Smt. Vimla Yadav, Member:— In this order I am considering Company Application No. 255 of 2008 filed in Company Petition No. 48 of 2008 by the applicant (respondent No. 1 company, Modi Fibres Ltd. (“MFL”)) against the respondent (petitioner-company, namely, Modi Rubber Ltd. (“MRL”)) in terms of section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956, challenging the maintainability of the company petition No. 48 of 2008. The Company Petition No. 48 of 2008 was filed by Modi Rubber Ltd. (“the petitioner”) against Modi Fibres Ltd. and Others (“the respondents”) under sections 111A, 235(2), 250(3), 397 and 398 read with sections 402, 403 and 408 of the Companies Act, 1956, alleging oppression and mismanagement.
2. M/s. Modi Fibres Ltd. (respondent No. 1) was incorporated on May 18, 1984, having its registered office at 1/180, “Shreyas”, Nariman Point, Mumbai-400021. The authorised share capital of the company was Rs. 10,00,000 divided into 90,000 equity shares of Rs. 10 each and 1,000 preference shares of Rs. 100 each with the main business of manufacturing, buying, selling, exchanging, converting, altering, importing, exporting, processing, twisting and to carry on business as agents and establish agency or agencies for and on behalf of local or foreign supplies of textile fibres and yam and for developing a commercial forestation for planting trees to be used as raw material for the manufacture of rayon grade pulp, etc. Shri Virender Ganda, counsel for the applicant, contended that in terms of section 399 of the Act, a petition under section 397/398 of the Act can only be filed by members holding 10 per cent. or more of the issued share capital of the company, in the present case, it is an admitted position that the petitioner-company does not hold any shares in the respondent-company. My attention was drawn to the petition itself as filed by the petitioner-company and it was pointed out that (a) in the prayer clause 8(ii), the petitioner-company has sought a declaration that the petitioner-company is a shareholder; (b) in prayer clause 8(viii) the petitioner-company has sought a declaration that it is the holder of 99.99 per cent. equity shares in the respondent-company; (c) in paragraph 6.18, it is stated that the petitioner-company requested the respondent-company to either allot the shares or refund the money; and (d) the same position is reiterated in the letter dated December 9, 1999, written by the petitioner-company to the respondent-company, and it was contended that these instances make it abundantly clear that the petitioner-company does not consider itself to be a shareholder/member in the respondent-company. It was argued that the present petition is not maintainable since the petitioner is not an existing shareholder. Section 397/398 can be invoked only by the existing shareholders and not by persons who wish that the shares to be allotted to them on the premises suggested or contended in the petition, therefore, the present petitioner cannot maintain the present petition on the basis that he seeks entitlement to certain shareholding. It was pointed out that the petitioner has not shown any application for such shareholding nor has the petitioner shown any basis for such claim, the claim for shareholding far exceeds 30 times of the authorised capital of the present respondent-company. Thus, it was argued that in the absence of any allotment the present petition cannot be filed, the present petition is an abuse of the process of law, at no point of time has there ever been any agreement between the respondent and the petitioner-company for allotment of any shares to the petitioner-company, nor has the petitioner-company ever applied for shares in the respondent-company, even otherwise there cannot be any question of allotting shares to the petitioner-company worth Rs. 3.58 crores as the authorised share capital of the petitioner-company is only Rs. 10 lakhs, it is abundantly clear that a company that has ???uthorised share capital of Rs. 10 lakhs cannot issue shares worth Rs. 3.58 ???ores.
3. ??? Further, counsel for the applicant contended that the basis of allotment ???shares can only be decided by the board of directors of the company and ??? existing shareholders in the present case, allotment of shares to the ???pondent/petitioner-company has never been considered either by the ???rd of directors or the shareholders of the respondent-company, the ??? basis for claiming shares by the petitioner-company is its own board ???lutions. Further, it was argued that even if one were to go with the ???d resolution dated August 30, 1990, passed by the petitioner-company, ???eby a conditional approval was granted by the board of the petitioner- ???any to invest in the shares of the respondent-company, the said approval was subject to the four conditions (a) obtaining the approvals of the financial and term lending institutions/banks; (b) obtaining the approvals of the Central Government under section 372 of the Act and section 30B of the MRTP Act; (c) the funds were to be first made available for the implementation of the expansion/modernisation scheme of the company; and (d) the funds were to be actually made available out of the convertible debenture issue. These four conditions were never fulfilled, so the petitioner-company could not invest in the equity share capital of the respondent-company. Furthermore, it was contended that even the petitioner-company, has nowhere averred in its petition that these conditions were ever fulfilled, IFCI, which was the lead financial institution of the petitioner-company, in fact, directed the petitioner-company not to invest in the respondent-company until the project of the respondent-company was duly approved by IDBI, which never happened. Further, as per the approval given by the Department of Company Affairs to the petitioner-company, the petitioner-company was required to subscribe to shares worth Rs. 13 crores in the respondent-company within one year from the date of approval, i.e, by August 30, 1992, which it never did. Therefore, the petitioner-company could not have invested in the share capital of the respondent-company.
4. Further, it was pointed out that the petitioner has admitted in the petition that the petitioner had agreed to invest Rs. 13 crores as equity contribution out of the total equity of Rs. 74 crores and the total project cost of Rs. 282 crores, the project could not proceed primarily because of the petitioner backing out from its commitment and in turn leading to abandonment of the project by the company and thus causing grave loss and injury to the company and its reputation.
5. Counsel for the applicant vehemently argued that the petitioner is admittedly not a member of the company which is a condition precedent for filing a petition under sections 397 and 398, the issued, subscribed an??? paid-up share capital as per the petition is Rs. 700 divided into 70 shares c??? Rs. 10 each, whereas in paragraph 2 of the petition, the petitioner stat??? that the petitioner-company is the holder of 99.99 per cent. of the shar??? holding of the respondent-company as promoters contribution to the tu??? of approximately Rs. 3,58,90,580.95 crores, all such facts stated are se??? contradictory and cannot be simultaneously true. My attention was dra??? to paragraph 8(viii) of the petition wherein the petitioner has soug??? declaration to the effect that the petitioner-company is the holder of 9??? per cent. of equity shares. It was argued that the Company Law B??? Regulations, 1992, require the petitioner to produce the docume??? evidence as proof of eligibility and status of the petitioner with rega??? the voting power held and the same is required to be enclosed with the petition under sections 397 and 398 of the Act, the documentary evidence has not been enclosed. And at the time of filing of the petition, the petitioner-company is admittedly not the member or the shareholder of the company and is, therefore, not eligible to file this petition. To support its contentions counsel for applicants (respondents) relied upon the case law in the matters of Suhas Chakma v. South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre P. Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 902 (CLB) : [2008] 84 CLA 427; Ram Gopal Patwari v. Patwari Exports P. Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 8 (CLB) : [2008] 85 CLA 208; Kerala Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Metalex Agencies, [2008] 144 Comp Cas 624 (CLB) : [2008] 86 CLA 158; Hiren Harshadrai Desai v. Fori India P. Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 406 (CLB); Kanwarjit Toney Singh Bansi v. Dolly Farms and Resorts P. Ltd., [1999] 3 Comp LJ 456 (CLB); T.N.K Govindaraju Chetty and Co. v. Kadri Mills (CBE) Ltd., [1998] 3 Comp LJ 329 : [1999] 96 Comp Cas 871 (CLB); Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel, [1977] 47 Comp Cas 151 (Guj); M. Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Manthramurthi High School Committee, [1963] 33 Comp Cas 346 (Mad) and Ved Prakash v. Iron Traders P. Ltd., [1961] 31 Comp Cas 122 (Punj).
6. Shri Virender Ganda, counsel for the applicant, further argued that the petitioner-company has never considered itself to be a shareholder member of the respondent-company. It has, through out, taken inconsistent and shifting stands on the issue, whether it is a shareholder or simply a lender to the respondent-company. It was pointed out that till recently, when the respondent-company was dormant and not doing any business, the petitioner-company considered itself as a creditor and exercised its rights as such by filing a winding up petition before the Bombay High Court. But now, when it saw that the respondent-company's project will take off, it started to agitate its false rights as a shareholder. Therefore, it was argued that it is clear that the present petition in so far as it seeks reliefs under sections 397 and 398 read with sections 402 and 403 of the Act, is not maintainable, since the petitioner-company is not a shareholder of the respondent-company.
7. Further, it was argued that the petitioner has consistently shown the said amount in its own books of accounts as “loan and advances” and not the “investment” as claimed. The petitioner in the capacity as creditor has been consistently seeking refund of the amount. It was contended that, without admitting, even if the petitioner's claim of being 99.99 per cent. shareholder of respondent No. 1-company is admitted as correct the respondent No. 1-company would become the subsidiary of the petitioner-company, which fact should have not only been reflected in the director's report of the petitioner-company, the annual accounts of respondent No. 1 company should have also been enclosed to the annual accounts of the petitioner-company together with a statement of particulars of subsidiary company(ies) as required under section 212 of the Act. No such compliance of section 212 has been made in respect of respondent No. 1 company, the directors' report also does not make any such disclosure. Counsel for the applicant argued that even if the petitioners' claim of giving the amount as share application money is considered as correct, in the absence of any issue or offer document of the company, the application for allotment of shares by the petitioner-company, etc., no jural relationship between the company and the petitioner-company is created. To support this contention, the applicant placed reliance on judgment by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in G. Siva Ramakrishna v. Rusni Distilleries P. Ltd., [2008] 143 Comp Cas 289.
8. Further, it was argued that the relief under section 111A of the Act is also not maintainable in as much as the petitioner-company at no point of time has lodged with the respondent-company any share transfer application, for transfer of any shares in its name, which is the sine qua non for any petition under the said section, since there is no application for share transfer, there cannot be any refusal by the board of the respondent-company. Accordingly, the petition is not maintainable under section 111A of the Act.
