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Factual and Procedural Background

Five petitioners — Vinod Kumar and four others — occupied wooden cabins (khokhas) standing along the G.T. Road between mile-stones Nos. 66 and 68 in the municipal area of Pathankot. The petitioners stated they set up these cabins towards the end of 1947 on migrating from West Pakistan and had been conducting business in them. The land on which the cabins stood belonged to the State.

Following a Punjab Cabinet decision dated 5 January 1961, the charge of the Amritsar-Pathankot-Kulu road from miles 66 to 68 was transferred to the Municipal Committee, Pathankot; that decision was communicated to the Committee on 25 January 1961 and an agreement between the Punjab State and the Municipal Committee (document R.2) was executed. R.2 provided, inter alia, that the Municipal Committee could construct and let out shop-cum-stalls and collect rents, and that for purposes of charging rent the portion would be deemed handed over to the Committee from 5 January 1961.

Relying on R.2, the Municipal Committee issued notices to occupiers (including the petitioners) calling upon them to pay tehbazari from 5 January 1961 and to obtain tehbazari tickets. After six months without compliance, on 27 June 1963 the Committee issued notices under section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act directing the petitioners to vacate within 24 hours for using municipal land without sanction or payment of tehbazari. When petitioners did not comply, on 4 July 1963 employees of the Committee demolished part of the khokha of petitioner No. 5 (Munshi Ram).

The petitioners then filed a writ petition in this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking directions restraining the Municipal Committee from dispossessing them or interfering with their business. The Municipal Committee contested the petition both on merits and on a preliminary objection that a joint petition by five persons occupying separate premises was not maintainable.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a joint writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 by five persons, each claiming individual rights in separate khokhas on separate pieces of land, is maintainable.
  2. Whether the Municipal Committee, relying on the State's transfer (decision of 5 January 1961 and agreement R.2), was entitled to demand tehbazari fees from the occupiers with effect from 5 January 1961.
  3. Whether the petitioners had a right to remain in possession of their respective khokhas without payment of rent or tehbazari fee (including whether they had permission from the Punjab Government for their occupation).
  4. Whether the Municipal Committee's partial demolition of petitioner No. 5's khokha and threat of dispossession were lawful and could be restrained by writ in this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners claimed they had set up their wooden cabins around late 1947 after migrating from West Pakistan and had been continuously carrying on business in them.
  • They asserted (or at least alleged) that their khokhas were constructed with the permission of the State of Punjab and therefore they had a right to remain in occupation without payment of rent or tehbazari to the Municipal Committee or Government.
  • Petitioner No. 5 in particular resisted the notice to vacate and refusal to pay, and from the petition it appears he sought to challenge both the demand for tehbazari and the demolition of part of his khokha.

Respondent (Municipal Committee)'s Arguments

  • The Municipal Committee relied on the Cabinet decision of 5 January 1961 and the subsequent agreement R.2 which placed the relevant portion of road in its charge and authorized it to construct premises and let them out, and to demand rents/tehbazari from occupiers with effect from that date.
  • The Committee issued initial notices demanding tehbazari and later notices under section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act directing occupiers to vacate for using municipal land without sanction or payment; it proceeded to demolish part of petitioner No. 5's khokha after non-compliance.
  • As a preliminary objection, the Committee challenged the maintainability of a joint petition by five different persons occupying separate premises and areas, asserting each petitioner had an individual right and therefore should file separate petitions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Revenue Patwaris Union, Punjab, Chandigarh v. The State of Punjab (1961 63 P.L.R. 530) Rule that several individuals, each alleging invasion of individual rights, cannot ordinarily aggregate their claims into a single joint writ petition merely because a common objection exists; each should file independent petitions. The Court applied and followed this rule to hold that the joint petition by the five petitioners was not maintainable because each occupied a separate khokha, asserted individual rights in different areas, and had been served with separate notices.
Jiwan Singh v. Consolidation Officer, Sunam (1962 64 P.L.R. 568) Division Bench (Mahajan and P.C. Pandit, JJ.) expressed a different view suggesting that in certain circumstances a joint petition by several persons may be competent; Mahajan, J. indicated disagreement with the Revenue Patwaris Union rule and referred to authorities supporting joint petitions. The Court noted these observations but treated Mahajan, J.'s comments as obiter dicta, distinguished the facts of that case from the present one, and did not adopt the differing view. The Court therefore declined to follow Jiwan Singh on the issue of maintainability in the present facts.
Annant Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 16) Identified in the opinion as an authority (cited in Jiwan Singh) for the proposition that in certain circumstances joint petitions by several persons may be competent. The opinion records that this case was cited in Jiwan Singh but does not apply it directly; the Court treated the invocation of such authorities in Jiwan Singh as part of obiter remarks not binding on the present decision.
Qurabali v. Government of Rajasthan Also cited in Jiwan Singh as supporting the view that, in certain circumstances, a joint petition may be competent. The Court noted Qurabali as cited in Jiwan Singh but did not rely on it; the opinion treats such citations as part of the obiter discussion in Jiwan Singh and did not adopt them for the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages in its analysis: first addressing the preliminary objection on maintainability of the joint petition, and then considering the merits (if the petition were treated as limited to petitioner No. 5).

