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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

FIR was registered on 28.6.1989 by the Managing Director of Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (PSWC) after a letter to the SHO, P.S. Makhu, alleging shortage and tampering in godown stock records. The petitioner, employed as a Godown Assistant at S/W Jalalabad and subsequently at Makhu, had taken charge of stock from a predecessor on 7.3.1989 with no shortage recorded at handing over. A subsequent physical verification (17.3.1989 and during lifting on 31.3.1989) revealed shortages (7 gunny bales; 75 found instead of 86), and an entry in the register was said to have been tampered with to show "received 79 gunny bales" instead of 86. Value of shortage was stated as Rs. 38,841/-.

After departmental enquiry and opinion of the District Attorney (Legal), Ferozepur, a police case was registered and investigation led to a challan. The petitioner stood trial on charges under Sections 409, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The Trial Court convicted and sentenced the petitioner to various terms (including terms and fines for the offences). On appeal, the Appellate Court upheld conviction on all charges but reduced the sentence for Sections 409 and 467 from three years to two years; other convictions and sentences were affirmed. The petitioner filed the present revision petition challenging his conviction and sentence on multiple grounds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether sanction under Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) was required for prosecution of the petitioner, given the charges (notably Section 409 IPC) and the petitioner's status in relation to the Punjab State Warehousing Corporation.
  2. Whether the offences alleged (criminal breach of trust, forgery and related offences) were committed by the petitioner in his capacity as a public servant such that Section 197 protection applies.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. K.S. Nalwa)

  • The prosecution of the petitioner required prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. because the charge was in respect of acts committed by him in his capacity as a public servant (specifically under Section 409 IPC).
  • Trial held without obtaining the required sanction was therefore bad and vitiated the conviction. Several decisions were placed before the Court in support of this submission (listed in the opinion).

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by PSWC counsel and State counsel)

