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  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code, for short) read with Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA, for short),
  • Sections 7, 8, 9, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PMLA read with Section 120-B and 420 IPC,
  • Section 439 of the Code read with Section 45
  • sub-section (1) of Section 437
  • Section 437(1) of the Code,
  • Section 45(1)(ii) of PMLA
  • Section 45(1)(ii)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Acts
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code, for short) read with Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA, for short),
  • Sections 7, 8, 9, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PMLA read with Section 120-B and 420 IPC,
  • Section 439 of the Code read with Section 45
  • sub-section (1) of Section 437
  • Section 437(1) of the Code,
  • Section 45(1)(ii) of PMLA
  • Section 45(1)(ii)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner applied for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 read with Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in Enforcement Case ECIR/15.DLZO-1/2014. The Central Bureau of Investigation had earlier registered a predicate case RC 217 2013 A0003 dated 12 March 2013 under Sections 7, 8, 9, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PMLA read with Section 120-B and 420 IPC concerning a contract for supply of 12 AW 101 VVIP helicopters. It was alleged that specifications were changed to favour M/s. Augusta Westland International Limited and that approximately 70 million Euros were paid as kickbacks.

The Enforcement Case (ECIR) registered under PMLA charged the petitioner and co-accused with laundering these proceeds into and through various companies and jurisdictions (including Mauritius and Dubai). The petitioner, alleged to be partner/director in companies in Dubai and associated with several other entities, was arrested in Chennai on 16 July 2017. During custodial proceedings her statement under Section 50 of the PMLA was recorded; the record states she gave evasive replies and did not cooperate fully with the investigation. Her HDFC Bank account showed substantial transactions, and investigators traced transfers to companies linked to the petitioner and her husband.

The petitioner sought bail on medical and personal grounds (she is a woman, about 53 years old, and said to be unwell), and on parity with other accused who had been released on bail in related proceedings. The respondent opposed bail. The court heard submissions and considered statutory provisions, relevant precedents and medical orders made by the Special Judge. The court ultimately dismissed the petitioner's bail application.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner, being a woman and alleged to be sick, can be released on bail under the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA despite the main non‑bailable rigours of Section 45(1) (in particular Section 45(1)(ii)).
  2. How the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA should be interpreted and applied—whether the proviso removes the applicability of the twin conditions in Section 45(1) (i) and (ii) for the categories it mentions, or whether the proviso is an enabling discretion to be exercised judicially and only in appropriate cases.
  3. Whether parity with other accused who were granted bail in related proceedings entitles the petitioner to bail in the present PMLA prosecution.
  4. Whether the petitioner's medical condition justifies interim or regular bail in light of the available jail medical treatment (physiotherapy) and the gravity of the alleged economic offences.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner is a woman (about 53 years old), a housewife, and unwell; medical orders from the Special Judge (dated 17 July, 21 July, 26 July 2017 and later orders) show she needs medical attention.
  • Under the first proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA, a woman or a sick person may be released on bail; therefore the rigours of Section 45(1)(ii) will not apply to her.
  • The petitioner has limited or no decision‑making role despite being a director in one company; she has been shown as an employee director in certain entities and is entitled to parity because other accused (including main accused in predicate FIR and certain co-accused) have been released on bail.
  • The petitioner has been in custody since 16 July 2017 and requires medical treatment which the petitioner says is not being properly provided in jail.

Respondent's Arguments (ASG)

