Batty, J.:— In this case the two accused Datu Hanmant and Ganesh Waman, having been entrusted with certain moneys belonging to the Swami of Chafal, the first as Karbhari and the second as cashier, were accused of having committed breach of trust in respect of those moneys; Datu, the first accused, having, it is, alleged, taken Rs. 650 on the 11th December 1898, Rs. 1,500 on the 12th February 1899, and Rs. 700 at some date unspecified in 1899; while Ganesh Waman is said to have committed breach of trust in respect of Rs. 400 on the 21st August 1898, 400 on the 21st December 1898 and 200 on the 17th July 1899.
2. Both the accused were convicted: each of them in respect of each item which he was alleged to have taken: except that Ganesh was not convicted in respect of the last mentioned item of Rs. 200.
3. The present application is one for revision in favour of Datu on the ground of misjoinder of charges. Certain facts connected with the grounds assigned for conviction have been stated to us, but in revision we do not ordinarily interfere with findings of facts and in the present case see no reason for departing from the ordinary practice.
4. The objections taken are, first that the various offences exceed three in number and were not all committed within one year, and that therefore the offences could not be tried together; secondly that the offences with which Dattu has been charged are totally distinct offences from those with which Ganesh has been charged and that therefore the two accused persons could not be tried together under s. 239 of Criminal Procedure Code
5. We think with reference to the first objection that s. 222 clearly admits of the trial of any number of acts of breach of trust committed within the year as amounting only to one offence. Section 222 does not require any particular formulation of the accusation, but only enacts that it is sufficient to show the aggregate offence without specifying the details. It dispenses with the necessity of amplification: it does not prohibit enumeration of the particular items in the charge. In this instance the objection to the charge is practically that it is more specific than it need have been, that it gave more details than are required under that section. This objection amounts, at most, to this that there has been— a merely form error in the drafting of the charge—an error in the form of the charge which certainly could not have prejudiced the accused and is one which may be dealt with as coming within s. 537. The introduction of greater detail than is legally necessary in no way affects the jurisdiction of the Court. Taken by themselves, the charges against Dattu and Ganesh may, therefore, respectively be regarded as one offence against each.
6. The only objection to the trial that remains for consideration is, whether these offences according to the accusation were offences committed in the same transaction. Section 239 admits of the joint trial when more persons than one are accused of different offences committed in the same transaction. It suffices for the purpose of justifying a joint trial that the accusation alleges the offences committed by each accused to have been committed in the same transaction within the meaning of s. 239. It is not necessary that the charge should contain the statement as to the transaction being one and the same. It is the tenour of the accusation and not the wording of the charge that must be considered as the test. And in this case, it is for the appellant to show that no such connection between the offences alleged against the two accused was set forth as would satisfy the condition required for a joint trial. “We think that the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellant would have been more convincing if no continuity of action and purpose, common to both the accused throughout, had been alleged in the case presented by the prosecution. The word “transaction” is unfortunately not defined in the Code and the meaning to be attached to it must be gathered from the context in which it occurs in various sections and illustrations.
7. According to its etymological and dictionary meaning the word “transaction” means “carrying through” and suggests, we think, not necessary proximity in time—so much as continuity of action and purpose. The same metaphor implied by that word is continued in the illustrations where the phrase used is “in the coarse of the same transaction.” In s. 215, the phrase is used in a connection which implies that there may be a series of acts—illustration (f) to that section, indicates that the successive acts may be separated by an interval of time and that the essential is the progressive action, all pointing to the same object. In s. 239, therefore, a series of acts separated by intervals of time are not, we think excluded, provided that those jointly tried have throughout been directed to one and the same objective. If the accused started together for the same goal this suffices to justify the joint trail, even if incidentally, one of those jointly tried has done an act for which the other may not be responsible [vide s. 239, illustration (b)].
8. We think the foundation for the procedure in that section is the association of two persons concurring from start to finish to attain the same end. No doubt if it Were attempted to associate in the trial a person who had no connection whatever with the transaction at a time when one or more of the series of the acts alleged had been done, then it might be urged that would be outside the provisions of the section. But since in this case two persons have associated for the carrying out of one particular common object viz. a breach of trust, the continuance of that object and the progressive execution of it by successive acts seem to satisfy the test and criterion implied in s. 239. In this case it has apparently been found by the lower Court that the accused were jointly in charge of the trust fund, one of the accused being the Karbhari, and the other cashier. The one could not act without the connivance of the other and they both evidently carried through their object in concert. That they carried out their scheme by successive acts done at intervals, alternately taking the benefits, does not prevent the unity of the project from constituting the series of acts one transaction i.e, the carrying throug of the same object which both had from the first act to the last. The objections raised are insufficient.
9. We accordingly reject the application.
10. Application rejected.
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