  • The respondents contended that sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was not necessary in this case. Authorities were cited in support of the proposition that in some circumstances sanction is not required.
  • The respondent-corporation's counsel additionally argued that the accused was an employee of a corporation (PSWC) and relied upon authority suggesting an employee of a local authority or corporation may not be a "Government servant" for purposes of requiring sanction; however, the corporation was also described as being fully government owned and financed by the State Government.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State Of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao, (1993) 3 SCC 339 The opinion records this case as cited by the petitioner counsel; no further principle from this case is elaborated in the provided text. Listed among authorities relied upon by petitioner; not separately analysed in the opinion excerpt.
Maruti Ramchandra Dawane v. State of Maharashtra, 1998 (3) RCR (Criminal) 302 Recorded as cited by the petitioner; the specific rule or passage relied upon is not detailed in the text. Included in the list of authorities placed before the Court by petitioner’s counsel.
Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar, (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 432 Recorded as cited by the petitioner; the opinion does not extract a specific principle from it in the available text. Noted as one of the authorities relied on by petitioner’s counsel.
Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, (2006) 2 SCC (Cri.) 358 Cited by the petitioner; no particular principle from the case is explicated in the opinion excerpt. Mentioned among petitioner’s authorities; not separately discussed.
Om Kumar Dhankar v. State of Haryana, 2007 (3) RCR (Criminal) 496 Recorded as a case in which the Court had earlier considered various decisions on sanction; referred to as a case where related authorities were considered. The Court notes that various decisions (including earlier ones) were considered in this case and refers to it in assessing the sanction question.
Dr. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v. Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jha, 1990 (4) SCC 169 Stands for (as described in the opinion) the proposition that an accused serving with a local authority was regarded differently — in that case the accused could not be termed a Government servant and sanction under Section 197 was held not required. Respondent relied on this case to argue that the petitioner, being an employee of a corporation, did not require sanction; the Court analysed and distinguished this authority based on the facts that PSWC was fully government owned and financed.
N. Bhargavan Pillai (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Kerala, 2004 (2) Cri. CC 575 Cited by respondent counsel; the opinion does not state a specific principle from this case in the available text. Not separately analysed in the opinion excerpt; listed among respondent’s authorities.
State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 372 Referenced for distinguishing official duty from acts done in course of service; the opinion notes the Supreme Court drew a difference between official duty and actions in the course of service. Court discussed this case and observed that its holding (restricting Section 197 protection to acts in discharge of official duty) applies and supports analysis; Court considered its facts while holding sanction was required here.
Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab, (2008) 9 SCC 140 Recorded as cited by respondent counsel; the opinion does not extract a distinct rule in the text provided. Included among authorities relied upon by respondents; not separately analysed in detail in the opinion excerpt.
Raghunath Anant Govilkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 289 Mentioned by respondent counsel; no particular portion or rule is quoted in the opinion excerpt. Listed with other respondent authorities; not separately discussed.
Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 3 SCC 398 Recorded as cited by respondent counsel; the opinion does not elaborate the principle in the excerpt. One of the respondent-cited authorities; not individually analysed in the text provided.
Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, 2007 (1) RCR (Criminal) 1 Described as a recent judgment considered on the issue of sanction; the opinion records it as addressing Section 197 questions. Noted among recent Supreme Court considerations; relied upon in general assessment that the issue has been considered by higher courts.
Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, 2008 (2) RCR (Criminal) 208 Also listed as a recent authority on the sanction question. Referred to as part of the body of recent Supreme Court decisions on the subject; the opinion treats these as relevant context.
Bakshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Gurmej Kaur, 1988 (1) RCR (Criminal) 35 Quoted for the proposition that courts must balance protection to officers (from vexatious proceedings) against citizens’ interests; protection under Section 197 shields responsible public servants acting as such. Cited by the Court to frame the balancing exercise when interpreting Section 197 and deciding whether sanction is required.
P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 Quoted at length for the principle that not every offence by a public servant requires sanction; sanction is needed where the act is directly concerned with official duty or within the scope/range of official duties. The Court relied on this articulation to determine that sanction is necessary when the quality of the act makes it part of official duty — and applied that standard to the charges against the petitioner.
Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari, AIR 19566 SC 44 Cited by the Court for the proposition that the offence must be related in some manner to the discharge of official duty and there must be a reasonable connection between act and duty. Used to support the view that the act must bear a relation to official duty such that the accused could reasonably claim it was done in the course of duty; applied in analysing the petitioner’s case.
P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, 2001 (3) RCR (Cri.) 835 (SC) Referenced as laying down tests to ascertain scope and meaning of "acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty" under Section 197. Cited by the Court to explain the appropriate test: whether the offence committed is in the discharge of official duties and to inform its analysis of the facts.
B. Saha v. M.S. Kochar, 1979 (4) SCC 177 Explained that the phrase in Section 197(1) is capable of narrow and wide interpretation and that an act constituting an offence directly and reasonably connected with official duty will require sanction. Relied upon to adopt a balanced approach between extremes and to conclude that an offence directly or reasonably connected with official duty attracts the requirement of sanction.
State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh (repeated reference) Again recorded as drawing a distinction between official duty and acts done in the course of service; used to show Section 197 does not extend protection to every act by a public servant. Court considered the decision and applied its distinction to conclude the petitioner's acts were in discharge of official duty and thus required sanction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the decisive issue as whether prosecution of the petitioner required prior sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The analysis proceeded by reference to:

  1. Nature of charges and factual matrix: The first and principal charge was under Section 409 IPC (criminal breach of trust by a public servant). The complaint and charge sheet described the petitioner as a public servant entrusted with stock and dominion over it, and the alleged breach of trust occurred in that capacity. Other charges (Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC) related to alleged forgery and tampering of stock registers and were factually interconnected with the Section 409 allegation and formed part of the same transaction.
  2. Legal test from precedents: The Court canvassed authorities explaining the scope of Section 197. It relied on P. Arulswami for the principle that not every offence by a public servant requires sanction; the "quality of the act" is important and sanction is required when the act is within the scope or range of official duties or directly concerned with official duty. The Court also cited Matajog Dobey and Matajog-like authority that an offence must be related in some manner to discharge of official duty with a reasonable connection. B. Saha was cited to advocate a balanced interpretation — between too narrow and too wide — concluding that an act constituting an offence directly and reasonably connected with official duty will require sanction. P.K. Pradhan was referred to for tests to ascertain whether an accused acted in discharge (or purporting to discharge) official duty.
  3. Application to facts: Applying the tests, the Court concluded that the alleged offences were not detached from the petitioner's official role: the petitioner was responsible for protecting stock in the course of his duties, and the alleged breach, register tampering and related offences were inextricably mingled with his official duty. Thus the acts bore a reasonable and direct connection to the discharge of official duties, which attracted the protection/sanction requirement of Section 197 Cr.P.C.
  4. Characterisation of the petitioner as a public servant: The Court noted the wide definition of "public servant" (Section 21 IPC as summarized) and observed that PSWC was fully government owned and financed by the State Government, so the petitioner fell within the definition of a public servant for these purposes. The Court distinguished Dr. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela (where the employee of a local authority was held not to be a government servant) on facts, concluding that the petitioner should be construed as a public servant.
  5. Conclusion on validity of trial: Because the Court found sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. was required for the prosecution (particularly given the Section 409 allegation) and the admitted fact was that no sanction had been obtained before trial, the trial was declared invalid. The Court therefore set aside the conviction and sentence on this ground and did not proceed to examine other grounds raised by the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The revision petition is allowed; the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner are set aside for want of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.

