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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Contract Receipts, the provisions of Section 19-A,
  • Section 19A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957,
  • Amending Act, while substituting Section 19-A,
  • Section 19-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act
  • provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 19-A,
  • SECTION 44 AC INCOME TAX ACT
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • Taxation (Laws) Amendment Act, 1997.
  • Section 13.(3) xxxx(4) xxxx(5) xxxx3.
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 19-A
  • sub-section (6) of Section 17,
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • sub-section (1) of Section 12
  • Section 5-B
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Contract Receipts, the provisions of Section 19-A,
  • Section 19A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957,
  • Amending Act, while substituting Section 19-A,
  • Section 19-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act
  • provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 19-A,
  • SECTION 44 AC INCOME TAX ACT
  • INCOME TAX ACT
  • Taxation (Laws) Amendment Act, 1997.
  • Section 13.(3) xxxx(4) xxxx(5) xxxx3.
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 19-A
  • sub-section (6) of Section 17,
  • provisions of sub-section (1)
  • sub-section (1) of Section 12
  • Section 5-B
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Tirath S. Thakur, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion considers a petition challenging the substituted provisions of Section 19-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (substituted by the Karnataka Taxation (Laws) Amendment Act, 1997). A Division Bench of this Court had earlier examined the constitutional validity of the original Section 19A in KEC International Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1997 105 STC 192) and struck down that earlier version as unconstitutional because it directed deduction of tax at a flat rate from the total contract amount without permitting deductions for components (such as labour and services) that were not exigible to sales tax.

The Legislature subsequently substituted Section 19-A to address the defects identified by the Court. The substituted provision now (inter alia) permits a dealer to obtain a certificate from the assessing authority that a works contract involves only labour/services (in which case Section 19-A will not apply), and permits a tentative exclusion of 25% of contract receipts as representing labour/service in mixed contracts. A Class‑1 contractor engaged in road construction (the petitioner) challenged the substituted Section 19-A contending it remained defective for three primary reasons. The Court heard submissions and dismissed the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the substituted Section 19-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 (as enacted by the 1997 Amendment) is constitutionally valid as a machinery provision for deduction of tax at source in respect of works contracts.
  2. Whether the substituted provision unlawfully permits deduction of tax at source on amounts that represent labour or service (which are not otherwise exigible to tax), by (a) failing to provide full parity with deductions available under Section 5-B and related Rules, and (b) by fixing a tentative flat deduction of 25% in mixed contracts instead of permitting a higher (or case-by-case) tentative deduction (for example, 30% where books are not acceptable).
  3. Whether the Legislature should have left the extent of permissible pre-assessment deductions to the discretion of the assessing authority rather than prescribing a statutory tentative rate (25%) for mixed contracts.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 19-A should permit full deduction of amounts attributable to labour/services because Section 5-B and the Rules allow full deduction of such amounts; therefore Section 19-A must provide the same protection against deduction at source.
  • Where the dealer's books of account are not accepted by the assessing authority, deduction of labour/other non‑taxable charges is admissible to the extent of 30% of total contract receipts; by fixing 25% as the tentative deduction, Section 19-A falls short of the recognised principle that tax cannot be levied or recovered on services and charges that are not otherwise taxable.
  • The Legislature should not have fixed a statutory tentative deduction of 25% in mixed contracts; instead the assessing authority should determine, contract‑by‑contract, the appropriate deduction so as to avoid confiscatory or arbitrary pre‑assessment deductions and to respect the principle that non‑taxable components should not be subjected to advance recovery.

Respondent / Government Arguments (as recorded)

