AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 7(1) of the Taxation Laws (Extention to Merged States and Amendment) Act (67 of 1949) and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Article 291 of the Constitution, section 4(x)(a) of the 1922 Act and section 10(19) of the 1961 Act.
  • provisions of section 14(1) of the 1922 Act or section 10(2) of the 1961 Act
  • section 14(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the 1922 Act)
  • Administration of Orissa Order, 1948, the Keonjhar Income-tax Regulation
  • Article 372 of the Constitution. Only the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • section 4 of the Keonjhar Income-tax Regulation, 1938. Keonjhar State
  • section 14(1) of 1922 Act and section 10(2) of the 1961 Act
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • section 14(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Act 67 of 1949 and the Constitution of India
  • provisions of section 14(1) of the 1922 Act.
  • section 14(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act,
  • section 2(24) of the 1922 Act and 1961 Act,
  • provision of the 1922 Act or 1961 Act.
  • section 7(1) of Act 67 of 1949
  • FOREIGN JURISDICTION ACT 1947
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • section 7(1) of the Taxation Laws (Extention to Merged States and Amendment) Act (67 of 1949) and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Article 291 of the Constitution, section 4(x)(a) of the 1922 Act and section 10(19) of the 1961 Act.
  • provisions of section 14(1) of the 1922 Act or section 10(2) of the 1961 Act
  • section 14(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the 1922 Act)
  • Administration of Orissa Order, 1948, the Keonjhar Income-tax Regulation
  • Article 372 of the Constitution. Only the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • section 4 of the Keonjhar Income-tax Regulation, 1938. Keonjhar State
  • section 14(1) of 1922 Act and section 10(2) of the 1961 Act
  • INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • section 14(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922,
  • Act 67 of 1949 and the Constitution of India
  • provisions of section 14(1) of the 1922 Act.
  • section 14(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act,
  • section 2(24) of the 1922 Act and 1961 Act,
  • provision of the 1922 Act or 1961 Act.
  • section 7(1) of Act 67 of 1949
  • FOREIGN JURISDICTION ACT 1947
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by B.R. Tuli, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

India attained independence on August 15, 1947. The rulers of Indian States executed instruments of accession surrendering state properties and sovereignty in favour of the Government of India; the Government undertook to pay privy purses and certain allowances to rulers' dependents. The Maharaja of Patiala entered into such an arrangement and, by letter dated April 2, 1949, the Ministry of States fixed amounts for privy purse, Raj Pramukh allowance and a total ceiling of Rs. 5,00,000 per annum for allowances to Rajmatas and other relations (with specified sub‑allocations).

The petitioner is a half‑brother of the Maharaja of Patiala and was paid an allowance of Rs. 2,000 per month. He claimed that the State of Patiala was an impartible estate of a Hindu undivided family governed by primogeniture, under which junior members (Maharajkumars) were entitled to maintenance allowances out of the income of the impartible estate. He relied on an inter‑state agreement (Dastur‑Ul‑Amal) and asserted that his allowance was exempt from income tax under section 14(1) of the Income‑Tax Act, 1922 (and the corresponding section 10(2) of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961).

