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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Petitioner, Telu Ram, a member of "The Hisar Scholars Coop. House Building Society Limited, Hisar," was allotted two plots (Plot No. 231-B and 232-B) in 1982. The Petitioner paid the entire sale price and development charges of Rs. 2,500 in 1983. However, the Respondents cancelled the allotment without prior notice by a letter dated 24.03.2005, received on 12.04.2005. The Respondents contended that the Petitioner failed to pay development charges from 1984 onward, justifying the cancellation under Society rules. The District Forum found no evidence of any notice demanding development charges from the Petitioner and held that cancellation after full payment of sale price was unjustified. The District Forum set aside the cancellation order, directed restoration of the plots to the Petitioner after development work completion, and awarded Rs. 5,000 as litigation expenses. The Respondents were granted liberty to take legal recourse regarding the illegal allotment of the plots to others. The State Commission dismissed the Petitioner's appeal against this order in limine on 30.05.2012, affirming that cancellation without notice was unjustified and upholding the District Forum's directions. The Petitioner filed the present Revision Petition challenging the State Commission's order, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay of 186 days in filing the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay of 186 days in filing the Revision Petition should be condoned.
  2. Whether the impugned order of the State Commission dismissing the appeal in limine was legally sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Petitioner contended that the impugned order granted liberty to take legal action against the respondents, and thus, the limitation period for such action would be three years from the date of the order (30.05.2012).
  • The Petitioner claimed to have sought legal advice under the bona fide impression that the limitation period for filing the Revision Petition was three years, resulting in delay beyond the prescribed 90 days.
  • The Petitioner argued that the District Forum and State Commission were not competent to adjudicate disputes pertaining to ownership of property, justifying the present Revision Petition.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the Respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 Discretionary power of courts under Section 5 for condonation of delay and the necessity to prove sufficient cause. The court emphasized that even if sufficient cause is shown, condonation of delay is discretionary and must be exercised judicially after considering relevant facts.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors, AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45 Interpretation of "sufficient cause" and judicial exercise of discretion in condoning delay. The court noted that sufficient cause should be construed liberally but only if no negligence or mala fide is imputable to the applicant.
R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, Supreme Court Requirement of reasonable diligence in prosecution of appeals and petitions to explain delay. The court held that delay must be properly explained and the petitioner must have acted with reasonable diligence.
Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) Special period of limitation under Consumer Protection Act and importance of expeditious adjudication of consumer disputes. The court emphasized that condonation of highly belated petitions in consumer matters defeats the object of expeditious adjudication and should be avoided.
Cicily Kallarackal Vs. Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) Reiteration of principles on condonation of delay in consumer protection cases and adherence to statutory limitation periods. The court reaffirmed that condoning inordinate delay without sufficient cause substitutes the statutory limitation period and is not justified.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the application for condonation of delay by applying established legal principles from authoritative Supreme Court precedents. It observed that "sufficient cause" is a question of fact and requires a proper explanation of the delay with reasonable diligence shown by the petitioner. The petitioner’s vague and general reasons, including reliance on legal advice and misinterpretation of limitation periods, were found insufficient. The petitioner failed to provide a day-to-day explanation or identify the counsel who advised the delay. The court noted that the petitioner’s blame on counsel was unacceptable, as litigants must diligently pursue their cases. Furthermore, the court recognized that a valuable right had accrued in favor of the respondents which could not be lightly disregarded. Applying the principles from cited precedents, the court concluded that the petitioner’s inordinate delay of 186 days was not justified by sufficient cause and the delay could not be condoned. Consequently, the Revision Petition was dismissed as barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

The Revision Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and being barred by limitation.

The direct effect of this decision is the dismissal of the petitioner’s Revision Petition challenging the State Commission’s order dated 30.05.2012. No costs were imposed. The court did not set any new precedent but reaffirmed the strict application of limitation periods and the requirement of sufficient cause for condonation of delay in consumer protection matters, emphasizing the need for expeditious resolution of such disputes.

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    Telu Ram v. Dr. S.S. Dudeja

    NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION

    NEW DELHI

    REVISION PETITION NO. 1014 OF 2013

    (Against the Order dated 30/05/2012 in Appeal No. 644/2012 of the State Commission Haryana)

    1. TELU RAM

    S/O BHAGWAN RAM, R/O VILLAGE NIANA TEHSIL

    HISAR

    HARYANA ...........Petitioner(s) Versus

    1. DR. S.S. DUDEJA & 6 ORS. S/O SH. A.D DUDEJA, R/O H.NO-238,SECTOR-15-A

    HISAR

    HARYANA

    2. RAJAT DUDEJA , S/O DR. S.S. DUDEJA. R/O 238,SECTOR- 15-A

    HISAR

    HARYANA

    3. HISAR SCHOLARS CO-OP HOUSE BUILDING

    SOCIETY LTD ., THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT

    MRS.KAPILA D/O NARIAN SINGH

    KAIMRI ROAD, AMARDEEP COLONY

    HISAR

    HARYANA

    4. HISAR SCHOLARS CO-OP HOUSE BUILDING

    SOCIETY LTD.

