RANJIT SINGH, J.
Through this revision petition, the petitioner has impugned his conviction for an offence under Sections 409/467/468/471 IPC and the award of sentence of two years under Sections 409/467 and same sentence under Sections 468/471 coupled with total amount of fine of Rs. 5000/- for different offences.
FIR was registered against the petitioner on 28.6.1989 by Managing Director Punjab State Warehousing Corporation through a letter written to SHO P.S Makhu. It is alleged that the petitioner while being posted at S/W Jalalabad as Godown Assistant, had taken over the charge from Agya Pal Singh, Technical Assistant. The charge was handed over in the presence of Roop Lal, Technical Officer and Sh. R.N Dhir W/Manager Zira. It is stated that there was no shortage at that time of handing over of charge on 7.3.1989, but on a physical verification carried out on 17.3.1989, certain shortages were detected. 7 gunny bales were found deficient. Entry in this regard was incorporated by Sh. SC Pujara at page No. 49 of the godown register. Subsequently, Sh. SL Verma District Magistrate, Ferozepur, had visited Makhu on 28.3.1989 He found that the petitioner had tempered with the godown register at page 45 by making an entry ‘received 79 gunny bales’ instead of 86 gunny bales leaving 7 bales short’.
Sh. Roop Lal, Technical Officer was deputed to supervise the lifting of the black unserviceable polythene covers at Makhu on 31.3.1989 While in the process of physical verification of stock, 75 gunny bales were found instead of 86. The value of short gunny bales was Rs. 38,841/-. A departmental inquiry was ordered besides writing a letter to SHO Police Station, Makhu. Preliminary enquiry was conducted and after seeking opinion of the District Attorney(Legal) Ferozepur, the case was registered under Sections 409/467/468/471 IPC. The investigation was commenced and thereafter, challan was filed before the Trial Court for the offences as noticed.
The parties led evidence and also placed on record certain documents. The petitioner examined one witness in defence and on the basis of evidence led by the parties, the Trial Court found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to various terms of imprisonment coupled with fine. The petitioner appealed against his conviction. The Appellate Court considered the various pleas raised before it and has upheld the conviction of the petitioner on all the charges, but reduced the term of imprisonment from 3 years to RI to two years for offence under Sections 409 and 467. The conviction and the sentence for the remaining offences, however, were affirmed. The petitioner, therefore, has filed the present revision petition on various grounds.
Considering the limited scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction, the counsel for the parties have been heard.
Mr. K.S Nalwa, counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that charge against the petitioner was on account of his capacity as a public servant but no sanction was obtained for his prosecution as required under Section 197 Cr.P.C To substantiate his plea that the trial of the petitioner without obtaining sanction would be bad, the counsel has placed before me number of judgments. Counsel has made reference to State Of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao.(1993) 3 SCC 339, Maruti Ramchandra Dawane v. State of Maharashtra, 1998 (3), RCR (Criminal) 302, Rakesh Kumar Mishra v. State of Bihar, (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 432, Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das, (2006) 2 SCC (Cri.) 358, and Om Kumar Dhankar v. State of Haryana, 2007 (3), RCR (Criminal) 496
Mr. Harsh Aggarwal, Advocate, appearing for the Punjab State Warehousing Corporation (for short ‘PSWC’) however, has seriously joined issues with the counsel for the petitioner on this ground. Even the State counsel would also say that the sanction for prosecution was not needed in this case and in support has made reference to some of the judgments like Dr. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela v. Naresh Kumar Chandrashanker Jha, 1990 (4) SCC 169, N. Bhargavan Pillai (Dead) by Lrs. v. State of Kerala, 2004 (2) Cri. CC 575, State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh, (2009) 6 SCC 372, Bholu Ram v. State of Punjab, (2008) 9 SCC 140, Raghunath Anant Govilkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 289 and Choudhury Parveen Sultana v. State of West Bengal, (2009) 3 SCC 398.
