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2017 INSC 414
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  • Articles 19(1), Article 21, and Article 14 of the Constitution of India
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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2017 INSC 414
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Articles 19(1), Article 21, and Article 14 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Sections 406, 420 and 144 of the Penal Code, 1860
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Gujarat created 1,800 posts of Revenue Talati (later raised to 2,400) to lessen the workload of existing talati-cum-mantris. The Gujarat Subordinate Service Selection Board expressed inability to conduct the recruitment, so a special Revenue Talati Recruitment Committee undertook the process with the help of Gujarat Technological University. An objective-type written examination for 1,500 posts was held on 16-2-2014 at 2,691 centres with 7,53,703 candidates.

Before and after the examination, multiple complaints and an FIR alleged large-scale malpractices, including payment of money for appointments and identical suspicious markings (“b” marks) on numerous OMR sheets. A forensic probe revealed 284 answer sheets with the special mark; further scrutiny disclosed other irregularities (e.g., 127 candidates from one family, 178 candidates sharing identical addresses). Concluding that the process was tainted, the Government issued Resolution dated 3-7-2015 (GR-II) cancelling the entire recruitment and directing fresh selection through the regular Board with age-relaxation for over-aged candidates.

The aggrieved successful candidates filed Special Civil Application No. 11149 of 2015 and allied proceedings before the Gujarat High Court. The High Court upheld the cancellation in its final judgment dated 27-6-2016 (2016 SCC OnLine Guj 6763). The present appeals challenge that decision before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What principles govern judicial review of administrative action in circumstances involving alleged large-scale examination malpractices?
  2. Whether the respondents’ decision to cancel the entire examination complied with those principles, particularly the tests of Wednesbury unreasonableness and proportionality?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The cancellation was illegal because no formal investigation or proof established systemic malpractice.
  • GR-II fails the twin tests of (a) Wednesbury reasonableness and (b) proportionality; the decision was based on irrelevant considerations such as governmental embarrassment.
  • Even if irregularities existed, they affected only a small group whose candidature could have been segregated without annulling the entire process, making the cancellation disproportionate.

Respondents’ Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents’ legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) Standard of “irrationality”/unreasonableness in judicial review. Used to test whether cancellation decision was outrageously illogical; Court held it was not.
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, 1985 AC 374 Three grounds of review—illegality, irrationality, procedural impropriety; possible future inclusion of proportionality. Adopted as overarching framework for analysis.
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 Courts normally review the decision-making process, not the merits. Cited to confine review to the Committee’s process rather than substitute judicial judgment.
Siemens Public Communication Networks (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2008) 16 SCC 215 Affirmation of Diplock’s threefold classification. Relied on for continuing validity of the Diplock framework in Indian law.
(2010) 6 SCC 614 (case name not specified in opinion) Reiteration that courts examine the process, not the decision. Quoted to underline limited scope of interference.
(1993) 1 SCC 445 (case name not specified) Same principle on scope of review. Cited alongside other authorities reinforcing process-based scrutiny.
(2003) 10 SCC 121 (case name not specified) Same principle on process-oriented review. Referenced for consistency with prior rulings.
(1979) 3 SCC 489 (case name not specified) Rationality as an aspect of public administration. Used to stress State’s duty to ensure purity of examinations.
(2016) 7 SCC 615 (case name not specified) Courts have upheld cancellation where large-scale malpractices exist. Employed to justify wholesale cancellation without individual proof.
(1994) 5 SCC 663 (case name not specified) Same as above—approval of cancelling tainted exams. Cited as precedent supporting State action.
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 Doctrine of proportionality; distinction between primary and secondary review. Guided Court in deciding whether proportionality review was attracted; concluded it was not.
G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91 Article 14 arbitrariness tested on Wednesbury grounds. Referred to in explaining secondary review role.
Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 Wednesbury standard in administrative law. Cited within the proportionality discussion.
Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187 Application of Wednesbury test. Quoted to illustrate limits of Article 14 review.
U.P. Financial Corp. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 299 Wednesbury standard affirmed. Included in list supporting secondary review approach.
E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N., (1974) 4 SCC 3 Concept of arbitrariness under Article 14. Distinguished from discrimination-based proportionality review.
Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow, 1956 AC 14 Earlier articulation of irrationality ground. Mentioned in Diplock quotation; forms historical background.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first restated the governing framework for judicial review—illegality, irrationality (Wednesbury unreasonableness) and procedural impropriety—acknowledging proportionality as a possible additional ground. It emphasised that courts usually scrutinise the decision-making process rather than re-assess the merits.

