Nazir Ahmad, Vice Chairman and S.D Prasad, A.M:— The petitioner, Shri Ram Bahadur Prasad Verma moved the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Patna in C.W.J.C No. 1695 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of ‘India for quashing the directions contained at (ii) and (iii) of the Order dated 24.1.1984 (Annexure 6) passed by Respondent No. 2. the Senior Divisional and Operating Superintendent (Transportation), Eastern Railway, Danapur for holding further enquiry against the petitioner and for placing him under deemed suspension with effect from 7.4.1978, as provided under Sub-rule (4) of rule (5) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968: The case got transferred to this tribunal under section 29 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
2. The main facts of the case, according to the petitioner and in so far as these relate to the petition, before us, are that the petitioner, while working as Yard Master of Sone Nagar Railway Station in Danapur Division, was charged under Sections 120B/167/420 of the Indian Penal Code as well as under sub-section (2) of Section 5(2)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and prosecuted along with four others in Special Case No. 17 of 1973 for offences between March and June, 1973 at Sone Nagar Railway Station involving alleged irregular and motivated despatches of coal in contravention of the existing circulars.
3. Pending criminal trial, the petitioner, was put under suspension with effect from 4.11.1975 He was subsequently convicted and-sentenced to various terms of imprisonment by judgment dated 4.7.1977 passed by the Sub-Judge (CBI), North Bihar, Patna. As a sequel to his conviction in a criminal case the petitioner was issued a show cause notice dated 14.12.1977 (Anhexure-1) against the proposed penalty’ of dismissal/removal from service. The petitioner filed his explanation on 12.1.1978 saying that he had preferred an appeal (Criminal Appeal No. 241 of 1977) before the Hon'ble High Court against his conviction and sentence. It is alleged that without waiting for the outcome of the appeal, an order (Annexure-2) was passed by the Respondent No. 2 on 28.3.78 removing the petitioner from service with, effect from 7.4.78 on the ground that he had already been crnvicted on criminal charges. The order of conviction and sentence passed on the petitioner was, however, set aside by the. Hon'ble High Court by judgment dated 12.9.1983(Annexure- 3) in the aforesaid Criminal Appeal No. 241 of 1977. The petitioner claims that he got a clean chit and honourable acquittal from the Appellate Court. Therefore, after obtaining a certified copy of the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court, the petitioner applied to the Divisional Manager, Eastern Railway, Danapur claiming (a) reinstatement in service with all consequential benefits including arrear pay and promotion, vide his letter dated 21.11.1983 (Annexure-4), and (b) reimbursement of costs, under Rule 1602 of the Railway Establishment Code, Volume I, incurred in defending himself in the criminal case before the trial Court and the Hon'ble High Court vide his letter dated 23.11.83 (Annexure-5). While setting aside the earlier order imposing the penalty of removal from service, Respondent No. 2, by his impugned order dated 24.1.1984 (Annexure-6), directed that a further enquiry be held against the petitioner under the provisions of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968, “on the allegations which led to the imposing of penalty of removal”, and also directing that the petitioner be deemed under Sub-rule (4) of rule (5) of the Railway Servants (D & A) Rules, 1968 to have been under suspension with effect from 7.4.1978, i.e the date of his conviction in the trial court, and until further orders. It is important to mention that no departmental proceeding or enqiry as contemplated in the aforesaid order was, in fact, instituted against the petitioner, who superannuated from Railway service only a week later’, i.e, from 1.2.1985
4. The facts, as narrated above, have not been seriously controverted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent. It has only been contended that the acquittal of the petitioner was not “honourable” as claimed by him and that the orders contained Annexure-6 were in accordance with the provisions of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.
