Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

C.W.P No. 576 of 1974

Judges

P.K Bahri, J.

Acts

Limitation Act and Section 11 and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Regulation 4 and by Rule 337 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules.
Punjab Public Service Commission Rules.5. State of Rajasthan
provisions of Order II Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure.
ARTICLE 316 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.7.
Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Rule 337 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules
Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure
ARTICLE 309 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
Rule 337 of the Rajasthan Service Rules
Rajasthan Civil Services Rules

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Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary — P.K. Bahri, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Shri Shanti Lal Ahuja (since deceased and substituted by his legal heirs) filed a writ petition seeking certiorari to quash respondent letters dated 1 July 1972 and 21 November 1973 that refused to refund pension which had been kept in abeyance during his period of service as Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC). He also sought a writ of mandamus requiring payment of the pension withheld for that period.

Material facts set out in the opinion: Ahuja was an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer serving in Rajasthan and was due to retire on 18 November 1959. Because he was denied 120 days' earned leave preparatory to retirement, his retirement date stood extended by 120 days. Before that extended date expired, he was appointed Member of the RPSC by the Governor by order dated 23 November 1959 (under Article 316). The appointment/order stated: re-employment from 17 March 1960; pay on re-employment fixed at Rs. 2,000 per month; his pension during the period being kept in abeyance; and deduction from his pay of an amount equivalent to death-cum-retirement gratuity (recorded as Rs. 177.46 per month).

The petitioner admitted he received the death-cum-retirement gratuity in 1960 after retirement from the IAS. He had earlier challenged deductions and the abeyance of pension by a writ petition in the Rajasthan High Court (Writ No. 337/63), which was dismissed by the Single Bench; a Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed by the Division Bench (annexure-2). No appeal to the Supreme Court was taken and that decision became final. The present petition repeated the claim that, because he was appointed to the RPSC before he had actually retired from the IAS, Regulation 4 of the RPSC (Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1951, and the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules could not validly be applied to deny him pension for the period his pension was kept in abeyance.

The State of Rajasthan filed a counter raising preliminary objections (lack of territorial jurisdiction and res judicata / Order II Rule 2 CPC) and, on merits, contended that Regulation 4 and Rule 337 applied and that practice did not permit payment of pension in addition to pay during re-employment. At final hearing no counsel appeared for the State. The learned judge dismissed the petition on grounds of lack of jurisdiction and on the basis of res judicata / Order II Rule 2 CPC; the petition was dismissed and the parties were left to bear their own costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court before which the petition was filed had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 to entertain a petition challenging orders of the Rajasthan Government (i.e., whether any part of the cause of action arose within the court's territorial jurisdiction).
Whether the petition was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and by Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (i.e., whether the petitioner had already raised the same cause of action and remedies in earlier proceedings in the Rajasthan High Court).
Whether, on the merits, the petitioner was entitled to the pension/refund withheld while re-employed as Member of the RPSC, in view of Regulation 4 of the RPSC (Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1951, and Rule 337 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules (this was the substantive relief claimed by the petitioner).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Because he was appointed Member of the RPSC before he had retired from the IAS, Regulation 4 (which contemplates a Governor deciding whether pension shall be held in abeyance where a Chairman or Member "at the time of his appointment, as such is a retired Government Servant") did not apply to him.
Being an IAS officer and holding a constitutional post under Article 316, he was not governed by the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules framed under Article 309 and therefore could not be made subject to Rule 337.
On the plain grammatical meaning of "held in abeyance" he argued entitlement to the amount held in abeyance after his retirement as Member of the RPSC.
He relied on a decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court (Civil Writ No. 2568/66 dated 21 May 1968) interpreting a similar regulation under the Punjab Public Service Commission Rules.