9. Further, it was contended that even the provisions of sections 111 and 111A of the Companies Act, 1956, are not applicable in the present case. Besides, the petitioner's own case is that it is a creditor of the company. During August 2001, the petitioner in the capacity as creditor had filed a petition under sections 433, 434 and 439 of the Companies Act, 1956, before the Bombay High Court (C.P No. 1179 of 2001), which is still pending adjudication, as per that petition, the respondent/petitioner has admitted itself to be a creditor of the company, my attention was drawn to the winding up petition, and statutory notices dated March 18, 2000 and dated August 17, 2002 under section 434(1)(a) issued by respondent/the petitioner-company through its counsel to respondent No. 1.
10. Furthermore, it was contended that even the relief sought under section 235(2) is not maintainable, because under section 235(2) minimum of 10 per cent. shareholding is required for such an application to be maintainable. Further, the application is not maintainable under section 250(3) as well because no averment has been made with regard to any transfer of shares that has taken place and as a result of which there has been a change in composition of the board of directors.
11. It was argued that since the basic ingredients of the various provision of law invoked by the petitioner-company are missing, the petition itself is not maintainable and should be dismissed as such.
12. Counsel for the applicant further argued that the petitioner-company is guilty of forum shopping by filing multiple petitions before different forums based on the same cause of action. Besides the present petition, the petitioner-company has also filed a winding up petition before the hon'ble Bombay High Court on the same cause of action, which is pending. In fact in the said petition the stand of the petitioner is that it has advanced sums of money to the respondent-company for its proposed project and since the respondent-company has failed to return the said amount, it should be wound up. On the one hand the petitioner-company is praying for winding up of the respondent-company and on the other hand it is seeking allotment of shares in the very same company, it is clear from the above that the petitioner is taking completely inconsistent stands in an opportunistic manner so as to suit its best interests. It was pointed out that till the filing of the present petition, the respondent-company was not even aware of the winding up petition being filed in the Bombay High Court, as the respondent-company was never served with any notice. It was argued that the petitioner-company has acted in a completely mala fide malicious and mischievous manner. Reliance is placed on the judgment in Sunitha Gupta v. Devendra Gupta, [2008] 141 Comp Cas 157 (CLB) : [2008] 85 CLA 246 (page Nos. 119-126 of the compilation).
13. Further, it was contended that the present petition is completely barred on the grounds of limitation, the respondent-company was incorporated in 1984, after six years, resolution is passed by the board of petitioner-company on August 30, 1990, for investment of Rs. 13 crores in the respondent-company, thereafter, for seventeen years the petitioner-company failed to agitate its rights as a shareholder. It was pointed out that the petitioner-company has woken up now only when it came to know of the proposed tie up of the petitioner-company with a foreign partner. Realising that the project with a foreign partner may take off and it may be profitable to be a shareholder in the respondent-company, the petitioner-company completely changed its stand and decided to agitate its right as a shareholder of the company, whereas all this while it was content claiming to be a lender/creditor. Therefore, it was argued that it is dear that the petitioner-company's conduct has been completely opportunistic and inconsistent to suit its selfish ends. Therefore, even on equitable grounds, the petitioner-company is not entitled to any of the reliefs. It was pointed out that as per the petition itself, the last financial transaction between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 company has happened in the year 1993, the winding up petition was filed by the petitioner-company in August, 2001 after a gap of eight years and this petition has been filed in 2008 after a gap of further seven years with a total gap of fifteen years. The petition, therefore, suffers from inordinate delays and laches besides a callous attitude of the petitioner in invoking its rights, if any. The petition is, therefore, not maintainable. To support its contentions, the applicant relied on the case law in the matters of A.N Somasundaram v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 472 (CLB) : [2008] 83 CLA 398; Raj Kumar Gupta v. R. Gupta, [2008] 84 CLA 390 : [2009] 147 Comp Cas 690 (CLB); Suruchi Chand v. Mahalaxmi Glass Works P. Ltd., [2008] 82 CLA 234 : [2009] 148 Comp Cas 496 (CLB); Corporation Bank v. Navin J. Shah, [2000] 100 Comp Cas 160 : (2000) 2 SCC 628; M.S Shoes East Ltd.… v. M.R.T.P & Ors.…, [2003] 107 DLT 595 : [2005] 128 Comp Cas 945 (Delhi); Dharambir v. State of NCT of Delhi, [2000] VIII AD (Delhi) 1145 and A.P Jain v. Faridabad Metal Udyog P. Ltd., [1998] 5 Comp LJ 561 : [1999] 95 Comp Cas 76 (CLB).
14. Distinguishing the case law relied upon by the respondent/petitioner in Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, [2006] 132 Comp Cas 479 (SC) : [2006] 69 SCL 211, it was pointed out that this judgment quoted by the respondent/petitioner-company also favours the applicant/respondent-company and not the respondent/petitioner as claimed. The ratio decided by the hon'ble Supreme Court in this case is that the plea in the nature of demurrer/maintainability of the petition is considered on the basis of averments made in the plaint alone and not on the basis of the pleas raised in the written statements or any piece of evidence. Applying the said principle, the petition alone brings out that (a) the petitioner is admittedly not a member of the company; (b) the provisions of section 111/111A are not applicable; (c) the petitioner having filed a winding up petition in the Bombay High Court has admitted itself to be a creditor; (d) the petition itself confirms the forum shopping by the petitioner; and (e) as per the petition itself, last transaction happened in 1993 and the petition, therefore, suffers from delays and laches without any explanation or application for condonation of delay.
15. Shri Parag D. Tripathi, counsel for the respondent/petitioner-company, drew my attention to the chronology of events to support the contentions that the amount of Rs. 3.59 crores was towards the promoters' contribution and not as loan/advances as claimed by the applicant/respondent-company. It was pointed out that on March 30, 1984, the board of directors of MRL approved promoting the project of MFL, on October 1, 1989, a letter was written by Dr. B.K Modi (respondent No. 3) ED of IFCI seeking approval for investment in Modi Fibres Ltd., on July 27, 1990, the chairman of the respondent-company applied to IDBI seeking financial assistance. On August 17, 1990 and August 30, 1990, the board of directors of MRL decided that the subscription up to Rs. 13 crores should be made after obtaining approvals from financial and term lending institutions/banks and from Central Government on September 27, 1990, in the annual general meeting shareholders of MRL approved for investment up to Rs. 13 crores in MFL, on July 20, 1991, the board of directors of MRL recorded that approvals from financial institutions and Central Government are still awaited. On August 13, 1991, the Government of India granted approval, on August 30, 1991, the Department of Company Affairs issued approval letter dated August 30, 1991. On December 22, 1991, a letter of possession was issued from Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation in favour of the respondent-company, on January 1, 1992 and February 4, 1992, the board of directors of MRL—recorded that IDBI's approval is still pending. On February 13, 1992, a letter of offer for FCDs was issued by MRL to shareholders regarding investment of Rs. 12 crores. On April 21, 1992 and May 22, 1992, the board of directors of MRL recorded that there was no progress by FIs. On July 24, 1992, the chairman of respondent No. 1 company wrote to the chairman of the petitioner-company that the cost of project had gone up so the investment of respondent No. 1-company would also increase and sought release of Rs. 50 lakhs. On August 26, 1992, December 30, 1992 and March 6, 1992, the board of directors of MRL recorded that pending IDBI's approval additional investment should be put on hold. On September 23, 1993, the chairman, MFL issued letter to MRL requesting to release Rs. 100 lakhs, on October 18, 1993 and November 20, 1993, the board in its meetings decided that no funds could be released. On December 17, 1993, MFL requested MRL for further release of funds. On December 23, 1993, the board of directors of MRL approved release of Rs. 25 lakhs to MFL for payment to IDBI, on March 7, 1994, the board of MRL took note of return of cheque for Rs. 25 lakhs by MFL as MFL did not propose to get appraisal done. The board desired to know reasons thereof. On May 17, 1994 and February 17, 1999, MRL sought approval of IFCI for utilisation of FCD proceeds for investment in MFL for day-to-day working capital during pendency of their final approval. On February 27, 1995, a letter was written to MRL from Shri S.K Modi pointing out that by alternative utilisation of funds collected for this project, the petitioner-company would commit breach of commitment made to public. On February 25, 1999, the IFCI gave approval to utilise balance amount towards clearance of dues to the institution. On June 1, 1999, June 27, 1999 and December 9, 1999, letters were written by MRL to MFL for allotment of shares against Rs. 3,58,90,580.95 and send share scrips or refund the amount. On March 18, 2000, a legal notice was issued to MFL. On August 17, 2000, the second legal notice was issued to respondents. On February 21, 2001, Mr. Atul Prakash forwarded details of expenses incurred by MFL on the project to the respondent/petitioner-company. On June 7, 2001, MFL confirmed credit balance of Rs. 294.58 lakhs in their books of account in the name of MRL. On July 1, 2001, an article was published in Business Line regarding collaboration of MFL with Lenzing Group of Austria on August 10, 2001, the petitioner-company filed a winding up petition against MFL before the Bombay High Court.
