A.P Chowdhri, J.:— The facts necessary for the disposal of this second appeal are that Ram Singh, respondent was employed as a Constable in the Police Force in District Rup Nagar. By order dated 10.10.1977, he was posted as Gunman with the Deputy Commissioner, Rup Nagar. During his posting as Gunman, he was found dead drunk in the evening of 6.9.1979 roaming about at the Bus-Stand, Ropar, wearing the service revolver. He is a Sikh gentleman with long hair and at that time, it is alleged, that his hair were untied and he could not take care of even his revolver. Traffic Constable Gurbachan Singh No. 93 brought him by a jeep to the Police Station where A.S.I Niranjan Singh disarmed him of the revolver with great difficulty. The revolver was deposited in the Malkhana of the Police Station and Ram Singh was sent to the Civil Hospital, where he was medically examined. It was declared that he was dead drunk. He was admitted to the hospital. Later at about 9.15 P.M he quarrelled with the Doctor on duty and abused him. The Superintendent of Police, who is the Punishing Authority, decided to have a departmental enquiry held against the respondent. The inquiry was held by Inspector Niranjan Singh in accordance with the provisions of rule 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934 (Volume II). On the basis of the inquiry, the Superintendent of Police passed an order of dismissal against the respondent on 11.2.1980 The respondents appeal against the said order was dismissed by the D.I.G Punjab on 18.4.1980 and a further revision against the said order was rejected by the Inspector-General of Police, which was communicated to him on 17.9.1981 The respondent challenged the dismissal order and orders passed in appeal and revision by a regular civil suit. The learned trial Court decreed the suit with the finding that dismissal of the respondent was not justified in view of the special provisions of rule 16.2 of the Rules; that he was not supplied with copies of statements and certain documents three days prior to the commencement of the inquiry in contravention of Punjab Government Instructions No. 5746-SII(3)-72 dated 16.10.1972 and also because the inquiry officer had himself cross-examined the witnesses produced in defence by the respondent. The State filed an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge. The State has thus filed this second appeal.
2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find that the appeal must fail.
3. The admitted case against the respondent relates to a single misconduct set out above. Rule 16.2of the Punjab Police Rules, in so far as material, reads as under:
“16.2 (1) Dismissal shall be awarded only for the gravest acts of misconduct or as the cumulative effect of continued misconduct proving incorrigibility and complete unfitness for police service. In making such an award regard shall be had to the length of service of the offender and his claim to pension.”
4. The above rule was considered in various decisions of this Court. In Bhagwat Parsad v. Inspector General of Police, 1967 SLR 807 : AIR 1970 Punjab and Haryana 81, a learned Single Judge took the view that use of the word ‘acts’ does not exclude a single act of misconduct. The learned Judge further observed that in order to gauge gravity of misconduct, what matters, is not frequency, but obliquity or delinquency.
5. It was further held that the words “gravest acts of misconduct” are incapable of definition. One has to apply one's mind to the words and give a meaning to each of them in the light of the actual deed, situation and circumstances. It was pointed out that ‘misconduct’ in order to earn the epithet of gravity has to be gross or flagrant. It was, therefore, held that the degree of misconduct to justify dismissal has to be higher or more serious. The learned Judge also observed that the use of the superlative ‘gravest’ and the adverb ‘only’ appeared to be intended to indicate a super-eminent, or a very high degree of misconduct, and not, that degree should be so high or so low as cannot be outclassed or excelled. In Gurdev Singh v. The State of Haryana, 1976 (2) SLR 442, the order of dismissal passed against a Sub-Inspector of Police found in a drunken condition while on duty was quashed on the ground:—
(a) that the order had been passed arbitrarily, without coming to a finding that the misconduct attributed to the alleged delinquent was ‘gravest act of misconduct’
(b) The Punishing Authority was duty bound to take into consideration the length of service of the offender and his claim of pension before awarding the penalty of dismissal.
