Macklin, J.:—
These three appeals arise out of two suits brought by one Ganesh Ramchandra and a third suit brought by the family of Laxman, who was Ramchandra's brother. Each suit was for a declaration of the right of the plaintiff to a half share in certain property alleged to belong to the family of which Ramchandra and Laxman were the two eldest members; and for a proper understanding of them it is necessary to set out the facts at some length.
Ramchandra and Laxman went to Bombay from the Ratnagiri district more than fifty years ago and worked at the Mint; and though Laxman appears to have been the more able of the two and to have earned more money and had a better head for business, they both managed to save a certain amount of money, and they kept three joint accounts with three different banks in Bombay. Laxman, as the better business man of the two, was given a power-of-attorney by Ramchandra; and it seems that the practice of the brothers was that when any transactions affecting both of them were entered into (and there were admittedly a number of such transactions,) the person who managed the transaction was Laxman but the transaction was conducted in the name of Ramchandra, because he was the elder of the two. In 1910 Laxman retired and Ramchandra also retired at about the same time. In 1914 a mortgage transaction was entered upon which is of importance in the present litigation. One Joshi borrowed Rs. 2,500 on the security of his land at Rahadgar. The money was actually paid by the hand of Laxman on behalf of the mortgagee, who is named as Ramchandra; and although in the subsequent litigation Ramchandra at one time claimed the entire mortgage as his, his son now says that he had no more than a share in it. In 1916 disputes arose between the brothers, and the power-of-attorney was cancelled. At some time in the same year a separation in interest admittedly occurred, though for some time longer the joint accounts continued. Towards the end of the year and after the separation had occurred Joshi borrowed Rs. 4,000 on the mortgage of his land at Shirgaon; and this mortgage is in the name of Laxman alone. Between 1916 and 1918 Laxman advanced various sums to Joshi, and for a settlement of the amounts due between them the matter was referred to arbitration. Without consulting Ramchandra they included in the matters referred to arbitration the mortgage for Rs. 2,500, and a decree was passed in favour of Laxman against Joshi for an amount of Rs. 9,529 as due upon the mortgage for Rs. 2,500, the mortgage for Rs. 4,000, and the other loans advanced by Laxman. Under this award both the Rahadgar and the Shirgaon properties were charged. In 1920 Ramchandra died. In March, 1922, Laxman filed a suit against Ganesh, son of Ramchandra, for partition of all land in the possession of Ganesh Ramchandra, and in that suit the mortgaged property was not included. Ganesh was not in possession of the mortgaged property, and he asked that all the property, both moveable and immoveable, including the property mortgaged for Rs. 2,500 and the award decree, should be dealt within the suit. To this Laxman replied that the Shirgaon properties covered by the mortgage of Rs. 4,000 were his exclusively. In April, 1924, this suit was withdrawn with liberty to bring a fresh suit, because Laxman said that he was ill and was unable to continue giving evidence. Shortly after this Laxman filed a darkhast to recover a sum of Rs. 12,580 due under the award decree by sale of Joshi's property. The matter Went to the Collector as Joshi was an agriculturist, and on hearing of it Ganesh Ramchandra put in an application to the Mamlatadar asking for the sale of the property to be made subject to his father's mortgage of Rs. 2,500. It is to be noted that he did not ask for it to be subject to any share that he might have in the mortgage of Rs. 4,000. This application was dismissed by the Mamlatdar in June, 1925. Two months later Ganesh Ramchandra filed a suit for a declaration of his sole rights in the mortgage of Rs. 2,500. But in 1926, while this suit was pending, Laxman came to an arrangement with Joshi under which the Shirgaon property that had been mortgaged for Rs. 4,000 was sold to Laxman