Historically, distribution of allowances was made by the Maharaja until 1953; thereafter family members drew allowances directly from the Patiala treasury without tax deduction until May 1955. From May 1955 the Treasury Officer, Patiala, paid the petitioner after deducting income tax at source following a Finance Department circular. The petitioner challenged the deduction and filed the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the monthly allowance of Rs. 2,000 paid to the petitioner by the Government of India (through the Treasury, Patiala) can be regarded as "any sum received by an individual as a member of a Hindu undivided family" or "in the case of any impartible estate, where such sum has been paid out of the income of the estate belonging to the family" so as to be exempt from income tax under section 14(1) of the Income‑Tax Act, 1922 (or section 10(2) of the Income‑Tax Act, 1961).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that the State of Patiala was an impartible estate within a joint Hindu family governed by primogeniture and that junior members had a settled right to maintenance allowances payable out of the income of that impartible estate.
  • He relied on the historical agreement (Dastur‑Ul‑Amal) and on section 14(1) of the Income‑Tax Act, 1922 (and corresponding section 10(2) of the 1961 Act) to claim exemption from income tax for the allowance.
  • The petitioner also argued that the Rs. 2,000 monthly payment was a maintenance allowance (not income) and therefore not taxable; he relied on precedents he considered supportive.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents (as reflected in the opinion) relied on precedent (the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Rajkumar Lakhminarayan Bhanja Deo v. Commissioner of Income‑Tax) and on the statutory and constitutional context to maintain that the allowance was paid out of public revenues (ultimately charged on Consolidated Fund of India) and not out of the income of a Hindu undivided family or an impartible estate.
  • They pointed to the legislative scheme and the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 (paragraph 15) which granted exemption only to specified persons (widow or mother of a former Ruler) indicating an intention not to exempt other relatives' allowances.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajkumar Lakhminarayan Bhanja Deo v. Commissioner of Income‑Tax, Bihar and Orissa (1956 58 I.T.R 457) Held that maintenance allowance paid to a younger brother of a Ruler was not exempt where it was paid out of State revenues and relevant State regulation had been displaced by Act 67 of 1949; the payment could not be treated as coming from a Hindu undivided family's income. The court relied on and treated the observations in this decision as squarely applicable: allowances paid from public revenues are not exempt under section 14(1) of the 1922 Act.
Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union of India (1969 3 SCC 150) Explained that Article 291 charges the privy purse on and to be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India; the privy purse is not private property of the Ruler. The court used this to reason by parity that allowances for relations of former Rulers are likewise charged on and paid out of public funds and not out of HUF or impartible estate income.
H.H. Maharajdhiraja Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India (1971 1 SCC 85) Held (paras 123–124) that Article 291 creates a constitutional liability to pay privy purses charged on public funds; obligations under covenants lost their original character on constitutional acceptance and the source of obligation changed. The court cited these paragraphs to support that the impartible estate lost its character on merger and that obligations to pay allowances rest on public revenues (constitutional source) rather than on private family income.
In re: Gajapatiraj, Vizianagaram Referenced by petitioner as precedent where property existed as HUF or impartible estate. The court noted this authority (and several others cited by petitioner) but held them not relevant because in those cases the allowances were paid out of income of an existing HUF or impartible estate; unlike the present facts.
Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bihar and Orissa v. Maharaja Visweswar Singh (1935 3 ITR 216) One of several older decisions where allowances arose from identifiable family/impartible estate income. The court observed such cases were distinguishable and inapplicable here because the allowances in those cases were paid out of family/estate income.
Commissioner of Income‑tax, Bihar and Orissa v. Maharani Gyan Manjuri Kuari (1945 13 ITR 56) Similar principle: allowance paid from HUF/impartible estate income. The court treated it as distinguishable and not applicable to present facts.
Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Sarwan Kumar (1945 13 ITR 361) Similar authority on allowances from HUF/impartible estate. Distinguished by the court as not relevant to the present situation.
Commissioner of Income‑tax, Central and United Provinces v. Rani Bijay Raj Kunwai (1948 16 ITR 1) Another decision concerning allowances from family/estate income. The court held it inapplicable because the present allowance was paid by Government out of public revenues after merger.
Promod Chandra v. State of Orissa (AIR 1962 SC 1288) Case cited by petitioner; concerns state/family revenue issues. The court listed it among petitioner's authorities but found them not relevant because of factual distinction (presence of family/estate income in those cases).
Rani Anand Kunwar v. Commissioner of Income‑tax, C.P. & U.P. (1943 11 I.T.R 935) Chief Court of Oudh decision applying section 14(1) where allowances were paid from family/estate income. Cited as another distinguishable authority; the court held it inapplicable to the present facts.
Commissioner of Income‑Tax v. Shaw Wallace and Company (59 IA 206) Authority cited for a definition of "income": periodic monetary return with some regularity from definite sources (Sir George Lowndes' formulation). The court quoted this definition and used it to conclude that the petitioner's allowance qualified as "income" for taxation purposes.
Gopal Saran Narain Singh v. Commissioner of Income‑Tax (1935 ITR 237) Lord Russell's amplification: anything properly described as income is taxable unless expressly exempted. The court relied on this amplification to support the proposition that the allowance is taxable income absent an express exemption.
Kamakashya Narain Singh v. Commissioner of Income‑Tax (1943 ITR 513) Lord Wright's observations on the broad and multifaceted character of "income". The court used these observations to reinforce that the allowance falls within the broad conception of taxable income.
Venkataswami Naidu and Company v. Commissioner of Income‑Tax (1959 35 ITR 694) Approved the above judicial observations regarding the nature of "income". The court invoked this approval to support the classification of the allowance as income subject to tax.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a step‑by‑step analysis strictly based on the factual and legal materials before it:

  1. Merger and source of payment: The courts observed that the territories of the former State of Patiala merged into India and that any joint Hindu family property or impartible estate that might previously have existed ceased to exist in that character after the State's merger. The obligation to pay allowances arose from agreements between the Maharaja and the Government of India and was undertaken unequivocally by the Government.
  2. Inapplicability of section 14(1)/section 10(2): Because payment was not being made out of the income of a Hindu undivided family or the income of an impartible estate retained by a family holder, the court held that section 14(1) of the 1922 Act and the corresponding section 10(2) of the 1961 Act did not apply to the petitioner's allowance.
  3. Legislative and administrative intent: The court noted that the Legislature explicitly granted exemptions to privy purses under Article 291 and related statutory provisions, but deliberately did not extend the same exemption to relatives' allowances provided under the agreements. The Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 (paragraph 15) granted an exemption only to the widow or mother of a former Ruler receiving maintenance out of public revenues, demonstrating an intention not to exempt other relations' allowances from income tax.
  4. Precedential support for taxability: The court accepted and applied the reasoning in Rajkumar Lakhminarayan Bhanja Deo — that where payments are made from State/public revenues (post‑merger or by operation of statute), they are not payments from the income of a Hindu undivided family and are therefore not covered by section 14(1). The court also drew support from Supreme Court authorities (Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh and Scindia) establishing that privy purses and similar obligations are charged on public funds (Consolidated Fund) and are not private family income.
  5. Distinguishing petitioner's authorities: The petitioner relied on several authorities where allowances were conceded to be paid out of the income of a HUF or an impartible estate. The court distinguished those cases from the present facts on that ground, finding them inapplicable.
  6. Nature of the allowance as "income": Citing established definitions and judicial pronouncements (Shaw Wallace; Gopal Saran Narain Singh; Kamakashya Narain Singh; Venkataswami Naidu and Company), the court held that the monthly allowance — being periodic, regular and arising from a definite source — constituted "income" within the broad, accepted meaning for taxation purposes and was not automatically excluded as mere maintenance.
  7. Conclusion of law: Combining the above factual and legal findings, the court concluded that the allowance paid to the petitioner by the Government of India/Treasury was taxable and that the deduction of income tax at source by the Treasury Officer was in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Petition dismissed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the income‑tax deducted at source from the petitioner's monthly allowance by the Treasury Officer, Patiala, was lawful and the petitioner cannot claim exemption under section 14(1) of the 1922 Act or section 10(2) of the 1961 Act.
  • The court emphasized that the impartible estate (if any) of the former State of Patiala ceased to exist in its prior character upon merger, and that obligations to pay allowances became obligations to be discharged from public funds rather than family or estate income.
  • No new wider precedent was established; the court distinguished earlier authorities where family/estate income existed and applied existing constitutional and statutory principles and precedents to the present facts.
  • Costs: As the point of law was not free from difficulty, the court ordered that parties bear their own costs.

This summary is confined to, and strictly derived from, the material contained in the provided opinion. No information beyond the text of the opinion has been added or inferred.