16. Shri Tripathi, counsel for the respondent/petitioner, argued that on its own submissions of the applicant/respondent-company, the sum in question amounting to Rs. 2,94,76,592 were received by the company and shown by the respondent-company as payable to the promoter, my attention was drawn to the audited balance-sheet for the financial year 1992–93 as on March 31, 1993. However, the respondent-company has not put in any money as agreed upon, the money contributed towards capital has been solely contributed by the petitioner-company. It was argued that the respondent-company cannot now turn around and seek to allege contrary to the contents of its own balance-sheet that the monies in question were received as loan or pursuant to any other transaction. Shri Tripathi argued that the principles of doctrine of legitimate expectations would apply to the present case as there was a contract and understanding between the petitioners and respondent being co-promoters in the project. My attention was drawn to the uncontroverted facts which, it was argued clearly establish the identity and purpose of the money by the petitioner to the respondent-company towards the allotment of the shares as promoter of the respondent-company: there were (i) necessary resolutions approved by the board of MRL in this regard in 1984; (ii) a report dated April 4, 1991, submitted by Shri Subhash Aggarwal giving the status of the company and means of financing; (iii) Dr. B.K Modi, the then managing director of MRL wrote to IFCI on October 1, 1989, requesting IFCI to approve the project of MFL; (iv) approvals were taken from various authorities: (a) respondent No. 1's application under section 22 of the MRTP Act, 1969, for modification in the scheme of finance which was duly approved by the Department of Company Affairs for contribution towards equity, (b) on September 16, 1991, a letter was issued by the CCI, Ministry of Finance, whereby a condition was laid that investment proposed by MRL in the project of the respondent will be made after obtaining approval of the IDBI, the monitoring institution who would ensure, inter alia, that the proposed investment would be made by the petitioner only after means of finance of the respondent's project is fully tied up, (c) approval was obtained on August 30, 1991, from the Department of Company Affairs by MRL for investment under section 372; (v) issue of convertible debentures for Rs. 65.39 crores was brought on February 27, 1992, by MRL out of which Rs. 13 crores were to be invested in MFL; (vi) application was made to the IDBI by MFL for appraisal wherein it is stated that MRL is a co-promoter of MFL, a declaration was also made by Sri S.K Modi in the said application stating that the statements and other papers enclosed are true and correct in all the particulars; (vii) the balance-sheet filed by MFL as on March 31, 1993, in the auditors report at item No. 5 at page 192 of the petition, it is stated that the company has not taken any loans from companies, firms or other parties listed in the register maintained under section 301 and from the companies under the same management, Dr. B.K Modi was the managing director of the petitioner as well as the respondent-company at the relevant time. Hence, it was argued that it was not a loan but the money was towards the share capital, the balance-sheet also shows it payable to promoters; (viii) vide letter dated February 25, 1995, by Shri S.K Modi, chairman of MFL wrote a letter to MRL that as one of the promoters alternative utilisation of funds would be gross violation of the understanding as well as the breach of commitment; (ix) there is a letter dated June 27, 1999, by MFL for further funds, this letter mentions the investment of MRL in MFL for equity. It was argued that the very fact that the petitioner has been treated as promoter has not been disputed nor denied, the respondent has not rendered any explanation whatsoever for treating the petitioner as promoter, therefore, the entire moneys contributed by the petitioner was towards capital, this being so, the respondent-company cannot now change its stand and take a stand, which is destructive of the earlier stand namely that the monies were paid as loan. To support its contentions the respondent/petitioner-company placed reliance on the case law in the matters of Chatterjee Petrochem (Mauritius) Co. v. Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd., [2008] 143 Comp Cas 726 (CLB).
17. It was argued that the conduct of the respondent-company also completely lacked the credibility and bona fides. The petitioner had specifically averred in the petition that no annual general meetings had been held and no returns had been filed with the Registrar of Companies by the respondent-company from the year 1993 onwards. However, after service of the copy of the petition, suddenly, numbers of annual returns were filed by the respondent-company with the Registrar of Companies on May 10, 2008, for the years 2000 to 2007. Balance-sheets as on March 31, 2000 and March 31, 2002 (Forms Nos. 23AC and 23ACA) were filed on May 12, 2008 and then on May 13, 2008, for the year ending March 31, 2004 (Form No. 23AC). Form No. 20B for the year ending March 31, 1995, March 31, 1996, Form No. 23AC for the year ending March 31, 1995 and March 31, 1996, Form No. 23ACA for the years 1994–95 to 1998–99 were filed on July 14, 2008, Form No. 2 and Form No. 23 for 2008 were filed on August 12, 2008. It was pointed out that the annual returns from the year 1992–1999 and balance-sheets from 1994–1999 have not been filed till date. Further, balance-sheets for the years 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007 have not been filed till date. Furthermore, it was pointed out that at no point of time, was any notice of the annual general meeting pertaining to any one of these annual general meetings was ever issued by the respondent-company to the petitioner and it is obvious that these so called annual returns are nothing but self-serving documents in order to unilaterally improve the case of the respondent-company.
18. Counsel for the respondent/petitioner argued that the case of the respondent-company is clearly founded on fraud and such a party and his case is liable to be thrown out at any stage of the proceedings as laid down in the cases of S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1; Eli Lilly Ranbaxy, In re, [1988] 71 DLT 1 and Express Newspapers P. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 259. It was argued that for this reason also, the objection of maintainability has to be rejected.
19. It was argued that no case has been made out to dismiss the company petition at the threshold, instead a case has been made out for throwing out the objection of the applicant. An objection as to the maintainability of the petition is only to be allowed at an initial stage if there is absolutely no doubt that the petition is not maintainable. It is a general principle that a petition is to be thrown out at an initial stage if it is unarguable on the demurrer. The courts have repeatedly held that if the question of maintainability is a triable issue, then the application for rejection of the petition or suit has to be dismissed and the issue has to be heard along with the merits of the case.
20. As regards delays and laches it was argued that it cannot be an issue as till date the amount is shown in the balance-sheet of the petitioner-company, moreover, this issue is also a mixed question of fact and law. Reliance was placed on the cases of Dayagen Pvt. Ltd v. Rajendra Dorian Punj & Anr , [2008] 87 SCL 314 : [2009] 151 Comp Cas 92 (Delhi); Jer Rutton Kavasmaneck v. Gharda Chemicals Ltd., [2001] 106 Comp Cas 25 (Bom) and Ramesh B. Desai v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, [2006] 132 Comp Cas 479 (SC) : [2006] 69 SCL 211.
21. Counsel for the respondent/petitioner drew my attention to another application, which is moved by Mr. Namo Narain Agarwal, who admittedly since incorporation of the company, is the holder of 10 equity shares, making him a shareholder of 14 per cent. of the issued and subscribed capital. It was argued that this is based on admitted facts and on records of the company itself, the respondent-company has been unable to show that at any point of time, during which it ostensibly increased its paid-up share capital from Rs. 700 to Rs. 5,00,000, any notice of this increase or of any meeting of the shareholders to discuss the same was ever served on Mr. Namo Narain Agarwal or indeed, on the petitioner, therefore, any technical objection which the respondent-company is now seeking to raise stands answered on account of the fact that Mr. Namo Narain Agarwal have moved an application for impleadment as co-petitioner and interveners. This application regarding maintainability by the respondent-company, if the Company Law Board will be adversed from passing an order rejecting the maintainability of the petition when admittedly, an application for impleadment as a co-petitioner is pending of a party, which at the relevant time, i.e, during the financial year 1993–94 had the requisite percentage of shareholding, namely, more than 10 per cent. and who has further contended that alleged enhancement of the paid-up share capital has been done illegally and without any notice to him, the company petition may not be dismissed at the threshold.
22. It was argued that if MFL has been treating this as a loan, they should have entered the particulars in the register to be maintained under section 301 of the Act. As per the balance-sheet annexed with the rejoinder and as per the latest annual returns made up to July 29, 2008, the issued subscribed capital at page 24 is Rs. 5 lakhs and at page 40 the shareholders are 33 in number. It was pointed out that as per the search conducted on April 22, 2008, filed with the application by the impleader/consenter, the paid-up capital of the company was only Rs. 700. MFL has not filed any balance-sheet after 1993. In the balance-sheet as at March 31, 1993, the share capital has been shown as Rs. 700 and an amount of Rs. 2.95 crores has been shown as payable to promoters (MRL). But with rejoinder to the application they have attached a balance-sheet as at March 31, 2007, wherein the amount payable to promoters has been shown as amount payable under the head current liability. Since, the company is yet to take up the construction and manufacturing activities, the replies in respect of the items dealing with (i) physical verification and valuation of stock, (ii) internal control procedure with regard to the purchase of stores and materials, plant and machinery, etc., (iii) determination of unserviceable and damaged stores raw material and finished goods, (iv) sale and disposal of bye-products and scrap, (v) maintenance of cost records, (vi) PF and ESI contributions, and (vii) undisputed amounts payable in respect of income-tax, wealth tax, sales tax, customs duty and excise duty, etc., are not applicable. The company is yet to take up construction and manufacturing activity, i.e, the company is yet to commence business and that is the reason for making development account instead of P and L account. Therefore, the company could not have shown MRL's promoters' contribution as payable under current liability as current liability are not long term liability. Further, it was argued that the company has neither been granted nor taken any loans, secured or unsecured, to/from companies, firms or other parties covered in the register maintained under section 301 of the Act. Further, it was pointed out that under the head current liability amount payable shown as Rs. 2,94,58,200 is the same amount which has been given by the respondent as reflected in their balance-sheet dated March 31, 1993, as payable to the promoters. To support its contention that the respondent/petitioner cannot be unsuited at the threshold, reliance was placed upon the case law in the matters of Dhananjay Pande v. Dr. Bais Surgical and Medical Institute P. Ltd., [2005] 125 Comp Cas 626 (CLB) and Smt. Vijay Khanna v. V.K Kapoor and Associates P. Ltd., [2007] 139 Comp Cas 524 (CLB).
23. Replying to the applicant/respondent's contention that the petitioner had filed a winding up petition before the hon'ble High Court of Mumbai after issuing legal notices to the respondent-company calling upon to allot and issue equity shares for the amount advanced or in the alternative to pay the amount together with interest at the rate of 18 per cent, per annum, it was pointed out that the respondents did not act upon the legal notice. Further, it was argued that this issue is a mixed question of fact and law. It is an issue of estoppel and waiver. It is equally a settled law that where the legal position relating to the right of recourse available to a party is ambiguous, it would rule out the “requisite knowledge” which is sine qua non for establishing the waiver of such right or recourse (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P, (1979) 2 SCC 409, paragraphs Nos. 5 and 6 at pages 420 and 421 refers).
