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  • Sections 49 and 27 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Section 229B, U.P.Z.A
  • Section 229-B
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 49 and 27 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act
  • Section 229B, U.P.Z.A
  • Section 229-B

    Mohd. Safi v. Mohd. Wajifan .

    H.N Agarwal, M.:— This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree of Sri B.N Singh, Additional Commissioner, Faizabad Division in Appeal. No. 2207 of 1973 dated 20-12-1974 modifying the judgment and order of the Judicial Officer Sadar, Sultanpur, dated 18-5-73 in Revenue Suit No. 364 of 1972 under Section 229B, U.P.Z.A & L.R Act.

    2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. Srimati Wajifan, respondent no. 1, had filed a suit for declaration of her sirdari rights in certain plots claiming to be the widow and legal heir of one Munir Ahmed. She also claimed that during consolidation proceedings the name of her husband had been recorded as the tenure-holder of the plots in dispute and Sections 49 and 27 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act barred further adjudication of title. The trial court decreed her suit. The lower appellate court upheld the order of the trial court, but added that the suit of the plaintiff was to be decreed both the declaration as well as for possession against the defendants. The contesting defendants Mohammad Safi, Mohammad Taqi and Mohammad Rafi, have now come up in second appeal before this Court.

    3. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the trial court having decreed the suit only on relief of declaration and not for possession, its judgment could not be varied, reversed or modified in appeal by the defendant-appellants. He has further contended that as the lower appellate court had recorded a finding that the plaintiff was out of possession on the date when the present suit was filed, it could not disturb the possession of the appellants now.

    4. A perusal of the original plaint shows that the plaintiff had prayed for a decree for declaration of her rights over the land in dispute and also for a decree of possession if she was not found to be in possession over the whole or a part of the land in dispute. However, the suit was filed only under Section 229-B and not under Section 209 of the U.P.Z.A & L.R Act. The defendant-appellants had contested the suit not on the ground that the plaintiff was not in possession, but on the ground that she was not the widow of Munir Ahmed and had no rights in the land in dispute. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the trial court had only framed the following issues—

    1. Whether the plaintiff is sirdar of the land in suit as alleged?

    2. Whether the plaintiff is widow of Munir Ahmed?

    3. Whether the contesting defendant is entitled to get special costs?

    5. Since the question of possession was not in issue before the trial court, it recorded no finding on the question of possession and only decreed the plaintiff's suit for a declaration that she was the sirdar of the land in suit. Since the plaintiff did not file an appeal against the trial court's order, the lower appellate court could not grant the relief of possession to the plaintiff on the basis of the appeal filed by the defendant-appellants.

    6. Coming now to the finding of the lower appellate court has held that the defendant-appellants have been in possession of the land in suit after the order of mutation passed by the mutation court. This order was passed by the Tahsildar, Musafirkhana in mutation case No. 118 on 20-4-72. An order in mutation proceedings is not binding in a declaratory suit. There is, therefore, no force in the plea of the learned counsel that the trial court in the present case could not give a finding contrary to the decision in the mutation case. However, as seen above, since the trial court did not pass a decree of possession in favour of the plaintiff, and no appeal was filed by the plaintiff against that order, the lower appellate court should not have granted any relief regarding possession.

    7. The learned counsel for the appellants has also argued that the will relied upon by the lower appellate court in favour of the plaintiff-respondent could not be read in evidence and was inadmissible and the finding based on the will was illegal. The learned counsel for the respondent has, on the other hand, argued that the will was a registered document, and that as the original will was in possession of the defendant-appellants, the plaintiff-respondent had filed a certified copy of the will which is admissible in evidence in the circumstances of the case. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent must be upheld. Where primary evidence of a document is not forthcoming, secondary evidence can be given, therefore, the certified copy of the registered will, which has been duly certified by the Sub Registrar concerned, had rightly been admitted in evidence. The lower appellate court committed no illegality in recording its finding on the basis of the will.

    8. The learned counsel for the appellants has further argued that in the mutation case the objection of the appellants was that the plaintiff-respondent was the maid servant of Munir Ahmed and this could not be read to mean that the appellants admitted her to be the widow of Munir Ahmed. A copy of the application jointly filed by the plaintiff-respondent Srimati Wajifan and the defendant-appellants, Mohammad Safi, Mohammad Taqi and Mohammad Rafi before the mutation court on 23-10-1971 is on record. In this application Srimati Wajifan has been described as the widow of Munir Ahmed Khan. Further, the finding of the courts below that Srimati Wajifan was the widow of Munir Ahmed is not based on this admission of the appellants, but on the other independent evidence, which has been fully discussed in the judgments, I see no reason to disagree with the finding of the courts below that the plaintiff-respondent is in fact the widow of Munir Ahmed. The learned counsel for the appellants has also argued that the statement of the plaintiff-respondent was self-contradictory. I have perused the statement of Srimati Wajifan before the trial court. The learned counsel for the appellants could not point out any instance of self-contra diction in her statement. On the other hand, this lady has in her statement given detailed facts about her marriage with Munir Ahmed indicating the name of the Qazi, the names of the witnesses present and the place of marriage.

    9. The result be that I would uphold the concurrent findings of the courts below that the plaintiff-respon dent was the widow of Munir Ahmed and was entitled to the declaration of sirdari rights in the land in suit. The trial court rightly decreed the suit for declaration of sirdari rights. The lower appellate court has erred in modifying the trial court's order so as to grant the relief of possession as well. I allow the second appeal to the extent that the modification ordered by the lower appellate court be quashed. The trial court's order is restored.

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    Mohd. Safi v. Mohd. Wajifan .
    (Apr 4, 1976)