    Raja Raghavinder Singh v. The State Of Punjab And Others

    B.R Tuli, J.:— India attained Independence on August 15, 1947 and the Indian States thereafter acceded to India or Pakistan on the basis of contiguity. The instruments of accession were executed by most of the Indian princes in favour of the Government of India whereunder the State properties and territories along with the sovereignty were surrendered. The Governmnt of India, in its turn, undertook to pay privy purse to each ruling prince and some allowances to his dependents or other relatives. The Ruler of the erstwhile State of Patiala entered into a similar covenant and by letter dated April 2, 1949, the Ministry of States communicated to the Maharaja of Patiala its decision with regard to his privy purse, allowance as Raj Pramukh and allowances for the Rajmatas and other relations as under:—

    “(a) Privy Purses.—Your Highness's privy Purse is fixed at Rs. 17,00,000/- per annum. This amount will be personal to your Highness and the provisions to be made for your Highness's successors will be considered subsequently as provided in Article 11(1) of the Covenant for the formation of the Union.

    (b) Raj Pramukh Allowance—Your Highness's allowance as Raj Pramukh of the Union is fixed at 5 lacs per annum. This amount will also be personal to your Highness and it will be reconsidered in the case of future Raj Pramukh. The allowance will be exclusive of the cost of the staff required for the Private Secretary's office which will be paid for separately by the Patiala and East Punjab States Union Government and the budget for this office should be sent to us when ready.

    (c) Allowances for Rajmatas and other relations.—It was agreed that a sum of Rs. 5 lacs per annum should bathe maximum amount which should be provided for the allowance to the Rajmatas and your Highness's other relations who are at present in receipt of such allowances. Out of this sum, the allowance paid to your Highness's mother will be Rs. 50,000/- per year. This will include all her expenses. The balance of Rs. 4½ lacs should be distributed between all other relations and your Highness should re-fix allowance in such a way that this amount is not exceeded.”

    2. The petitioner is a half-brother of the Maharaja of Patiala. He was allowed an allowance of Rs. 2,000/- per month. According to the petitioner, the State of Patiala was an impartible estate or property of the joint Hindu family of the petitioner, which was regulated by the rule of primogeniture in matters of succession. According to this rule, the eldest son succeeded to the Gaddi while the younger ones, who were called Maharajkumars, were entitled to a suitable maintenance allowance out of the income of the impartible estate. The right of the Junior Maharajkumars to receive maintenance allowance out of the income of the impartible estate was settled by means of an agreement entered into between the States of Patiala, Nabha and Jind on October 13, 1960. Translation in English of that agreement has been filed as Annexure “A” to the petition. This agreement was known as Dastur-Ul-Amal. On August 20, 1948, the Union of Patiala and East Punjab States (Pepsu) was formed of which the State of Patiala was a constituent and was given the status of Part ‘B’ State.

    3. Out of the sum of Rs. 5 lacs sanctioned as allowances for Rajmatas and other relations, the petitioner was paid Rs. 2,000/- per month and the distribution of that amount used to be made by the Maharaja of Patiala till 1953, when the Maharaja, of his own accord, declined to undertake this job and the members of the family started drawing their allowances directly from the Patiala treasury without deduction of any income-tax. This arrangement continued till May, 1955. Thereafter, the amount of allowance was paid to the petitioner by the Treasury Officer, Patiala, after deducting income-tax at the source in accordance with the circular issued by the Finance Department on May 17, 1955. The petitioner's plea in this petition is that the respondents were not justified in deducting the income-tax out of the amount of allowance paid to him by the Government of India through the Treasury, Patiala. Reliance is placed on section 14(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter called the 1922 Act) reading as under:—

    “14. Exemptions of a general nature:—

    (1) The tax shall not be payable by an assessee in respect of any sum which he receives as a member of a Hindu undivided family were such sum has been paid out of the income of the family or in the case of an impartible estate where such sum has been paid out of the income of the holder of the estate belonging to the family.”

