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citation codes
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Acts
  • Section 34(1) of the Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act) and Section 35 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI ACT),
  • CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 5 of 21 11. Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act,
  • Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act. The Commercial Courts Act
  • Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act as under: 21. Act
  • SECTION 4 DELHI HIGH COURT AMENDMENT ACT 2015
  • Act. the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act
  • Order 39 Rule 10 prior to addition of Order XV-A
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • Section 12(1)(a) of the Commercial Courts Act,
  • Courts Fees Act or the Suits Valuation Act.
  • Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act
  • Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act
  • SECTION 4 SUITS VALUATION ACT 1887
  • Section 12 (c) of the Commercial Courts Act
  • Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870
  • Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act
  • Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act,
  • Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act
  • Courts Act, 2015 (Commercial Courts Act)
  • made; ii) Order 20 Rule 12 of the CPC
  • Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act
  • SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • Section 2(1)(c)(vii)
  • Section 12(1)(c)
  • Section 2(1)(c)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • Section 34(1) of the Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act) and Section 35 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI ACT),
  • CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 5 of 21 11. Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act,
  • Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act. The Commercial Courts Act
  • Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act as under: 21. Act
  • SECTION 4 DELHI HIGH COURT AMENDMENT ACT 2015
  • Act. the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act
  • Order 39 Rule 10 prior to addition of Order XV-A
  • section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
  • Section 12(1)(a) of the Commercial Courts Act,
  • Courts Fees Act or the Suits Valuation Act.
  • Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act
  • Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act
  • SECTION 4 SUITS VALUATION ACT 1887
  • Section 12 (c) of the Commercial Courts Act
  • Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870
  • Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act
  • Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act,
  • Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act
  • Courts Act, 2015 (Commercial Courts Act)
  • made; ii) Order 20 Rule 12 of the CPC
  • Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act
  • SUITS VALUATION ACT
  • Section 2(1)(c)(vii)
  • Section 12(1)(c)
  • Section 2(1)(c)
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 (Delhi High Court, 19 July 2016)

