Prem Chand Jain, J.:— Dwarka Dass has filed this appeal under clause X of the Letters Patent against the judgment and decree of a learned Single Judge of this Court, by which the appeal of the State of Punjab (R.S.A No. 1503 of 1972) was allowed. Although detailed facts have been given in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, but in order to decide the controversy raised before us, certain salient features of the case may be noticed which read as under:
2. Dwarka Dagg appellant was appointed as an Upholster in the Punjab Roadways in the year 1968. According to the averments made in the plaint, his services were terminated vide order dated Merch 21, 1969 with effect from March 20, 1969, by the General Manager, Punjab Roadways without giving him any show cause notice and in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. The plaintiff challenged the order of termination on the ground that he had completed 240 days of service, he had become a permanent employee and his services could not be terminated in a summary manner.
3. The suit was contested by the State of Punjab Inter alia on the ground that the Impugned order was not an order of termination but it was an order simplicities of discontinuance, in accordance with the terms and conditions of appointment, that the order was in accordance with the Civil Services Rules and that the plaintiff had not completed 240 days of service.
4. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. On appeal, the judgment and decree of the the trial Court was set aside and the suit was decreed with costs. In second appeal, the learned Single Judge reversed the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court and held that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. It was further ordered that the plaint be returned to the plaintiff As earlier observed, the present appeal under clause X of Letters Patent has been filed by the plaintiff against the judgment and decree of the learned Single Judge of this Court.
5. The only contention raised before us by Mr. Bali, learned counsel for the appellant was that the appellant had completed 240 days of service and that in terms of his conditions of service, the order by which his services were terminated was not legally sustainable. It was also submitted by the learned counsel that under Section 25-B|2)(a)(ii) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the plaintiff had become a permanent employee. On the basis of the aforesaid contentions, the learned counsel further submitted that the civil Court too had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and a contrary finding recorded by the learned Single Judge was not legally sustainable. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. ???? ???n ???k, (1976) 1 SCC 496 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 2238.
6. After giving our thoughtful consideration to the entire matter, we fill ourselves unable to agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. In Premier Automobiles Ltd.'s case, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court, after considering the entire case law, have enumerated the principles which would be applicable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in reference to an industrial dispute. The said principles read as under:—
“(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court.
(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular case.
(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.
(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.”
7. In the instant case, as is evident from the contentions of Mr. Bali, the appellant wants to take benefit of the provisions of Section 25-B(2)(a)(ii) of the Act. In other words, the dispute between the parties relates to the enforcement of a right created under the Act with the result that principle (3) which has been reproduced above, would straightaway be attracted, and that the remedy available to the suitor would be to get adjudication under the Act and not by filing a civil suit.
8. In our view, the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is unexceptionable and Mr. Bali was unable to persuade us to take a contrary view, other than the one arrived at by the learned Single Judge.
9. No other point was urged.
10. For the reasons recorded above, we find no merit in this appeal and consequently dismiss the same, but without there being any order as to costs.
11. Appeal dismissed.