State of Rajasthan's Arguments (Respondent)

Preliminary objections: the court before which the petition was filed had no territorial jurisdiction because no part of the cause of action arose within its territorial jurisdiction and the Rajasthan Government is not located within its jurisdiction.
The present petition was barred by res judicata or constructive res judicata and by Order II Rule 2 CPC because the matter had been previously litigated in the Rajasthan High Court.
On the merits, the State contended that Regulation 4 and Rule 337 applied to the petitioner and that pension kept in abeyance could not be paid; the established practice is that a government servant reappointed to a post is not paid pension in addition to pay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
K.S. Rashid and son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207	Explains the two limitations on the exercise of Article 226: (1) writs cannot run beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court; (2) the person/authority must be within those territories (amenable to jurisdiction).	Used to support the conclusion that the present High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition challenging Rajasthan Government orders made wholly within Rajasthan.
Madan Gopal Rungta v. The Secretary to the Government of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1513	Reiteration of principles regarding territorial limits on Article 226 jurisdiction.	Reiterated the territorial limitation principle relied upon to hold no jurisdiction existed.
Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., AIR 1963 SC 1124	Reiterated the same jurisdictional principles under Article 226.	Relied upon as further authority for the territorial limitation of the High Court's writ jurisdiction.
Shiv Shanker Lal Gupta v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay, AIR 1968 Delhi 295	Held that if a cause of action arose outside the jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, no writ can lie in Delhi High Court for asserting rights arising out of such cause of action.	Cited to show that because the cause of action arose in Rajasthan, the present court could not entertain the petition.
M.P. Raghavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer, AIR 1971 Kerala 175	Full Bench decision holding the principles underlying Limitation Act, Section 11 and Order II Rule 2 CPC are applicable to petitions under Article 226; such provisions embody public policy principles.	Relied on to justify applying Order II Rule 2 and related principles to bar re-litigation in writ proceedings.
L. Kashi Nath Seth v. Collector, Central Excise, AIR 1979 Allahabad 128	Observation that although CPC does not directly apply by its own force to Article 226 proceedings, some salutary principles of the CPC (including those preventing multiplicity of suits) are applicable to writ proceedings.	Used to support the application of Order II Rule 2 principles to writ petitions to avoid multiplicity of litigation.
A Court v. Cross, (1825) 130 ER 540	Quoted for the observation: "Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them" — used to illustrate the policy of repose underlying rules like Order II Rule 2.	Quoted to reinforce the public-policy rationale for barring stale or repetitive claims.
K.N. Oil Industries v. State of M.P., 1986 Supp SCC 348 : AIR 1986 SC 1929	Authority indicating that principles of res judicata and constructive res judicata apply to writ proceedings.	Relied upon to show it is well settled that res judicata principles apply to Article 226 petitions and to support dismissal on that ground.
G.K. Dudani v. S.D. Sharma, 1986 Supp SCC 239 : AIR 1986 SC 1455	Also cited as authority that res judicata principles are applicable to writ proceedings.	Supported the court's conclusion that the petition was barred by res judicata.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the petition in two principal stages: jurisdiction and res judicata (including Order II Rule 2 CPC). Having dealt with these threshold matters, the judge declined to examine the merits.

Jurisdiction: The court began by considering Article 226(1) and (2) of the Constitution and reiterated that a High Court's power to issue writs is territorially limited to the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The court found no part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the court: the petitioner worked, retired and the impugned orders were made in Rajasthan; the petitioner's subsequent residence in Delhi and later correspondence with Rajasthan Government did not create a cause of action within this court's territory. The court relied upon authorities (including K.S. Rashid and son and others) that explain the territorial limitations and applied them to hold that the present High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Res judicata / Order II Rule 2 CPC: The court then examined the prior litigation in the Rajasthan High Court. It concluded that the Division Bench's findings on the issues now raised were final and that the same pleas (including entitlement to amounts "held in abeyance") had been put before the Rajasthan High Court. The judge quoted parts of the earlier judgment to demonstrate that the question whether the petitioner was entitled to pension held in abeyance had been raised and considered previously.