Factual and Procedural Background

Both suits are for ejectment of the defendant from different parts of property No. M-1, Hauz Khas, New Delhi. A decree for ejectment had been passed on admissions. On appeals the defendant was given time up to 31 July 2016 to vacate the property. The issue of mesne profits remained for adjudication. As per the plaints the value of both suits, for purposes of Court Fees and jurisdiction, was less than the enhanced minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of the High Court; accordingly, under an Office Order dated 24 November 2015 (exercising powers under Section 4 of the Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2015) the suits were liable to be transferred to the concerned District Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether CS(OS) No.2331/2008 qualifies as a "commercial dispute" within the meaning of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (the Commercial Courts Act) such that it must remain in the High Court notwithstanding the plaint valuation being below the enhanced pecuniary threshold.
  2. Whether the "specified value" for a suit concerning immovable property (for purposes of the Commercial Courts Act) should be determined by reference to market value under Section 12(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act even where the Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act provide for a different valuation method (notably Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act and Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act).
  3. Whether pending contempt/ancillary applications filed by the plaintiff alleging non-compliance by the defendant preclude transfer of the suits to the subordinate court.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • CS(OS) No.2331/2008 should remain in the High Court as a commercial suit because, although the plaint valuation is below the enhanced threshold, the "specified value" under Section 12(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act is the market value of the immovable property and, by reference to GNCTD circle rates on the date of institution, exceeds Rs.1 crore.
  • Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act (the non-obstante / overriding clause) gives the provisions of that Act overriding effect over inconsistent provisions of other laws (including the Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act), and therefore the specified-value regime of the Commercial Courts Act should govern.
  • The suits could not be transferred because the plaintiff had filed petitions alleging contempt (non-compliance by the defendant with payment directions), and those pending applications should prevent transfer to the subordinate court.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any arguments advanced on behalf of the defendant in the text provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balbir Singh v. M.C.D. (1985) 1 SCC 167 Principle that rateable/annual value (for municipal/tax purposes) must be determined by the rent which the owner can reasonably expect in law; owner cannot be taken to reasonably expect more than the maximum rent permitted in law. Used to support the proposition that market value cannot be invoked to determine jurisdiction/court-fees where law prescribes a different basis (e.g., rental value under applicable statutes).
A.G. Varadarajulu v. State of T.N. (1998) 4 SCC 231 Non-obstante clauses must be interpreted to determine the extent of intended overriding effect; such clauses do not automatically exclude or override all other provisions unless clearly intended. Relied on to hold that Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act must be read to determine its intended scope and cannot be taken to completely displace the Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act without regard to context.
Central Bank of India v. State of Kerala (2009) 4 SCC 94 Non-obstante clauses give overriding effect only if there is an inconsistency with other law; if no inconsistency exists, the non-obstante clause cannot be used to override other enactments. Applied to conclude that Section 21 does not automatically supersede the Court Fees Act/Suits Valuation Act unless there is an inconsistency that warrants such overriding.
Union of India v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. AIR 2008 SC 2286 Court should adopt a pragmatic view in statutory interpretation and consider the practical effect of a construction. Invoked to support a purposive and pragmatic interpretation of the Commercial Courts Act so as to avoid defeating its object (expeditious resolution of commercial disputes) by importing an interpretation that would inundate commercial courts with disputes not intended for them.
Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke v. Pune Municipal Corporation (1995) 3 SCC 33 Limits of pecuniary jurisdiction of a first instance court do not prevent awarding damages (or monetary relief) beyond that pecuniary limit; principle relevant to future mesne profits and claims accruing after suit institution. Relied on to explain that future mesne profits may be claimed and that the pecuniary limit of the court at institution does not prevent awards beyond that limit, but that specified value for Commercial Courts Act is determined by amount due up to the date of filing (Section 12(1)(a)).
Mukesh Kumar Gupta v. Rajneesh Gupta (RFA No.76/2016) Interpretation that valuation for court-fees and jurisdiction in suits for specific performance is to be as per the contract consideration (per Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act), and that circle rates are only presumptive. Referred to for consistency: Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act should be read with Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act; circle rates are presumptive and not absolute.
Manu Narang v. The Lieutenant Governor, GNCTD (MANU/DE/4234/2015) & Amit Gupta v. GNCTD (MANU/DE/0841/2016) Circle rates notified by GNCTD are presumptive/guidance for Sub-Registrars and open to rebuttal (not definitive market value). Used to support the proposition that circle rates are not conclusive evidence of market value for determining specified value under the Commercial Courts Act.
Santosh Arora v. M.L. Arora (MANU/DE/1162/2014) Observations: (i) claim for future mesne profits may be made though cause of action accrues later; (ii) Order 20 Rule 12 CPC requires decree or enquiry for mesne profits for period prior to suit if within limitation and for period until delivery of possession; (iii) plaintiff cannot plead/valuate future mesne profits at institution; (iv) pecuniary jurisdiction limits do not bar award of damages beyond it. Relied on to explain treatment of mesne profits and relevance to valuation/specifed-value determination under the Commercial Courts Act.
Raghubir Rao v. Prem Lata (211 (2014) DLT 516) & Shakuntala Devi v. Seven Star Electricals Pvt. Ltd. (MANU/DE/2725/2008) Authority for the proposition that where a defendant fails to comply with an order to deposit/pay rent during pendency, remedy includes striking off the defence (Order 39 Rule 10 / corresponding law). Applied to indicate that remedies for non-compliance exist other than preventing transfer and that subordinate courts can exercise such remedies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a sequence of legal determinations anchored in the language of the Commercial Courts Act, the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act, and established interpretive principles:

  1. Starting point: Both suits were within the territorial ambit of the High Court but, per the Office Order exercising Section 4 of the Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2015, suits valuated below the enhanced pecuniary threshold were liable to be transferred to the District Judge.
  2. Plaintiff's contention: CS(OS) No.2331 is a "commercial dispute" because Section 12(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act determines specified value of suits relating to immovable property by market value; as the market value (per GNCTD circle rates at institution) exceeded Rs.1 crore, the suit should remain in the High Court.
  3. Definition check: The Court examined the statutory definition of "commercial dispute" in Section 2(1)(c) and noted that only disputes arising out of agreements relating to immovable property "used exclusively in trade or commerce" (clause (vii)) qualify. The plaint did not plead that the property was used exclusively in trade or commerce. The plaintiff's averments indicated lawfully permitted user and claimed charges if non-permitted uses were made; the defendant's written statement claimed the lease was for storage, exhibition of handicraft items and residence. The Court therefore found the statutory predicate (exclusive commercial use) absent on the pleadings.
  4. Statutory interpretation of "used exclusively in trade or commerce": The Court applied the principle of legality and literal/legal sense of words (citing authorities on construction) to hold that clause (vii) must be read as referring to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce in accordance with law, and not property used in contravention of law. Therefore illegal commercial use does not convert a dispute into a "commercial dispute" for purposes of the Commercial Courts Act.
  5. Interaction with Court Fees / Suits Valuation Acts: The Court addressed Section 21 (overriding effect) of the Commercial Courts Act and rejected the argument that it displaces the Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act wholesale. Relying on precedents about the limited reach of non-obstante clauses, the Court held Section 12 (determination of specified value) must be read harmoniously with the Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act. Concretely, where other statutes prescribe a different mode of valuation for particular suits (for example, landlord-tenant eviction suits valued by annual rent under Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act and Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act), Section 12 should not be read to supplant those provisions.
  6. Application to landlord-tenant/eviction suits: By statutory fiction (Section 7(iv) Court Fees Act and Section 4 Suits Valuation Act), valuation for jurisdiction/court-fees in suits for recovery of possession from a tenant is the rent for the year preceding institution, not market value. The Court concluded that in such suits the specified value cannot be taken as the market value for the purpose of the Commercial Courts Act.
  7. Consequence of existing decree and nature of surviving claim: The Court observed that a decree for recovery of possession had already been passed; as of the Commercial Courts Act's commencement (and now), the suit only survived for arrears of rent and future mesne profits. Section 12(1)(a) determines specified value for monetary claims by the money sought to be recovered inclusive of interest "computed up to the date of filing" — i.e., future accruals after filing are not to be considered for deciding specified value. Even if future mesne profits might ultimately total more than Rs.1 crore, they do not make the specified value exceed Rs.1 crore because specified value for recovery of money is assessed as at the date of filing.
  8. On circle rates and market value: The Court reiterated prior conclusions that GNCTD circle rates are presumptive and open to rebuttal; circle rates do not conclusively establish market value for purposes of Section 12.
  9. Contempt/pending applications and effect on transfer: The plaintiff argued that pending contempt petitions (alleging non-compliance) prevented transfer. The Court ruled otherwise: the ancillary petitions are of a type (Order XXXIX Rule 2A/Order 39 Rule 10 style remedies) that subordinate courts are competent to deal with; alternatively, the plaintiff may approach this Court separately under contempt jurisdiction. Thus pending contempt applications did not preclude transfer.
  10. Final step: Considering all the above (lack of pleaded exclusive lawful commercial use, statutory valuation rules for landlord-tenant suits, and that the surviving monetary claims did not make the specified value exceed Rs.1 crore as of filing), the Court concluded the suits do not qualify as commercial disputes triable by the High Court's Commercial Division and ordered transfer to the District Judge (South-East), Saket Courts, with parties directed to appear on 29 August 2016.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: THE SUITS (CS(OS) NO.2330/2008 & CS(OS) NO.2331/2008) ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE DISTRICT JUDGE (SOUTH-EAST), SAKET COURTS.

Direct effects and immediate consequences:

  • The applications for exemption mentioned at the outset were allowed subject to just exceptions and the applications stood disposed of (per the order headings).
  • The suits, together with pending applications, were transferred to the District Judge (South-East), Saket Courts. Parties were directed to appear before that court on 29 August 2016.
  • A decree for ejectment had already been passed previously and the issue of mesne profits remains for adjudication in the subordinate court (subject to existing appellate timelines and the avenue for contempt jurisdiction as noted by the Court).

Broader implications addressed by the Court:

  • The Court interpreted the Commercial Courts Act in harmony with the Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act and held that the specified-value regime of the Commercial Courts Act does not automatically displace valuation rules expressly provided by older statutes (for example, valuation by annual rent in landlord-tenant eviction suits under Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act and Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act).
  • The opinion emphasised interpretive limits of non-obstante/overriding clauses and applied established principles that such clauses must be read to determine the extent of intended overriding effect rather than treated as absolute displacements of other statutes.

