Valmiki J. Mehta, J. (ORAL)
1. Challenge by means of this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is to the concurrent orders of the courts below; of the first appellate court dated 13.1.2014 and the trial court dated 08.10.2013; by which the injunction application filed by the petitioner/plaintiff claiming the relief that the contract for providing of tempo services/commercial vehicle services by the petitioner/plaintiff to the respondent/defendant be not cancelled by the respondent/defendant, has been dismissed.
2. The sum and substance of the case which has been put forth by the petitioner is that he has invested heavily in purchase of the commercial vehicles for providing tempo services to the respondent/defendant, and that since the contract is valid till 31.3.2017, consequently, the respondent/defendant cannot terminate such a contract and the respondent/defendant should continue to take commercial vehicles on hire from the petitioner/plaintiff.
3. Both the courts below have dismissed the injunction application by arriving at two conclusions. Firstly, it is observed that the suit itself is not maintainable as the petitioner is a partnership firm which is not registered, and therefore Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act, 1932 bars the suit. Second reason for declining the relief was by reference to Section 41(e) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short ‘the Act’) which provides that injunction cannot be granted which will amount to specifically enforcing a contract which otherwise cannot be specifically enforced. We are concerned in the present petition with the second conclusion.
4. Section 14 of the Act provides that certain contracts cannot be specifically enforced. Such contracts include contracts where on account of non-performance of which compensation in money is an adequate relief. Section 41(e) of the Act states that no injunction can be granted to prevent the breach of a contract which cannot be specifically enforced.
5. In commercial contracts such as the present, surely the best entitlement of the petitioner/plaintiff would be to net profits on account of providing tempo/commercial vehicle services. Clearly, therefore money as compensation is an adequate relief, and consequently in view of the provisions of Sections 14 and 41(e) of the Act, the suit was clearly barred as has been held by the courts below.
6. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in this petition, and the courts below have rightly dismissed the injunction application because grant of the relief of injunction would have amounted to directing specific performance of the contract, and which was not permissible in view of Sections 14 and 41(e) of the Act.
7. Dismissed.
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