    THROUGH ITS VICE PRESIDENT, KAIMRI ROAD,

    AMARDEEP COLONY

    HISAR

    HARYANA

    5. HISAR SCHOLARS CO-OP HOUSE BUILDING

    SOCIETY LTD.

    THROUGH ITS SECRETARTY, KAIMRI ROAD,

    AMARDEEP COLONY

    HISAR

    HARYANA

    6. DINESH KUMAR, S/O. LALJI RAM, R/o. Kali Ravan, Cement Store, Near Leading High School, Azad Nagar,

    Hisar

    Haryana

    7. DEEPAK, S/O SH. BHAGWAN DASS H.NO- 288, SHAKTI NAGAR

    HISAR

    HARYANA ...........Respondent(s)

    1

    BEFORE:

    HON'BLE MRS. REKHA GUPTA,PRESIDING MEMBER For the Petitioner : Mr. Sanchar Anand, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. C.S. Advocate for R-1 & 2 Nemo for R-3 to R-7

    Dated : 14 Mar 2017

    ORDER

    Present Revision Petition has been filed by the Petitioner/ Complainant against the impugned order dated 30.05.2012, passed by Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at Panchkula (for short, 'State Commission') in First Appeal No.644 of 2012.

    2. Brief facts of the case are that the Petitioner/Complainant being the member of the 'The Hisar Scholars Coop. House Building Society Limited, Hisar' was allotted two plots of 250 Sq. yards bearing Plot No. 231-B and 232-B in the year 1982. Thereafter, Complainant had deposited the entire sale price of the plots is question with the Respondents No.1 to 3/Opposite Parties No. 1 to 3 followed by the development charges of Rs.2,500/- in the year 1983. However, without giving any notice, the Respondents cancelled the allotment of the above plots of the Petitioner vide letter bearing Ref. No. 828 dated 24.03.2005, which was received on 12.04.2005 through registered post.

    3. The defence of the Respondents/Opposite Parties was that the Petitioner did not deposit the development charges of their plots from the year 1984, therefore, as per the rules and regulations of the Society, allotment of the plots in question were cancelled and thereafter, it was made in favour of the Petitioner.

    4. On the scrutiny of the pleadings of the parties and evidence adduced on record, the District Forum was of the view that Respondents had miserably failed to produce on record any notice every issued by them to the Petitioners with respect to the demand of the development charges. It had been further observed by the District Forum that once the Petitioners had paid the entire sale price of the plot, in that event, the Respondents had no right to cancel the allotment of the plot of the Petitioners. It was under these circumstances, the District Forum accepted the complaint and has granted the following relief to the Complainants:-

    ".......... we set aside the cancellation order and direct the OP society to restore the plots in question i.e. Plot No.232-B and 232-B to the complainants and offer of possession of the plots in question to the complainant after completing the development work. At the same time, we direct the complainant to deposit the development charges, if any. The OP No.1 society is further directed to pay Rs.5,000/-(Rupees Five Thousand only) to the complainants as litigation expenses. However, the OP society has admitted in their reply that plots in question were allotted to Dinesh Kumar and Telu Ram and Dinesh Kumar has further transferred the same to Deepak, hence the opposite party no. 4 to 6 is at liberty to take legal recourse against the OP society…….."

    5. Aggrieved by the order of the District Forum, the Petitioner filed an Appeal before the

    2

    State Commission. The State Commission vide their order dated 30.05.2012 while dismissing the appeal in limini, observed as under;

    "We have gone through impugned order and have taken into consideration the fact and circumstances of the case and are of the view that when the opposite parties have miserably failed to produce on record any notice ever issued to the complainant with respect to the demand of development charges right from the year1984, in that even the cancellation of allotment of the plot of the complainant for non-payment of development charges is not justifiable on the part of the appellants, especially when they had already received the entire sale prices of the plots. As far as the illegal allotment of the said plots in favour of the appellant opposite parties No.4 to 6 is concerned, the District Forum has already granted liberty to the appellant to take legal recourse against the opposite party. In this view of the matter, we do not find any illegality to ambiguity in the impugned order.

    No merit, dismissed in limini."