24. Distinguishing the cases relied upon by the applicant/respondent-company it was pointed out by counsel for the respondent/petitioner that the case of G. Siva Ramakrishna v. Rusni Distilleries P. Ltd., [2008] 143 Comp Cas 289, is distinguishable as it pertains to petition under sections 433 and 434 of the Act and the case of Suhas Chakma v. South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre P. Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 902 (CLB) : [2008] 84 CLA 427, pertains to transfer of shares vis-a-vis qualification under section 399 and hence it is not applicable to the facts of the present case. To support its contentions, the respondent/petitioner-company further placed its reliance on the decisions in the cases of Shri Balaji Textile Mills P. Ltd. v. Ashok Kavle, [1989] 66 Comp Cas 654 (Karn) : [1989] 3 Comp LJ 322 and Srikanta Datta Narasimharaja Wadiyar v. Venkateswara Real Estate Enterprises P. Ltd., [1990] 68 Comp Cas 216 (Karn) : [1990] 3 Comp LJ 38.
25. Further, it was contended that admittedly and undisputedly the petitioner was the promoter of the respondent-company. The Indian promoters investment was about Rs. 22 crores and an amount of Rs. 13 crores were to be brought by the petitioner-company. Against Rs. 13 crores, the petitioner gave Rs. 3.58 crores whereas the respondent brought only Rs. 700 (including Rs. 100 by the intervener). The money brought in by the petitioner was in adherence to the memorandum of understanding arrived at by the promoters of the respondent-company. But shares for the money brought in by the petitioner-company were not issued.
26. It was pointed out that the documents filed by the petitioner-company which include those of respondent-company categorically establish that the petitioner has invested Rs. 3,58,90,580.95 in the respondent-company and sought periodical reports from the respondents about the progress made in the project. The respondents have admittedly put only Rs. 700 as investment (which includes Rs. 100 invested by the intervener Shri Namo Narayan Agrawal) and are controlling the company whereas it is the petitioner-company which has made huge investments. It was argued that the respondents are now dishonestly trying to wriggle out by filing self-serving documents with the Registrar of Companies after the notice of the present petition. The respondents have deliberately chosen not to file reply to the pleadings as filing of the same would have destroyed the very foundation of the contrary stand adopted by the respondent-company. There have been no answers to the fact that the money has been brought in by the promoters for the very purpose of the project of the respondent-company. There has been no denial of the documents and pleadings filed by the petitioner-company in this regard. It was pointed out that at this stage the respondents have come up with a absurd theory that the money had come as loan and are making desperate attempts before the Company Law Board in believing that the promoter who had invested Rs. 3.58 crores against the respondent's investment of Rs. 600 has no locus standi/claim whatsoever in the respondent-company. It was argued that this new found theory is beyond reasonable logics and against prudent business sense as no formality of loans/financial assistance has been followed, it defines the contemporaneous business understandings and, therefore, cannot be accepted and the present application challenging the maintainability needs to be rejected at the threshold.
27. Replying to the applicant's argument that since there is no rebuttal on the part of the respondents of the documents and the pleadings of the petitioner-company, the maintainability is established, it was argued that even assuming but not admitting, the respondent's case, at best, in the present case the question of maintainability is a mixed question of fact and law, even otherwise admittedly the petitioner-company is the promoter of the respondent-company.
28. Counsel for the respondent/petitioner-company reiterated that the petitioner is the shareholder of the company as the petitioner-company had invested in the respondent-company with a specific understanding as a shareholder which is evident from the various correspondences exchanged between the parties, it is not a case of non-compliance of section 399. Distinguishing the cases relied upon by the applicant/respondent-company, it was pointed out that the facts of the present case are different from the case of Suhas Chakma v. South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre P. Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 902 (CLB) : [2008] 84 CLA 427, relied upon by the respondent-company as that case deals with transfer of the shares of the petitioner who had also amended his petition seeking only limited relief instead of invoking relief under sections 397 and 398; the facts of the present case are not applicable to the case of Ram Gopal Patwari v. Patwari Exports P. Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 8 (CLB) : [2008] 85 CLA 208, relied upon by the respondent-company, which deals with the fact that the petitioner had transferred their shares and had acknowledged the same in their income-tax returns and the petition itself was ill motivated, in the present case the petitioner is a promoter/shareholder of the respondent-company; the case of Kerala Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. Metalex Agencies, [2008] 144 Comp Cas 624 (CLB) : [2008] 86 CLA 158, is of no assistance to the respondent-company as it is with regard to consent and while giving consent whether there has been due application of mind, in the present case the consenter also holds one-seventh of the issued and subscribed capital, he has also moved an application seeking investigation under section 235(2) which is also pending before the Company Law Board, in the present petition the impleadment application by Shri Namo Narain was filed prior to the present application challenging its maintainability; the case of Hiren Harshadrai Desai v. Pori India P. Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 406 (CLB), relied on by the respondent-company has no bearing on the present case and is entirely different on facts and on question of law, in that matter the shares were allotted and the petitioner had not paid the entire consideration, in the present case the petitioner was to bring in about Rs. 13 crores as its promoters contribution out of Rs. 22 crores committed by the Indian promoters, the petitioner-company was not issued/allotted shares even to the extent of its investments made. As regards the contention that there was an embargo from CCI (Controller of Capital Issues) for non-releasing of further funds to the respondent till the appraisal of the project by the IDBI, it was also pointed out that for getting appraisal done from the IDBI, the petitioner-company even forwarded a cheque of Rs. 25 lakhs to the respondent-company but the respondent chose not to go ahead with appraisal for the reasons best known to them.
29. As regards in the case of Kanwarjit Toney Singh Bansi v. Dolly Farms and Resorts P. Ltd., [1999] 3 Comp LJ 456 (CLB), relied upon by the respondent, it was pointed out that the money by way of cheque, was also refunded to the petitioner which he did not encash whereas in the present case the contribution towards equity was as per the memorandum of understanding arrived at between the promoters and the same is admitted by the respondents in their application to the Department of Company Affairs, under section 22 of the MRTP Act, the payment for the land is made to MIDC for the project directly by the petitioner and this fact is admitted by the respondent-company, in the present matter there has been no refund of money. In the case of T.N.K Govindaraju Chetty and Co. v. Kadri Mills (CBE) Ltd., [1998] 3 Comp LJ 329 : [1999] 96 Comp Cas 871 (CLB), relied on by the respondent-company, the petition was held to be maintainable and, therefore, is against the proposition pleaded by the respondent-company. Referring to the observations in the case of Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel, [1977] 47 Comp Cas 151 (Guj), which read as under (page 162):
“Now, one can conceivably envisage a case where there may not be a serious dispute as to the title of the petitioners to the shares of which he claims ownership and yet his name may not be found in the register of members and incidentally he is required to seek rectification of the register, he would be perfectly justified in filing a composite petition under sections 155, 397 and 398. It is not that in all cases such a composite petition is not maintainable but it would be for the court to decide whether the petition should be rejected on the ground that it is a composite petition unworthy of examination, or to admit the petition in part leaving open the question of admission of the remainder of the petition to a later date.”
It was pointed that even in the present case a composite petition has been filed.
30. As regards the case of M. Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Manthramurthi High School Committee, [1963] 33 Comp Cas 346 (Mad), relied upon by the respondent-company, it was pointed out that it will not be applicable to the present case as it relates to the jurisdiction as to beneficiaries of trust vis-a-vis the Company Law Board. As regards the case of Ved Prakash v. Iron Traders P. Ltd., [1961] 31 Comp Cas 122 (Punj), relied on by the respondent-company, it was pointed out that it is distinguishable as the petitioner in that case had also filed a case in the civil court for rectification of register of member as well as before the hon'ble company judge.
31. As regards the applicant's contention of non-applicability of section 111A, it was argued that this is an exceptional case where the petitioner-company had been treated as a shareholder till the stage of project appraisal and further but now the respondent even refuses to acknowledge the petitioner-company as a shareholder thus controverting its own admissions before the various Government authorities and financial institutions. The respondent/petitioner-company placed reliance on various correspondences and also on the balance-sheet, as at March 31, 1993, of the respondent-company wherein the amount invested by the petitioner-company has not been treated as loan.
32. Replying to the applicant's contention that it is the petitioner's own case that it is a creditor of the company, it was contended that in the legal notices sent by the petitioner-company, the respondent-company was asked for allotment of shares, the bare perusal of the legal notices and the petition for winding up clearly establish that the petitioner had given option to the respondent who deliberately chose not to respond.
33. As regards the allegation of the applicant, relying upon the case of forum shopping and multiple proceedings (Sunitha Gupta v. Devendra Gupta, [2008] 141 Comp Cas 157 (CLB) : [2008] 85 CLA 246 refers), it was contended that it has no relevance to the present case as the same are on entirely different footing in the case of Sunitha Gupta, as per the memorandum of understanding the petitioner had waived her rights and the issues have been same in civil suit as well as before the Company Law Board.