On maintainability:

  • The Court found the Municipal Committee's preliminary objection well-founded. It emphasized that each petitioner occupied a separate khokha standing on a separate piece of land, each claimed an individual right to remain in possession of his particular khokha, each had been served separate notices demanding different amounts, and separate notices under section 173 had been issued to each.
  • The Court applied the rule laid down by a Division Bench in The Revenue Patwaris Union v. State of Punjab that similar individual grievances do not justify a joint writ petition when each petitioner seeks relief in respect of distinct individual rights. The Revenue Patwaris Union decision was held fully applicable to the facts of this case.
  • The Court considered but distinguished the conflicting observations in Jiwan Singh v. Consolidation Officer, Sunam (Mahajan, J.), noting those observations to be obiter dicta and pointing out that the facts in Jiwan Singh were different. Consequently, the Court did not accept the dissenting obiter view as controlling here.

On the merits (treating the petition as if confined to petitioner No. 5):

  • The Court reviewed the notices issued to petitioner No. 5: an initial notice demanding tehbazari and, after non-payment, a notice under section 173 directing vacation within 24 hours.
  • Part of petitioner No. 5's khokha had been demolished on 4 July 1963. The Court observed that the record did not indicate the current extent of the remaining structure or whether it had remained intact during the four years of pending proceedings.
  • The Court held that even if petitioner No. 5 could prove a right to remain without payment, it could not issue a writ directing the Municipal Committee to keep a half-demolished structure intact because the undemolished portion might be a potential danger to the public.
  • The Court identified multiple disputed factual questions that would have to be resolved on evidence: whether the petitioner had permission from the Punjab Government to occupy the area, whether he had a right to remain without payment after transfer of the property to the Municipal Committee, and whether the fee demanded was just and reasonable. These issues could not be resolved in writ proceedings without evidence.
  • The Court reiterated the settled principle that jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 is not intended to resolve disputed questions of fact in the manner of a civil suit; the Court would hesitate to convert itself into an ordinary civil court to try factual disputes that require evidence.
  • Finally, the Court noted there was nothing on record apart from the petitioners' own affidavit to support the claim of governmental permission, and in the absence of such supporting material it was not possible to restrain the Municipal Committee from demanding tehbazari under the agreement authorizing it to do so.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed with costs. (The Court held that the joint petition by all five petitioners was not maintainable; and even if treated as confined to petitioner No. 5, the petition would fail on the merits for the reasons stated.)

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioners obtain no relief from this Court; the Municipal Committee may proceed in accordance with law. The Court explicitly stated that the petitioners' remedy, if any, lies in a civil Court and they may approach a competent civil forum for redress.
  • No broader precedent was announced beyond the Court's application of the existing rule (as laid down in The Revenue Patwaris Union case) that joint writ petitions are not appropriate where each individual claims a right in respect of separate premises and separate notices; the Court did not adopt the obiter views in Jiwan Singh for the present facts.

Order: Petition dismissed.