Implications

  • Direct consequence for the parties: The petitioner’s conviction and sentence (as imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the Appellate Court) have been set aside because the prosecution proceeded without the statutory sanction required under Section 197 Cr.P.C. The Court did not decide matters on other grounds raised and remitted no further directions in the excerpt.
  • On precedent and legal development: The Court based its decision on existing principles articulated by higher courts (as cited) concerning the scope of Section 197 Cr.P.C. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond applying those established tests to these facts; it expressly set aside the conviction on the procedural ground of absence of sanction.

The Court explicitly stated it was not entering upon other grounds urged by the petitioner once the conviction was set aside for lack of sanction.

    Bhushan Chander Petitioner v. State Of Punjab

    RANJIT SINGH, J.

    Through this revision petition, the petitioner has impugned his conviction for an offence under Sections 409/467/468/471 IPC and the award of sentence of two years under Sections 409/467 and same sentence under Sections 468/471 coupled with total amount of fine of Rs. 5000/- for different offences.

    FIR was registered against the petitioner on 28.6.1989 by Managing Director Punjab State Warehousing Corporation through a letter written to SHO P.S Makhu. It is alleged that the petitioner while being posted at S/W Jalalabad as Godown Assistant, had taken over the charge from Agya Pal Singh, Technical Assistant. The charge was handed over in the presence of Roop Lal, Technical Officer and Sh. R.N Dhir W/Manager Zira. It is stated that there was no shortage at that time of handing over of charge on 7.3.1989, but on a physical verification carried out on 17.3.1989, certain shortages were detected. 7 gunny bales were found deficient. Entry in this regard was incorporated by Sh. SC Pujara at page No. 49 of the godown register. Subsequently, Sh. SL Verma District Magistrate, Ferozepur, had visited Makhu on 28.3.1989 He found that the petitioner had tempered with the godown register at page 45 by making an entry ‘received 79 gunny bales’ instead of 86 gunny bales leaving 7 bales short’.

    Sh. Roop Lal, Technical Officer was deputed to supervise the lifting of the black unserviceable polythene covers at Makhu on 31.3.1989 While in the process of physical verification of stock, 75 gunny bales were found instead of 86. The value of short gunny bales was Rs. 38,841/-. A departmental inquiry was ordered besides writing a letter to SHO Police Station, Makhu. Preliminary enquiry was conducted and after seeking opinion of the District Attorney(Legal) Ferozepur, the case was registered under Sections 409/467/468/471 IPC. The investigation was commenced and thereafter, challan was filed before the Trial Court for the offences as noticed.

    The parties led evidence and also placed on record certain documents. The petitioner examined one witness in defence and on the basis of evidence led by the parties, the Trial Court found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to various terms of imprisonment coupled with fine. The petitioner appealed against his conviction. The Appellate Court considered the various pleas raised before it and has upheld the conviction of the petitioner on all the charges, but reduced the term of imprisonment from 3 years to RI to two years for offence under Sections 409 and 467. The conviction and the sentence for the remaining offences, however, were affirmed. The petitioner, therefore, has filed the present revision petition on various grounds.

    Considering the limited scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction, the counsel for the parties have been heard.