    6. Hence, the Revision Petition.

    7. The present Revision Petition has been filed with an application for condonation of delay of 197 days. However, as per the Registry, there is delay of 186 days in filing the Revision Petition.

    8. The reasons given in the application for condonation of delay for condoning the delay are read as under;

    "3 That in the impugned order it has been mentioned by the Hon'ble State Commission, that "As far as the illegal allotment of the said plots in favour of the appellant/opposite parties no.4 to 6 is concerned, the District Forum has already granted liberty to the appellant to take legal course against the opposite Party." Therefore, in terms of the above order, the revisionist sought legal advice in order to take legal action against the respondent society and was under bonafide impression that the limitation period for taking legal recourse against the respondents in terms of the above mentioned order dated 30.05.2012 would be 3 years from the impugned order dated 30.05.2012, as provided in the Limitation Act, because the cause of action to take any further action against the respondents arose in favour of the revisionist only on 30.05.2012 when the impugned order was passed. Therefore, the revisionist could not prefer the Revision Petition within the prescribed period of 90 days and instead due to ambiguity created by the above mentioned order, sought legal advice for moving before court of competent jurisdiction on civil as well as criminal side.

    4. That the revision was informed by the lawyers that until the revisionist challenges the impugned order before the appropriate forum, no challenge could successfully be made by the revisionist before other courts and non- challenge of the impugned order dated 30.05.2012 by the revisionist before the

    3

    appropriate Commission would go against the revisionist in future litigation. Moreover, the revisionist also came to know that the District Forum as well as State Commission were not competent to adjudicate disputes pertaining to ownership of property. Hence the present Revision Petition challenging the impugned order dated 30.05.2012 passed by the Hon'ble State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana, Panchkula."

    9. It is well settled that "sufficient cause" for condoning the delay in each case is a question of fact.

    10. In Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed;

    "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

    11. Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Kailash Devi & Ors. AIR 1994 Punjab and Haryana 45, it has been laid down that;

    "There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence."

    12. In R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, Supreme Court

    observed;

    "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."

    13. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has laid down that;

    4

    "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras."

    14. Decision of Anshul Aggarwal (Supra) has been reiterated in Cicily Kallarackal Vs. Vehicle Factory, IV (2012) CPJ 1(SC) 1, wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court observed;

    "4. This Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. NOIDA, (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has explained the scope of condonation of delay in a matter where the special Courts/ Tribunals have been constituted in order to provide expeditious remedies to the person aggrieved and Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is one of them. Therefore, this Court held that while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in such cases the Court must keep in mind the special period of limitation prescribed under the statute (s).

    5. In the instant case, condoning such an inordinate delay without any sufficient cause would amount to substituting the period of limitation by this Court in place of the period prescribed by the Legislature for filing the special leave petition. Therefore, we do not see any cogent reason to condone the delay.

    6. Hence, in the facts and circumstance of the case as explained hereinabove, we are not inclined to entertain these petitions. The same are dismissed on the ground of delay."

    15. It is seen that the Petitioner has given extremely vague reasons in very general terms in the application for seeking condonation of an inordinate delay of 186/197 days in filing the Revision Petition. The Petitioner in the entire application has nowhere disclosed the name of the Advocate/Advocates with whom he had consulted and who had advised him to file this Revision Petition. In the application, the Petitioner has failed to give the day to day explanation for condoning the inordinate delay of 186/197 days in filing this Revision Petition. I am of the view that the inordinate delay of 186/197 days cannot be condoned, without showing "sufficient cause". Further, Petitioner has put the entire blame on his counsel. It is well settled, that it is the duty of a litigant also to pursue his litigation in a diligent manner and he cannot shift entire blame for delay on its counsel.

    16. The explanation given by Petitioner that he was under impression that the limitation for taking legal recourse against the Respondents in terms of the impugned order dated 30.05.2012 would be three years from the date of order is absolute vague and has no legs to stand. It is also seen that a valuable right has accrued in the favour of the Respondents and that right cannot be brushed aside lightly. Thus, inordinate delay of 186/197 days in filing the petition cannot be condoned since, no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner.

    17. The observations made by Apex Court in the authoritative pronouncements discussed

    5

    above, are fully attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, gross negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides is imputable to the Petitioner. No sufficient grounds has been shown for condoning the long delay of about 186/197 days in filing the this Revision Petition. Under these circumstances, Revision Petition stands dismissed, being barred by limitation.

    18. No order as to cost.

    ......................

    REKHA GUPTA

    PRESIDING MEMBER

    6

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    Telu Ram v. Dr. S.S. Dudeja
    (Mar 14, 2017)