Applying that framework, the Court addressed each appellant contention:

  1. No proof of malpractice. The Court noted prima facie evidence: the distinctive “b” markings on 284 OMR sheets, extraordinary clustering of successful candidates, and several corruption complaints. Established precedent allows cancellation based on reasonable material; exhaustive, court-style proof is unnecessary. The submission was rejected.
  2. Wednesbury unreasonableness. Given the scale and seriousness of irregularities, the cancellation could not be labelled “outrageous” or illogical. Hence the administrative action survived the irrationality test.
  3. Proportionality. Because the dispute engaged Article 14 in an “arbitrariness” sense and not a claim of discriminatory classification, the Court held only secondary (Wednesbury) review was warranted. Even if proportionality were considered, the measure was not excessive: identifying individual wrongdoers would be impractical and time-consuming; all candidates retain an opportunity to sit a fresh examination with age relaxation for affected aspirants. Accordingly, the action bore a rational nexus to the objective of preserving examination integrity.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the Gujarat Government’s Resolution cancelling the recruitment and affirmed the High Court’s judgment. No order as to costs.

Implications: The cancellation of the 2014 Revenue Talati examination stands, clearing the way for a fresh selection process through the Gujarat Subordinate Service Selection Board with specified age relaxation. The judgment reinforces existing jurisprudence on the State’s authority to annul tainted examinations and does not create a new doctrinal precedent.

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    Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai And Others v. State Of Gujarat And Others

    Jasti Chelameswar, J.— Leave granted. These appeals are preferred against the final judgement dated 27-6-2016 of the High Court of Gujarat in Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai v. State of Gujarat 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 6763. The facts leading to the instant litigation are as follows: the appellants herein are candidates who successfully appeared in the examination conducted by the respondents for recruitment to the post of Revenue Talati but were not appointed.

    2. The State of Gujarat decided to create a new post of Revenue Talati, under the control of the Revenue Department. Revenue Talatis are to maintain revenue records, collect revenue, etc. The creation of these posts is meant to ease the burden on existing talati-cum-mantris who were under the control of the Panchayat Department, performing duties relating to the maintenance of land records and various duties incidental thereto.

    3. A total of 1800 posts of Revenue Talati were created by a Government Resolution dated 23-10-2008. Ordinarily recruitment to such post is carried out by Gujarat Subordinate Service Selection Board (Gsssb). The Board was requested to do so. The Board expressed its inability to undertake the task within the time-frame decided by the State.

    4. Given the urgency of the situation, the Revenue Board of the State of Gujarat decided to undertake the recruitment process by itself. The proposal was approved by the State by a Resolution dated 4-12-2013 (for convenience GR-I) of the General Administration Department. By another GR dated 11-12-2013, the Revenue Talati Recruitment Committee (hereafter Committee) was constituted under the chairmanship of Revenue Inspection Commissioner, who is an ex officio Secretary to the State of Gujarat with Collector, Ahmedabad and Collector, Gandhinagar and Joint Secretary of Revenue Department as the members of the Committee, to “carry out the procedure of direct recruitment” and matters incidental thereto and subject to the various limitations imposed under the said GR. The Committee decided to avail the assistance of Gujarat Technological University (hereinafter GTU) for conducting the examination. GTU dated 15-1-2014

    5. On 15-1-2014, an advertisement for filling up of 1500 posts of Revenue Talatis was published. Performance of the candidates at an objective type written examination for 100 marks was stipulated to be the basis for selection. The examination was conducted in 2691 centres spread over 33 districts. 7,53,703 candidates appeared in the examination.

    6. A day prior to the examination i.e 15-2-2014, a crime was registered in FIR No. 46 of 2014 in Sector 7 Police Station, Gandhinagar under Sections 406, 420 and 144 of the Penal Code, 1860 against two persons, namely, Kalyanish Mulsinh and Nileshbhai Umeshbhai Shah. The allegation is that they had collected money from some of the candidates who were to appear in the said examination by assuring them appointments.

    7. However, the examination process went ahead. In the process of evaluating the OMR sheets, it was noticed that a large number of OMR sheets had specific markings. On 26-5-2014, the police authorities informed the Chairman of the Committee that during interrogation of the two arrested persons, it emerged that they had advised the candidates to put a ‘b’ mark on the right side of the OMR sheet.

    8. Thereafter, the entire data was sent to a forensic science laboratory for further investigation. The investigation revealed 284 OMR sheets with the specific mark. The Committee decided to eliminate those candidates from consideration. Therefore, a provisional merit list was declared on 10-10-2014. 8465 candidates were placed in the list.