  • The petitioner was actively involved in money‑laundering; she cannot be treated differently simply because she is a woman or said to be sick.
  • The proviso in Section 45 is an enabling discretion that does not nullify the main section’s twin conditions; it must be applied only where the accused’s condition fits the category in the proviso and justifies relief in the special circumstances of the case.
  • The petitioner’s sickness is not of a serious nature; she only requires physiotherapy which is already being provided in jail per orders dated 23 August and 4 September 2017.
  • Reliance was placed on the Bombay High Court decision in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate (16 June 2016, Bail App No. 1050/2016) where medical bail was declined despite serious ailments, to show medical conditions do not automatically entitle bail.
  • The petitioner is not comparable on parity grounds to other accused who have roots in India; the petitioner and her family have been residents of Dubai for 25 years and there is a risk of flight. The petitioner’s husband remains in Dubai and has not participated in the investigation despite notices.
  • Evidence on record indicates the petitioner held significant roles (including power of attorney) and possessed a Master’s in Finance, contradicting the claim she is merely a housewife.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Prahalad Singh Bhati v. GNCT, Delhi (2001) 4 SCC 280 Establishes that the proviso to Section 437(1) of the CrPC is an enabling provision: persons specified (under age 16, woman, sick or infirm) are not necessarily entitled to bail; the discretion must be exercised judicially. The court relied on this authority to conclude that the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA likewise confers an enabling discretion and does not automatically entitle a woman or sick person to bail; discretion must be judicially exercised.
Meenu Dewan v. State (Single Judge of this Court) Holds that mere status as a woman does not automatically entitle a person to bail under the proviso; the nature, gravity and seriousness of the offence must be considered. The court cited this decision to support the proposition that the proviso is not a blanket entitlement and that seriousness and gravity of the offence must inform the exercise of discretion.
Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate Demonstrates that serious medical conditions do not necessarily warrant interim bail under Section 45 read with criminal procedure provisions—medical bail was declined in that case despite multiple chronic ailments. The court relied on this ruling to show that medical infirmity in itself (even when significant) may not justify bail; applied to find the petitioner’s need for physiotherapy did not constitute sufficient medical grounds for release.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several linked steps, each grounded in statutory text and precedent cited in the opinion:

  1. Statutory interpretation of Section 45(1) PMLA: The court observed that Section 45(1) imposes twin conditions for grant of bail in offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years under Part A of the Schedule: (i) the Public Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose bail; and (ii) if opposed, the court must be satisfied there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and is not likely to commit an offence while on bail.
  2. Role of the proviso: The first proviso to Section 45(1) allows a court to release on bail a person who is under 16, or is a woman, or is sick or infirm. The court held that the rigours of Section 45(1)(ii) will not be applicable to categories mentioned in the proviso; otherwise the proviso would be rendered nugatory because those persons would still have to satisfy Section 45(1)(ii) to obtain bail. Nevertheless, the court emphasized that the proviso is a discretionary exception to be applied depending on the special circumstances of each case, not as an automatic rule entitling all persons in the listed categories to bail.
  3. Analogy with Section 437(1) CrPC and precedents: The court drew a parallel with the proviso to Section 437(1) CrPC, and cited Prahalad Singh Bhati and Meenu Dewan to underscore that the proviso is an enabling discretion which must be exercised judicially and does not mandate release. Thus, mere status as a woman, or sickness, does not automatically determine entitlement to bail.
  4. Application of facts to the statutory framework: The court reviewed the material on record and found prima facie that the petitioner is not a mere housewife: she has a Master’s in Finance (2002), held responsible positions in various companies, had powers of attorney from specified entities, and was actively involved in affairs of companies. The court noted evidence of transactions and transfers tracing proceeds to companies linked to the petitioner and her husband.
  5. Medical condition assessment: The record showed that the Special Judge had directed physiotherapy and that jail authorities were to provide necessary arrangements; the petitioner herself had stated she was receiving medications and physiotherapy. The court found no record of such serious ailments that would necessitate treatment in a multi‑speciality hospital or specialist care beyond what could be provided in jail or an affiliated facility. The court contrasted this with Chhagan Bhujbal where serious medical bail was declined.
  6. Gravity of offence and risk considerations: The court emphasized that the alleged offences are economic crimes of a grave kind, typically committed professionally by white‑collar persons and having severe effects on public health and national wealth. The court noted the respondent's contention regarding risk of flight (petitioner’s long residence in Dubai and husband remaining abroad) and the substantial evidence of active participation in laundering.
  7. Parity argument rejected: The court found parity inapplicable because the courts that released other accused did not consider or discuss the special rigours of Section 45(1) PMLA; consequently, parity could not override the statutory scheme and facts showing the petitioner’s active involvement.
  8. Conclusion of analysis: Weighing statutory text, judicial precedent, medical reports and the prima facie evidence of active involvement in laundering and the grave nature of the alleged offences, the court concluded that the petitioner had not established special circumstances under the proviso to Section 45(1) that would justify bail. Therefore the bail application failed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petitioner's application for bail was dismissed. The court concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated special circumstances (as a woman or sick person) sufficient to warrant bail under the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA, having regard to the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and the material on record.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the petitioner remains in custody; bail was denied in this enforcement case under the PMLA.
  • The court applied established interpretive principles (following Prahalad Singh Bhati and Meenu Dewan) to hold that the proviso to Section 45(1) is an enabling discretion rather than an automatic entitlement; it must be exercised judicially and in light of the nature and seriousness of the offence and the facts of the case.
  • No broader or novel legal principle was announced beyond the application of existing authority and the court's view on the correct interpretation and limited application of the proviso. The decision applies the statutes and precedents to deny bail on the specific facts presented; it does not purport to set a new precedent beyond those interpretations.
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    Mrs. Shivani Rajiv Saxena Petitioner v. Directorate Of Enforcement & Anr. S