for Rs. 12,000 and the Rahadgar property which was subject to the mortgage of Rs. 2,500 was released. Thereupon Ganesh Ramchandra withdrew his suit with liberty to bring a fresh suit. Acting under the liberty given to him to bring a fresh suit, he brought suit No. 154 of 1934 for a declaration that he was entitled to a half share in the Shirgaon property subject to the mortgage of Rs. 4,000, and for partition or in the alternative joint possession of that property. On the same day he filed another suit (No. 155 of 1934) for a share in a house and some land which had been bought by Laxman on his retirement in 1910. In both these suits an objection was taken on the ground that all the property available for partition was not included in the suit, and in the case of suit No. 155 a further objection was taken that it was barred by O. II, r. 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, by reason of the fact that suit No. 154 might have included the property which was the subject of suit No. 155 but had not included it. Suit No. 154 was dismissed on the ground that partial partition was inadmissible. Suit No. 155 was dismissed for the same reason and for the further reason that it was-barred by O. II, r. 2. The decree in suit No. 154 was taken in appeal to the High Court and suit No. 155, which was a second class suit though tried in fact by the First Class Subordinate Judge, went in appeal to the District Court. The High Court held that although suit No. 154 might not be able to result in a decree for partial partition, nevertheless the claim in the alternative was for joint possession, and it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to joint possession if the property belonged to the family, and in any event the plaintiff was entitled to a declaration of his share in the property, if it belonged to the joint family and it was not possible to give the plaintiff joint possession. It may be mentioned that neither the plaint nor the written statement of this suit referred to any separation of interest between the brothers in 1916, and it does not seem that the fact of the separation in 1916 was brought to the notice of the High Court. Suit No. 154 was then referred back to the trial Court for a decision on the merits.
In 1938 the family of Laxman, who was then dead, brought suit No. 172 of 1938 for a declaration of their half share in all the family property and for partition of their share. This suit was heard along with suit No. 154 which had been remanded for a fresh trial on the merits by the High Court. The result of suit No. 154 was that the suit was dismissed, partly on the ground that the plaintiff Ganesh Ramchandra had not proved that he had any interest in the mortgage for Rs. 4,000 and partly on the ground that by reason of art. 11 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, his suit was barred, it not having been filed within one year of the Mamlatdar's order refusing to sell Joshi's property subject to the mortgage of Rs. 2,500. The decision in that suit has given rise to Letters Patent Appeal No. 8 of 1940. The cross-suit No. 172 of 1938 included four groups of properties. As to groups C and D the suit was dismissed. As to groups A and B, which comprised the family property at Mhapan and also other property at Mhapan, some of which was held along with stranger co-sharers, the suit was allowed, and Laxman's family was recognised as having a half share in it in spite of a plea by Ganesh Ramchandra that the claim was barred by his adverse possession. The decision in this suit has given rise to First Appeal No. 107 of 1940. After the remand of suit No. 154 by the High Court, suit No. 155 was heard in appeal by the District Judge. The High Court had already decided in the other suit that the fact of the suit being for only partial partition was no ground for dismissing it, and the same reasoning applied to suit No. 155 also in that respect. The learned Judge therefore did not touch the question of partition but considered the question of O. II, r. 2, and decided against Ganesh Ramchandra on that ground without going further into the merits of the case. In consequence of that decision Second Appeal No. 585 of 1939 has been filed.
