Order
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant material. Leave granted.
2. The respondents in the appeal, as plaintiffs, had instituted a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for settling a scheme for the administration of the first defendant temple viz. Sree Panimoola Devi Temple (hereinafter referred to as “the temple”) and other incidental reliefs. The suit was dismissed by the learned trial court. In appeal, the High Court has set aside 2009 SCC OnLine Ker 4233 the decree of dismissal passed by the learned trial court and remanded the suit for de novo consideration. Aggrieved, the defendants have filed the present appeal.
3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length, we find that the matter lies within a short compass. The learned trial court, on an elaborate consideration of the evidence adduced by the parties, came to the conclusion that the case set up by the plaintiffs that the temple is a public temple had not been proved and established. In this regard, the documents exhibited by the defendants as Exts. B-1 to B-4 were also considered in great detail by the learned trial court to come to the aforesaid conclusion. The learned trial court also held that the worship by the public for long, by itself, could not make the temple a public temple and in this regard relied, inter alia, on a judgment of the Privy Council in Babu Bhagwan Din v. Gir Har Saroop (1939-40) 67 IA 1, (1940) 51 LW 4, AIR 1940 PC 7. In appeal, the High Court agreed with the conclusion of the learned trial court that the plaintiffs in the suit have not adduced sufficient evidence to show that the temple had acquired the status of a public temple. However, proceeding further, the High Court appreciated/reappreciated the contents of Exts. B-1 to B-4 to conclude that the said documents, relied upon by the learned trial court, were not sufficient to enable any firm and categorical finding to be recorded. Accordingly, the impugned order 2009 SCC OnLine Ker 4233 of remand was passed which has been challenged before us.
4. If the plaintiffs had not led sufficient evidence to establish their case, as held by the High Court, ordinarily, that should have been the end of the matter. In any case, the conclusion of the High Court that the Exts. B-1 to B-4 were not sufficient to reach any positive conclusion does not commend to us in view of the elaborate consideration of the said documents by the learned trial court to reach the conclusion that the temple was a private temple. In such circumstances, remand of the suit for de novo consideration virtually gives to the plaintiffs a second opportunity to establish their case.
5. The case of the plaintiffs all along and also in the counter-affidavit filed before this Court has been that the temple was initially a private temple, but the same acquired the status of a public temple with passage of time due to the visits of large number of persons and offerings made by the general public, including their participation in the religious rites performed therein. Even if we are to accept the aforesaid position, the said fact by itself would not be sufficient to enable a determination in favour of the plaintiffs.
6. In this regard, following observation of the Privy Council in Babu Bhagwan Din (1939-40) 67 IA 1, (1940) 51 LW 4, AIR 1940 PC 7 may be extracted with profit: (IA pp. 9-10)
“… In these circumstances it is not enough in Their Lordships' opinion, to deprive the family of their private property to show that Hindus willing to worship have never been turned away or even that the deity has acquired considerable popularity among Hindus of the locality or among persons resorting to the annual mela. Worshippers are naturally welcome at a temple because of the offerings they bring and the repute they give to the idol; they do not have to be turned away on pain of forfeiture of the temple property as having become property belonging to a public trust. Facts and circumstances, in order to be accepted as sufficient proof of dedication of a temple as a public temple must be considered in their historical setting in such a case as the present; and dedication to the public is not to be readily inferred when it is known that the temple property was acquired by grant to an individual or family. Such an inference, if made from the fact of user by the public, is hazardous, since it would not in general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that worshippers should be turned away; and, as worship generally implies offerings of some kind, it is not to be expected that the managers of a private temple should in all circumstances desire to discourage popularity.”
7. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs on a decision of this Court in Bala Shankar Maha Shanker Bhattjee v. State of Gujarat 1995 Supp (1) SCC 485 to contend that worship by the general public for long and offerings made by the public would give a private temple a status of a public temple.
8. A reading of the opinion of this Court in Bala Shankar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 485 makes it clear that the worship by the members of the public and offerings made was one of the several circumstances considered relevant by this Court for determination of the question, namely, whether the temple in question—Kalika Mataji Temple—is a public temple. There were several other relevant aspects that were taken into account by the Court to answer the said question, namely, cash allowance paid from the State treasury to maintain the deity from time to time; fixed grants given by the Rulers i.e Scindia and British Rulers; the Temple and its properties being shown in government records as belonging to Mataji and the respondents being shown as Pujaris. The reliance placed on Bala Shankar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 485, therefore, is of no consequence.
9. In view of the foregoing discussions and the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the High Court was not correct/justified in remanding the suit to the learned trial court for de novo consideration. We, therefore, set aside the order of the High Court and allow this appeal and restore the decree passed by the learned trial court.