The opinion does not purport to create a broad new precedent beyond the statutory interpretations and holdings applied to the facts before the Court; its immediate effect is the transfer of these suits and guidance on how specified value should be determined in landlord-tenant eviction suits in relation to the Commercial Courts Act.


Prepared from the provided text of the judgment dated 19 July 2016. This summary is based exclusively on the material contained in the supplied opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that material.

    MRS. SONI DAVE v. M/S TRANS ASIAN INDUSTRIES EXPOSITIONS PVT. LTD.

    CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 1 of 21 *IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI % Date of decision: 19 July, 2016 + CS(OS) No.2330/2008, IA No.19934/2015 (of the plaintiff for direction) & CCP (O) No.30/2016. MRS. SONI DAVE ..... Plaintiff Through: Mr. Saurabh Prakash and Mr. Kunal Gosain, Advs. Versus M/S TRANS ASIAN INDUSTRIES EXPOSITIONS PVT. LTD. .....Defendant Through: Mr. R.A. Jain, Ms. Nidhi Parashar and Ms. Anumita Chandra, Advs + CS(OS) No.2331/2008, IA No.19927/2015 (of the plaintiff for direction) & CCP (O) No.29/2016). M/S. G.S. BERAR & CO. PVT. LTD. AND ANR .... Plaintiffs Through: Mr. Saurabh Prakash and Mr. Kunal Gosain, Advs. Versus M/S TRANS ASIAN INDUSTRIES EXPOSITIONS PVT. LTD. .....Defendant Through: Mr. R.A. Jain, Ms. Nidhi Parashar and Ms. Anumita Chandra, Advs. CORAM:- HONBLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW IA No.5243/2016 (for exemption) in CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & IA No.5238/2016 (for exemption) in CS(OS) No.2331/2008. CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 2 of 21

    1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

    2. The applications stand disposed of. CS(OS) No.2330/2008, IA No.19934/2015 (of the plaintiff for direction) & CCP (O) No.30/2016). CS(OS) No.2331/2008, IA No.19927/2015 (of the plaintiff for direction) & CCP (O) No.29/2016).

    3. Both the suits are for ejectment of the defendant from different parts of the property no.M-1, Hauz Khas, New Delhi.

    4. A decree, on admissions, of ejectement has already been passed and in appeals preferred thereagainst, time up to 31 July, 2016 has been given to the defendant to vacate the property. The issue of mesne profits remains for adjudication.

    5. Both suits, as per the plaint therein, for the purposes of Court Fees and jurisdiction have a value of less than the enhanced minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court. The suits, in accordance with the Office Order dated 24 November, 2015 of Honble the Chief Justice, issued in exercise of powers under Section 4 of the Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 2015, are liable to be transferred to the concerned District Judge. CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 3 of 21

    6. The counsel for the plaintiff however argues that as far as CS(OS) No.2331/2008 is concerned, though the valuation thereof as per the plaint is less than the enhanced minimum pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court, is a commercial suit within the meaning of The Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (Commercial Courts Act) and since the specified value, i.e. the market value of the property qua which the relief of ejectment was claimed therein was/is in excess of Rs.1 crore, the same has to remain in this Court and is not liable to be transferred. Attention in this regard is invited to Section 12 (c) of the Commercial Courts Act prescribing the mode of determination of Specified Value and to Section 21 thereof giving the provisions of the said Act an overriding effect.

    7. The contention of the counsel for the plaintiff, though an innovative one, does not find favour with me for the reasons following.