    9. In the meanwhile, complaints were received by different authorities of the State alleging the commission of a large number of malpractices in connection with the examination:

    (i) A complaint from Bhubhai Damor on 17-10-2014.
    (ii) The Collector, Sabrakantha District forwarded a complaint received by him from Mr R.D Patel detailing various irregularities.
    (iii) Similar complaint of irregularities was addressed to the Principal Secretary, General Administration Department by one Kameshbhai from Rupakheda, District Dahod.
    (iv) Another complaint was filed in the local crime branch of Surendranagar against one Hiren Narottambhai Kaoisha alleging that he had collected an amount of Rs 1.55 crores from 62 candidates.
    (v) Further complaint alleging that one Dhirubhai Bhil, who was working as a peon in the office of the Secretary, Land Reforms and one woman employee from the same office had accepted money from a number of candidates promising to ensure that these candidates would clear the examination. The Secretary, Land Reforms was also the Chairman of the Recruitment Committee.

    10. In view of receipt of a large number of complaints, the Committee probed into the matter. Some irregularities were noticed. For example, 127 candidates belonging to one family were placed in the provisional merit list. 178 candidates were found to have given same residential addresses. Both these sets of candidates had 47 candidates in common, etc.

    11. The Committee thought it fit to cancel the entire examination process. Accordingly, the Government issued orders by a Resolution dated 3-7-2015 (hereafter GR-II) cancelling the recruitment process. It was further ordered inter alia thereunder:

    “3. On cancelling the entire recruitment procedure for filling up the 1500 posts of Revenue Talati class and by adding 900 vacancies from the other years, it is, hereby, resolved to fill up the total 2400 posts through Gujarat Subsidiary Service Selection Board.
    4. As stated at No. 1, the candidates, whose name figured in the list, whose upper age-limit is about to attain, now, as they shall not be entitled to appear in the examination that shall be conducted now, as a special case, a relaxation of five years is given in the upper age-limit.”

    12. Aggrieved by the abovementioned GR, the appellants herein filed a writ petition (Special Civil Application No. 11149 of 2015) seeking a declaration that the GR was illegal and arbitrary. Further, the petitioners filed an application (Civil Application No. 11685 of 2015) seeking to restrain the respondents from publishing any fresh advertisements for recruitment. The Gujarat High Court vide an interim order dated 14-12-2015 2015 SCC OnLine Guj 5547 disposed of Civil Application No. 11685 of 2015 allowing the respondents to proceed with fresh recruitment for 980 seats. The petitioners filed LPAs Nos. 73 and 74 of 2016 challenging the 14-12-2015 2015 SCC OnLine Guj 5547 order. The petitioners also filed an application seeking a stay on fresh recruitment being LPA No. 74 of 2016. The Gujarat High Court dismissed all applications and appeals vide the impugned judgment 2016 SCC OnLine Guj 6763 holding that the decision of the Committee was not unreasonable since there was some material on the basis of which the decision was made viz. the various allegations that have cast a shadow over the sanctity of the recruitment process. Hence, this appeal.

    13. The appellants argued (i) that cancellation of the examination without any investigation or proof of the allegations of a vitiated examination process is illegal; (ii) the legality of GR-II must be tested on the touchstone of the principle of Wednesbury (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) Reasonableness and the principle of proportionality; (iii) tested in the light of the twin principles mentioned above, the decision of the Committee is both unreasonable and disproportionate to the alleged mischief, unreasonable since it is based on the irrelevant consideration of the embarrassment caused to the Government and disproportionate since the allegations pertain to a small number of candidates whose candidature could have been segregated and rejected.

    14. Two questions need to be examined:

    14.1 (i) What are the principles which govern the jurisdiction of the courts which exercise the power of judicial review of administrative action in the context of a situation like the one presented by the facts of these appeals?;

    14.2 (ii) Whether those legal principles are strictly followed by the respondents while taking the impugned decision?

    15. The basic principles governing the judicial review of administrative action are too well settled. Two judgments which are frequently quoted in this regard are Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) and Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1985 AC 374, (1984) 3 WLR 1174, (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL).

