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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 14 of the Limitation Act
  • Customs Act, 1962
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 14 of the Limitation Act
  • Customs Act, 1962
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an order-in-original passed by the Commissioner of Customs, Kanpur. Instead of approaching the jurisdictional court, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court. On 9-11-2009 that writ petition was converted into a statutory customs appeal.
On 9-9-2010 the respondent objected to the Delhi High Court’s territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner sought adjournments and ultimately, on 5-1-2012, withdrew Custom Appeal No. 10 of 2009 with liberty to approach the jurisdictional High Court. While permitting withdrawal, the Delhi High Court observed that it was for the “jurisdictional High Court to decide the prayer for waiver/exclusion.”
The petitioner then filed a statutory appeal before the Allahabad High Court accompanied by an application to condone delay, invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Allahabad High Court rejected the application, holding the appeal time-barred by 697 days, and criticised the petitioner’s conduct as forum shopping.
A Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed against the Allahabad High Court’s decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP with costs of Rs 25,000.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 so as to exclude the period spent before the Delhi High Court and thereby secure condonation of delay.
  2. Consequently, whether the statutory customs appeal before the Allahabad High Court was within limitation or liable to be dismissed as time-barred.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ketan V. Parekh (2011) 15 SCC 30 Deprecation of forum shopping and strict view on condonation when proceedings are not pursued with bona fide diligence. The Allahabad High Court relied on this case to conclude that the petitioner was not pursuing the matter bona fide and therefore could not invoke Section 14. The Supreme Court concurred with this view.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found that the initial writ petition in the Delhi High Court was not bona fide because that court lacked territorial jurisdiction over an order passed by the Commissioner of Customs, Kanpur. The Court characterised the petitioner’s conduct as “taking a chance” and engaging in forum shopping, mirroring the assessment of the Allahabad High Court.
Because the proceedings in Delhi were not pursued bona fide, the essential pre-condition for invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act—due diligence and good faith in the wrong forum—was absent. Therefore, the time spent before the Delhi High Court could not be excluded, rendering the subsequent appeal before the Allahabad High Court hopelessly time-barred by 697 days.
Finding no merit in the challenge, the Supreme Court agreed entirely with the reasoning of the Allahabad High Court and dismissed the SLP.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed with costs quantified at Rs 25,000.

Implications: The dismissal affirms the Allahabad High Court’s refusal to condone delay and reinforces the principle that parties cannot rely on Section 14 of the Limitation Act when their prior proceedings were not pursued bona fide. The order sends a cautionary signal against forum shopping but does not lay down a new legal precedent beyond applying settled principles.

    Neeraj Jhanji v. Commissioner Of Customs Andcentral Excise .

    Order

    1. Heard. In our opinion, the initial filing of writ petition by the petitioner before the Delhi High Court against the order-in-original passed by the Commissioner of Customs, Kanpur was not at all bona fide. The Delhi High Court, however, converted the writ petition into statutory appeal under the Customs Act, 1962 by order dated 9-11-2009. On 9-9-2010 the respondent raised an objection about the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. The matter was adjourned at the instance of the petitioner. Then on 5-1-2012 Custom Appeal 10 of 2009 the petitioner withdrew the appeal with liberty to approach the jurisdictional High Court. The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal as withdrawn. While doing so, the Delhi High Court observed:

    “It is for jurisdictional High Court to decide the prayer for waiver/exclusion. However, it does appear that the appellant in the present case had bona fide filed the appeal in this Court and has been pressing the same, as the Tribunal is located in Delhi.”

    2. The petitioner then filed statutory appeal before the Allahabad High Court and applied for condonation of delay by seeking the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The Allahabad High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and also dismissed the appeal as time barred. It said:

    “21. In the present case also as in Ketan V. Parekh (2011) 15 SCC 30, the appellant was assisted and had the services of the counsel, who are expert in the central excise and customs cases. They first filed a writ petition, and then without converting it into appeal obtained an interim order. They kept on getting the matter adjourned and thereafter in spite of specific objection taken, citing the relevant case law, which is well known, took time to study the matter. Thereafter, they took more than one year and three months to study the matter to withdraw the appeal. They took a chance, which apparently looking to the facts in Ketan V. Parekh case (2011) 15 SCC 30 and this case appear to be the practice of the counsel appearing in such matters at Delhi High Court and succeeded in getting interim orders. The Supreme Court has strongly deprecated such practice of forum shopping. In this case also there is no pleading that the writ petition and thereafter appeal was filed in the Delhi High Court, under bona fide belief that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and that the appellant was pursuing the remedies in wrong court with due diligence. The appellant, thereafter, caused a further delay of 20 days in filing this appeal, which he has not explained.
    22. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. This appeal is barred by limitation by 697 days, which has not been sufficiently explained by the appellant.”

    3. The very filing of writ petition by the petitioner in the Delhi High Court against the order-in-original passed by the Commissioner of Customs, Kanpur indicates that the petitioner took a chance in approaching the High Court at Delhi which had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter. We are satisfied that filing of the writ petition or for that matter, appeal before the Delhi High Court was not at all bona fide. We are in agreement with the observations made by the Allahabad High Court in the impugned order. The Allahabad High Court has rightly dismissed the petitioner's application of condonation of delay and consequently the appeal as time barred.

    4. The special leave petition is dismissed with costs which we quantify at Rs 25,000 (Rupees twenty-five thousand only).

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    Comments

    Neeraj Jhanji v. Commissioner Of Customs Andcentral Excise .
    (Jul 26, 2013)