  • The substituted Section 19-A is a machinery provision intended to effectuate the charging provisions (Section 5-B) and is within the State Legislature's power under Entry 54 of the State List to provide for recovery (including deduction at source) of taxes validly levied.
  • The amended Section 19-A addresses the constitutional defects identified earlier by (a) providing for a certificate to exclude contracts that involve only labour/services; (b) permitting a tentative exclusion of 25% for mixed contracts; and (c) these presumptions are rebuttable on final assessment.
  • The Amending Act also reduced the period for completing assessments (Section 12(5)) from three years to two years, which mitigates prejudice that an assessee might suffer if an excess deduction is made at source.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
KEC International Limited v. State of Karnataka (1997 105 STC 192) — Division Bench Held that the original Section 19-A was unconstitutional because it directed deduction of tax at flat rates from the total contract amount without provision for deductions for components (labour/services) not exigible to sales tax. Used as the background: the earlier decision struck down the original Section 19-A; the Court explains that the Legislature substituted Section 19-A to rectify the defects highlighted in that decision.
Ganon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan (1993 88 STC 204 SC) Principle that a works contract turnover includes components exigible to tax and other components (labour/services) which are not exigible; taxable amount must be determined after excluding non‑taxable components. Relied upon by the earlier Division Bench to establish that deductions must account for non‑taxable components; cited to explain the nature of taxable turnover for works contracts.
Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of Andhra Pradesh (as cited) Quoted to support judicial deference to legislative classifications in taxation and to caution against imposing too rigorous standards of scrutiny on complex fiscal schemes. The Court invoked its reasoning approving a passage from San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigues to underscore that taxation schemes often have discriminatory impact and courts should not impose overly rigorous scrutiny that would invalidate local fiscal schemes.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigues (quoted) Observation (quoted) that no scheme of taxation is free of discriminatory impact and that courts should avoid imposing too rigorous a standard of scrutiny on fiscal schemes. Quoted (through Venkateshwara Theatre) to justify judicial restraint and to support the proposition that presumptive machinery provisions for tax collection may be constitutionally permissible in light of practical difficulties faced by revenue authorities.
Union of India v. Sanyasi (219 I.T.R. 330) Upheld presumptive provisions (Sections 44-AC and 206C of the Income Tax Act) enacted to meet practical difficulties of collection; such presumptive collection methods are not offensive to Article 14. Relied upon to analogise and support the view that presumptive/estimative machinery for tax collection (including deduction at source on a presumptive basis) may be constitutionally valid.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a structured analysis applying the statutory text and existing principles:

  1. Characterisation of Section 19-A: The Court treated Section 19-A as a machinery provision aimed at effectuating the charging provision in Section 5-B (which levies tax on the taxable turnover of transfer of property in goods involved in works contracts). As a machinery provision, it is permissible for it to provide for tentative measures to secure collection of tax that is validly levied.
  2. Identification of prior constitutional defect: The earlier Division Bench had struck down the original Section 19-A because it mandated deduction at flat rates from total contract amounts without even a tentative allowance for components (labour/services) not exigible to tax. That absence of even tentative exclusions took the provision outside the permissible scope of a machinery provision.
  3. Examination of the substituted provision: The substituted Section 19-A now provides (a) a procedure for dealers to obtain a certificate from the assessing authority that a contract involves only labour/services (in which case Section 19-A does not apply), and (b) a tentative statutory presumption in mixed contracts that 25% of the total receipts represent labour/service and shall be excluded when making deductions at source.
  4. On the petitioner's objection that Section 19-A should provide for full deductions comparable to Section 5-B and Rules (or at least 30% when books are unacceptable): The Court observed that presumptive/tentative dedutions are permissible and that the Rules already provide for a range (20–30%) in cases where books are unacceptable. The Court held that it was not necessary for the machinery provision to be perfect to the last farthing at the pre‑assessment stage; what mattered was recognition of the broad principle of excluding non‑taxable amounts and providing a rebuttable basis.
  5. Deference to legislative classification and practical necessities: Citing Venkateshwara Theatre (via San Antonio) and Union of India v. Sanyasi, the Court emphasised judicial restraint in reviewing tax machinery provisions. Given practical difficulties of collection and assessment, the legislature is afforded wide discretion to adopt presumptive mechanisms for recovery of tax.
  6. Safeguards and mitigation of prejudice: The Court noted that the Amending Act simultaneously reduced the limitation period for assessments (Section 12(5)) from three years to two years, a change said to lessen potential prejudice where tentative deductions at source might turn out to exceed the final liability.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: The Court found that the specific defects that rendered the earlier Section 19-A unconstitutional had been addressed by the substituted provision — the substituted Section 19-A recognises and permits tentative exclusions, allows a certificate for pure labour/service contracts, and makes the 25% presumption explicitly rebuttable upon final assessment. On that basis, the petitioner's objections were not sufficient to declare the substituted provision unconstitutional.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is dismissed.