    4. In the Income tax Act, 1961, (hereinafter called the 1961 Act), the corresponding provision is to be found in section 10(2) reading as under:—

    “Incomes not included in total income:—

    5. In computing the total income of a previous year of any person, any income falling within any of the following clauses shall not be included:—

    (1) ****

    (2) any sum received by an individual as a member of a Hindu undivided family, where such sum has been paid out of the income of the family, or, in the case of any impartible estate, where such sum has been paid out of the income of the estate belonging to the family.”

    6. The question that arises for determination is whether the allowance paid by the Government of India to the petitioner every month can be said to be a sum received by an individual as a member of the Hindu undivided family out of the income of the family or out of the income of the impartible estate belonging to the family. The territories of the former State of Patiala have merged into the territories of India and all the joint Hindu family property or the impartible estate, which existed prior to the accession, if at all, have ceased to exist as such. The petitioner is not receiving the allowance from the Government of India as a member of Hindu undivided family out of the income of that family or as a member of the family owing an impartible estate from the holder thereof out of the income of that estate. The obligation was taken by the Government of India unequivocally under the agreement that had been arrived at between the Maharaja of Patiala and that Government. The provisions of section 14(1) of the 1922 Act or section 10(2) of the 1961 Act do not apply to the facts of the present case. The petitioner, therefore, cannot claim that the allowance received by him from the Government was or is exempt from the payment of income-tax. It is payment to note that exemption from payment of income lax was allowed to the privy purse paid to the princes of Indian States under Article 291 of the Constitution, section 4(x)(a) of the 1922 Act and section 10(19) of the 1961 Act. The Legislature deliberately did not allow such exemption to the other members of the princely order who were allowed allowances under the agreements, like the one in the case of the petitioner. It was known to the Legislature that such allowances were being paid to the relatives of the acceding princes. While the rulers were granted exemption from the payment of income-tax, the allowance paid to the other relatives were not made exempt from that payment. The Central Government made the Part B States (Taxation Concessions) Order, 1950 specifying the exemptions reductions in rate of tax and the modifications, in exercise of its powers conferred by section 60-A of the 1922 Act. Paragraph 15 of this Order granted the following exemption, among others:—

    “15(1)(i) any sum which the widow or the mother of a person who was the Ruler of an Indian State receives as her maintenance allowance out of public revenues.”

    7. This exemption granted only to the widow or the mother of the former Ruler and not to his other relations or dependents, clearly shows the intention of the Government not to exempt the allowance paid to such relations or dependents from the payment of income-tax it is, therefore, abundantly clear that the income-tax deducted from the allowance paid to petitioner was in accordance with law and no exception can be taken thereto.

    8. The learned counsel for the respondents has relied on the judgment of a Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Rajkumar Lakhminarayan Bhanja Deo v. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bihar and Orissa . 1956 58 I.T.R 457.. In that case, the assessee, the younger brother of the Ruler of Keonjhar was entitled to maintenance allowance of Rs. 2,000/- a month. This amount was exempted from payment of income tax by virtue of section 4 of the Keonjhar Income-tax Regulation, 1938. Keonjhar State merged with the province of Orissa with effect from January 1, 1948, but under the Administration of Orissa Order, 1948, the Keonjhar Income-tax Regulation continued to be operative in the ex-Keonjhar State until altered or amended by an order made under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1947. The income-tax Officer included the annual maintenance allowance of Rs. 24,000/- in the assessee's total income for each of the assessment years 1950–1951 to 1956–1957, on the grounds that the Keonjhar Income-tax Regulation ceased to have effect from April 1, 1949, by virtue of section 7(1) of the Taxation Laws (Extention to Merged States and Amendment) Act (67 of 1949) and the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, became the law relating to income-tax in the ex-Keonjhar State with effect from April 1, 1948 and the maintenance amount of his 2,000/- a month of the petitioner had not been exempted from income-tax under section 60A. The assessee contended that the State Income tax Regulation continued in force even after Act 67 of 1949 and the Constitution of India came into effect and that in any event, the maintenance allowance was exempted from taxation under section 14(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, as the payment to the assessee was made by the Ruler of Keorjhar as a member of the Hindu undivided family but these contentions were rejected by the Appellate Tribunal. The High Court held that section 7(1) of Act 67 of 1949 must be construed as an express repeal of the Keonjhar Income-tax Regulation as from January 1, 1949, that is, even prior to the coming into force of the Constitution of India and the said Regulation cannot be deemed to continue in force by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution. Only the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, applied from April 1, 1949 and as the allowance was not exempted by any notification under section 60, it was rightly assessed to income-tax.