34. As regards the contention regarding delays and laches, it was pointed out that there has been no delay in filing the present petition, the petitioner-company placed reliance on the cases of Mrs. Promila Bansal v. Wearwell Cycle Co. (India) Ltd., [1978] 48 Comp Cas 202 (Delhi) and Farhat Sheikh v. Escman Metalo Chemical P. Ltd. and, [1991] 71 Comp Cas 88 (Cal). As regards the case of A.N Somasundaram v. Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Ltd., [2008] 142 Comp Cas 472 (CLB) : [2008] 83 CLA 398, it was pointed out that this case deals with section 111A of the Companies Act, and, therefore, cannot be relied vis-a-vis the present case, and in the case of Raj Kumar Gupta v. R. Gupta, [2008] 84 CLA 390 : [2009] 147 Comp Cas 690 (CLB), the petitioner did not complain of continuous acts of oppression, moreover, the petitioner himself was a director when the alleged acts took place, the facts and circumstances of the present case have no co-relation with the case relied upon by the respondent-company. As regards the case of Suruchi Chand v. Mahalaxmi Glass Works P. Ltd., [2008] 82 CLA 234 : [2009] 148 Comp Cas 496 (CLB), it was pointed out that this case is entirely different on facts as well as law. And in the case of Corporation Bank v. Navin J. Shah, [2000] 100 Comp Cas 160 : (2000) 2 SCC 628, relied upon by the respondent-company deals with (he matter tiled before the National Commission where the claims were old, but in the present case the cause of action is continuous, the respondents are now looking for fresh infusion of capital whereas the assets of the company have been purchased out of the infusion of funds made by the petitioner-company, and further that in the year 2007 the respondent-company has been negotiating with Lenzing group of Austria and as soon as the petitioner-company discovered the same, it approached the Company Law Board. As regards the case of M.S Shoes East Ltd.… v. M.R.T.P & Ors.…, [2003] 107 DLT 595 : [2005] 128 Comp Cas 945 (Delhi), relied upon by the respondent-company it was pointed out that it is distinguishable as the same is based on adjudication of the claims whereas in the present case the petitioner-company is seeking equitable reliefs under section 397/398 of the Companies Act for the continuous acts of mismanagement and oppression. As regards the case of Dharambir v. State of NCT of Delhi, [2000] VIII AD (Delhi) 1145, it was contended that the facts and circumstances are distinguishable and are not applicable to the present case. As regards the case of A.P Jain v. Faridabad Metal Udyog P. Ltd., [1998] 5 Comp LJ 561 : [1999] 95 Comp Cas 76 (CLB), relied upon by the respondent-company it is distinguishable as in the present case on the same facts the petitioner had approached the Company Law Board whereas he had already filed a case in the High Court, in the present case the respondent is indulging in acts of mismanagement and oppression and is continuing to do so.
35. As regards the allegation that the petitioner-company withdrew from its commitment to invest the agreed amount of Rs. 13 crores, it was contended that the petitioner-company has invested Rs. 3,58,90,580.95 in the respondent-company and sought periodical reports from the respondents about the progress made in the project, the respondent-company either did not reply to the queries raised by the board of directors of the petitioner or circumvented the queries. It was further argued that the petitioner is a public limited company and during the relevant period the board of the petitioner-company had at least 4 nominee directors representing financial institutions and, therefore, it was not possible for the petitioner to act irresponsibly like the respondent-company and at the same time the erstwhile CCI (Controller of Capital Issue) put a rider. It was emphasised that the respondents have put only Rs. 700 as investment (which includes Rs. 100 invested by the intervener Shri Namo Narayan Agrawal) and are controlling the company whereas it is the respondent/petitioner-company which has made the huge investment towards promoters' contribution but no shares have been allotted.
36. I find that the Company Petition No. 48 of 2008 is a petition wherein the provisions of sections 111A, 235(2) and 250(3) of the Act have also been invoked along with the provisions of sections 397 and 398 read with sections 402, 403 and 408 of the Act. On considering the pleadings, the annexures therewith, the arguments and the case law cited by the parties it is noted that the applicant/respondent-company has preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of Company Petition No. 48 of 2008. It is argued that the petitioner (MRL) in this company petition does not have the requisite shareholding to have a right to apply as a member for attracting the provisions of sections 397 and 398 read with sections 402, 403 and 408 of the Act. Further, the company petition is not maintainable under section 111A or 235(2) or 250(3) of the Act, the ingredients of the sections attracted have not been fulfilled.
37. It is noted that the applicant's case (i.e, of the respondent-company, namely, MFL) in the present Company Application No. 255 of 2008 in Company Petition No. 48 of 2008 is that the present petition is not maintainable under section 397/398 of the Act, it does not have the right to apply under section 399 of the Act, the petitioner-company does not hold any shares in the respondent-company; it is not an existing shareholder; cannot maintain the present petition on the basis that it seeks entitlement to certain shareholding; it is its own case that it has sought a declaration that the petitioner-company is a shareholder; that it has 99.99 per cent, equity shares in the respondent-company; it has requested the respondent-company to either allot the shares or refund the money; the petitioner-company does not consider itself to be a shareholder/member in the respondent-company; it has not shown any application for such shareholding nor has any basis for such claim, the claim for shareholding far exceeds 30 times of the authorised capital of the present respondent-company; in the absence of any allotment it is an abuse of the process of law; at no point of time was there any agreement between the respondent and the petitioner-company for allotment of any shares to the petitioner; allotment of shares to the respondent/petitioner-company has never been considered either by the board of directors or the shareholders of the respondent-company; the basis for claiming shares is its own board resolutions giving a conditional approval which was subject to the four conditions: the approvals of the financial and term lending institutions, approvals of the Central Government under section 372 of the Act and section 30B of the MRTP Act, funds were to be first made available for the implementation of the expansion/modernisation scheme of the company and funds were to be actually made available out of the convertible debenture issue; the four conditions were never fulfilled, the petitioner-company could not invest in the equity share capital of the respondent-company; project of the respondent-company was to be duly approved by the IDBI, which never happened; as per the Department of Company Affair's approval to the petitioner-company was required to subscribe to shares worth Rs. 13 crores in the respondent-company by August 30, 1992, which it never did; the petitioner-company has taken inconsistent and shifting stands on the issue, it is not sure whether it is a shareholder or simply a lender to the respondent-company; when the respondent-company was dormant and not doing any business, the petitioner-company considered itself as a creditor, and even exercised its rights in a winding up petition but now realising that the project will take off it started agitating its claim of being a shareholder. Further, the applicant's case is that the petition is not maintainable under section 111A of the Act; the petitioner-company at no point of time has lodged with the respondent-company any share transfer application for transfer of any shares in its name, which is the sine qua non for any petition under the said section, since there is no application for share transfer, there cannot be any refusal by the board of the respondent-company. Further, no case has been made out under section 235(2) or under section 250(3) of the Act. Furthermore, the MFL's case is that the MRL has indulged in forum shopping by filing multiple petitions; besides the present petition it also filed a winding up petition before the hon'ble Bombay High Court on the same cause of action, which is pending on this ground alone the petition is not maintainable; further MRL has taken inconsistent stands in an opportunistic manner so as to suit its best interests; it has acted in a completely mala fide, malicious and mischievous manner. Besides, the petition is barred on the grounds of limitation, company was incorporated in 1984, after six years resolution was passed by the board of the petitioner-company on August 30, 1990, for investment of Rs. 13 crore in the respondent-company and for seventeen years the petitioner-company failed to agitate its rights as a shareholder, the last financial transaction between the petitioner and respondent No. 1 company has happened in the year 1993, the winding up petition was filed by the petitioner-company in August, 2001, and it is after a gap of further eight years that this petition has been filed in 2008 with a total gap of fifteen years, the petition suffers from inordinate delays and laches. Furthermore, even on equitable grounds MRL is not entitled to any relief. Even if its claim of being 99.99 per cent, shareholder of respondent No. 1-company is admitted as correct, respondent No. 1-company would become the subsidiary of the petitioner- company, which fact should have not only been reflected in the director's report of the petitioner-company, but the annual accounts of respondent No. 1-company should have also been enclosed to the annual accounts of the petitioner-company together with a statement of particulars of subsidiary company(ies) as required under section 212 which is not the case here; the issued, subscribed and paid-up share capital as per the petition is Rs. 700 divided into 70 shares of Rs. 10 each, whereas in paragraph 2 of the petition, the petitioner states that the petitioner-company is the holder of 99.99 per cent. of the shareholding of the respondent-company as promoters' contribution to the tune of approximately Rs. 3,58,90,580.95 crores, all such facts stated are self contradictory and cannot be simultaneously true; the Company Law Board Regulations, 1991, require the petitioner to produce the documentary evidence as proof of eligibility and status of the petitioner with regard to the voting power held; the plea in the nature of demurrer/maintainability of the petition is considered on the basis of averments made in the plaint alone and not on the basis of the pleas raised in the written statements or any piece of evidence. Applying the said principle, the applicant's case is that the petition alone brings out that (a) the petitioner is admittedly not a member of the company; (b) the provisions of section 111/111A are not applicable; (c) the petitioner having filed a winding up petition in the Bombay High Court has admitted itself to be a creditor; (d) the petition itself confirms the forum shopping by the petitioner; and (e) as per the petition itself, last transaction happened in 1993 and the petition, therefore, suffers from delays and laches without any explanation or application for condonation of delay.