The Court concluded that the substituted Section 19-A, as enacted by the Karnataka Taxation (Laws) Amendment Act, 1997, addresses the constitutional defects earlier identified in the original provision and operates as a permissible machinery provision for deduction of tax at source in respect of works contracts.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The petitioner (a Class-1 contractor) remains subject to the substituted provisions of Section 19-A; the petition challenging those provisions failed and was dismissed.
  • On the legal position: The decision upholds the validity of the substituted Section 19-A and accepts the legislature's use of tentative, presumptive deductions (including a 25% tentative exclusion for the labour/service component in mixed contracts) so long as such presumptions are rebuttable and the machinery recognises exclusion of non‑taxable amounts.
  • On precedent and broader law: The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel, far‑reaching precedent beyond applying established principles (including prior Court decisions cited). It reasoned within settled lines of deference to legislative classification in taxation and the constitutionality of presumptive recovery mechanisms; no indication is given that a new principle has been established beyond the facts of this amendment and challenge.

Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add information beyond that opinion's text.

    B. Seenaiah & Co., Contractors & Engineers v. The Deputy Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes

    Tirath S. Thakur, J.:—

    A Division Bench of this Court in KEC International Limited v. State of Karnataka . 1997 105 STC 192. examined the constitutional validity of Section 19A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, which made a provision for deduction at source from amounts payable to a Dealer in respect of works Contracts of the nature specified in the VI Schedule to the Act. The challenge was mainly based on the plea that Section 19A, authorised deduction of tax on the total amount of works contract without making any provision for deduction of the value of certain components, of such contracts which were not otherwise exigible to tax. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ganon Dunkerley & Co. v. State of Rajasthan . 1993 88 STC 204 SC. this Court held that the entire amount payable under a works contract was not exigible to Central or State Sales Tax and that the taxable amount has to be calculated out of the total amount on the principles stated by their Lordships in the afore-mentioned judgment. It was held that Section 19A made a provision for deduction of tax at certain percentages on the total amount payable to a Dealer in respect of a works contract which meant that such deductions have to be made even on the amounts which were not otherwise exigible to tax, but which sometimes form an integral part of the total amount. While repelling the argument that Section 19A was only a machinery provision, meant to make the charging Section effective, the Court held that an ancillary provision could not go beyond the legislative power of the State and must confine itself to the power conferred on it by an Entry in one or the other lists enumerated in the Constitution. The Court upheld the argument that in the garb of the machinery provisions made by the Legislature for recovery of a tax it could not enact a provision under which advance tax could be levied even in respect of the amounts that were not exigible to tax either under the State or the Central Sales Tax Enactments. The provisions of Section 19A were accordingly found to be ultra vires of the Constitution struck down. The reasoning for the view proceeded thus:

    “It is clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above that a works contract may take in turnover which is exigible to tax either under the State or under the Central Act, there are other components in a works contract, viz., charges for labour and services which are not exigible to tax at all to be deducted from the value of the works contract for the purpose of determining the tax liability. No provision is made in Section 19-A even tentatively to give deductions for the aforesaid amounts and the amount is deducted at a flat rate from the total amount payable to the contractor which is not constitutionally permissible. As stated earlier, the power under entry 54 is restricted by various constitutional inhibitions and other provisions which are not reflected at all in Section 19-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act. Accordingly, we do not find our way to agree with the learned single Judge and in reversal of the same, we hold that Section 19-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act is constitutionally invalid and liable to be struck down. As stated earlier, the power of the State Legislature for making a provision for collection of tax in advance cannot be doubted but in so far as Section 19-A is concerned, it directs deduction of tax at a flat rate from the total amount of the contract amount which is impermissible. The invalidity of the above section goes to the root of the imposition of the advance tax and in the absence of the said provision, advance tax cannot be levied.

    In view of what is stated above, these appeals are allowed. The judgment of the learned single Judge is set aside and it is declared that Section 19-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act is unconstitutional and void.”

    2. With a view to rectifying the defects highlighted by the Court, the Legislature has substituted the provisions of Section 19-A, by a new provision under the Karnataka Taxation (Laws) Amendment Act, 1997. The substituted provision of Section 19-A as it now stands in the Statute Book and to the extent the same is relevant for the present reads as under:

    “19-A. Deduction of tax at source.-

    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Central Government, or any State Government, or an industrial, commercial or trading undertaking of the Central Government or of any State Government, or a local authority or a statutory body, shall deduct out of the amounts payable by them to a dealer in respect of works contracts of the nature specified in the sixth Schedule executed for them, in the State,, an amount calculate,-

    (a) in the case of a dealer who is permitted to pay amount by way of composition under sub-section (6) of Section 17, at the rate of four per cent of the total amount payable to such dealer