    9. It was further observed that the payment of the maintenance amount to the assessee could not be held to fall under section 14(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as the amount was paid out of the revenues of the State of Orissa and not out of the income of the Hindu undivided family or out of the income of the holder of the impartible estate. These observations squarely apply to the facts of the present case.

    10. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court pointed out in Kunwar Shri Vir Rajendra Singh v. Union Of India † . 1969 3 SCC 150, that as far as the right to privy purse of a Ruler is concerned, Article 291 of the Constitution enacts that payment of any sum which has been guaranteed to any Ruler of a State as a privy purse shall be charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India. The privy purse is not an item of private property to which the Ruler succeeds. On a parity of reasoning it can be said that the allowance for maintenance of the relations of the former Rulers is charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India and not out of the income of any Hindu undivided family or any impartible estate.

    11. It has to be remembered that the impartible estate of the former State of Patiala was put an end to by an act of State and, therefore, it shed its character as an impartible estate and merged in the territories of India. It was pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in H.H Maharajdhiraja Madhay Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. The Union of India . 1971 1 SCC 85, paragraphs 123 and 124 of the report that:—

    “123. Article 291 does not merely incorporate recognition of the obligation to pay the privy purse under convenants incurred by the Government of the Dominion of India, it gives rise to a liability de hors the covenants. Under the covenants and agreements the obligation to pay the privy purse was undertaken in the case of all Princes (bar the beads of the States of Bhopal, Hyderabad and Mysore) to be made out of the revenues of their respective States. The Government of India concurred in and guaranteed payment of the amount of the privy purse under the terms of the agreements constituting the Unions. By the States Merger (Governors' Provinces) Order, 1949, this liability was imposed upon the Provinces when the States merged with those Provinces. In the case of a Union of States the liability to pay the privy purse to a head of State lay upon the Union of States to be discharged out of the revenues of the State. In the case of centrally merged States the Dominion Government had to pay the privy purse out of the revenues of the State.

    124. Even after the integration of States, the obligations under the convenants were to be met out of the revenues of the respective States. The convenants and the various stages through which ultimate integration was achieved probably remained acts of State. The rights and obligations accruing or arising under those acts of State could be enforced only if the Union of India accepted those rights and obligations. After the Constitution the obligation to pay the privy purse rested upon the Union of India, not because it was inherited from the Dominion of India; but because of the constitutional mandate under Article 291. The source of the obligation was in Article 291 and not in the covenants and the agreements. Reference to the covenants and agreements in Article 291 was for defining the privy purse; the obligations of the provinces in respect of the ‘Provincially merged States’ and obligation of the Union of States in respect of the States merged in such Unions, ceased by recognition to retain their original character. The obligation which arose out of the merger agreement and was on that account an act of State shed its original character on acceptance by the Constitution. The entity obliged to pay the privy purse did not, after the Constitution, remain the same; the source out of which the obligation was to be satisfied was not the original source; the incident relating to exemption from payment of tax was vitally altered and the amount also was in some cases different. Whereas the liability to pay the privy purse to the Rulers under the merger agreements was assured by the Dominion Government, the Constitution imposed upon the Union Government a directive to pay the privy purse.”

    12. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following judgments:—

    1. In re: Gajapatiraj, Vizianagaram4.

    2. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa v. Maharaja Visweswar Singh . 1935 3 ITR 216.

    3. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar and Orissa v. Maharani Gyan Manjuri Kuari . 1945 13 I.T.R 56.