6. It was held that the said part of the sub-rule was mandatory in character and the order passed in disregard of it could not be upheld. The same view was taken in an unreported short decision in Civil Writ Petition No. 3037 of 1977 by a Division Bench consisting of A.D Koshal and R.N Mittal, JJ. (as their Lordships then were). It was held that it was incumbent on the Appointing Authority to take into consideration the provisions of rule 16.2 before awarding the penalty of dismissal from service and the same having not been considered by the Authorities, the order of dismissal was quashed, by order dated 16.11.1977 The same view has been followed in two decisions in Ratan Lal Ex Constable v. The State of Haryana, 1983 (2) SLR 159 and Sukhdev Singh v. The State of Punjab, 1983 (2) SLR 645. I have gone through the order of dismissal passed by the Superintendent of Police as well as the orders passed by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police and Inspector General of Police in appeal and revision respectively. The Superintendent of Police in his order held that the respondent was on an important duty as Gunman with the Deputy Commissioner and the misconduct proved against him amounted to serious infraction of discipline while being a Member of the Disciplined Force. There is nothing in the order to even remotely suggest that the Punishing Authority was alive to the provisions of rule 16.2, either with regard to the gravity of the misconduct or the delinquent being habitual in indulging in gravest type of misconduct or that he had put in, as I am informed at the Bar about 17 years of service, and would qualify for pension after putting another three-four years' service. The order passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police in appeal also fails to show that he had in mind the provisions of the above rule while disposing of the appeal. In the order of the Inspector-General of Police, all that was said was that the misconduct on the part of the alleged delinquent was “very grave” and that he was rightly dismissed from service. Again, there was nothing to show in the order that provisions of the above rule were kept in view. As the provisions of rule 16.2 have been held to be mandatory, failure of the authorities to take due notice of the same and passed an appropriate order is sufficient to vitiate the order.
7. Both the Courts below have taken the view that there was contravention of the Government instructions dated 16.10.1972 referred to in the earlier part of this order. The said instructions have been published in the Manual of Instructions on service matters published by the Punjab Government at page 658. These instructions do not in terms apply to the case in hand. A perusal of the instructions shows that the same were issued following judgment of this Court in Parkash Nath v. State of Punjab (Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 1374 of 1960) in which it was held that if in a preliminary inquiry, statements of witnesses are recorded and thereafter a regular inquiry is held, the delinquent was entitled to the copies of the previous statements of those witnesses. The aforesaid decision as also the rules which were relevant were the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1970. Rule 16.24 of the Punjab Police Rules on the other hand lays down, as it were, a Code of Procedure to be followed in inquiries held against Police Officers. Sub-rule (viii) of rule 16.24 no doubt empowers the Superintendent of Police to have a preliminary enquiry held but in the facts of the present case no preliminary inquiry was in fact held. There was thus no question of statements of witnesses recorded at any such fact-finding inquiry being supplied to the respondent. According to the procedure prescribed in rule 16.24 where the delinquent does not admit the misconduct, the Inquiry Officer has to record evidence both oral and documentary in support of the charge. The evidence is recorded in the presence of the delinquent and he has to be given opportunity to take notes of their statements and cross-examine them. In other words, there is no provision for delivery of copies of the statements, apparently for the reason that the statements are recorded in the presence of the delinquent and he is given a right to cross-examine the witnesses. In this inquiry, P.W 1 and P.W 2 were examined on 24.10.1979 in the presence of the delinquent and he cross-examined them. P.W 3 and P.W 4 were examined on 26.10.1979 and the respondent duly cross-examined them. P.W 5 was examined on 31.10.1979 He too was cross-examined by the respondent. It was on 31.10.1979 that the respondent made an application to the Inquiry Officer. The application is Exhibit D-5 on the record. He prayed for being supplied with copies of D.D Report No. 33 and 34 dated 6.9.1979, report of the S.H.O Shri Surjit Singh and report of the M.L.R and any other report made by the Senior Medical Officer. In the margin of the same application, the delinquent acknowledged that he had received copies of all the five documents prayed for by him under his signature. On the backside of the said application is a note recorded by the Inquiry Officer, Shri Jagir Singh, to the effect that the delinquent asked for copies of statements of witnesses already examined for the Department. He turned down the request noting that under the rules, the delinquent was entitled to take notes of the statements of witnesses examined in his presence and that there was no provision for furnishing him with copies thereof. It cannot be disputed that the statements of the witnesses were recorded in the presence of the delinquent and he was entitled to take notes in accordance with the provisions of rule 16.24(iii). It is pertinent to add that the respondent did not make any request to the Inquiry Officer at any stage to recall any of the witnesses examined for further cross-examination after receipt of five documents delivered to him on 31.10.1979 To conclude, therefore, there was no violation of the rules of procedure laid down in rule 16.24 and the Government instructions dated 16.10.1972 were not applicable to this case.
8. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed with costs.
9. Appeal dismissed.
Comments