    (b) in the case of a dealer other than the dealer referred to in clause (a), at the rates specified in the Sixth Schedule:

    (i) no such deduction shall be made if the amount payable to a dealer by the authorities mentioned in sub-section (1), is less than one lakh rupees in a year; or

    (ii) if any works contract for execution for the authorities mentioned in sub-Section (1), involves only labour or service but does not involve transfer of property in goods and it is certified to be so by the assessing authority or by the assessing authority of the area on an application made by any dealer, the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply and every such application shall be disposed of by the assessing authority within one month from the date of receipt, either by issue of a certificate as aforesaid or by endorsement intimating ineligibility to such a certificate to the dealer, as the case may be;

    (iii) in case of a dealer mentioned in clause (b), in respect of any other works contract which involves partly labour or service and partly transfer of property in goods, the total amount on which tax is calculable under Sub-section (1), shall be the total amount payable to the dealer as reduced by twenty-five per cent thereof as tentatively representing cost of labour or service.

    (2) The authority making deduction under sub-section (1), shall send every month to the Prescribed Authority a statement in the prescribed form containing particulars of tax deducted during the preceding month and pay full amount of the tax so deducted by it within twenty days after the close of the preceding month in which such deductions were made and the amount so payable shall for the purpose of Section 13 be deemed to be an amount due under this Act.

    Provided that where default is made in complying with the provisions of this sub-section, the prescribed authority may, after such enquiry as it deems fit and after giving opportunity to the concerned authority of being heard, determine to the best of its judgment, the amount payable under this sub-section by such [authority and the amount so determined shall be deemed to be an amount due under the Act for the purposes of Section 13.

    (3) xxxx

    (4) xxxx

    (5) xxxx

    3. A bare reading of the above would show that there is a specific provision now incorporated in Section 19-A, under which in the case of ‘works contracts’ which involve only labour or service, it is possible for the Dealer executing such contracts to apply to the Assessing Authority for a Certificate to the effect that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 19-A, do not apply to such a contract. Any such application is required to be disposed of by the Assessing Authority within one month from the date of receipt, either by issue of a Certificate as afore-mentioned or by an endorsement intimating to the dealer his ineligibility for the grant of the same. In the case of dealers executing works contracts which involve partly labour or service and partly transfer of goods, the substituted provision permits a tentative deduction to the tune of 25% from the total amount payable to the Dealer towards the cost of Labour or Services. Deduction of Tax at source under Sub-section (1) of Section 19-A is thus made at the prescribed rates on only 75% of the total receipts disbursed to a dealer executing such contracts.

    4. The petitioner who is a Class-1 contractor presently engaged in the construction of a Road in Belur Industrial Area in Dharwad is dissatisfied with the machinery provided by Section 19-A, even in its present incarnation. He has questioned the provisions of Section 19-A, on the basis of a three-fold argument. Firstly, it is contended that since Section 5B of the Act read with Rules permit full deduction of the amount received on account of labour or services provided, Section 19A should also have provided for the same. Secondly, it is urged that even in cases where the Books of Account maintained by the Dealer were not accepted by the Assessing Authority, deductions on account of Labour and other charges were admissible to the extent of 30% of the total contract receipts. In having provided for a deduction to the extent of only 25% of the Contract Receipts, the provisions of Section 19-A, argued the Learned Counsel, do not adhere to the well recognised principle that no tax can be levied or recovered on services and charges that are not otherwise taxable. Thirdly, it was contended that instead of fixing the permissible deductions at a statistic rate of 25% of the total receipts, the Legislature ought to have left it to the Assessing Authority to determine in his wisdom, having regard to the nature of the contract under execution, the extent of deductions that would be justified. Such a provision, argued Mr. Narayan, would have been more in tune with the spirit of law which frowns at deductions from payments that are not truely taxable. Such deductions if permitted would be confiscatory depriving the Assessee concerned not only of the amount lawfully due to him but even compensation for such deprivation in the form of interest.

    5. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made at the Bar. Tax on transfer of property in goods involving execution of works contracts is chargeable under Section 5-B of the Act, which provides that every dealer shall pay for each year a tax under the Act, on his taxable turn-over of transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of works contract mentioned in Column 2 of the VI Schedule at the rate specified therein. Section 19-A, as it originally stood, as also as it stands now was and continues to be a machinery provision meant to effectuate the provisions of the charging section. It only permits deduction of tax payable under Section 5-B at the source from where payments for such contracts are made provided the contracts are executed for the Central Government, any State Government or any Industrial, Commercial or Trading undertaking of such Governments or for any local or Statutory Authority.