    16. Lord Diplock in his celebrated opinion in Council of Civil Service Unions 1985 AC 374, (1984) 3 WLR 1174, (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL) summarised the principles as follows: (AC p. 410 D-H & 411 A-B)

    “… Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds upon which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call “illegality”, the second “irrationality” and the third “procedural impropriety”. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of “proportionality” which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community; but to dispose of the instant case the three already well-established heads that I have mentioned will suffice.
    By “illegality”, as a ground for judicial review, I mean that the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it. Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to be decided, in the event of dispute, by those persons, the Judges, by whom the judicial power of the State is exercisable.
    By “irrationality” I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as “Wednesbury unreasonableness (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)). It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it. Whether a decision falls within this category is a question that Judges by their training and experience should be well equipped to answer, or else there would be something badly wrong with our judicial system. To justify the court's exercise of this role, resort I think is today no longer needed to Viscount Radcliffe's ingenious explanation in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow 1956 AC 14, (1955) 3 WLR 410 (HL) of irrationality as a ground for a court's reversal of a decision by ascribing it to an inferred though unidentifiable mistake of law by the decision-maker. “Irrationality” by now can stand upon its own feet as an accepted ground on which a decision may be attacked by judicial review.
    I have described the third head as “procedural impropriety” rather than failure to observe basic rules of natural justice or failure to act with procedural fairness towards the person who will be affected by the decision. This is because susceptibility to judicial review under this head covers also failure by an administrative tribunal to observe procedural rules that are expressly laid down in the legislative instrument by which its jurisdiction is conferred, even where such failure does not involve any denial of natural justice. But the instant case is not concerned with the proceedings of an administrative tribunal at all.”

    It can be seen from the above extract, Lord Diplock identified three heads under which judicial review is undertaken i.e illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. He also recognised the possibility of new heads such as “proportionality” being identified in future. He explained the concepts of the three already identified heads. He declared that the head “irrationality” is synonymous with “Wednesbury unreasonableness”.

    17. The principle laid down in Council of Civil Service Unions 1985 AC 374, (1984) 3 WLR 1174, (1984) 3 All ER 935 (HL) has been quoted with approval by this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 and Siemens Public Communication Networks (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2008) 16 SCC 215, AIR 2009 SC 1204.

    18. Normally while exercising the power of judicial review, the courts would only examine the decision-making process of the administrative authorities but not the decision itself. The said principle has been repeatedly stated by this Court on a number of occasions. (2010) 6 SCC 614 at para 21, (1993) 1 SCC 445, (2003) 10 SCC 121

    19. We shall now examine the questions raised by the appellants in the light of the abovementioned principles in which judicial review of the administrative action is undertaken.

    20. The first submission of the appellant is that there is no proof of tampering with the examination process on a large scale as asserted by the respondent, but there are only allegations of such tampering, the truth of which has never been tested by any established process of law. Therefore, the decision of the respondent to cancel the examination in its entirety is without any basis in law.

    21. Purity of the examination process — whether such examination process pertains to assessment of the academic accomplishment or suitability of candidates for employment under the State — is an unquestionable requirement of the rationality of any examination process. Rationality is an indispensable aspect of public administration under our Constitution. (1979) 3 SCC 489 The authority of the State to take appropriate measures to maintain the purity of any examination process is unquestionable. It is too well settled a principle of law in light of the various earlier decisions of this Court that where there are allegations of the occurrence of large-scale malpractices in the course of the conduct of any examination process, the State or its instrumentalities are entitled to cancel the examination. (2016) 7 SCC 615 at para 23, (1994) 5 SCC 663, (2010) 6 SCC 614 This Court has on numerous occasions approved the action of the State or its instrumentalities to cancel examinations whenever such action is believed to be necessary on the basis of some reasonable material to indicate that the examination process is vitiated. They are also not obliged to seek proof of each and every fact which vitiated the examination process.

    22. Coming to the case on hand, there were allegations of large-scale tampering with the examination process. Scrutiny of the answer sheets (OMR) revealed that there were glaring aberrations which provide prima facie proof of the occurrence of a large-scale tampering of the examination process. Denying power to the State from taking appropriate remedial actions in such circumstances on the ground that the State did not establish the truth of those allegations in accordance with the rules of evidence relevant for the proof of facts in a court of law (either in a criminal or a civil proceeding), would neither be consistent with the demands of larger public interest nor would be conducive to the efficiency of administration. No binding precedent is brought to our notice which compels us to hold otherwise. Therefore, the first submission is rejected.

    23. The next question is whether the impugned decision could be sustained judged in the light of the principles of Wednesbury (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) unreasonableness”. In the language of Lord Diplock, the principle is that “a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it”. Having regard to the nature of the allegations and the prima facie proof indicating the possibility of occurrence of large-scale tampering with the examination process which led to the impugned action, it cannot be said that the impugned action of the respondent is “so outrageous in its defiance of logic” or “moral standards”. Therefore, the second submission of the appellant is also required to be rejected.