    Vinod Kumar v. Municipal Committee Pathankot

    Gurdev Singh, J.:— Vinod Kumar and four others, the petitioners before m;, are in possession of wooden cabins standing along the G.T road between mile-stones Nos. 68 and 68 in the municipal area of Pathankot. They claim to have set up these cabins towards the end of the year 1947 on their migration from Wist Pakistan and have since been carrying on their business in them. The land on which these cabins are standing admittedly belongs to the State. In pursuance of a decision of the Punjab Cabinet, dated 5th January, 1961 (copy annexure R. 1), the charge of Amritsar-Pathankot-Kulu road from miles 66 to 68 was transferred to the Municipal Committee, Pathankot. This decision was communicated to the Municipal Committee, Pathankot, on 25th January, 1961, and subsequently an agreement was executed between the Punjab State and the Municipal Committee, the terms of which are given in the document marked R. 2. This agreement inter-alia provided that the Municipal Committee would be entitled to construct shop-cum-stalls and shop-cum-flats etc. on both sides of the berm of the road and be at liberty to lease out the land of the premises or any other structure constructed by it so as to derive rents to raise its revenues. It was further provided in R. 2 that for the purpose of charging rent from the occupiers, the charge of the portion of road in question would be deemed to have been handed over to the Committee from the date of the decision of the Cabinet, i.e, with effect from 5th January, 1961. Basing its claim on this agreement, the respondent-Municipal Committee, Pathankot, issued separate notices to various occupiers of the khokhas etc. standing between miles Nos. 66 and 68 on the Amritsar Pathankot Kulu road, calling upon each one of them to pay various amounts as tehbazari with effect from 5th January, 1961, and to obtain tehbazari tickets from the Municipal Committee for the future. These notice's of demand were also issued to the present petitioners, and they were warned.—

    “In case you fail to deposit the arrears within the above-said period and fail to get the Tehbazari Ticket issued for future, you shall be removed from the site and recovery of the arrears made according to law.”

    2. Six months later, on 27th June, 1963, after waiting in vain for compliance of this demand for tehbazari, the Municipal Committee issued notices, purporting to be under section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act, to each of the petitioners wherein it was stated:—

    “It has been brought to the notice of the Committee that you are using municipal land without the sanction of the committee or without payment of prescribed tehbazari fee. You are, therefore, directed to vacate the site within 24 hours, falling which legal action will have to be taken against you. Please note.”

    3. As the petitioners persisted in refusing to pay anything to the Municipal Committee and ignored these notices as well, on 4th July, 1963, the employees of the Municipal Committee demolished a part of the khokha, which was in occupation of Munshi Ram petitioner No. 5. On the petitioners'; protest, the Municipal authorities did not proceed with further demolition, but instructed the petitioners to obtain a stay order from a competent authority. It was then that the five petitioners approached this Court with this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution challenging the right of the Municipal Committee to charge them tehbazari fee or to demolish the khokhas which they were occupying, praying that an appropriate writ or direction be issued to the respondent-Municipal Committee not to dispossess them from the sites in their possession nor interfere with their business which they had been carrying on in the khokhas. Besides contesting the petitioners' claim that they had constructed the khokhas in dispute with the permission of the State of Punjab and they have a right to remain in occupation without payment of any rent or fee to the Municipal Committee or to the Government, the respondent-Municipal Committee has contested the petition on the preliminary objection that a joint petition by five different persons, who are in occupation of separate premises and different areas, is not maintainable. After hearing the parties' counsel and considering the averments made in the petition, I find that this objection is well-founded and must prevail. As has been noticed earlier, each of the five petitioners is in occupation of a separate khokhas standing on a separate piece of land which he claims to have set up at his own cost. The area in possession of each is different and the type of structure is admittedly not the same. Each of petitioners claims individual right in himself to remain in possession of the particular khokha which is in his occupation. They were served with separate notices of demand for different amounts of tehbazari. Again, notices under section 173 of the Punjab Municipal Act were separately issued to them. It is thus obvious that the petitioners are fighting for their individual right. No order of the Government has been produced under which they have been granted permission to erect or set up khokhas on the land which now vests in the respondent Municipal Committee. Even if it be conceded for a moment that the petitioners were granted permission by the Government to occupy various portions of the land in their possession, each of the petitioners will have to prove that such a permission was granted to him. It is thus obvious that there is no joint interest which may entitle the petitioners to obtain redress under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution from this Court by means of a joint petition brought on behalf of all of them. The rule laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in The Revenue Patwaris Union, Punjab, Chandigarh v. The State of Punjab . 1961 63 P.L.R 530., is fully applicable to the facts of this case. It was observed in that case that the fact that the relief prayed for by the several individuals, each of whose individual right alleged to have been invaded improperly by the impugned order was grounded on a common objection, did not afford any basis for a joint writ petition by several petitioners aggrieved by similar orders and each of them had to file independent petitions, paying separate court fee on each, with separate vakalat, etc.