38. The respondent/petitioner-company's case is that the amount of Rs. 3.59 crores was towards the promoters' contribution and not as loan/advances as claimed by the applicant/respondent-company. On March 30, 1984, the board of directors of MRL approved promoting the project of MFL, on October 1, 1989, a letter was written by Dr. B.K Modi (respondent No. 3) to ED of IFCI seeking approval for investment in Modi Fibres Ltd., on July 27, 1990, the chairman of the respondent-company applied to the IDBI seeking financial assistance. On September 27, 1990, in the annual general meeting the shareholders of MRL approved investment up to Rs. 13 crores in MFL. On August 13, 1991, the Government of India granted approval, on August 30, 1991, Department of Company Affairs issued approval letter dated August 30, 1991. On December 22, 1991, a letter of possession was issued from Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation in favour of the respondent-company, on January 1, 1992 and February 4, 1992, the board of directors of MRL recorded that the IDBI's approval is still pending. On August 26, 1992, December 30, 1992 and March 6, 1992, the board of directors of MRL recorded that pending the IDBI approval, additional investment should be put on hold. On September 23, 1993, the chairman, MFL issued letter to MRL requesting to release Rs. 100 lakhs, on October 18, 1993 and November 20, 1993, the Board in its meetings decided that no funds could be released. On December 17, 1993, MFL requested MRL for further release of funds. On December 23, 1993, the board of directors of MRL approved release of Rs. 25 lakhs to MFL for payment to IDBI, on March 7, 1994, the board of MRL took note of the return of cheque of Rs. 25 lakhs by MFL as MFL did not propose to get appraisal done. The board desired to know reasons thereof. On May 17, 1994 and February 17, 1999, MRL bought approval of IFCI for utilisation of FCD proceeds for investment in MFL for day-to-day working capital during pendency of their final approval. On June 1, 1999, June 22, 1999 and December 9, 1999, letters were written by MRL to MFL for allotment of shares against Rs. 3,58,90,580.95 and send share scrips or refund the amount. On March 18, 2000, a legal notice was issued to MFL. On August 17, 2000, the second legal notice was issued to the respondents. On February 21, 2001, Mr. Atul Prakash forwarded details of expenses incurred by MFL on the project to the respondent/petitioner-company. On June 7, 2001, MFL confirmed credit balance of Rs. 294.58 lakhs in their books of account in the name of MRL. On July 1, 2001, an article was published in Business Line regarding collaboration of MFL with Lenzing group of Austria on August 10, 2001, the petitioner-company filed a winding up petition against MFL before the Bombay High Court. On applicant/respondent-company's own submissions, the sum in question amounting to Rs. 2,94,76,592 were received by the company and shown by the respondent-company as payable to the promoter, my attention was drawn to the audited balance-sheet for the financial year 1992–93 as on March 31, 1993. However, the respondent-company has not put in any money as agreed upon, the money contributed towards capital has been solely contributed by the petitioner-company. The principle of doctrine of legitimate expectations has been attracted as there was a contract and understanding between the petitioners and respondent being co-promoters in the project. My attention has been drawn to uncontroverted facts to establish the identity and purpose of the money brought in by the petitioner into the respondent-company towards the allotment of the shares, necessary resolutions, report dated April 4, 1991, giving the status of the company and means of financing; managing director of MRL wrote to IFCI on October 1, 1989, requesting IFCI to approve the project of MFL; approvals were taken from various authorities, application was made to the IDBI by MFL for appraisal wherein it is stated that MRL is a co-promoter of MFL, the balance-sheet filed by MFL as on March 31, 1993, in auditors report at item No. 5 at page 192 of the petition it is stated that the company has not taken any loans from the companies. Firms or other parties listed in the register maintained under section 301, it was argued that it was not a loan but the money was towards the share capital, the balance-sheet also shows it payable to the promoters; vide letter dated February 25, 1995, by Shri S.K Modi, chairman of MFL wrote a letter to MRL that as one of the promoters alternative utilisation of funds would be gross violation of the understanding as well as breach of commitment; there is a letter dated June 27, 1999, by MFL for further funds, this letter mentions the investment of MRL in MFL for equity, the very fact that the petitioner has been treated as a promoter has not been disputed nor denied, the conduct of the respondent-company also completely lacked the credibility and bona fides. The petitioner had specifically averred in the petition that no annual general meetings had been held and no returns had been filed with the Registrar of Companies by the respondent-company from the year 1993 onwards. However, after service of the copy of the petition, suddenly, number of annual returns were filed by the respondent-company with the Registrar of Companies on May 10, 2008, for the years 2000 to 2007, annual returns from the year 1992–99 and balance-sheets from 1994–99 have not been filed till date, balance-sheets for the years 2001, 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2007 have not been filed till date, at no point of time, was any notice of annual general meeting pertaining to any one of these annual general meetings was ever issued, the annual returns are nothing but a self-serving documents in order to unilaterally improve the case of the respondent-company, the case is clearly founded on fraud and such a party and his case is liable to be thrown out at any stage of the proceedings, MFL has been treating this as loan, they should have entered the particulars in the register to be maintained under section 301 of the Act, the latest annual returns made up to July 29, 2008, the issued subscribed capital at page 24 is Rs. 5 lakhs and at page 40 the shareholders are 33 in number, as per the search conducted on April 22, 2008, filed with the application by the impleader/consenter, the paid-up capital of the company was only Rs. 700. MFL has not filed any balance-sheet after 1993. In the balance-sheet as at March 31, 1993, the share capital has been shown as Rs. 700 and an amount of Rs. 2.95 crores has been shown as payable to promoters (MRL). But with rejoinder to the application they have attached a balance-sheet as at March 31, 2007, wherein the amount payable to promoters has been shown as the amount payable under the head current liability. The company is yet to take up construction and manufacturing activity, i.e, the company is yet to commence business and that is the reason for making development account instead of P and L account, company has neither been granted nor taken any loans, secured or unsecured, to/from companies firms or other parties covered in the register maintained under section 301 of the Act, the petitioner had filed a winding up proceedings before the hon'ble High Court of Mumbai after issuing legal notices to the respondent-company, the respondents did not act upon the legal notice, however, it is a mixed question of fact and law. It is an issue of estoppel and waiver. It is equally a settled law that where the legal position relating to the right of recourse available to a party is ambiguous, it would rule out the “requisite knowledge” which is sine qua non for establishing the waiver of such right or recourse, admittedly and undisputedly the petitioner was the promoter of the respondent-company. The Indian promoters investment was about Rs. 22 crores and an amount of Rs. 13 crores were to be brought by the petitioner-company. Against Rs. 13 crores, the petitioner gave Rs. 3.58 crores whereas the respondent brought only Rs. 700 (including Rs. 100 by the intervener). The money brought in by the petitioner was in adherence to the memorandum of understanding arrived at by the promoters of the respondent-company. There have been no answers to the fact that the money has been brought in by the promoters for the very purpose of the project of the respondent-company. There has been no denial of the documents and pleadings filed by the petitioner-company in this regard, the respondents have come up with absurd theory that the money had come as loan and are making desperate attempts before the Company Law Board in believing that the promoter who had invested Rs. 3.58 crores against the respondent's investment of Rs. 600 has no locus standi/claim whatsoever in the respondent-company, no formality in respect of loans/financial assistance has been followed, the respondent's case, the question of maintainability is a mixed question of fact and law, even otherwise admittedly the petitioner-company is the promoter of the respondent-company, the petitioner-company had invested in the respondent-company with a specific understanding as a shareholder which is evident from the various correspondences exchanged between the parties, it is not a case of non-compliance of section 399, the petitioner-company was not issued/allotted shares even to the extent of its investments made, it is an exceptional case where the petitioner-company had been treated as a shareholder till the stage of project appraisal.
39. As regards the preliminary objection on maintainability of this petition in view of the necessary qualification under section 399 of the Act, it is correct that in order to maintain a petition under sections 397 and 398 the petitioners should hold either 10 per cent. or more shares of subscribed capital or should constitute 10 per cent. or more of total members in the company. In this regard my attention was drawn to the provisions of section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956. A bare reading and perusal of the provisions of section 399(1) of the Act would show that: (a) in the case of a company having a share capital, members constituting not less than 100 members of the company or not less than one-tenth of the total number of its members whichever is less or members' holding not less than one-tenth of the issued share capital of the company… shall have right to apply under section 397 or 398 of the Companies Act. It is, therefore, far from doubt that section 399 stipulates minimum qualifications which members should possess such as their numerical strength or the extent of their share capital. Section 399 engrafts an important exception to this rule of competence to make an application under sections 397 and 398 of the Act, exception lies in the special dispensation, which the Central Government may give to any person to make an application despite the fact that the person concerned is not eligible to make an application in terms of section 399(1). The petitioner while applying under sections 397 and 398 must hold the requisite number of shares at the time of filing of petition. Section 399(1) is not a procedural provision. The nature of provisions of section 399(1) is not procedural but it is a part of substantive law and, therefore, the requirements of section 399(1) should be construed as mandatory. The word shall used therein is considered to be imperative in nature and it has to be interpreted as mandatory having regard to the text, and context of the statute irrespective of the fact whether any prejudice is caused. In terms of section 399 of the Act the members fulfilling the requirements thereof have the right to allege oppression and mismanagement in the affairs of the company and can file petition in terms of the said sections. In view of the aforesaid unambiguous provisions of the Act, the petitioners are required to satisfy the Company Law Board that the petitioners individually or together hold the requisite percentage of shares in the company. It is the requirement of the law that petition under sections 397 and 398 has to accompany documentary evidence in proof of eligibility and status of petitioners that the voting power held by each of them is as per provisions of section 399 of the Act. The petitioners have to meet the requirement under section 399 either in terms of the number/percentage of shares or in terms of number of shareholders. Further, it has been held in a number of cases that if the shareholding of the petitioner in a petition under sections 397 and 398 of the Act got reduced to below 10 per cent. on issue/allotment of further shares and if the said issue/allotment is the very act which is challenged as “oppressive” in the said petition, the maintainability of the petition would be decided after determining the validity of the issue of allotment.
40. The requirement of share qualification is relevant and material for maintaining the petition. Even though a subscriber to the memorandum is a member in terms of section 41 of the Act, but without the consideration for the shares he cannot be treated as a member for the purposes of section 399 of the Act. A reading of the section would indicate that only a member can apply provided all calls and other sums due on the shares held have been paid. Section 399 not only specifies that there should not be any pending dues on the calls made, it also provides that no other sum should also be due on the shares. The prima fade evidence to the shares could be either the share certificate or even the register of members. However, even in the absence of share certificates or entry in the register of members, if a person could establish that certain shares have been allotted to him, then, for the purposes of section 399 of the Companies Act, 1956, he could be treated as a member. It is settled law that a shareholder could establish allotment of shares not only by the register of members of the company, but also by the statutory returns and documents maintained and filed by the company, it is not open to the company to contend that the petitioner has not complied with the requirements of section 41(2) of the Act.
41. Persons having monetary claims against a company by way of loans or otherwise cannot seek relief in this equitable jurisdiction, they may seek this relief from a civil court. There also there is a bar due to the period of limitation. The Company Law Board has the jurisdiction to consider the petitioner's entitlement to become a member. The Company Law Board can go into the question whether the petitioners are eligible or qualified to become members of the company and whether default has been committed by the company in entering, their names in the register of members.