    8. Per Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act, all suits and applications relating to commercial disputes of a specified value filed in a High Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction are to be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of that High Court. CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 4 of 21

    9. A commercial dispute is defined in Section 2(1)(c) of the Act as a dispute arising out of transactions/relationships as described in Clauses (i) to

    (xxii) thereunder. The only clause on which the plaintiff can perhaps rely and to which the counsel for the plaintiff draws attention is Clause (vii) which is as under:

    (vii) agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce; The explanation to Section 2(1)(c) is as under: Explanation. A commercial dispute shall not cease to be a commercial dispute merely because (a) it also involves action for recovery of immovable property or for realisation of monies out of immovable property given as security or involves any other relief pertaining to immovable property; (b) one of the contracting parties is the State or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, or a private body carrying out public functions;

    10. The term specified value is defined in Section 2(1)(i) of the Act as under:

    (i) specified value, in relation to a commercial dispute, shall mean the value of the subject matter in respect of a suit as determined in accordance with Section 12 which shall not be less than one crore rupees or such higher value, as may be notified by the Central Government. CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 5 of 21

    11. Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act, as contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, provides for determination of specified value. The same is as under:

    12. Determination of Specified Value. (1) The Specified Value of the subject-matter of the commercial dispute in a suit, appeal or application shall be determined in the following manner: (a) where the relief sought in a suit or application is for recovery of money, the money sought to be recovered in the suit or application inclusive of interest, if any, computed up to the date of filing of the suit or application, as the case may be, shall be taken into account for determining such Specified Value; (b) where the relief sought in a suit, appeal or application relates to movable property or to a right therein, the market value of the movable property as on the date of filing of the suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, shall be taken into account for determining such Specified Value; (c) where the relief sought in a suit, appeal or application relates to immovable property or to a right therein, the market value of the immovable property, as on the date of filing of the suit, appeal or application, as the case may be, shall be taken into account for determining Specified Value; (d) where the relief sought in a suit, appeal or application relates to any other intangible right, the market value of the said CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 6 of 21 rights as estimated by the plaintiff shall be taken into account for determining Specified Value; and (e) where the counterclaim is raised in any suit, appeal or application, the value of the subject-matter of the commercial dispute in such counterclaim as on the date of the counterclaim shall be taken into account. (2) The aggregate value of the claim and counterclaim, if any as set out in the statement of claim and the counterclaim, if any, in an arbitration of a commercial dispute shall be the basis for determining whether such arbitration is subject to the jurisdiction of a Commercial Division, Commercial Appellate Division or Commercial Court, as the case may be. (3) No appeal or civil revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as the case may be, shall lie from an order of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court finding that it has jurisdiction to hear a commercial dispute under this Act.

    12. According to the counsel for the plaintiff, since the suit relates to immovable property or to a right therein, the specified value thereof as per Section 12(1)(c) is the market value of the property as on the date of filing of the suit and the market value of the immovable property for recovery of possession of which CS(OS) No.2331/2008 was filed, as per the circle rates prescribed by the Government of NCT of Delhi (GNCTD), on the date of institution of the suit also was in excess of Rs.1 crore. CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 7 of 21

    13. As per Section 2(1)(c)(vii) supra, only a dispute arising out of agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce qualifies as commercial dispute. It is nowhere the plea in the plaint that the property with respect to which the suit is filed is used exclusively in trade or commerce. The plea of the plaintiff in this regard is that the property user was as per law and that in the event that the defendant were to put the suit property to any use that was not normally permitted under law but could be permitted upon payment of applicable charges, the defendant was liable to tender such charges as applicable in respect thereof including any penalties, interest etc. thereon. Since the defendant has been using the suit property as the show room, the applicable charges were to be additionally borne by it. Therefrom it appears that the property No.M-1 is situated in the residential colony of Hauz Khas and not in the Hauz Khas market. I may notice that it is the plea of the defendant in its written statement that the letting out of the property as per the lease deed between the parties was for storage, exhibition of handicraft items and residence.

    14. The plaintiff, without pleading that the transaction from which the dispute subject matter of suit arises, relates to immovable property used CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 8 of 21 exclusively in trade or commerce, cannot seek for the suit to remain in this Court by labeling it as a commercial dispute.