    6. That the Legislature could in exercise of its taxing power under Entry 54 of the State List provide for deduction of the tax levied by it at source has not been disputed, as indeed the same could not be disputed for the power to levy a tax must of necessity carry with it the incidental power of recovery of such tax including a recovery made at source from where payments representing the turn-over subject to tax flow. A provision made for any such deduction at source, has therefore to be distinguished from the charging Section and understood as a provision made in the nature of a machinery provided for the recovery of the taxes that are validly levied. Such a provision may provide for a recovery on a tentative basis both as regards the total amount on which the recoveries are made as also the rate at which the same are made. Section 19-A, as it stood, authorised deductions at source, at a rate lower than the one at which works turnover was taxable under the VI Schedule. For instance, in the case of ‘Works Contracts’ falling under Sl. No. 6 of VI Schedule, it permitted deduction at the rate of 2% of the total amount payable to the dealer against a rate 8% otherwise prescribed by the schedule. In regard to the rest, it prescribed a uniform rate of 4% even though the rate prescribed in the VI Schedule varied from 4% to 15%. The substituted provision however, classified the dealers differently for purposes of deduction at source. It permits deduction at source at the rate 4% of the total amount payable to such dealers in cases where the dealers are permitted to pay the tax amount by way of composition under sub-section (6) of Section 17 of the Act. In the remaining cases, the substituted provision permits deduction at source at the rates specified in the VI which are the rates otherwise prescribed for purposes of Section 5-B also. The question then is whether the deduction at source of tax at the prescribed rate could be found fault with even when there is no legal infirmity in the levy of the said tax under Section 5-B of the Act. In the case decided by the Division Bench the challenge to 19-A, as it then stood, had succeeded because the provision was found to prescribe a uniform rate but deduction at source without prescribing even tentatively a deduction on amounts that the dealer may have received by way of service or labour charges not otherwise exigible to such tax. This Court found that in the works contracts where transfer of property in goods is accompanied by Labour and Service charges deduction of tax at source, at a uniform rate without providing for any deduction for amounts that were not otherwise taxable would go beyond the power of the legislature to prescribe a machinery for effectuating the charging provisions of the Act. That defect has, in my opinion, been sufficiently removed by the Legislature in the provisions of Section 19-A as it now stands. As noticed earlier, the provisions of Section 19A, clearly recognises the right of a dealer to prevent deduction at source by proving to the satisfaction of the Assessing authority and obtaining a Certificate from him to the effect that the ‘works contract’, being executed by any such dealer involves only labour and/or services without involving any transfer of property in goods. The provision thus clearly identifies cases in which no deductions would be permissible having regard to the fact that the amounts received by the Dealer are referable only to labour and services provided by him. Even in cases where the Dealer is executing ‘works contracts’ which involve partly labour or service and partly transfer of property in goods, the provision now recognises the fact that the payments made to the tune of 25% would be tentatively taken as payments representing the cost of laobur or service and would therefore be excluded from consideration while deducting the tax at source. Unlike the provisions of Section 19-A, as it originally stood, the provisions of 19A now on the Statute Book permit deductions no matter on a tentative basis. The absence of any such provisions, in Section 19-A, as it then stood alone was the basis of this Court holding that the provision was unconstitutional for in the absence of such a provision, the deduction at source would be even in respect of amounts that are received by the Dealer but are not otherwise taxable under the Act. The decision of this Court does not however lay-down that deductions for purposes of recovery of tax at source ought to be to the fullest extent possible or that the validity of the provision permitting such deductions could be judged on golden scales. What was found unacceptable by the Court was the absence of a provision in Section 19-A permitting deductions even on a tentative basis in regard to amounts that were not admittedly taxable. That however is not the position in Section 19-A as it now stands. Not only does the provision permit total exclusion of such deductions in cases where the works contract involve only supply of labour or services but it permits deductions even in contracts involving transfer of goods to the extent of 25% of the total receipts. Just because the deductions are tentative in nature or the same are less than the total deductions that the dealer might on regular assessment be found entitled to cannot possibly affect the validity of a machinery provision. What is important is not whether the machinery provided by the provision is effective and correct to the last farthing even at an interim stage of deductions at source but whether the machinery provision recognises the broad principle and excludes from recovery amounts that are not subject to tax. The provisions of Section 19-A, are to an extent presumptive in nature. They recognise subject to a regular assessment being completed in due course that any contract involving both transfer of goods and providing service and labour, the component attributable to ‘Service’ and ‘Labour’ should be to the extent of 25% of the total receipts. This presumption, there is no gainsaid is tentative as indeed, the provision itself says so and would therefore be clearly rebuttable by the Assessee in the course of the final assessment. The argument that while providing for a deduction the machinery by which the deductions could be granted to the extent of 100% even at the preassessment stage or at least permitted such deductions at the optimum level of 30% admissible, in cases where the Books of Accounts maintained by the Dealer were not acceptable also does not impress me. It is fairly well settled that while a taxing provision is not immune from a challenge on the touch-stone of the provisions contained in the Constitution, yet in the field of taxation the legislature exercises an extremely wide discretion in classifying items for purposes of tax and making machinery provisions for recovery of the tax levied. So long as the legislature refrains from a clear and hostile discrimination or an intrusion which can be said to be unconstitutional, the Court would not substitute their own standards or classifications made by the former or even prescribe rates, no matter the same may appear in their wisdom to be more reasonable or rational. In Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of Andhra Pradesh . 1973/411 US 1. the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following passage from the decision of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodrigues . 1973/411 US 1. where Justice Stewart speaking for the majority observed thus:—