42. There is no quarrel with the general principle that a petition or suit has to be dismissed and thrown out at an initial stage if it is unarguable on the demurer. Further, there is no quarrel with the respondent/petitioner-compan's contention that if maintainability is a triable issue then the application for rejection of the petition or suit has to be dismissed and the issue has to be heard along with merits of the case.
43. The petition can be held demurrable only if the claim put forward cannot be established even if all the allegations made in the petition are accepted to be true. To decide whether the petitioner had fulfilled requirements of section 399, the Company Law Board is to examine only the averments in the petition. In Jer Rutton Kavasmaneck v. Gharda Chemicals Ltd., [2001] 106 Comp Cas 25, the Bombay High Court has taken the view that a petition under section 397 can be thrown out only if the case put forward is unarguable. It is only at the final hearing of the petition that the court would be able to decide the complicated issues of facts and law. The test is whether, even if the facts pleaded by the petitioner in this petition under sections 397 and 398 are assumed to be true, the petition filed by it can be held to be not maintainable. This test is similar to the test applied by a civil court while dealing with the issue of rejection of the plaint under Order 7, rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the present case it cannot be said that at the threshold a case has been made out for dismissing the company petition as unarguable and hence not maintainable. The plaint can be rejected in plain and obvious cases when the action is one which cannot succeed or is in some way an abuse of the process of the court. The plaint should not be struck out unless the case is unarguable. Even assuming that the allegations of the petitioner, if proved, do make out a case of oppression and mismanagement within the scope of sections 397 and 398 of the Act, mere proof of those allegations will not entitle the petitioner to the reliefs sought for when the reliefs are discretionary reliefs and they will be granted only to persons who approach this court in good faith and the parties who approach this court for equitable reliefs must come with a clean record.
44. The petitioner-company's grievance has arisen from non-allotment or failure or default on the part of the company to make the allotment to it. Though in a case of application by the general public, failure to allot could not be questioned, in the circumstances of this case where the contribution is part of promoters' equity the denial of allotment to co-promoter stands on a different footing. Counsel for the petitioner-company (MRL) has rightly relied on the Division Bench judgment of the Karnataka High Court in Shri Balaji Textile Mills P. Ltd. v. Ashok Kavle, [1989] 66 Comp Cas 654 (Karn) : [1989] 3 Comp LJ 322, to the effect that the word “member” has to be understood in the context in which it is used. In that case, the court has specifically ruled out section 41(2) in construing the meaning of the word “member” in section 399 of the Act. The powers are wider and, hence, it has been often held that this jurisdiction is a discretionary and equitable jurisdiction. The factum of allotment should be supported by other contemporaneous records. The only issue that I have to consider for the present is whether the petitioner is a shareholder of the company. The prima facie evidence to the shares could be either the share certificate (section 84 of the Act) or entry in the register of members (section 164 of the Act). In this case, the admitted position is that no shares have been issued in the name of the petitioner-company and, its name does not appear in the register of members as no allotment of shares had been made to the petitioner. The audited account as on March 31, 1993, continue to show the amount paid by the petitioner-company as promoters' contribution towards equity capital.
45. It is noted that the amount payable to promoter has been shown as amount payable under the head current liability in the rejoinder attaching balance-sheet for the year ending 2007 by the respondent-company (MFL). This balance-sheet has been filed only during the pendency of this matter before the Company Law Board. The petitioner-company's allegation that no annual returns have been filed after 1992–93 is correct. In the balance-sheet for 1992–93 as on March 31, 1993, this amount of Rs. 2,94,76,592 has been shown as payable to the promoters. The paid-up capital is shown as Rs. 700 and that continues to be the same till the date of search, i.e, on April 22, 2008, by the impleader. Since respondent No. 1-company is yet to take up the construction and manufacturing activities, etc., replies in respect of purchase of stores or materials, etc., are not applicable. The company has not commenced its business as yet and that is why there is development account instead of profit and loss account. The company could not have shown this amount as payable under current liabilities as current liabilities are not long-term liabilities. Respondent No. 1 has neither been granted nor taken any loans, secured or unsecured, from companies, firms or other parties concerned in the register maintained under section 301 of the Act, Rs. 2,94,58,200 is the same amount which has been given by the petitioner-company and is reflected by the respondent in their balance-sheet dated March 31, 1993, as payable to the promoters, the petitioner-company was the co-promoter of respondent No. 1-company as per the chronology of events, the contemporaneous record of the petitioner-company as well as that of the respondent-company, the various documents including the Government approvals and correspondences with the financial institutions establish it beyond doubt that this amount was given by the petitioner-company as payment towards equity as per the agreement and the memorandum of understanding for the proposed project which could be implemented after appraisal and clearances in this regard, money was given for having 99.99 per cent. stake in the company, the respondents have not denied that they have not contributed anything, MFL has utilised the petitioner-company's payment made as promoters' contribution, however, no shares were issued for the amount paid towards equity capital.
46. To determine the locus standi of the petitioner, it is to be examined whether the company has treated the petitioner as a shareholder. In Banford Investment Ltd. v. Magadh Spun Pipe Ltd., [1998] 93 Comp Cas 685 : [1998] 3 Comp LJ 509, the Company Law Board has prescribed certain tests to determine whether a person is a member of a company or not. One of the tests prescribed is whether the company has treated a person as a member. In the present case, the petitioner had been treated as a member of the company.
47. It is uncontroverted that Rs. 341.35 lakhs being promotional and project expenses were incurred for Modi Fibres Ltd., which were to be adjusted in the manner mutually agreed and approved by the board of directors of the company. It is correctly pointed out that MFL duly used these funds and had the benefit of the said amount all along. The amount contributed was treated as promoters' contribution in various representations, MFL was aware of these contributions towards the equity capital. Money was contributed as part of the promoters' contribution. The fact of acceptance of the contribution and the company having taken advantage of the money for its project are admitted facts. Requirement of an agreement in writing can also be dispensed with (Ram Kishan v. Kanwar Papers P. Ltd., [1990] 69 Comp Cas 209 (HP) refers). If the company by its own conduct had treated the parties as shareholders and if it is prima facie established from the documents maintained by the company that the petitioner had been parties in one way or the other as members, the prima fade test is satisfied. MFL is aware and has admitted MRL as promoter and its contribution accepted as part of the promoters' contribution meaning thereby that MRL has been treated as if it is a member.
48. It is settled law that persons who wish to file a petition under section 397/398 if are not shown as members rightly or wrongly, they must have the register rectified before they can bring a petition. The percentage holding of a member can be brought down, normally, in two ways. One is omitting his name from the register of members in respect of certain shares, on allotment of further shares, either excluding him from further allotment or by allotting shares to others in a higher proportion. Omission of name may arise on account of transfer of his shares, or by any other manner with or without sufficient cause. When the omission of one's name from the register of members in respect of any shares is impugned in a section 397/398 petition, the courts have taken the view that the aggrieved person should proceed under section 111. This is what has been decided in the two cases: Ved Prakash v. Iron Traders P. Ltd., AIR 1960 Punj 427 : [1961] 31 Comp Cas 122 and Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel, [1977] 47 Comp Cas 151 (Guj), relied upon by the applicant-company.
49. As regards another preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents that in order to file a petition under section 111, one has to be a member since section 111(4)(b) states, and that there is no application for shares, it is noted that the words “the fact of any person having become a member” as used in section 111(4)(b) indicate not the actual membership but the eligibility of the petitioners to become members. The respondents are aware and have admitted the petitioner-company as the promoters and their contribution has been accepted as part of the promoters' contribution meaning thereby that the petitioner-company has been treated as if it is a member.
50. Though I am clear in my mind regarding the availability of jurisdiction to enquire into the matters relating to allotment, yet I may in particular circumstances depending upon the facts of a case, refrain from exercising the jurisdiction available. But each case turns on its own facts. In the facts and circumstances of this case I have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner-company's claim for entitlement to shares can be considered under section 111A(4)(b) of the Act.
51. Merely because it may be open to an aggrieved person to avail of more than one remedy in a civil court it does not mean that such a person should be driven first to exhaust his remedy in a civil court or any other forum and thereafter initiate another independent proceeding under the Act to complain about oppression and/or mismanagement, particularly in this matter where the petitioner-company lacked “the requisite knowledge”, the right of recourse available to the party is ambiguous, the applicant's contention of forum shopping in view of the winding up petition cannot be held as tenable.
52. With regard to the very applicability of the Limitation Act to the proceedings before the Company Law Board, this matter has been considered at great length in A.V Sampat, Official Liquidator v. Dunlop India Ltd., [1996] 87 Comp Cas 398, wherein the Company Law Board have relied on certain decisions of the Supreme Court in the context of the applicability of the Limitation Act, namely, Nityanand M. Joshi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1969) 2 SCC 199 : AIR 1970 SC 209 and Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Hubli, (1969) 1 SCC 873 : AIR 1969 SC 1335, and came to the conclusion that the Company Law Board is not a court for the purpose of the Limitation Act, 1963, and as such the limitation under article 137 of the Limitation Act, does not apply to the proceedings before the Company Law Board. However, this does not preclude the Company Law Board from rejecting/dismissing petitions on account of delay/laches in appropriate cases. Delay and laches do apply which start from the date of knowledge. The doctrine of laches is based on equitable consideration and depends on general principles of justice and fair play. There is no presumption that delay is deliberate. To be laches delay should be such that it could be said that the petitioner is not entitled to relief on account of gross negligence or inaction or for want of bona fide imputable to him or that he has given up (waived) his right by acquiescence or by his conduct or neglect.