The court explained that even if some aspect of the relief might not have been expressly pursued previously, Order II Rule 2 CPC (and the principles underlying Limitation Act and Section 11) prevent a party from raising in a later petition matters which could have been raised in earlier proceedings arising from the same cause of action. The judge relied on Indian precedents (for example, M.P. Raghavan Nair; L. Kashi Nath Seth) and later authorities confirming that salutary principles of the Code of Civil Procedure and res judicata apply to writ proceedings under Article 226 in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The court held that the present petition was therefore barred by res judicata as well as by Order II Rule 2 CPC.

Resulting approach: Because of lack of jurisdiction and because the petition was barred by res judicata / Order II Rule 2 CPC, the court found it unnecessary and futile to re-examine the merits of the petition regarding applicability of Regulation 4 or Rule 337. The court also noted that no one appeared on behalf of the State at final arguments and took that into account only in relation to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition dismissed.

Implications and direct effects:

The High Court dismissed the writ petition for lack of territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 and on the ground that the petition was barred by res judicata and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Because the petition was dismissed on these threshold grounds, the court did not decide the substantive question whether the petitioner was entitled to the pension/refund on the merits.
The court treated the Rajasthan High Court's prior judgment as final and binding between the parties on the point that the petitioner was not entitled to pensionary benefits for the period he remained employed as Member of the RPSC.
No broader or novel precedent was fashioned by this opinion; the court applied existing principles concerning territorial jurisdiction and the applicability of res judicata and related civil procedure principles to writ proceedings. The direct consequence is that the petitioner’s claim remains barred and the prior decision stands.

Order on costs: as there was no appearance for the respondent at final arguments, the court ordered that parties bear their own costs.

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Shanti Lal Ahuja (Deceased) Through Lrs v. State Of Rajasthan .

P.K Bahri, J.:— Shri Shanti Lal Ahuja (since deceased and now substituted by his legal heirs) had filed this writ petition seeking the writ of certiorari quashing the decision of the respondent contained in letters dated July 1, 1972 and November, 21, 1973, refusing to refund petitioner's pension which was kept in abeyance during his period of service as Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and he had sought writ of mandamus requiring the respondent to pay to the petitioner the pension of that period which was kept in abeyance.

2. Briefly the facts leading to filing of this writ petition are that the petitioner was a member of the Indian Administrative Service and he was assigned to the State of Rajasthan where he had served in different capacities, inter alia, as Member of Rajasthan Board of Revenue, as Commissioner (Food & Supply), Departmental Inquiries, and he was due for retirement from the State service on the 18th November, 1959 but he was denied 120 days earned leave preparatory to his retirement and thus his date of retirement stood extended by 120 days and before the expiry of the said period, the petitioner was appointed Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission vide order dated November, 23, 1959 under Article 316 of the Constitution of India by the then Governor of the State of Rajasthan. The order was made in the following terms.

GOVERNMENT OF RAJASTHAN

APPOINTMENT (A) DEPARTMENT

No. F. 14(11) Appts. (A)/59 Dated Jaipur, the 23 Nov. 1959.

In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 316 of the Constitution of India, the Governor has been pleased to appoint Shri Shanti Lal Ahuja, I.A.S, as Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, from the date he takes over.

By order of the Governor,

Special Secretary to Govt.

Copy forwarded to:—

xxxxxx

3. The Accountant General, Rajasthan, Jaipur. At present this appointment is against the newly created post of a temporary Member, Rajasthan Public Service Commission for one year.

xxxxxx

The period of re-employment of Shri Ahuja shall be from 17th March, 1960. Under the provision to Regulation 4 of the R.P.S.C (Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1951, the Governor has been pleased to order that Shri Ahuja's pay on re-employment be fixed @ Rs. 2,000/-; p.m the pay of the post of Member, R.P.S.C, his pension during this period being kept in abeyance. The amount of pension equivalent to Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity will be deducted from his pay.