    15. I may in this regard also observe that a property, prescribed user whereof as per the law i.e. the Master Plan and the municipal laws is residential, even if let out for use exclusively in trade or commerce or when, without being so let out, is used exclusively in trade or commerce, the same would still not qualify as an immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act. The Commercial Courts Act has brought only disputes arising out of transactions relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce within the ambit of a commercial dispute. The legislature could not have intended to bring disputes arising out of transactions relating to immovable property illegally used exclusively in trade or commerce within the ambit of commercial disputes. The principle, as enunciated in the context of the provisions in the municipal laws, of determination of rateable value / annual value (for payment of property tax / house tax on the basis of) the rent at which the property can reasonably be expected to let, will be applicable. It has been held that where, under the law i.e. the Rent Acts, the landlord is prohibited from charging from the tenant anything more than the CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 9 of 21 standard rent the municipal authority cannot, determine the rateable value / annual value at a rent more than the standard rent, even if the owner / landlord is actually receiving rent more than standard rent. Reference in this regard can be made to Dr. Balbir Singh Vs. M.C.D. (1985) 1 SCC 167. It was held that the owner / landlord could not reasonably expect to get more than the maximum rent permitted in law.

    16. Justice G.P. Singh in his Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 13th Edition in Chapter 5 titled Subsidiary Rules and under the head Construction of General Words has referred to Principle of Legality, as the general words of a statute are not to be construed as to alter the previous policy of the law, unless no sense or meaning can be applied to those words consistently with the intention of preserving the previous policy untouched. It is further authored that there are many presumptions which an interpreter is entitled to raise which are not readily displaced merely by use of general words, unless there is the clearest provision to the contrary. The Principle of Legality has also been described as an aspect of the rule of law known both to Parliament and the Courts, upon which statutory language will be interpreted. Similarly, in Chapter 2 titled Guiding Rules and under the head The Rule of Literal Construction Lord Macnaghten has been quoted CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 10 of 21 as opining that in construing acts of Parliament, it is a general rule that words must be taken in their legal sense unless the contrary intention appears.

    17. Following the said principles, Section 2(1)(c)(vii) has to be read and interpreted as immovable property which is in accordance with law, used exclusively in trade or commerce and not as immovable property which, in contravention of law, is used exclusively in trade or commerce.

    18. Even otherwise, the claim of the plaintiff in the suit, for recovery of possession of immovable property, already stands decreed and the suit as of today or on the date of coming into force of the Commercial Courts Act could not have been said to be for recovery of immovable property. Thus the market value of the property is today not relevant. The suit today survives only for the relief of recovery of arrears of rent and future mesne profits relating to immovable property.

    19. Also, though the counsel for the plaintiff has argued that the specified value of the property is more than Rs.1 crore but has not paid the court fees thereon and court fees has been paid in terms of Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, 1870 as on a suit between the landlord and tenant, for recovery of CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 11 of 21 immovable property from a tenant including a tenant holding over after the determination of tenancy, according to the amount of the rent of the immovable property payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint.

    20. As per Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887, the valuation of a suit for the purpose of jurisdiction is not to exceed the value of the land or interest in land as determined by Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act and as per which as aforesaid, the value is according to the amount of the rent payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint.

    21. It would thus be seen that by a statutory fiction created by Section 7(iv) of the Court Fees Act, the value of the immovable property for the purposes of recovery of possession thereof from a tenant is not its market value but its rental value for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint. The reason therefor is not difficult to understand. The owner / landlord of a immovable property, for the relief of eviction of a tenant paying or who had agreed to pay, not the market value of the property, but rent of the property which may be a miniscule part of the market value CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 12 of 21 of the property, cannot be made to pay ad valorem court fees on the basis of market value of the property.

    22. I am unable to agree with the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff that owing to Section 21 of the Commercial Courts Act as under:

    21. Act to have overriding effect. Save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law for the time being in force other than this Act. the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act stand overridden or superceded.