In view of the conflicting stands, it is to be examined if there was any requirement of obtaining sanction for prosecuting the petitioner in terms of Section 197 Cr.P.C To appreciate this aspect of the submissions, it would be essential to notice the charges as preferred against the petitioner. The first charge preferred against the petitioner is under Section 409 IPC. Rather this Section punishes breach of thrust by a public servant or banker, merchant or agent. The very Section itself is clear that offence created under Section is in respect of public servant and others. Section says, whosoever being in any manner entrusted with property or with any dominion over property in his capacity as a public servant commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, can be punished under this Section. It is not disputed before me that the petitioner was a public servant and the offences alleged against the petitioner relate to his duties as a public servant. The first charge made against the petitioner is under Section 409 IPC and the allegations thereof are as under:-
“That you during March, 1989 in area of the village Makhu being a public servant as a Godown Assistant in Public State Warehousing Department at Makhu entrusted with and dominion over the stock, specifically of bardana (gunny bags) bales numbering 11 of the value of Rs. 38,841/- and the record in such a capacity committed breach of trust and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 409 IPC.” It is thus, clear that the petitioner was charged for this offence in his capacity as a public servant. He was given the charge of the stock or had the dominion over the stock in his capacity as a public servant. It is alleged that he had committed the criminal breach of trust, while he was in the performance of his duties as a public servant. Charges two to four, in my view, are related and rather appear to be part of same transaction. Second charge against the petitioner is under Section 467 for forging the stock register and this was only to explain the deficiency that had been alleged against him. The third charge relates to tempering entries in the stock register for using the same for the purpose of cheating and is in relation to an offence of criminal breach of trust alleged in the first charge. Similar is the position in regard to the fourth charge. The requirement of sanction is to be seen in light of this factual position. The issue in regard to grant of sanction has been raised in large number of cases and has been subject matter of discussion and interpretation by various courts. In the two recent judgments in the case of Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab, 2007 (1) RCR (Criminal) 1 and Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, 2008 (2) RCR (Criminal) 208, this issue has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. These two judgments and various other decisions have been considered by this Court in Om Kumar Dhankar's case (supra). It is emphasized in Bakshish Singh Brar v. Smt. Gurmej Kaur, 1988 (1) RCR (Criminal) 35 that the Court has to balance between the protection to the officer and that of the citizens. As noticed in this case, the protection given under Section 197 of Cr. PC. is to protect responsible public servants against the institution of possibly of vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have been committed by them while they are acting or purporting to act as a public servant. It is noticed in this case that when the public servant purporting to act as such, he still would be under the statutory protection as provided under Section 197 Cr.P.C In the instant case, it is not a situation where the petitioner is alleged to have done something while purporting to act as a public servant. The allegations are made against him in his capacity as a public servant. The observation made in case of P. Arulswami v. State of Madras, AIR 1967 SC 776 is relevant to appreciate this aspect. In this case, it has been observed as under:-
“It is not therefore every offence committed by a public servant that requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code; nor even every act done by him while he is actually engaged in the performance of his official duties; but if the act complained of is directly concerned with his official duty so that, if questioned, it could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then sanction would be necessary. It is quality of the act that is important and if it falls within the scope and range of his official duties the protection contemplated by Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or it may be committed within the scope of the official duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty there can be no protection. It is only when it is either within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it that the protection is claimable.” The observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Matajog Dobey v. H. C. Bhari , AIR 19566 SC 44, may also be relevant and can be noticed here. As is observed in this case, the offence as alleged to have been committed by the accused person must have been something to do or must be related in some manner with the discharge of the official duty. It is further observed that there must have a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty. The act must bear such relation to the duty that the accused could lay a reasonable claim, but not pretended or fanciful claim that he did it in the course of performance of his duty.
In P.K Pradhan v. State of Sikkim, 2001 (3) RCR (Cri.) 835 (SC), some different tests have been laid down in deciding cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code:-
i.e any offence alleged to have been committed while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. It is also observed in this case that the offence alleged to have been committed by the accused person must have something to do, or must be related in some manner with the discharge of official duty. The point for determination is whether the offence committed is in the discharge of official duties.
There seems to be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. Accordingly, what the Courts have to find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of official duty, though, possibly, in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation.
In B. Saha v. M.S Kochar, 1979 (4) SCC 177, the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the wording of the Section to understand the requirement of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C It is observed:-
“The words ‘any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section 197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too narrowly, the Section will be rendered altogether sterile, for, ‘it is no part of an official duty to commit an of-fence, and never can be’. In the wider sense, these words will take under their umbrella every act constituting an offence, committed in the course of the same transaction in which the official duty is performed or purports to be performed. The right approach to the import of these words lies between two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not every of-fence committed by a public servant while engaged in the performance of his official duty, which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act constituting an offence, directly and reasonably connected with his official duty will require sanction for prosecution under the said provision.”