After dealing with Letters Patent Appeal No. 8 and First Appeal No. 107 of 1940 his Lordship continued:
In the last of the appeals (second appeal No. 585 of 1939) we are concerned only with the effect of O. II, r. 2. Suit No. 155 of 1934 out of which it arises was filed on the same day as suit No. 154. The claim in suit No. 154 might have included the properties in suit No. 155, but did not. The contention therefore is that the plaintiff comes within the mischief of sub-r. (2) of O. II, r. 2, and that suit No. 155 must be dismissed as being a suit brought after the plaintiff had omitted to sue in respect of a portion of a claim admissible to him in a former suit. Sub-rule (1) of r. 2 of O. II says “Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action.” It has been found by the lower appellate Court that the cause of action for the two suits is the same, and on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff it is argued before us that it is not the same. Reference has been made to Ittappan v. Manavikrama, Kupuswami v. Subramaniyya,(2) and Syed Habibur v. Ashita Mohan(3) with the object of showing that in suits between co-owners as distinct from co-parceners the plaintiff is not bound to include in his suit the entire claim that he might have against his co-owner and that if he fails to sue in respect of the entire property of which he is the co-owner he can nevertheless sue at a later date in respect of the remainder. But however that may be, there can be no doubt that in this case the cause of action for the two suits is the same. The cause of action dates from the denial of Ramchandra's rights to the suit properties in a counter written statement which Laxman made in the suit of 1922 after Ganesh Ramchandra had asserted in his written statement that the house in Ratnagiri and the award decree were joint property; and in each case the principal fact which the plaintiff would have to prove is the source of the money, and proof of the source as being joint funds would dispose of either case. The cases cited as to co-owners as distinct from coparceners do not seem to touch the case of a denial of a co-owner's right to partition or joint possession of any of the property held by the co-owners. On the merits the issues in the two suits are substantially the same, and each of the suits Nos. 154 and 155, in so far as it does not include, the entire claim which the plaintiff might have made upon the cause of action, seems to offend against sub-r. (1) of r. 2 of O. II. But even though this is so, it does not follow that the penalty for a breach of sub-r. (1) should be the dismissal of suit No. 155 or indeed of either of the suits. It is true that there are authorities to show that even in the case of suits filed upon the same day one or other should be dismissed unless an appropriate amendment has been made (see Murti v. Bhola Ram and Rayalu Ayyar v. Ramudu Ayyar. But we have the authority of our own High Court to show that it is possible to deal with this situation in a different way. In Heirs of Bapu Kamble v. Narayan Dabhulkar three suits were brought by a co-owner against his co-proprietor and the three alienees in respect of three distinct parcels of land alienated. In the appeal to the High Court it was objected that the provision in the Code corresponding to O. II, r. 2, had been infringed. The High Court agreed that the procedure was irregular and that as the plaintiff had only one cause of action against the co-proprietor, he ought to have brought only one suit against him and either included all the alienees in this suit or brought separate actions against the alienees for the several pieces of land in their possession and had the proceedings in those suits stayed until the suit against the co-proprietor was determined. But they refused to interfere under the provisions of the Code corresponding to what is now s. 99 (prohibiting an appellate Court from reversing or substantially varying a decree because of an error or irregularity which does not materially affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court) because the separate actions against the co-proprietor had been instituted simultaneously and therefore the error in splitting up the claim against him did not affect the merits. Under sub-r. (1) the plaintiff is required to include the whole of the claim upon the cause of action, and any suit which fails to do so is to that extent defective. Sub-rule (2) provides the penalty, namely that the plaintiff shall not afterwards sue in respect of that claim which has been omitted. Applying the principle underlying the decision in Heirs of Bapu Kamble v. Narayan Dabhulkar, it seems that although two suits have been filed each of which does offend against sub-r. (1), still no question of applying the penalty provided in sub-r. (2) ought to arise here. Without going so far as to say that in the case of suits filed simultaneously as these have been the penalty provided by sub-r. (2) should never be applied and one or the other of the suits should never be dismissed merely on that ground, we nevertheless think that in this case the suit ought not to have been dismissed. It would have been possible to consolidate the two suits, as any Court has the power to do in its inherent jurisdiction (see Qazi Muhammad Afzar v. Mankumar Mahton; and in fact they were tried together, and the material issues in the two suits were the same. For practical purposes they were treated as only one suit; and I say this in spite of the fact that one of them was triable as a second class suit, and the appeal went to the District Court instead of to the High Court. We think therefore that the appeal must be allowed and this suit be remanded for trial on the merits, setting aside the decree dismissing the suit. The costs will be costs in the cause.
Broomfield, J.:—I agree with my learned brother and have only to add a few observations on the points of law arising in these appeals.