    Mr. K.S Nalwa, counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that charge against the petitioner was on account of his capacity as a public servant but no sanction was obtained for his prosecution as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C To substantiate his plea that the trial of the petitioner without obtaining sanction would be bad, the counsel has placed before me number of judgments. Counsel has made reference to State Of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao.(1993) 3 SCC 339, Maruti Ramchandra Dawane v. State of Maharashtra, 1998 (3), RCR (Criminal) 302, Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar, (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 432, Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, (2006) 2 SCC (Cri.) 358, and Om Kumar Dhankar v. State of Haryana, 2007 (3), RCR (Criminal) 496

    Mr. Harsh Aggarwal, Advocate, appearing for the Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (for short ‘PSWC’) however, has seriously joined issues with the counsel for the petitioner on this ground. Even the State counsel would also say that the sanction for prosecution was not needed in this case and in support has made reference to some of the judgments like Dr. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v. Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jha, 1990 (4) SCC 169, N. Bhargavan Pillai (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Kerala, 2004 (2) Cri. CC 575, State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 372, Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab, (2008) 9 SCC 140, Raghunath Anant Govilkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 289 and Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 3 SCC 398.

    In view of the conflicting stands, it is to be examined if there was any requirement of obtaining sanction for prosecuting the petitioner in terms of Section 197 Cr.P.C To appreciate this aspect of the submissions, it would be essential to notice the charges as preferred against the petitioner. The first charge preferred against the petitioner is under Section 409 IPC. Rather this Section punishes breach of thrust by a public servant or banker, merchant or agent. The very Section itself is clear that offence created under Section is in respect of public servant and others. Section says, whosoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over property in his capacity as a public servant commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, can be punished under this Section. It is not disputed before me that the petitioner was a public servant and the offences alleged against the petitioner relate to his duties as a public servant. The first charge made against the petitioner is under Section 409 IPC and the allegations thereof are as under:-

    “That you during March, 1989 in area of the village Makhu being a public servant as a Godown Assistant in Public State Warehousing Department at Makhu entrusted with and dominion over the stock, specifically of bardana (gunny bags) bales numbering 11 of the value of Rs. 38,841/- and the record in such a capacity committed breach of trust and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 409 IPC.” It is thus, clear that the petitioner was charged for this offence in his capacity as a public servant. He was given the charge of the stock or had the dominion over the stock in his capacity as a public servant. It is alleged that he had committed the criminal breach of trust, while he was in the performance of his duties as a public servant. Charges two to four, in my view, are related and rather appear to be part of same transaction. Second charge against the petitioner is under Section 467 for forging the stock register and this was only to explain the deficiency that had been alleged against him. The third charge relates to tempering entries in the stock register for using the same for the purpose of cheating and is in relation to an offence of criminal breach of trust alleged in the first charge. Similar is the position in regard to the fourth charge. The requirement of sanction is to be seen in light of this factual position. The issue in regard to grant of sanction has been raised in large number of cases and has been subject matter of discussion and interpretation by various courts. In the two recent judgments in the case of Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, 2007 (1) RCR (Criminal) 1 and Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, 2008 (2) RCR (Criminal) 208, this issue has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. These two judgments and various other decisions have been considered by this Court in Om Kumar Dhankar's case (supra). It is emphasized in Bakshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Gurmej Kaur, 1988 (1) RCR (Criminal) 35 that the Court has to balance between the protection to the officer and that of the citizens. As noticed in this case, the protection given under Section 197 of Cr. PC. is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly of vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as a public servant. It is noticed in this case that when the public servant purporting to act as such, he still would be under the statutory protection as provided under Section 197 Cr.P.C In the instant case, it is not a situation where the petitioner is alleged to have done something while purporting to act as a public servant. The allegations are made against him in his capacity as a public servant. The observation made in case of P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 is relevant to appreciate this aspect. In this case, it has been observed as under:-

    “It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duty so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable.” The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari , AIR 19566 SC 44, may also be relevant and can be noticed here. As is observed in this case, the offence as alleged to have been committed by the accused person must have been something to do or must be related in some manner with the discharge of the official duty. It is further observed that there must have a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty. The act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in the course of performance of his duty.

    In P.K Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, 2001 (3) RCR (Cri.) 835 (SC), some different tests have been laid down in deciding cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code:-

    i.e any offence alleged to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. It is also observed in this case that the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused person must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty. The point for determination is whether the offence committed is in the discharge of official duties.

    There seems to be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. Accordingly, what the Courts have to find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of official duty, though, possibly, in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation.

    In B. Saha v. M.S Kochar, 1979 (4) SCC 177, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the wording of the Section to understand the requirement of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C It is observed:-

    “The words ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, ‘it is no part of an official duty to commit an of-fence, and never can be’. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every of-fence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision.”