53. It is correct that where the applicant seeking condonation of abnormal delay in a case of refusal by the company to register transfer of shares approaches the Company Law Board disclosing a callous attitude in as much as the application is vague and does not show “sufficient cause” for the delay, the Company Law Board is likely to refuse to entertain the application. Even if the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the proceedings before the Company Law Board, yet there is an abnormal delay in bringing the matter before the Board, and on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed, more so when there is no plea for condonation of delay and laches on the part of the petitioners in initiating proceedings before the Company Law Board.
54. If the facts in the company petition are disputed the question of limitation could not have been determined at a preliminary stage without a decision on facts after the parties had been given an opportunity to adduce evidence. The courts have no jurisdiction to decide mixed question of fact and law as preliminary issue, unless the facts are clear from the plaint itself and the mixed question of fact and law can be determined on the principle of demurrer. Where a decision on an issue of law depends upon a decision of fact, it cannot be tried as a preliminary issue. Unless it becomes apparent from the reading of the company petition that the same is barred by limitation the petition cannot be rejected under Order 7, rule 11(d) of the CPC. After hearing counsel for the parties, going through the company petition and company application, I am of the opinion that the present company petition cannot be dismissed as barred by limitation without proper pleadings, framing of an issue of limitation ex-facie in the present case on the reading of the company petition it cannot be held that the company petition is barred by time. It is settled law that when the legal position relating to the right of recourse available to a party is ambiguous, it would rule out the “requisite knowledge” which is sine qua non for establishing the waiver of such right or recourse (Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P, (1979) 2 SCC 409, paragraphs Nos. 5 and 6 at pages 420 and 421 refers). In the facts and circumstances of this case, there was no “requisite knowledge” and even otherwise there was no gross negligence or inaction or want of bona fides, delay cannot be attributed to the petitioner-company which could disentitle the petitioner to seek relief in the proceedings before the Company Law Board.
55. The provisions contained in sections 397 to 409 of the Act constitute a Code by themselves and are not subject to other provisions of the Act; the Company Law Board has wide powers under section 402 of the Act including the power to give directions contrary to other provisions in the Act; the only limitation on the power that the Company Law Board could exercise under section 408 of the Act is that there must be a nexus between the complaint made and the reliefs granted; the statutory provisions contained in sections 397,398,402 and 403 of the Act confer a statutory right to the shareholders and can only be invoked before the Company Law Board; the said provisions are an alternative to winding up and deal with public interest, the representative cause of shareholders and derivative cause of company.
56. The balance-sheets of respondent No. 1-company up to 1992–93 reflect the amount contributed by the petitioner-company as the promoters' contribution. Even the complete details of all moneys received from the promoters towards equity capital were provided to the petitioner-company. The audited accounts of respondent No. 1-company, the contemporaneous records of the petitioner-company, the correspondences with respondent No. 1-company as well as with the financial institutions, Government authorities giving the requisite approvals, all go to show that the money was contributed as part of the promoters' contribution. Records of the company show the entitlement of the petitioner-company to the shares and since the shares were not allotted, the Company Law Board has to intervene and consider the petitioner's claim.
57. The petitioner's argument is that it is a co-promoter, it is part of the records of the company, the case stands on a different footing, the respondents are aware and have admitted the petitioner as promoter and its contribution has been accepted as part of the promoters' contribution meaning thereby that the petitioner has been treated as if it is a member. I have to distinguish between an offer for purchase in general and acceptance of the offer by the Board from a case of a person enforcing his rights linked to any facet or express understanding by which the right accrues and to which understanding the company is also a party. It shall not be appropriate for the Company Law Board to entertain any objection for mere non-allotment of shares per se. The Company Law Board can look into the case for rectification in case a person being entitled to the shares is denied entry in the register of members. In the present case, the records of the company bear adequate evidence that the money was accepted and used for the purpose of the company, as part of the promoters' contribution.
58. Sub-section (7) of section 111/111A gives very wide jurisdiction to the Company Law Board to decide any question relating to rectification of the register and in this process it is open to the Company Law Board to decide questions of allotment/non-allotment/forfeiture which have a bearing on the register of members. It is appropriate to cite in this connection a decision of the Gujarat High Court in Gulabrai Kalidas Naik v. Laxmidas Lallubhai Patel, [1978] 48 Comp Cas 438, in which the court has stated that the jurisdiction which enables the court in an application under section 155 to examine all questions, complex, intricate or otherwise relating to title to the shares, further enlarges the jurisdiction of the court set up under the Act, to decide all those questions which the court considers necessary or expedient to decide in connection with an application for rectification. With regard to the scope of section 155, it is stated that “it is wide and generous for doing justice against illegality and fraudulent action”. In Gulabrai Kalidas Naik, [1977] 47 Comp Cas 151 (Guj) it has been held that:
“It would be open to the court having jurisdiction under the Companies Act to decide the question of title to a share, in order to ascertain whether the person claiming to be a member is in fact a member or not and whether his name has been rightly entered or wrongly omitted. But, till the name is entered, it could not be said that he can enjoy the powers of a member conferred by the Act on the members of a company. The prerequisite for invoking jurisdiction under section 397/398, which has been statutorily provided for in section 399(1), is that the complaint must come forth from a member. One has to be a member before he can complain of oppression as a member of the company. If the petitioner's title to the membership is in dispute and they have to seek relief under section 155 for getting their names placed on the register of members to clothe themselves with the rights of members, it would be improper, till that dispute is settled, to permit such persons to maintain a petition under section 397/398. If the petitioners' petition under section 155 fails, obviously, they cannot maintain a petition under sections 397 and 398 because they are not members. Prima facie, reading these sections together, it becomes clear that in order to acquire the status of a member of a company, name of the person seeking to be a member must be entered in the register of members, and only then the acquires the status of a member of a company. It is obligatory upon the company to maintain a register of its members. Now, section 399(1) provides that members, set out in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) thereof, alone have a right to apply under sections 397 and 398. Apart from the qualifying number of eligibility to maintain a petition, those who invoke court's jurisdiction, must indisputably be the members of the company and this is very natural because section 397(1) provides that any member of a company who complains that the affairs of a company are being conducted in a manner prejudicial to public interest or in any manner oppressive to any member or members, may apply to the court. One can thus complain of oppression or conduct prejudicial to public interest, if he is a member of the company. The language of sections 397 and 398 leaves no room for doubt that the oppression complained of must not only be complained of by a member of the company, but oppression must be of some part of the members (including himself) in their capacity or his capacity as members or member of a company as such (vide H.R Harmer Ltd., In re, [1958] 3 All ER 689 : [1959] 29 Comp Cas 305 (CA)). Therefore, it is crystal clear that complaint must come forth from a member and it must be a complaint to be made to the court by a member. The prerequisite for invoking jurisdiction under section 397/398, which has been statutorily provided for in section 399(1), is that the complaint must come forth from a member. One has to be a member before he can complain of oppression as a member of the company. Now, if the petitioner's title to the membership is in dispute, and he has to seek relief under section 155 for getting his name placed on the register of members to clothe himself with the rights of a member, it would be improper, till that dispute is decided, to permit such a person to maintain a petition under section 397/398. If the petitioners' petition under section 155 fails, obviously, they cannot maintain a petition under section 397/398, because they are not members. Considering all the aspects of the matter, at this stage, the petition so far as it seeks reliefs under section 155 should be admitted and the consideration of the petition for the purpose of admission for reliefs under section 397/398 should be deferred to a later date and the petition to that extent need not be dismissed. The allegations made are grave and serious and if the petitioners are qualified to maintain the petition, it would be necessary for the court to examine these allegations. Accordingly, I direct that the petition should be admitted for the relief under section 155 and notice be issued to the respondents. Parties would be at liberty to move at a later stage for consideration whether the circumstances have come into existence which necessitate examining the question of admission or otherwise of petition for the reliefs under sections 397 and 398. Order accordingly.”
59. Each case turns on its own facts. It is an exceptional case where the petitioner-company has been treated as a shareholder till the stage of appraisal of the proposed project of MFL. This complicated question of facts and law relate to the contribution of Rs. 3,58,90,580.95 crores by the petitioner-company as promoters towards equity capital of the respondent-company (MFL), and hence their claim for entitlement to shares of MFL. It is an arguable matter. It is a triable issue. In the face of the undisputed facts, MRL's claim for entitlement to shares of MFL needs to be considered under section 111A of the Act.
60. The petitioners have established that they had and still have legitimate expectations while joining and continuing with the company. The doctrine of “legitimate expectation” applies to closely held companies for the reasons that not only at the time of coming into association, even when continuing with such association, parties undertake obligations with certain legitimate expectations. No convincing arguments have been advanced as to why this doctrine should not be applied in the present case. The conduct of the parties pursuant to the understanding caused creation of legitimate expectation for the petitioner-company.
61. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case this composite petition is admitted in part under section 111A of the Act, a prima facie case having been made out this composite petition is held to be maintainable under section 111A(4)(b) of the Act, the parties are at liberty to amend the pleadings/file additional affidavits to prove/disprove their case under section 111A(4) at this stage, further, the preliminary issues of maintainability of the petition as well as on merits considering the allegations attracting the provisions of section 397/398 of the Act are left open to be decided at a later stage depending upon the outcome of the hearing under section 111A(4)(b) of the Act. Parties would be at liberty to move at a later stage for consideration whether it is necessary to examine the question of admission or otherwise of the petition for reliefs sought under section 397/398 of the Act. The petitioner is at liberty to apply under section 235(2) of the Act.
62. However, this is not the stage to consider the applicability of section 250(3) of the Act. Interim reliefs to continue till further orders. There is no way to consider impleader's application at this stage. It is deemed to be dismissed for being not maintainable at this stage seeking impleadment in the present company petition. However, the impleader is at liberty to file a fresh company petition or the impleader's application shall stand revived for consideration only if the parties move under section 397/398 after the decision on the petition under section 111A of the Act.
63. Company Application No. 255 of 2008 is disposed of in the above terms. Interim orders to continue till decision in this matter under section 111A of the Act. No order as to costs.