    4. Commissioner of Income-tax v. Sarwan Kumar . 1945 13 I.T.R 361.

    5. Commissioner of Income-tax, Central and United Provinces v. Rani Bijay Raj Kunwai . 1948 16 I.T.R 1.

    6. Promod Chandra v. State of Orissa . AIR 1962 SC 1288..

    13. These judgments are not relevant in this case as in those cases there were admittedly properties of the Hindu undivided family or the impartible estate and the allowance was paid out of their income. The cases were therefore, directly covered by the provisions of section 14(1) of the 1922 Act. In the same strain is the judgment of the Chief Court of Oudh in Rani Anand Kunwar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, C.P and U.P . 1943 11 I.T.R 935..

    14. The result of the above discussion is that the former State of Patiala having merged in the Union of India, the impartible estate or the Hindu undivided family, if any existed, disappeared on account of an act of State and it cannot be said that the petitioner is or has been receiving the maintenance allowance from the Government of India either as a member of the joint Hindu family cut of the income of that family or as a member of a family owning an impartible estate from the holder thereof out of its income. The exemptions to such allowances were granted because the income of the Hindu undivided family or the impartible estate was taxed at one place and thereafter it was the distribution or dispersal of that income amongst its various members. The same cannot be said about the Government of India when it took the obligation to pay the monthly allowance to the petitioner after the merger of the erstwhile State of Patiala into the Union of India. The income-tax has been rightly deducted from the allowance paid to the petitioner by the Treasuary Officer, Patiala. The learned counsel for the petitioner then argued that the sum of Rs. 2,000 paid every month to the petitioner by way of allowance cannot be said to be income, but is only maintenance allowance. Income has been defined in section 2(24) of the 1922 Act and 1961 Act, but that definition is inclusive and not exhaustive. In Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Shaw Wallace and Company . 59 IA 206, Sir George Lowndes gave the following definition of income:—

    “Income in this Act connotes a periodical monetary return ‘coming in’ with some sort of regularity, or expected regularity, from definite sources. The source is not necessarily one which is expected to be continuously productive, but it must be one whose object is the production of a definite return excluding anything in the nature of a mere windfall. Thus, income has been likened pictorially to the fruit of a tree, or the crop of a field. It is essentially the produce of something which is often loosely spoken of as ‘capital’. But capital, though possibly the source in the case of income from securities, is in most cases hardly more than an element in the process of production”.

    15. This definition was followed in Gopal Saran Narain Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax . 1935 ITR 237., by Lord Russel of Killowen who, however, added the important amplification:—

    “Anything, which can properly be described as income, is taxable under the Act unless expressly exempted.”

    16. In Kamakashya Narain Singh v. Commissioner of Income-Tax . 1943 ITR 513., Lord Wright repeated the above observations of Sir George Lowndes and Lord Russel and remarked:—

    “Income, it is true, is a word difficult and perhaps impossible to define in any precise general formula. It is a word of the broadest connotation Sir George Lowndes speaks of ‘income’ being likened pictorially to the fruit of a tree or the crop of a field. But it is clear that such picturesque similes cannot be used to limit the true character of income. Income is not necessarily the recurrent return from a definite source, though it is generally of that character. Income again may consist of a series of separate receipts, as it generally does in the case of professional earnings. The multiplicity of forms which ‘income’ may assume is beyond enumeration.”

    17. These observations were approved by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Venkataswami Naidu and Company v. Commissioner of Income-Tax . 1959 35 ITR 694.. In the light of these weighty pronouncements, the allowance paid to the petitioner by the Government of India can be rightly termed as income. It has a regular source from which it has been flowing every month and such an allowance is not exempted from the payment of income-tax under any provision of the 1922 Act or 1961 Act. The only provision under which exemption is claimed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is section 14(1) of 1922 Act and section 10(2) of the 1961 Act which have been fully discussed above and have been held to be not applicable. No other point was argued.

    18. For the reasons given above, I find no merit in this petition which is dismissed. As the point of law involved was not free from difficulty, I leave the parties to bear their own costs.

    19. Petition dismissed.

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    Raja Raghavinder Singh v. The State Of Punjab And Others
    (Oct 13, 1972)