    On the other hand, the counsel for the respondents submits that the allegations of cheating or breach of trust are of a nature, which cannot be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. No doubt in some of the cases, it has been observed that in such cases, official status only provides opportunity for commission of offence. The observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Saha's case (supra) explains the position to understand this aspect. The words ‘any offence’ is not to be construed narrowly as that can result in making the sanction totally sterile. Right approach in such cases is between two extremes as noted in this case where an act constituting an offence directly or reasonably is connected with official duty making the sanction of prosecution essential having regard to the facts. So far as the commission of offence in this case is concerned, the very allegation would clearly reveal that it is not a case where the allegations are in any other capacity than a public servant. The allegation against the petitioner is that while being a public servant, he had committed a criminal breach of trust. It is only in the performance of the official duty that the petitioner is alleged to have been found with certain deficiencies for which allegation of criminal breach of trust as well has been made against him. Certainly the facts in this care are inextricably mingled with the official duty of the petitioner to be considered severable to call for dispensing with the requirement of sanction. The judgment relied upon by the counsel for the respondents primarily would not point to any different situation. In the case of Paras Nath Singh (supra), this Court had refused to grant appeal on the ground that person, who had granted sanction for initiation of the criminal proceedings was not the authority to do so. The aggrieved person in the said case has faced trial for alleged commission of the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 461 & 468 IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has drawn difference between the official duty and doing something by public servant in the course of his service. It is observed that the section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service, but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions, which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. Even this observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would fully apply to the facts of the present case. Here, the petitioner is alleged to have committed this offence not only as a public servant but is stated to have done so in discharge of his official duty. In discharge of his official duty, the petitioner was required to protect stock, which he failed to do so and so he is asked to account for the same. As has been observed in B. Saha's case (supra), the words used in Section 197(1) are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. Interpreting the word in an ordinary sense may lead to make requirement of a sanction being totally redundant. The petitioner is not alleged to have done anything other than what was expected from him in discharge of his official duty. Under normal circumstances, the offence under Sections 467/468/471 IPC may be of such a nature that requirement of obtaining sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C may not be called for. The offences in this case have been interconnected with the main offence alleged against the petitioner under Section 409 IPC and it would clearly indicate that these offences could not be separately treated or dealt with. Requirement of obtaining sanction would be needed for an offence under Section 409 IPC and the same may not be separated from the remaining offences.

    The counsel for the respondent-Corporation has then made reference to Dr. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela's case (supra). In this case, the accused was working as Laboratory Officer in Municipal Corporation. He was entrusted with functions of public analyst. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that he could not be termed as a Government servant as he was serving with the local authority. It is, accordingly, held that the sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C was not required in this case. Counsel has co-related the fact situation in this case with the present case. His submission is that the petitioner in the present case was not the Government servant, but was an employee of a Corporation. The Punjab State Warehousing Corporation is fully Government owned and also is completely financed by the State Government. In this context, the petitioner would definitely be covered under the definition of a public servant. Indeed, this fact has also not been denied by the counsel for the respondents.

    Public servant under Section 21 of the IPC has been defined in a very wide manner. Every person, who is in the service or pay of a local authority or a Corporation established by or under a Central Provincial or State Act or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, is defined to be a public servant. The employment of the petitioner with the Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, thus, would not bring any change in his status as a public servant. The petitioner is construed to be a public servant. If any other interpretation is given to the same then his trial under Sections 409 IPC may not have been open. Perhaps in order to avoid this difficulty that counsel for the respondent - Corporation has pleaded that the petitioner is a public servant. His submission that some of public servant should be such, which should be removable by the Government, may amount to stretching the provision to artificial limits. There are large number of employees, who are in the service of the State or the Central Government, whose services can be dispensed with by various officers working in the Government. That requirement, thus, cannot be separated to obtain the sanction under Section 197 Cr.PC I am of the considered view that a sanction was needed under Section 197 Cr.PC in this case for prosecuting he petitioner as allegations against him related to discharge of his duties as public servant. Concededly the petitioner was put to trial without obtaining any sanction. The trial would not be valid. The conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner is, therefore, set aside on this ground. I am not going into the other grounds raised by the counsel for the petitioner.

    The revision petition is, accordingly, allowed.

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    Bhushan Chander Petitioner v. State Of Punjab
    (May 5, 2011)