    24. We are left with the third question—whether the magnitude of the impugned action is so disproportionate to the mischief sought to be addressed by the respondents that the cancellation of the entire examination process affecting lakhs of candidates cannot be justified on the basis of the doctrine of proportionality.

    25. The doctrine of proportionality, its origin and its application both in the context of legislative and administrative action was considered in some detail by this Court in Om Kumar v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 386. This Court drew a distinction between administrative action which affects fundamental freedoms (2001) 2 SCC 386 at pp. 407-08 under Articles 19(1) and 21 and administrative action which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This Court held that in the context of the violation of fundamental freedoms: (Om Kumar case (2001) 2 SCC 386 at pp. 407-08)

    “54. … the proportionality of administrative action affecting the freedoms under Article 19(1) or Article 21 has been tested by the courts as a primary reviewing authority and not on the basis of Wednesbury (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) principles. It may be that the courts did not call this proportionality but it really was.”

    This Court, thereafter took note of the fact that the Supreme Court of Israel recognised proportionality as a separate ground in administrative law to be different from unreasonableness.

    26. It is nobody's case before us that the impugned action is violative of any of the fundamental freedoms of the appellants. We are called upon to examine the proportionality of the administrative action only on the ground of violation of Article 14. It is therefore necessary to examine the principles laid down by this Court in this regard.

    27. This Court posed the question in Om Kumar case (2001) 2 SCC 386:

    “61. When does the court apply, under Article 14, the proportionality test as a primary reviewing authority and when does the court apply the Wednesbury (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) rule as a secondary reviewing authority? From the earlier review of basic principles, the answer becomes simple. In fact, we have further guidance in this behalf.”

    and concluded:

    “66. It is clear from the above discussion that in India where administrative action is challenged under Article 14 as being discriminatory, equals are treated unequally or unequals are treated equally, the question is for the constitutional courts as primary reviewing courts to consider correctness of the level of discrimination applied and whether it is excessive and whether it has a nexus with the objective intended to be achieved by the administrator. Here the court deals with the merits of the balancing action of the administrator and is, in essence, applying “proportionality” and is a primary reviewing authority.
    67. But where an administrative action is challenged as “arbitrary” under Article 14 on the basis of E.P Royappa v. State of T.N (1974) 4 SCC 3 (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the question will be whether the administrative order is “rational” or “reasonable” and the test then is the Wednesbury (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) test. The courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. [In G.B Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal Council (1991) 3 SCC 91 (SCC at p. 111).] Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then was) pointed out that “reasonableness” of the administrator under Article 14 in the context of administrative law has to be judged from the standpoint of Wednesbury (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 (SCC at pp. 679-80), Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641 (SCC at pp. 691), Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 187 (SCC at p. 241) and U.P Financial Corpn. v. Gem Cap (India) (P) Ltd. (1993) 2 SCC 299 (SCC at p. 307), while judging whether the administrative action is “arbitrary” under Article 14 (i.e otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a Wednesbury (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) review always.
    68. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory under Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the courts by applying proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as “arbitrary” under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on Wednesbury (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA) principles applies.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    28. The submission by the appellants is that the mere fact that some of the candidates resorted to some malpractice cannot lead to the conclusion that the entire examination process is required to be cancelled as it would cause undue hardship to huge number of innocent candidates. In other words, the appellants urge this Court to apply the primary review test.

    29. We have already held that there were large-scale malpractices at the examination process and the State was entitled to take appropriate remedial action. In the context of the occurrence of such malpractice, obviously there can be two classes of candidates: those who had resorted to malpractice and others who did not. By the impugned action, no doubt, all of them were treated alike. Whether such herding together would amount to the denial of the equal protection guaranteed under Article 14, is the question.

    30. Identifying all the candidates who are guilty of malpractice either by criminal prosecution or even by an administrative enquiry is certainly a time-consuming process. If it were to be the requirement of law that such identification of the wrongdoers is a must and only the identified wrongdoers be eliminated from the selection process, and until such identification is completed the process cannot be carried on, it would not only result in a great inconvenience to the administration, but also result in a loss of time even to the innocent candidates. On the other hand, by virtue of the impugned action, the innocent candidates (for that matter all the candidates including the wrongdoers) still get an opportunity of participating in the fresh examination process to be conducted by the State. The only legal disadvantage if at all is that some of them might have crossed the upper age-limit for appearing in the fresh recruitment process. That aspect of the matter is taken care of by the State. Therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned action is vitiated by lack of nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the State, by herding all the candidates at the examination together.

    31. We see no reason to interfere with the judgment under appeal. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed, with no order as to costs.

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    Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai And Others v. State Of Gujarat And Others
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