4. Shri S.L Ahuja, I.A.S, Jaipur.

xxxxxx

3. It was averred in the petition that the petitioner was appointed Member of the State Public Service Commission before he actually retired from the Indian Administrative Service and thus Regulation 4 of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (Conditions of Service) Regulations, 1951, was not applicable to him. The said Regulation reads as follows:

“4. (1)— The Chairman shall be paid a salary of Rs. 2,500/- p.m and each of the Members a salary of Rs. 2,000/- p.m

(2)— Provided that if a Chairman or a Member at the time of his appointment, as such is a retired Government Servant, the Governor shall determine whether his pension shall be held in abeyance, and if so, whether wholly or in part, or in the alternative shall determine whether the pay fixed by this Regulation shall be reduced by an amount not exceeding the amount of such pension including such portion of it as may have been commuted, if pension is allowed to be drawn in full.”

4. However, in pursuance to the abovesaid regulation and the appointment order, Rs. 177.46 P per month was deducted from the petitioner's salary every month as a pension equivalent of the death-cum-retirement gratuity and his pension was also kept in abeyance. The petitioner admits that he has been paid the amount due to him as death-cum-retirement gratuity in the year 1960 after he retired from Indian Administrative Service. The petitioner admittedly had filed a writ petition in the High Court of Rajasthan and annexure-2 is the copy of the judgment of the said High Court given in Letters Patent Appeal as the writ petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed by the Single Bench and vide this judgment the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. It was contended in that particular writ petition by the petitioner that it was not competent on the part of the authorities to have deducted Rs. 177.64 P per month as pension equivalent of death-cum-retirement gratuity inasmuch as his pension had been kept in abeyance and he was not governed by Rule 337 of the Rajasthan Service Rules inasmuch as they were framed by the Governor under Article 309 of the Constitution of India and applied to the civil servants working with the Rajasthan Government and could not be made applicable to the petitioner who was holding a constitutional post under Article 316 of the Constitution of India. It was also pleaded in the writ by the petitioner that if the payment of the pension was held in abeyance then on plain grammatical meaning of the words “held in abeyance” he was entitled to draw the amount “held in abeyance” after his retirement as a Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. It was also contended in that very writ by the petitioner that Regulation 4 contemplated two alternatives, firstly, whether his pension was to be held in abeyance wholly or in part on his being appointed as Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission and in the alternative whether his pay was to be reduced by any amount exceeding the amount of such pension including such portion as may have been commuted after the pension was allowed to be drawn in full. It was contended by the petitioner that the note given underneath the order of his appointment requiring the pension to be kept in abeyance and also for deduction of pension equivalent to death-cum-retirement gratuity, from his pay was not in consonance with Regulation 4 as either of the two alternatives could be adopted and not both the matters simultaneously. A perusal of the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court shows that it came to the conclusion that Note 3 below Rule 337 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules is applicable to the petitioner's case and by virtue of the said Rule read in consonance with Regulation 4 the petitioner was not entitled to have any refund of the amount deducted from his pay as equivalent of pension-cum-retirement gratuity as the amount payable to the petitioner as death-cum-retirement gratuity is part of the pension and the pension can be held in abeyance in case of re-employment of the Government servant after retirement. It was clearly held that the petitioner was not entitled to any such pensionary benefits kept in abeyance for the period petitioner remained employed as Member of the Public Service Commission. No further appeal to the highest court was filed against this judgment and it became final and binding on the parties. However, the petitioner filed the present writ petition pleading that there was no rule applicable to the petitioner which could debar him from getting his pension as a retired Member of the Indian Administrative Service in addition to the pay he was entitled to get as Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. It was averred in this petition that being Member of the Indian Administrative Service he was not governed by the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules and in the alternative his being constitutional appointment as Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission he was governed only by Rajasthan Public Service Commission (Conditions of Service) Regulation, 1951 and thus Regulation 4 which could apply only to a government servant who is appointed Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission after his retirement could not possibly apply to the petitioner as he was appointed as Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission before he had retired from the Indian Administrative Service and there being no provision in the aforesaid Regulation debarring the petitioner from having his pension in addition to the pay. Thus he is entitled to have the pension for the period which was kept in abeyance. The matter having the same point has been stated to be decided by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 2568/66 on 21st May, 1968 interpreting similar regulation appearing in the Punjab Public Service Commission Rules.