    “No scheme of taxation whether the tax is imposed on property in question or purpose of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exists the Court does well not to impose too rigorous standards of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes becomes subjects of criticism under the equal protection clause.”

    7. In Union of India v. Sanyasi . 219 I.T.R p. 330., the Supreme Court was examining the constitutional validity of Section 44-AC of the Income Tax Act, which made a special provision for computing profits and gains from business of trading in certain goods. Section 206C of the Income Tax Act provided for deduction at source of Income Tax from persons carrying trading activities in alcoholic liquor, forest produce and scrap etc., and authorised deduction at source by way of tax under the Act, a sum of equal to 15% of the amount paid by such dealer towards the purchase of goods by him. The provisions enabled the revenue to estimate the profits of a person engaged in the trades mentioned above on a presumptive basis. Upholding the provision, the Supreme Court held, that the same had been enacted in the light of the practical difficulties faced by the Revenue. Such provisions aimed at facilitating collection of the tax on a presumptive basis, it was declared was not offensive to Article 14 of the Constitution.

    8. In the present case also, the deduction at source is made on a presumptive basis only though the method prescribed for such deduction is different. Here instead of the assessee depositing money at the prescribed rate for the purchase of goods of the prescribed nature, it is the Authority making the payment to the dealer who is supposed to deduct tax at the prescribed rate after giving a deduction prescribed tentatively towards the cost of labour or services. The deductions at 25% apart from being tentative can also not be termed arbitrary having regard to the fact that the Rules made under the Act provide for a deduction ranging from 20 to 30% in the case of ‘works contracts’ depending upon their nature in cases where the Books of Accounts maintained by the Dealer are not acceptable. So also it was not necessary that even for purposes of deductions at source based on a tentative assumption of the taxable turn-over, the legislature ought to have provided for a machinery that was perfect in all respects. Insistence upon the law providing for a machinery which could work-out the tax liability or the admissible deductions correct to the last penny amounts to insisting upon making a final assessment at every stage in the execution of a contract which I am afraid in neither warranted nor necessary.

    9. There is yet another aspect which cannot be ignored. In terms of Section 12(5) as it stood originally, the Assessing Authority could make an assessment order within a period of three years from the date on which a return under sub-section (1) of Section 12 was submitted by the Dealer. The Amending Act, while substituting Section 19-A, has simultaneously amended Section 12(5) also to provide that the assessments shall be completed within two years from the dates on Which the returns are filed under sub-section (1) of Section 12. There is therefore merit in the submission made by the Government Pleader that the reduction in the period of limitation prescribed for completing the Assessment is meant to proportionately reduce any prejudice that an Assessee may suffer should it be found that an amount in excess of what was actually pay.

    10. In the result, I see no merit in this petition, which fails and is accordingly dismissed.

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    B. Seenaiah & Co., Contractors & Engineers v. The Deputy Commissioner Of Commercial Taxes
    (Sep 25, 1997)