (Jagdish Singh case (1992) 1 SCC 647)

    “24. When the plaintiff by his option has made specific performance impossible, Section 21 does not entitle him to seek damages. That position is common to both Section 2 of Lord Cairn's Act, 1858 and Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. But in Indian law where the contract, for no fault of the plaintiff, becomes impossible of performance Section 21 enables award of compensation in lieu and substitution of specific performance.
    ***
    29. In the present case there is no difficulty in assessing the quantum of the compensation. That is ascertainable with reference to the determination of the market value in the land acquisition proceedings. The compensation awarded may safely be taken to be the measure of damages subject, of course, to the deduction therefrom of money value of the services, time and energy expended by the appellant in pursuing the claims of compensation and the expenditure incurred by him in the litigation culminating in the award.
    30. We accordingly confirm the finding of the High Court that respondent was willing and ready to perform the contract and that it was the appellant who was in breach. However, in substitution of the decree for specific performance, we make a decree for compensation, equivalent to the amount of the land acquisition compensation awarded for the suit lands together with solatium and accrued interest, less a sum of Rs 1,50,000 (one lakh fifty thousand only) which, by a rough and ready estimate, we quantify as the amount to be paid to the appellant in respect of his services, time and money expended in pursuing the legal claims for compensation.”

    14. This Court in Kanshi Ram v. Om Prakash Jawal (1996) 4 SCC 593 has again in context of suit for specific performance of the contract held that granting decree for specific performance of contract is one of the discretion to be exercised on sound principles. When the court gets into equity jurisdiction, it would be guided by justice, equity, good conscience and fairness to both the parties.

    15. From materials brought on record, it does appear compensation was determined in favour of Defendant 6 to the extent of amount of Rs 10,03,743. It also appears that compensation towards shops was also determined. The name of Defendant 6 being recorded in the revenue records, compensation was determined in its favour. In view of the judgment and decree of courts below whereby the gift deed dated 8-7-1991 has been declared void, Defendant 6 is left with no right in the suit land and is clearly not entitled to receive any amount consequent to the acquisition of the suit land. It has not come on the record as to whether compensation consequent to the acquisition of the suit land has been received by Defendant 6 (Respondent 1 to the appeal) or not.

    16. Taking into consideration overall facts of the present case, we are of the view that ends of justice be served in awarding compensation of Rs 10 lakhs in favour of the appellant-plaintiff out of the compensation received consequent to the acquisition of the suit land. The rest of the compensation, if any, received towards land and shops in question has to be paid to the landowner, that is, Defendants 1 to 5 (Respondents 2 to 6 to this appeal) after deducting an amount of Rs 10 lakhs out of the said compensation. We further direct that in event compensation has not yet been disbursed, the compensation be disbursed to the appellants (legal heirs of the plaintiff) and Respondents 2 to 6 in the above manner and in the event the compensation has been received by Defendant 6 (Respondent 1), Respondent 1 shall return the compensation to the extent of Rs 10 lakhs to the appellants and the rest of the amount to Defendants 1 to 5 (Respondents 2 to 6). The judgment and decree of the High Court dated 2-11-2012 2012 SCC OnLine HP 6844 is modified to the above extent.

    17. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

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    Urmila Devi And Others v. Deity, Mandir Shree Chamunda Devi Through Temple Commissioner And Others
    (Jan 10, 2018)