5. State of Rajasthan had filed a counter opposing the petition in which certain preliminary objections had been raised, firstly that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to decide this particular writ petition as no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territories amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court and also the Rajasthan Government is not located within the jurisdiction of this Court. It was also pleaded that the present petition is barred on the principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata and in any case by the provisions of Order II Rule 2, Code of Civil Procedure. On merits it was controverted that the petitioner was not governed by Regulation 4 and by Rule 337 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules. It was pleaded that the pension which had been kept in abeyance could not be paid to the petitioner as it is the practice being followed that a government servant, who is reappointed in any post, is not to get penion in addition to the pay.

6. At the time of final arguments, unfortunately no one appeared on behalf of the State of Rajasthan to argue the matter. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner in detail and gone through the record and I am of the firm view that this petition is not maintainable in this High Court and more over, the petition is barred on the principles of res judicata as well as under Order II, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

7. Coming to the first point regarding jurisdiction Article 226(1) of the Constitution clearly lays down that the High Court shall have power throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue writs of various natures mentioned in this Article. It is quite clear that the Rajasthan Government is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Under Article 226()(2) the High Court could exercise the jurisdiction in case the cause of action wholly or in part arises in the territories within its jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of such government is not within its territories. In the present case no part of cause of action at all has arisen in the territories within the jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner worked as Indian Administrative Officer in the State of Rajasthan and he retired also from that State and the impugned orders had been made by the Rajasthan Government in Rajasthan. The mere fact that after retirement as Member of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission the petitioner has taken up residence in Delhi and he had entered into some correspondence with the Rajasthan Government again claiming his pension does not mean that any part of cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. After all a decision had been taken by the Rajasthan Government in. 1963 denying the petitioner the pension etc. and the petitioner had filed a writ petition No. 337/63 in the Rajasthan High Court itself challenging the said orders of the Rajasthan Government. So, by no stretch of reasoning it can be held that any part of cause of action had occurred within the jurisdiction of this Court so as to give right to the petitioner to file a writ petition in this Court. In K.S Rashid and son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207, the Hon'ble Supreme Court after making reference to case law laid down that Article 226 confers on all the High Courts new and very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs which they never possessed before but there are only two limitations placed upon the exercise of these powers by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; one is that the power is to be exercised “throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction”, that is to say, the writs issued by the Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. The other limitation is that the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue writs “must be within those territories” and this implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. In Madan Gopal Rungta v. The Secretary to the Government of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1513 and Collector of Customs, Calcutta v. East India Commercial Co. Ltd., Calcutta, AIR 1963 SC 1124, same principles were again reiterated. In Shiv Shanker Lal Gupta v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay, AIR 1968 Delhi 295, it was held that if a cause of action had arisen out of the jurisdiction of Delhi High Court no writ can lie in Delhi High Court for asserting any right arising out of such a cause of action. Counsel for the petitioner failed to bring to my notice any case taking any view to the contrary. So, I must hold that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition.