    23. The Commercial Courts Act has not been enacted to interfere with the Courts Fees Act or the Suits Valuation Act. It is a settled principle of law that the provisions such as Section 21 supra have to be read and interpreted by finding out the extent to which the legislature intended to give it a overriding effect and the context in which such a provision is made and on a consideration of purpose and policy underlying the enactment. It is also relevant to consider whether the conflicting enactment can be described as a special one and in which case the special one may prevail over the more general one, notwithstanding that the general one is later in time. CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 13 of 21

    24. Supreme Court, in A.G. Varadarajulu Vs. State of T.N. (1998) 4 SCC 231, while dealing with a non-obstante clause under which the legislature wants to give overriding effect to a section held that the Court must try to find out the extent to which the legislature had intended to give one provision overriding effect over another provision. It was reiterated that the non-obstante clause, no doubt a very potent clause intended to exclude every consideration arising from other provisions of the same statute or other statute but when the section containing the said clause does not refer to any particular provision which it intends to override but refers to the provisions of statute generally, it is not permissible to hold that it excludes the whole Act and stands all alone by itself. Similarly, in Central Bank of India Vs. State of Kerala (2009) 4 SCC 94, in the context of non-obstante clauses in Section 34(1) of the Recovery Of Debts Due To Banks And Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (DRT Act) and Section 35 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI ACT), giving overriding effect to the provisions of those statutes, it was held that they had overriding effect only if there was anything inconsistent in any other law or instrument having effect by virtue of any other law and if there was no provision in the other CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 14 of 21 enactment which was inconsistent with the DRT Act or SARFAESI Act, the said provisions could not override other legislations.

    25. In my view Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act providing for determination of specified value as defined in Section 2(i) thereof is not intended to provide for a new mode of determining the valuation of the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fees. It would be incongruous to hold that while for the purpose of payment of court fees the deemed fiction provided in the Court Fees Act for determining the value of the property is to apply but not for determining the specified value under the Commercial Courts Act.

    26. In my opinion Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act has to be read harmoniously with the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act and reading so, the specified value of a suit where the relief sought relates to immovable property or to a right thereunder has to be according to the market value of the immovable property only in such suits where the suit as per the Court Fees Act and / or the Suits Valuation Act has to be valued on the market value of the property and not where as per the Court Fees Act and the Suits Valuation Act the valuation of a suit even if for the relief of CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 15 of 21 recovery of immovable property or a right therein is required to be anything other than market value as is the case in a suit by a landlord for recovery of possession of immovable property from a tenant.

    27. I have already in judgment dated 5 May, 2016 in RFA No.76/2016 titled Mukesh Kumar Gupta Vs. Rajneesh Gupta while setting aside the judgment and decree of dismissal at the threshold of two separate suits for specific performance of two separate agreements for sale of immovable property inter alia on the ground that two separate suits had been filed to create pecuniary jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge which otherwise has no jurisdiction as per the value of the property in accordance with the circle rates and Section 12 of the Commercial Courts Act held (a) that since as per the Court Fees Act and Suits Valuation Act the valuation for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property has to be as per the consideration agreed in the contract, the specified value of such a suit necessarily has to be in accordance with the consideration agreed in the contract for sale and not the market value of the property; (b) Circle rates notified by the GNCTD for the purpose of guidance of Sub-Registrars to whom the documents/instruments of transfer of property are presented for CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 16 of 21 registration, to ensure that stamp duty in accordance with law is paid thereon have in Manu Narang Vs. The Lieutenant Governor, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi MANU/DE/4234/2015 and in Amit Gupta Vs. Government of NCT of Delhi MANU/DE/0841/2016 been held to be only presumptive, open to rebuttal.

    28. If it were to be held that all suits arising out of agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce and / or for recovery of possession thereof and / or for realization of monies with respect thereto, where the market value of the property is in excess of Rs.1 crore are commercial dispute triable by the Commercial Division of the High Court, it would bring to the Commercial Division of this Court all the disputes as between landlord and tenant of such property and for specific performance of agreements of sale of such property, even if the annual rent thereof or the sale purchase consideration thereof is of less than Rs.1 crore, inundating the commercial divisions of the High Court and not allowing commercial disputes for expeditious disposal whereof the Commercial Courts Act was enacted to be decided expeditiously and defeating the very purpose of enactment of the Commercial Courts Act. It is a settled principle of interpretation of statutes that the provisions of a statute have to be interpreted in CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 17 of 21 a reasonable way, to serve the purpose for which the statute has been enacted and not to defeat the said purpose. Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. AIR 2008 SC 2286 held that the Court has not only to take a pragmatic view while interpreting a statutory provision, but must also consider the practical aspect of it.