    A.K Pathak, J.:— By this application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (the Code, for short) read with Section 45 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA, for short), petitioner has prayed for grant of bail to her in Enforcement Case ECIR/15.DLZO-1/2014.

    2. Brief facts of the case are that Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), registered a case vide RC 217 2013 A0003 dated 12 March, 2013 under Sections 7, 8, 9, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PMLA read with Section 120-B and 420 IPC, in respect of a contract signed by Ministry of defence with M/s. Augusta Westland International Limited, for supply of 12 numbers of AW 101 VVIP helicopters. It was alleged that the contract was awarded to the said company after changing the specifications of the helicopters, in order to favour the said company after taking huge commission/bribe. Subsequently, on the basis of said case, present ECIR case was registered for the offence under Section 3 punishable under Section 4 of the Act. During the investigation, it was revealed that total 70 million Euros was paid as ‘kick backs’ by the said company. Petitioner and co-accused Gautam Khaitan, Rajiv Saxena (husband of petitioner, based in Dubai) and others were instrumental in laundering the bribe money in India and abroad. They were the carriers of proceeds of crime. The money laundering was done through several consultancy contracts executed between the said company and other companies, namely, M/s. Gordian Services Sarl, M/s. Tunisia and M/s. IDS Sarl, Tunisia etc. These companies further executed consultancy contracts with M/s. Interstellar Technologies Ltd., Mauritius, M/s. IDS Infotech Ltd., Chandigarh, M/s. Aeromatrix Info Salutations Pvt. Ltd., India and others. M/s. IDS, Tunisia received Euro 24.37 million from M/s. Agusta Westland. M/s. Interstellar Technologies Ltd., Mauritius had received 12.4 million Euros. These proceeds were then transferred to foreign locations including the companies owned by the petitioner and her husband, namely, M/s. UHY Saxena, Dubai and M/s. Matrix Holdings Limited, Dubai. Petitioner was partner/director in both the companies. Petitioner was arrested in Chennai on 16 July, 2017 and her custody remand was taken. During this period, her statement under Section 50 of the Act was recorded. She was confronted with the records but she gave evasive replies. She also avoided to furnish information regarding companies situated in Mauritius and Dubai with which she and her husband (co-accused) were associated. Petitioner did not cooperate in the investigation. Huge transactions were noticed in the HDFC Bank accounts of the petitioner in India. Petitioner did not disclose other banks accounts, which found reflected in her HDFC Bank account. Petitioner was also associated with M/s. Matrix Group Limited, Dubai, M/s. Matrix Holdings Limited, Dubai, M/s. Cronimet Mercon Invest. Ltd., Dubai, M/s. Re Com Properties Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. Whitespring Estate Pvt. Ltd. as a director or otherwise.

    3. As per the respondent, the proceeds of crime were routed to India by way of investments made by the petitioner, her husband and their companies, details whereof, as could be traced till now, are as under:—

    4. Learned senior counsel has contended that petitioner is a woman aged about 53 years. She is a house wife and is also sick. Petitioner is unwell, which is evident from the remand application dated 21st July, 2017 filed by the respondent before the learned Special Judge. Orders dated 17 July, 2017, 21 July, 2017 and 26 July, 2017 passed by the learned Special Judge also show that petitioner is sick and needs medical attention. During the investigation, respondent was directed to provide necessary medical assistance to the petitioner vide aforesaid orders. Even now, petitioner is sick and is not being provided proper medical treatment in jail, which fact is evident from the order dated 4 September, 2017 passed by the learned Special Judge, wherein it is noted that there was no physiotherapist available in jail. Since petitioner is a woman and sick, rigours of Section 45(1)(ii) of the PMLA will not be applicable, in view of the first proviso to the said Section.