8. The findings given by the Rajasthan High Court between the parties have become final on the points that the petitioner's right to pension is to be governed by the Rajasthan Civil Services Rules on the subject read with Regulation 4 and the petitioner was not entitled to have pensionary benefits of the period for which petitioner remained employed as Member of Rajasthan Public Service Commission. It is not possible to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the finding given in the previous judgment does not cover the issues raised now in the present writ petition. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the writ petition filed before the Rajasthan High Court the only relief sought was with regard to the refund of the amount deducted from his pay which was equivalent to the amount of death-cum-retirement gratuity and no prayer was made for payment of the other pension kept in abeyance. This appears to be not correct contention because on page 4 of the judgment it was observed by the Rajasthan High Court as follows:

“The appellant's case further was that if the payment of the pension was held in abeyance then on plain grammatical meaning of the words “held in abeyance” he was entitled to draw the amount held in abeyance after his retirement as a Member of the R.P.S.C”

9. So, it is quite clear that same plea has been raised in the present writ petition that the petitioner is entitled to have the pension which was held in abeyance. So, the finding given by the Rajasthan High Court that petitioner was not entitled to have any pensionary benefits of the period for which he remained employed as Member of Rajasthan Public Service Commission is now final and operates as res judicata. It appears that at page 14 of the judgment of Rajasthan High Court while discussing the matter from another angle, it was observed that “during the course of re-employment the petitioner's pension other than death-cum-retirement gratuity was also kept in abeyance and he himself has not made any claim for payment of the amount withheld during the period of re-employment”. Taking strength from these words the petitioner has now filed the present writ petition but he forgets that these words only mentioned that the petitioner did not claim the pension withheld as long as he was employed as Member of Rajasthan Public Service Commission. These words do not show that in the writ the petitioner had not sought the relief of refind of the whole of the pension kept in abeyance when it is clearly mentioned at page 4 of the judgment that petitioner had claimed such a relief. Even otherwise if it is to be assumed that the petitioner failed to claim this relief in the previous writ petition even then by virtue of principle laid down in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the petitioner is debarred from filing another writ petition for claiming the relief which he could have claimed in the previous writ petition as the said relief also flows from the same cause of action as was set up in the previous writ petition. In M.P Raghavan Nair v. State Insurance Officer, AIR 1971 Kerala 175, a Full Bench of the said High Court clearly laid down that the principle underlying statutory provisions like Limitation Act and Section 11 and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, are applicable to the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was observed that these provisions are not to be regarded as embodying technical rules of procedure as they are based upon principle of public policy aiming at justice, the securing of which is the very object of Article 226. It was held that the principles are principles of repose and peace. After quoting the observations in A Court v. Cross, (1825) 130 ER 540, to the effect “Long dormant claims have often more of cruelty than of justice in them”, the High Court went on to observe that the fighting of the same legal battle over and over again with the same addressee is not to be permitted and once a wrong has been suffered the fighting of the battle in piece-meal for redressal is also not to be countenanced. In L. Kashi Nath Seth v. Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad, AIR 1979 Allahabad 128, it was observed that although the explanation inserted in Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure makes it clear that the said Code does not apply by its own force to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution but some of the salutary principles enshrined in the Code of Civil Procedure are appliable to the writ proceedings because those principles only lay down the general principles of law. In this judgment also it was held that the principle laid down in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure being a general principle of law must be applied to the cases in order to avoid multiplicity of writ petitions arising from the same cause of action. I entirely agree with the reasoning given in these judgments. It is now almost well settled that principles of res judicata as well as constructive res judicata do apply to the writ proceedings (See K.N Oil Industries v. State of M.P, 1986 Supp SCC 348 : AIR 1986 SC 1929 and G.K Dudani v. S.D Sharma, 1986 Supp SCC 239 : AIR 1986 SC 1455). So examined from any angle it is quite clear that this present writ petition is barred by principle of res judicata as well as by the principle laid down in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is futile now to examine the case of the petitioner on merits again. In the result, I dismiss the writ petition but as there has been no appearance on behalf of the respondent at the stage of arguments, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.

10. Petition dismissed.

Shanti Lal Ahuja (Deceased) Through Lrs v. State Of Rajasthan .

Legal Opinion Summary — P.K. Bahri, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

State of Rajasthan's Arguments (Respondent)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Shanti Lal Ahuja (Deceased) Through Lrs v. State Of Rajasthan .

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