    29. The claim of the plaintiff in the suit which survives as aforesaid, for realization of monies, even if held to be monies pertaining to immovable property within the meaning of explanation to Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act was for less than the specified value of Rs.1 crore. Even if the claim now of the plaintiff for realization of such monies, taking into account, the rent / mesne profits accruing in the last nearly eight years since the institution of the suit were to be more than Rs.1 crore, the same also according to me would not make the specified value of the suit to be more than Rs.1 crore. The determination of specified value as per Section 12(1)(a) of the Commercial Courts Act, where the relief is for recovery of money, is the amount due up to the date of filing of the suit and not the amount due which may be falling due thereafter. CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 18 of 21

    30. I have, speaking for the Division Bench of this Court in Santosh Arora Vs. M.L. Arora MANU/DE/1162/2014 observed that i) law permits a claim for future mesne profits i.e. for a relief, the cause of action wherefor has not accrued to the plaintiff on the date of the institution of the suit to be made; ii) Order 20 Rule 12 of the CPC requires the Court, in a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, to, besides passing decree for possession, also pass a decree for mesne profits or direct an enquiry as to such mesne profits, for the period prior to the institution of the suit if claimed and if within limitation on the date of institution of the suit, and for the period, from the date of institution of the suit until delivery of possession; iii) with regard to future mesne profits, the plaintiff has no cause of action on the date of the institution of the suit, and it is not possible for him to plead this cause of action or to value it or to pay court-fees thereon at the time of the institution of the suit; iv) the limits of the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court of first instance does not impede and is not a bar to award damages beyond its pecuniary jurisdiction. Reliance was placed on Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke Vs. Puna Municipal Corporation (1995) 3 SCC 33. CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 19 of 21

    31. Thus, for this reason also the suit will not qualify as a commercial dispute to be tried by this Court.

    32. The next contention of the counsel for the plaintiff is that the suits cannot be transferred owing to the plaintiff having filed petitions averring the contempt of court by the defendant for non-compliance with the direction for payment of monthly amounts.

    33. Order XV-A as added to the CPC applicable in Delhi provides a remedy therefor of striking off of the defence. Even if the contention of the counsel for the plaintiff that Order XV-A having been introduced after the institution of the suit would not apply were to be accepted, the law as developed under Order 39 Rule 10 prior to addition of Order XV-A also was that if the defendant failed to comply with the order of deposit/payment of rent during the pendency of the suit, the remedy therefor was of striking off of the defence. Reference to be made to Raghubir Rao Vs. Prem Lata 211 (2014) DLT 516 and Shakuntala Devi Vs. Seven Star Electricals Pvt. Ltd. MANU/DE/2725/2008.

    34. Rather, I have enquired from the counsel for the plaintiff whether not the grant of time to the defendant to vacate the property was subject to such CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 20 of 21 payment and if it was so, why the plaintiff, upon non-payment by the defendant, not apply to the Court for the order of ejectment to be executed forthwith.

    35. The counsel for the plaintiff states that though the order of grant of time was subject to the payment which the defendant was directed to make but since the time is coming to an end on 31 July, 2016, the plaintiff has not applied therefor.

    36. In my view the pendency of application/s averring contempt of court by the defendant also does not come in the way of the suits to be transferred to the subordinate court for the reason i) the said applications are in the nature of Order XXXIX Rule 2A and which the subordinate courts are competent to deal with; and, ii) even if a case for contempt were to be made out it is always open to the plaintiff to independently approach this Court under its contempt jurisdiction or the subordinate courts are empowered to make a contempt reference to this Court.

    37. Accordingly, the suits with pending applications are transferred to the District Judge (South-East), Saket Courts within whose jurisdiction the property at Hauz Khas, New Delhi is situated. The parties to appear before the CS(OS) No.2330/2008 & CS(OS) No.2331/2008 Page 21 of 21 District Judge/Additional District Judge (South-East), Saket Courts, New Delhi on 29 August, 2016. RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J. JULY 19, 2016 pp/gsr/bs

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    MRS. SONI DAVE v. M/S TRANS ASIAN INDUSTRIES EXPOSITIONS PVT. LTD.
    (Jul 19, 2016)