5. The contention that the petitioner's acquittal was not entirely ‘honourable’, does not seem to be well founded. A perusal of the judgment (Annexure-3) of the Hon'ble High Court clearly indicates that the petitioner got a clean acquittal as far as the criminal charges were concerned. Thus, the concluding portion of paragraph 14 of the judgment categorically says, “there is nothing whatsoever which may be said to be legal evidence or even circumstantial evidence clearly pointing to the guilt of the appellants. The petitioner no doubt derived considerable advantage in his appeal before the Hon'ble High Court on account of the clean acquittal of Sri M.M Sinha and Sri Om Prakash Makin by the trial. Court. The following portion reproduced from para 14 of the judgment is thus significant:—
“I have already indicated that the while prosecution suffers from a severe jolt on account of clean acquittal of M.M Sinha and Om Prakash Makin because the charges as they have been levelled against the accused persons at the trial Stage find their base on the initial terminas reflected in Ext. 15 which emanated from M.M.P Sinha, a legally competent authority, and once that is accepted, (as held by the trial court), the consequences ensuing therefrom cannot be branded as offences. The acquittal of M.M.P Sinha means a confirmation of actions. The prosecution against rest of the accused must on that score alone fail.”
6. Paragraph 15 of Annefixure-3, while lending full support to the aforesaid view, makes it clear that the Hon'ble High Court did not consider it necessary to go into the question of compliance with departmental rules and circulars regarding despatch of coal. To quote from para 15 of the judgment:—
“In view of my discussions of the broad principles, I feel no necessity of dealing with evidence of any witness who all have deposed on the question of rule and circulars regarding despatch of coal. Those facts simply give an inkling of some irregularities which might be set fight or redressed by the railway athorities through other forum but the criminal forum can be resorted to only when there is a positive evidence to prove the criminality, which, in the instant case, there is none.”
7. A clean acquittal on criminal charges, however, does not necessarily imply that on the same facts, a departmental proceeding will not lie. There are instances of violation of departmental rules or instructions which would merit severe indictment in the departmental proceeding but would fail to make out a criminal offence of whatsoever nature.
8. It follows, therefore, that a departmental proceeding could be instituted ever, after the acquittal of the petitioner on criminal charges. This could be done on the same facts, but not “on the allegations which led to the imposing of the penalty of removal”, as stated incorrectly in sub-para (ii) of Annexure-6. However, this point need not be laboured further for two reasons. Firstly, no action seems to have been taken by the Railways against Sri M.M Sinha, the prime accused in the criminal case, at whose behest apparently the petitioner and others acted. This is borne out of the averment made in para 20 of the petition, and it has not been” controverted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent. Secondly, the respondent has confirmed that soon after passing the orders contained in Annexure-6, the idea of taking out disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner was given up, presumably because he superannuated only a week later, i.e, with effect from 1.2.1984 Para 10 of the counter-affidavit says, “However, on subsequent development it was decided not to hold the enquiry.” This “subsequent development” obviously refersto the retirement of the petitioner from railway service.
9. Retirement of a railway employee from service in the normal course cannot be considered to be an unforeseen event or sudden development. On 14.1.84, when the impugned orders in Annexure-6 were issued it must be presumed that the impending retirement of the petitioner from railway service only a week later was already a known fact. The necessary inference must, therefore, be drawn that the Order dated 24.1.84, in so far as it related to the contemplated institution of departmental proceeding against the petitioner, did not really mean what it said. A reference to the departmental proceeding was merely a ruse to continue to suspension of the petitioner and invoke rule 5(4) of the Railway Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.
10. Suspension of an employee is not one of the penalties specified in the Discipline and Appeal Rules. Had it been so its imposition would have required a definite finding against the employee after going through the procedure laid down for imposing a penalty, major or minor. As in a criminal case so in a departmental proceeding, a person must be presumed to be innocent until the charge against him is proved. In the instant case, the “contemplated” proceeding never really took off. The only proceeding ever instituted against the petitioner, that is the criminal case, ended in his acquittal. Therefore, on the facts as they are, there is nothing to establish in what way the petitioner failed to live up to his obligations as a railway employee. In view of this, we must hold that nothing adverse has been established against the petitioner. His protracted suspension over a period of more than eight years must, therefore, be considered to be hard and unfortunate, even though not altogether unjustified to begin with. The petition is accordingly allowed and the directions at Clauses (ii) and (iii) of the Order dated 24.1.1984 (Annexure-6) are hereby quashed, the respondents are further directed to consider the letter dated 23.11.1983 (Annexure-5) of the petitioner under Rule 1602 of the Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I and give him such relief as may be permissible in the circumstances of the case. There shall be no order as to costs.
11. Petition allowed.