    5. Petitioner is in custody since 16 July, 2017. Though, petitioner is Director in M/s. Matrix Holding Ltd. but has no role to play in decision making process. Her husband is a chartered accountant and manages his profession and the companies. Petitioner is shown as an employee with a mere designation of Employee Director in M/s. UHY Saxena, a partnership concern. Petitioner is also entitled to bail on parity since main accused Gautam Khaitan and other accused, namely, Ritu Khaitan, R.K Nanda and J.B Subramaniam have already been released on bail by the learned Special Judge. Ritu Khaitan, R.K Nanda and J.B Subramaniam were not even arrested by the respondent. In the predicate offence, that is, FIR No. RC 217 2013 A 0003 main accused namely Air Chief Marshell (Rtd.) Shashinder Pal Tyagi, Gautam Khaitan and Sanjeev Tyagi have also been released on bail.

    6. Per contra, learned ASG has contended that petitioner is actively involved in the offence of money laundering and cannot be treated separately for the purpose of bail, merely because she is a woman and sick. The discretion given to Court in the first proviso of Section 45 of the PMLA cannot be invoked to enure to the benefit of petitioner in the facts of the present case. Proviso can be pressed into service only in such cases where the accused, by virtue of a woman and sick, would justify her being treated in the same genre of the person enlisted in the proviso. Sickness of the petitioner is not serious in nature. She only needs physiotherapy, as is evident from the orders dated 23rd August, 2017 and 4 September, 2017 of the learned Special Judge. Physiotherapy is already being provided while she is in jail. There is nothing extraordinary in the condition of the petitioner warranting bail, inasmuch as, in more serious medical conditions bail on the medical ground has been declined in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate by the Bombay High Court vide judgment dated 16 June, 2016 passed in Bail App No. 1050/2016.

    7. It is further submitted that the proviso is only an enabling provision which vests power in Court to exercise discretion in appropriate cases to the categories of persons as notified therein including woman or sick, but the same cannot be construed to mean that it would annihilate the main section which provides the twin rigours as its basic feature and commences with a non obstante clause “Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973”. It is submitted that Legislature, by placing the Non Obstante Clause in the PMLA, intends that bail in PMLA cases cannot be treated as a bail under the Code. Similar proviso finds mentioned in Section 437(1) of the Code and in the context of said proviso, Supreme Court in Prahalad Singh Bhati v. GNCT, Delhi (2001) 4 SCC 280 has observed that the persons as notified in the proviso should not necessarily be released on bail. Reliance has also been placed on Meenu Dewan v. State wherein also similar view has been taken. It is further submitted that there is enormous evidence on record to show that petitioner is guilty and likely to repeat the offence. Petitioner is not similarly placed as Gautam Khaitan and others, who have their roots in India. Petitioner and her family are residents of Dubai for the last 25 years and if released she may flee to Dubai using porous borders of India. Petitioner's husband is still in Dubai and has not participated in the investigation despite notices being issued to him. By placing reliance on several documents collected during the investigation, learned ASG has contended that petitioner is not a house wife and, in fact, was actively associated with the affairs of the companies, as detailed in para 3 herein-above. She has done Masters in Finance.

    8. Relevant it would be to refer and rely upon Section 45 of the PMLA at this stage, which reads as under:—

    “45. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years under Part A of the Schedule shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless-]

    (i) The Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release; and

    (ii) Where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail:

    Provided that a person who is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, may be released on bail, if the special court so directs:

    Provided further that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 4 except upon a complaint in writing made by-

    (i) The Director; or

    (ii) Any officer of the Central Government or State Government authorized in writing in this behalf by the Central Government by a general or a special order made in this behalf by that Government.

    [(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other provision of this Act, no police officer shall investigate into an offence under this Act unless specifically authorized, by the Central Government by a general or special order, and, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed.]

    (2) The limitation on granting of bail specified in subsection (1) is in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.”

    9. A perusal of section 45(1) of pmla makes it clear that no person, accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of more than three years under Part A of the Schedule, shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless twin conditions as stipulated in Section 45(1) are satisfied. Firstly, Public Prosecutor has to be given an opportunity; secondly in case Public Prosecutor opposes the application the Court has to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. First proviso is exception to the above rule and vests power of discretion to the Court to release on bail the categories of persons, as notified in the proviso, which includes a woman or a sick person. I am of the view, that rigours of Section 45(1)(ii) of PMLA will not be applicable to the categories of persons, as mentioned in the proviso. In case it is held that conditions as laid in Section 45(1)(ii) shall also be attracted in respect of the persons, as notified in the proviso, in my opinion, proviso will be rendered nugatory, in as much as, an accused will otherwise be entitled to be released if he satisfies the condition laid down in Section 45(1)(ii).However, in my view, the discretion as envisaged in the proviso has to be applied depending upon the special circumstances attending to such categories of person and not as a matter of Thumb rule that all such categories of persons shall necessarily be granted bail.

