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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 100
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 148, 323, 324 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2008 INSC 100
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 148, 323, 324 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On 17-1-1992, while Hrishikesh Jana was cultivating his land, the present appellants, allegedly led by Sachin Jana, formed an unlawful assembly armed with bombs, sticks, knives, iron rods and acid. Jana was reportedly assaulted, and acid was poured on him as well as on Amulya Giri and Kartick Maity; Sabitri Giri was beaten when she tried to intervene. A first information report was lodged the same day.

The police filed a chargesheet against 20 persons for offences under Sections 148, 323, 324 and 307 read with Section 149 IPC. The trial court acquitted six accused under Section 232 CrPC and convicted the remaining fourteen, sentencing each to ten years’ imprisonment under Section 307 IPC along with lesser sentences for allied offences.

On appeal, the Calcutta High Court upheld the guilt of the present appellants but acquitted twelve co-accused, altering the conviction to Sections 307/34 IPC. The appellants then approached the Supreme Court, which granted leave to appeal and delivered the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction of the appellants for attempt to murder under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC was justified on the evidence.
  2. Whether Section 34 IPC (common intention) was correctly applied when only some accused were convicted.
  3. Whether the sentence of ten years’ imprisonment was excessive and warranted reduction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The prosecution case was a false implication.
  • The ingredients of Section 307 IPC were not satisfied because the injuries, though severe, did not demonstrate an intention to murder.
  • Section 34 IPC should not have been invoked as common intention had not been proved.
  • In any event, the ten-year custodial sentence was unduly harsh.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent-State’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab (1977) 1 SCC 746 Existence of common intention is essential for Section 34 IPC; participants’ acts need not be identical. Cited to explain that liability arises when accused act jointly in furtherance of a shared intention.
Chinta Pulla Reddy v. State of A.P. 1993 Supp (3) SCC 134 Section 34 applies even if a particular accused inflicts no overt injury. Used to reinforce that every member of the group is liable despite differing individual acts.
Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004) 3 SCC 793 Interpretation of Section 34 IPC and joint liability. Relied on as a recent reiteration of the principles governing common intention.
State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983) 2 SCC 28 Scope of Section 307 IPC—intent may be inferred even without fatal injuries. Quoted to show that actual death-causing injury is unnecessary for a Section 307 conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court observed that the medical evidence showed each injured victim had sustained more than 50% burns from acid, injuries deemed sufficient to cause death if untreated. It relied principally on the eyewitness testimony of PWs 1, 2 and 3, all victims of the assault, which the trial court and High Court had found trustworthy.

On the applicability of Section 34 IPC, the Court invoked established jurisprudence that common intention may be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances; identical acts by each accused are unnecessary. The coordinated attack with acid and weapons demonstrated a shared intent to cause lethal harm, satisfying Section 34.

Regarding Section 307 IPC, the Court reiterated that the decisive factor is the intention or knowledge with which the act was committed, not the ultimate result. Pouring acid capable of causing death clearly met the statutory threshold for attempt to murder.

Nonetheless, considering “the nature of dispute”, the Court found the original ten-year sentence excessive. It reduced the custodial term to five years for each appellant but enhanced the fine to ₹25,000 each, directing that ₹10,000 from every deposit be paid to each victim (PWs 1, 2 and 3). A default term of one year’s imprisonment was prescribed for non-payment.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants under Sections 307/34 IPC but reduced the sentence to five years’ imprisonment and imposed an enhanced fine with victim compensation. Failure to pay the fine will result in an additional one-year custodial term.

The decision primarily affects the parties by modifying the sentence; it does not introduce new legal principles but applies established doctrines on common intention and attempt to murder.

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    Sachin Jana And Another v. State Of West Bengal .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

    2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court which confirmed conviction of the appellants while directing acquittal of twelve co-accused persons. Originally, 20 persons including the present appellants faced trial for offence punishable under Sections 148, 323, 324 and 307 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). After recording evidence the trial court acquitted six persons under Section 232 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “CrPC”) and the rest 14 were convicted.

    3. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:

    First information report was lodged by one Hrishikesh Jana on 17-1-1992, stating that on 17-1-1992 in the morning when said Hrishikesh Jana was busy in the field for cultivation of his land, the appellants under the leadership of appellant, Sachin Jana forming an unlawful assembly and being armed with different weapons like bombs, sticks, knives, iron rods and bottle of acid threatened Hrishikesh Jana with dire consequences and when Hrishikesh Jana did not oblige them by leaving the work of cultivation, the accused persons started assaulting him with blows, kicks, iron rods, etc. and acid was also poured on his face and body. Hrishikesh Jana alleged in his written complaint that the appellants also poured acid on one Amulya Giri and Kartick Maity and also assaulted one Sabitri Giri who came forward to save Hrishikesh Jana. After completion of investigation charge-sheet was filed. Accused persons pleaded false implication.

    4. In order to further its version the prosecution examined 11 witnesses including the informant Hrishikesh Jana and injured persons Amulya Giri, Kartick Maity. The accused persons examined three persons to contend that the prosecution was not projecting the correct scenario. The trial court after considering the evidence came to the conclusion that on 17-1-1992 Sachin Jana and remaining appellants, after forming an unlawful assembly assaulted him when Amulya (PW 2), Kartick (PW 3) and Sabitri came to rescue Hrishikesh. The accused persons shared common intention and also poured acid on the person of Amulya and assaulted.

    5. Fourteen persons were found guilty of offence punishable under Section 307 IPC and each was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment and fine of Rs 2000 with default stipulation. Different sentences were also imposed for the other offences.

    6. The trial court primarily relied on the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 who were claimed to be victims of acid pouring. The High Court in appeal found that the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 clearly established the guilt of the appellants, but was not sufficient to convict the 12 co-accused persons. Accordingly, the appeal so far it relates to the present appellants was dismissed. But the conviction was altered to Sections 307/34 IPC.

    7. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the case was one of false implication. In any event, offence under Section 307 IPC is not made out and the sentence as imposed is clearly excessive.

    8. It is also submitted that Section 34 IPC has no application.

    9. It is to be noted that three persons suffered injuries on account of acid poured on them. The doctor had indicated that each of the injured persons suffered more than 50% burn injury which was caused due to acid and the same was sufficient to cause death if not attended by medical aid at appropriate time.

    10. “9. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it prearranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true concept of the section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab (1977) 1 SCC 746 the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.
    10. The section does not say ‘the common intentions of all’, nor does it say ‘an intention common to all’. Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As was observed in Chinta Pulla Reddy v. State of A.P 1993 Supp (3) SCC 134 Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.”

    The above position was highlighted in Girija Shankar v. State of U.P (2004) 3 SCC 793

    11. “9. … Section 307 IPC reads:

    ‘307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.’
    To justify a conviction under this section it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in this section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.”

    This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983) 2 SCC 28

    12. When the evidence on record is analysed, it is clear that Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC has clear application. The acid burns caused disfigurement.

    13. Considering the nature of dispute the custodial sentence is reduced to 5 years. However, each of the appellants is directed to pay a fine of Rs 25,000. If the amount is deposited by the appellants within six weeks from today, out of each deposit, Rs 10,000 shall be paid to each of the victims PWs 1, 2 and 3; in case the amount of fine imposed is not deposited, the default custodial sentence of one year each.

    14. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

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    Comments

    Sachin Jana And Another v. State Of West Bengal .
    (Jan 25, 2008)