After dealing with the Letters Patent Appeal No. 8 and the First Appeal No. 107 of 1940 his Lordship continued:
Then there is the question of the construction of O. II, r. 2, which aries in Second Appeal No. 585. We are concerned only with the first two clauses of the rule. Clause (1) says that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action, and cl. (2) provides that where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. I feel no doubt whatever that the cause of action in the two suits filed on October 5, 1934, was the same. The essential and material part of the cause of action was the denial by Laxman in the pleadings of the suit of 1922 of Ramchandra's right to the Shirgaon property, the subject of suit No. 154, and the property in Ratnagiri town, the subject of suit No. 155. These properties were not included in that suit of 1922 brought by Laxman for partition but he sought partition of all the other properties. Ganesh in his mitten statement alleged that these properties also were joint and should be included. Laxman then put in a counter statement in which he maintained that they belonged to him exclusively. The only essential facts to be proved in both suits were that there was a common fund belonging to the two joint brothers out of which both these properties were acquired. The cases cited by Mr. Walawalkar, Syed Habibur Rasul v. Ashita Mohan Ghosh and Kuppusami Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar are not really of any assistance. It is true that a tenant in common, unlike a coparcener, may sue for partial partition and there may be several such suits in spite of O. II, r. 2. But, if, as in the present case, there has been a denial of his ownership in respect of all the properties, the tenant in common has a cause of action in respect of them all and the rule must apply. Ittappan v. Manavikrama was also cited, but that has no application. What was held there was that a suit for partial partition does not bar a suit for general partition or for a partition of the rest of the properties. That is so, as the Court pointed out, because the cause of action is clearly not the same.
The important question is whether the second part of r. 2 applies. Is it a case of a plaintiff afterwards suing in respect of a portion of a claim omitted from a former suit? The plaints in the two suits were presented on the same day and bear consecutive numbers. It is reasonable to suppose that they were presented simultaneously. It has been held by the Allahahad High Court in Murti v. Bhola Ram and by the Rangoon High Court in The Standard Electric and Motor Works v. Picture Palace that in such circumstances the suit bearing the later number is to be presumed to have been filed afterwards. The basis of these decisions is that if O. II, r. 2 (or s. 43 of the old Code), were not to be applied in the case of suits filed on the same day, it would open the door to deliberate and continual evasion of the law. For instance, if A buys on the same occasion seven different articles from B in B's shop, B might file on the same day seven suits against A in respect of the price of the seven articles sold which, it is said, would be absurd. I am by no means satisfied, however, that this argument ab inconvenienti really makes it necessary to strain the language of the rule and to assume contrary to the fact that one of two plaints presented simultaneously has been presented afterwards. The Madras High Court has declined to make this assumption: Rayalu Ayyar v. Ramudu Ayyar; but apparently it thought it necessary nevertheless to assume that one or the other of the suits was instituted afterwards and so the expedient was adopted of giving the plaintiff the option of electing which of the suits should be, regarded as the earlier.
It is obvious that either of these purely arbitrary methods of procedure may cause great injustice. That would no doubt be irrelevant if there were no other way of preventing evasion of the rule that a suit must include all claims arising out of the same cause of action. But I think that is not so. In the hypothetical case put by Sir John Edge in Murti v. Bhola Ram the man who brought seven suits on the same day based on the same cause of action would not and could not in fact evade the provisions of the first part of O. II, r. 2, and the Court would obviously not be bound to hear all these suits separately. The Court might consolidate them or call upon the plaintiff to include all the claims in one suit and withdraw the rest.
The only ruling of our own High Court on the point, so far as we are aware, is Heirs of Bapu Kamble v. Narayan Dabhulkar That seems to be an authority, binding on this Court, for the view that if suits are filed simultaneously there is no contravention of the part of the rule which prohibits a plaintiff from afterwards suing for a relief omitted in a former suit. In that particular case both suits had been tried and as the High Court was dealing with the matter in appeal, it applied the section corresponding to the present s. 99. Here the lower Courts have dismissed one of the suits and there is no question of applying s. 99. But as we take the view that this procedure, on the face of it unjust to the plaintiff, was not necessary on the true construction of the rule, we consider ourselves justified in treating the two suits as having been consolidated, as they ought to have been. To all intents and purposes it may be said that they were in fact consolidated since they were tried together on the same evidence.
L.P.A No. 8 of 1940 partly allowed;
F.A No. 107 of 1940 dismissed;
S.A No. 585 of 1939 allowed.
Y.V.D