On the other hand, the counsel for the respondents submits that the allegations of cheating or breach of trust are of a nature, which cannot be regarded as having been committed by any public servant while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duty. No doubt in some of the cases, it has been observed that in such cases, official status only provides opportunity for commission of offence. The observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B. Saha's case (supra) explains the position to understand this aspect. The words ‘any offence’ is not to be construed narrowly as that can result in making the sanction totally sterile. Right approach in such cases is between two extremes as noted in this case where an act constituting an offence directly or reasonably is connected with official duty making the sanction of prosecution essential having regard to the facts. So far as the commission of offence in this case is concerned, the very allegation would clearly reveal that it is not a case where the allegations are in any other capacity than a public servant. The allegation against the petitioner is that while being a public servant, he had committed a criminal breach of trust. It is only in the performance of the official duty that the petitioner is alleged to have been found with certain deficiencies for which allegation of criminal breach of trust as well has been made against him. Certainly the facts in this care are inextricably mingled with the official duty of the petitioner to be considered severable to call for dispensing with the requirement of sanction. The judgment relied upon by the counsel for the respondents primarily would not point to any different situation. In the case of Paras Nath Singh (supra), this Court had refused to grant appeal on the ground that person, who had granted sanction for initiation of the criminal proceedings was not the authority to do so. The aggrieved person in the said case has faced trial for alleged commission of the offences punishable under Sections 409, 420, 461 & 468 IPC. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case has drawn difference between the official duty and doing something by public servant in the course of his service. It is observed that the section does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission done by a public servant in service, but restricts its scope of operation to only those acts or omissions, which are done by a public servant in discharge of official duty. Even this observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court would fully apply to the facts of the present case. Here, the petitioner is alleged to have committed this offence not only as a public servant but is stated to have done so in discharge of his official duty. In discharge of his official duty, the petitioner was required to protect stock, which he failed to do so and so he is asked to account for the same. As has been observed in B. Saha's case (supra), the words used in Section 197(1) are capable of a narrow as well as a wide interpretation. Interpreting the word in an ordinary sense may lead to make requirement of a sanction being totally redundant. The petitioner is not alleged to have done anything other than what was expected from him in discharge of his official duty. Under normal circumstances, the offence under Sections 467/468/471 IPC may be of such a nature that requirement of obtaining sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C may not be called for. The offences in this case have been interconnected with the main offence alleged against the petitioner under Section 409 IPC and it would clearly indicate that these offences could not be separately treated or dealt with. Requirement of obtaining sanction would be needed for an offence under Section 409 IPC and the same may not be separated from the remaining offences.
The counsel for the respondent-Corporation has then made reference to Dr. Lakshmansingh Himatsingh Vaghela's case (supra). In this case, the accused was working as Laboratory Officer in Municipal Corporation. He was entrusted with functions of public analyst. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that he could not be termed as a Government servant as he was serving with the local authority. It is, accordingly, held that the sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C was not required in this case. Counsel has co-related the fact situation in this case with the present case. His submission is that the petitioner in the present case was not the Government servant, but was an employee of a Corporation. The Punjab State Warehousing Corporation is fully Government owned and also is completely financed by the State Government. In this context, the petitioner would definitely be covered under the definition of a public servant. Indeed, this fact has also not been denied by the counsel for the respondents.
Public servant under Section 21 of the IPC has been defined in a very wide manner. Every person, who is in the service or pay of a local authority or a Corporation established by or under a Central Provincial or State Act or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956, is defined to be a public servant. The employment of the petitioner with the Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, thus, would not bring any change in his status as a public servant. The petitioner is construed to be a public servant. If any other interpretation is given to the same then his trial under Sections 409 IPC may not have been open. Perhaps in order to avoid this difficulty that counsel for the respondent - Corporation has pleaded that the petitioner is a public servant. His submission that some of public servant should be such, which should be removable by the Government, may amount to stretching the provision to artificial limits. There are large number of employees, who are in the service of the State or the Central Government, whose services can be dispensed with by various officers working in the Government. That requirement, thus, cannot be separated to obtain the sanction under Section 197 Cr.PC I am of the considered view that a sanction was needed under Section 197 Cr.PC in this case for prosecuting he petitioner as allegations against him related to discharge of his duties as public servant. Concededly the petitioner was put to trial without obtaining any sanction. The trial would not be valid. The conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner is, therefore, set aside on this ground. I am not going into the other grounds raised by the counsel for the petitioner.
The revision petition is, accordingly, allowed.