Sujoy Paul, J.:— This order will govern disposal of W.P Nos. 682/14, 1348/14, 1798/14 and 2304/14.
2. These matters were analogously heard on the joint request of the parties. Facts are taken from W.P No. 682/14. The petitioner preferred his candidature pursuant to an advertisement issued by M.P Professional Examination Board (Vyapam). Petitioner participated in the selection and in the result his name finds place at S. No. 1 in the waiting list (Annexure P/4). Petitioner was appointed as Assistant Engineer (Electrical). The said appointment was subsequently canceled by order dated 4.01.2014 (Annexure P/1).
3. Shri. P.R Bhave, learned Senior counsel criticized the order dated 4.1.2014 by contending that although petitioner's name was mentioned in the wait list, the fact remains that as per advertisement (Clause 5.0)(Annexure P/3), it was made clear that the respondents will prepare a merit list and the waiting list separately. Thus, preparation of waiting list was requirement of the advertisement. The petitioner was given appointment by order dated 9.11.2012 (Annexure P/4). As per condition No. 18 of the said appointment order, the only impediment was that petitioner's appointment will remain subject to final outcome of W.P No. 16652/12 O.P Shrivastav v. Mandi Board). Learned senior counsel submits that the impugned order came as a bolt from blue to the petitioner whereby his appointment was canceled on the ground that as per Service Regulation of 1998, there was no provision for preparation of waiting list. Thus, the petitioner's name was wrongly picked-up from the waiting list which could not have been prepared. Shri. Bhave relied on document dated 5.6.2013 (Annexure P/3) and contended that regulations were amended w.e.f 05.06.2013 and hence amendment is not retrospective in nature. Such amendment will not take away the right which has already accrued and crystallized in favour of the petitioner. Shri. Bhave during course of the argument fairly submitted that in W.P No. 464/14, the Indore Bench dismissed the petitioner of a candidate by holding that candidate from waiting list has no indefeasible right of appointment. He agreed that said order passed in Ritu Mangal v. The Director, M.P State Krishi Vipanan Board, Bhopal got stamp of approval by Indore Bench in W.A No. 871/14 and R.P No. 269/14 decided on 28.09.2016
4. The core issue raised by Shri. Bhave, learned Senior counsel is that the respondents are bound by the principle of promissory estoppel. He contended that said principle is attracted for three reasons, namely, (i) In the advertisement itself it is mentioned that the waiting list will be prepared; (ii) The appointment of the petitioner could have been annulled only as per clause 18 of the appointment order mentioned hereinabove and (iii) The respondents have otherwise unconditionally appointed the petitioner on the post in question. He relied on the case of Manoj Manu v. Union of India-(2013) 12 SCC 171. Learned senior counsel submits that the question of promissory estoppel was neither raised nor considered by the Indore Bench in the case of Ritu Mangal (supra).
5. Shri. Jai Shukla, counsel for the petitioner in connected writ petitions borrowed the arguments advanced by Shri. P.R Bhave, learned Senior counsel appearing in W.P No. 682/14.
6. Shri. Tabrez Sheikh, counsel for respondent No. 2 contended that curtains on the present controversy has been drawn by the Indore Bench in the case of Ritu Mangal (supra). In view of dismissal of the case of similarly situated candidate by Indore Bench, the petitioner cannot be given different treatment. He placed heavy reliance on the case of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Suresh Prasad-(2004) 2 SCC 681.
7. The parties confined their arguments to the extent indicated above.
8. The impugned order dated 04.01.2014 (Annexure-P/1) shows that petitioner's appointment is cancelled for the reasons (i) as per the State Mandi Board Service Regulations, 1998, there is no provision for preparation and appointment of candidate from the wait list; (ii) the appointment of petitioner from wait list amounts to illegal appointment: (iii) the appointment of petitioner can be terminated by giving one month's notice or notice Bay in lieu thereof. During the course of argument, Shri. Tabrez Seikh contended that even otherwise, the select list was prepared on 14.11.2010 and appointments were made on 09.11.2012 Thus, the life of the panel stood expired on the date the petitioner was appointed.
9. No other point is pressed by the parties.
10. Parties were heard at length.
11. The Indore Bench in Ritu Mangal (supra) held that as per the GAD Circular dated 18.06.1986, the life/validity of the select panel is one year only. Since the appointments were made beyond that one year, it cannot be upheld. The said judgment of Indore Bench in Ritu Mangal got stamp of approval from the Division Bench in W.A No. 871/2014. The review petition filed by Ritu Mangal (supra) was also dismissed on 28.09.2016 In the order of Ritu Mangal (supra), this Court has made it clear that there was no legal right of appointment for the wait list candidate. To this extent, the present cases are covered by the judgment of Ritu Mangal (supra).
12. As noticed, Shri. Bhave, learned senior counsel made an effort to distinguish his case with that of Ritu Mangal (supra) by contending that principles of promissory estoppel are applicable here. This point requires consideration. A careful reading of the pleadings of W.P No. 682/2014 makes it clear that the petitioner has not pleaded that respondents are bound by the principles of promissory estoppel. The question is: Whether in absence of such pleadings, the doctrine of principles of estoppel can be pressed into service? This point is no more res integra. In (1998) 2 SCC 502 (Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari v. State of U.P), the Apex Court opined as under:
“It may also be stated that the appellant did not make any clear, sound and positive averment as to which officer of the Government, when and in what manner gave the assurance to the appellant or any of his colleagues that they would be promoted as Lecturers. It was also not stated that the appellant had, at any time, acting upon the promise, altered his position, in any manner, specially to his detriment. Bald Pleadings cannot be made the foundation for involving the doctrine of promissory estoppel.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
13. Same view is followed by the Apex Court in (2005) 1 SCC 625 Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer which reads as under:-
“19. In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any supporting material to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. The Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must for ever be present in the mind of the Court.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
14. In Manoj Manu (Supra), the recruiting agency forwarded names of certain candidates from reserved list but deprived some more deserving and similarly situated persons. In the said judgment, the Apex Court did not consider the effect of expiry of life of panel. The said judgment is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. More so when the employer has given similar treatment to all wait listed candidates and those candidates were either not appointed or their appointments were cancelled.
15. In view of the above judgments of Supreme Court and in absence of categorical pleadings about applicability of principles of promissory estoppel, the said principles cannot be pressed into service in the present case.
16. Apart from this, in (2007) 8 SCC 161 (State of Rajasthan v. Jagdish Chopra), the Apex Court held as under:
“Vacancies which arose in the subsequent years could be filled up from the select list prepared in the previous year and not in other manner. Even otherwise, in absence of any rule, ordinary period of validity of select list should be one year.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
17. I will be failing in my duty if I won't consider the judgment cited by the respondents in the case of Bihar State Electricity Board v. Suresh Prasad (2004) 2 SCC 687. As per this judgment of Supreme Court, it is clear that in absence of any statutory provision, which requires the employer to prepare a wait list in addition to the merit list, the employer cannot appoint his candidate on the basis of waiting list. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-
“There are no statutory recruitment rules which require the appellant Board to prepare a waiting list in addition to the panel. No rule has been shown in support of the respondents' argument that when 18 candidates failed to turn up the appellant was bound to offer the posts to candidates in the waiting list.”
18. In the light of aforesaid analysis, in my view, the curtains are drawn on the questions involved by the Indore Bench in Ritu Mangal (supra). Resultantly, I find no reason to interfere in these batch of matters. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. No cost.
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