    4. Mr. Hansraj Aggarwal, appearing for the petitioners, however, points out that a different view was taken by a liter Division Bench (D.K Mahajan and P.C Pandit JJ) in Jiwan Singh v. Consolidation Officer, Sunam . 1962 64 P.L.R 568.. In this connection, he referred to the following observations of Mahajan, J. in paragraph 17 of his judgment:—

    “So far as the second question is concerned, it is not necessary to decide the same, though as at present advised we seem to differ from the view taken by a Bench decision of this Court in Revenue Patwaris Union v. State of Punjab, particularly when in this Court the practice has been to entertain joint petitions by a number of persons. Moreover, there is an authority for the view that in certain circumstances, particularly like the one in the present case, a joint petition is competent (see inter alia, Annant Adinarayana v. State of Andhra Pradesh . A.I.R 1958 A.P 16. and Qurabali v. Government of Rajasthan).

    5. It is true that a discordant note has been struck by Mahajan, J. but these observations are obiter dicta. The question whether a joint petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is competent or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The facts of the case with which the Division Bench was dealing in Jiwan Singh v. Consolidation Officer, Sunam, were different. If now appears to be well settled that the mare fact, that a common question arises for consideration is not enough to justify the making of a joint petition. Similar orders may be passed in dealing with cases of different individuals, but that does not justify the making of a single writ petition when the orders relate to individual rights of different persons. I am, accordingly, of the opinion that the present petition on behalf of all the five petitioners is not competent.

    6. Mr. Aggarwal has at this stage made a request that this petition be treated as having been made on behalf of petitioner No. 5 alone and should be decided on that basis. Such a course was suggested before the Division Bench (K.L Gosain and A.M Grover, JJ.), in the case of The Revenue Patwaris Union, Punjab4 (supra) but the learned Judges refused to accede to the request. They however, permitted the petitioners to withdraw the petition instead of facing its dismissal.

    7. Even it this petition be treated as one on behalf of petitioner No. 5, I am of the opinion that it cannot succeed of merits. The two notices that had been issued by the respondent-Municipal Committee against the petitioner have been referred to earlier. By the first of these notices he had been called upon to pay the tehbazari fee, and by the other on his failure to make the payment, as required by the first notice, he had been informed to vacate the premises within 24 hours, failing which legal action had to be taken against him. According to the averments in para No. 5 of the petition, on the petitioner No. 5's refusal to vacate the premises or pay tehbazari, a part of his khokha was demolished. There is nothing on the record to indicate to what extent this wooden khokha is still in existence and whether this undemolished portion has during the past four years or so, for which the present proceedings had been pending in this Court, has remained intact. In these circumstances, even if the petitioner proves that he has a right to remain in possession of the khokha without payment of tehbazari fee, no direction or writ can be issued to the Municipal Committee to keep that half demolished structure intact, especially when the undemolished portion may constitute a potential danger to any one who may be tempted to use it.

    8. The relief sought for by the petitioner can be granted only after going into the questions whether he had occupied the area for which tehbazari is demanded by the Municipal Committee with the permission of the Punjab Government, whether he had a right to remain in possession without payment of any rent or tehbazari fee even after the property had been transferred to the Municipal Committee and it has been authorized to let out the same and realize its rent, and whether the petitioner can remain in possession despite his refusal to pay the rent or tehbazari fee. A further question that arises for consideration, according to Mr. Hans Raj Aggarwal, is whether the fee demanded by the Municipal Committee is just and proper and not exorbitant. These are all questions, which can be decided only on consideration of evidence as they involve dispute on facts. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction vesting in this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is not intended to settle disputed questions of fact, and in dealing with such matters the Court would hesitate to convert itself into an ordinary civil Court for the trial of disputes of private nature in the course of which evidence has to be adduced and considered. Apart from this difficulty of converting these proceedings into an ordinary suit, no relief can be granted to the petitioner as there is nothing on the record, excepting his own affidavit, which is disputed by the opposite party, that he had been in possession of the site, which now vests in the Municipal Committee, with the permission of the Punjab Government. Unless there is something to support this claim of his, it is not possible for this Court to restrain the Municipal Committee from demanding the tehbazari fee which the Committee is entitled to charge in view of the agreement by which the property has been placed in its charge by the Punjab Government. For all these reasons, I find no force in this petition and dismiss the same with costs.

    9. The petitioners' remedy, if any, lies in a civil Court. He may, if so advised, approach the competent Court for redress.

    10. Petition dismissed.

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    Vinod Kumar v. Municipal Committee Pathankot
    (Jul 28, 1967)