    10. Similar proviso finds mentioned in Section 437(1) of the Code, which reads as under:—

    “(1) When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Session, he may be released on bail, but-

    (i) such person shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life;

    (ii) such person shall not be so released if such offence is a cognizable offence and he had been previously convicted of an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for seven years or more, or he had been previously convicted on two or more occasions of a non-bailable and cognizable offence: Provided that the Court may direct that a person referred to in clause (i) or clause (ii) be released on bail it such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm: Provided further that the Court may also direct that a person referred to in clause (ii) be released on bail if it is satisfied that It is just and proper so to do for any other special reason: Provided also that the mere fact that an accused person may be required for being identified by witnesses during investigation shall not be sufficient ground for refusing to grant bail if he is otherwise entitled to be released on bail and gives an undertaking that he shall comply with such directions as may be given by the Court.”

    (Emphasis laid)

    11. In the context of proviso to Section 437(1) of the Code, a learned Single Judge of this Court in Meenu Dewan (Supra) has held that merely because the petitioner is a woman does not entitle her for bail under the proviso but the nature, gravity and seriousness of offence have also to be considered. In Prahalad Singh Bhati (Supra) also, Supreme Court has held thus “the condition of not releasing the person on bail charged with an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life shall not be applicable if such person is under the age of 16 years or is a woman or is sick or infirm, subject to such conditions as may be imposed. It does not, however, mean that persons specified in the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 437 should necessarily be released on bail. The proviso is an enabling provision which confers jurisdiction upon a court, other than the High Court and the Court of Session, to release a person on bail despite the fact that the there appears reasonable ground for believing that such person has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life. There is no gainsaying that the discretion conferred by the Code has to be exercised judicially”.

    (Emphasis laid)

    12. In the present case, sufficient material has been placed on record to show, of course, prima facie, that petitioner is not a house wife. She is a highly qualified lady having completed Masters in Finance in the year 2002 from international university. She was actively involved in the affairs of the various companies by virtue of her holding responsible positions, inasmuch as, she was holding power of attorney in her favour from M/s. Atlanta Natural Resources PTE. Ltd., Cronimet Mining GmbH, Matrix Holdings Limited etc. In the order dated 23 August, 2017, learned Special Judge has recorded, on the basis of medical reports regarding health condition of the petitioner, that physiotherapy was being provided to her. It has been further noted that upon enquires made from the petitioner she submitted that she was getting proper medications and physiotherapy. Order dated 4 September, 2017 also indicates that jail authorities have been directed to make necessary arrangements for physiotherapy of the petitioner. There is nothing on record to establish that petitioner is suffering from such serious ailments which necessitates her treatment in multi specialty hospital from specialist doctor. Petitioner can be and is being provided medical treatment in jail itself. Petitioner only requires physiotherapy which can easily be provided either in jail or in any other hospital affiliated to the jail or in the vicinity of the jail. In Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (Supra), a prayer was made for releasing the petitioner on interim bail for three weeks by filing an application under Section 439 of the Code read with Section 45 of the PMLA but the same was declined, even though, he was diagnosed as a known case of Hypertension with Controlled Diabetes Mellitus with Bronchial Asthma with Obstructive Sleep Apnea with Root Canal treatment for 46, 47 with Periapical Osteltis 46 chronic ailments as mentioned in the clinical diagnostic report produced in Court.

    13. The offence alleged against the petitioner falls under the category of economic offences which stand on a graver footing. These crimes are professionally committed by white-collared people which inflict severe injuries on both health and wealth of the nation. Such offences need to be dealt with a heavy hand and releasing such accused on bail will affect the community at large and also jeopardize the economy of the country. The plea of parity is also not tenable in this case since the court did not consider, refer to and discuss the rigours of Section 45(1) of the PMLA. Petitioner has also failed to bring out any special circumstances for her release on bail being a woman or sick, keeping in mind the nature and gravity of offence, bail application is dismissed.

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    Mrs. Shivani Rajiv Saxena Petitioner v. Directorate Of Enforcement & Anr. S
    (Sep 15, 2017)