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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Ss. 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923
  • S. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Ss. 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
  • Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923
  • S. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act
  • MOTOR VEHICLES ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment arises from a motor accident on 22 February 1979 near Pillur village on the Grand Trunk Road. Three claim petitions (O.P. Nos. 85, 133 and 137 of 1979) were filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Cuddalore, which rendered a common judgment. Two appeals (against awards in O.P. Nos. 85 and 137 of 1979) were brought by the owner of the lorry involved in the accident (the appellant). The appellant-owner is the owner of lorry MDG 1609. The first respondent in one appeal was a claimant who suffered injuries (resulting in amputation of the left forearm); respondents 1 to 7 in the other appeal were claimants for compensation for the death of Sengan. The insurance company was the second respondent both before the Tribunal and in these appeals.

The Tribunal found that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry. It awarded Rs. 13,300 to the injured claimant (comprising Rs. 10,000 for permanent disability, Rs. 300 for loss of income for two months, and Rs. 3,000 for pain and suffering) and Rs. 20,600 to the heirs of the deceased (comprising Rs. 16,100 for loss of dependency and Rs. 4,500 to the wife for loss of society). The Tribunal directed the owner to pay compensation but dismissed claims against the insurance company. The owner appealed on two grounds: (1) the Tribunal erred in exonerating the insurance company; (2) the quantum of compensation was excessive.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Insurance Company is liable under Sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act for injuries/death of persons who were carried in a goods vehicle (lorry) while accompanying and carrying their own goods, where they were not shown to be employed by the vehicle owner.
  2. Whether the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to (a) the injured claimant (including permanent disability, pain and suffering, and loss of income) and (b) the heirs of the deceased (loss of dependency and loss of society) was excessive and should be interfered with on appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The Tribunal erred in exonerating the insurance company; a proper construction of Section 95 (and the proviso) and Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act would make the insurer liable.
  • The quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal is excessive (appellant challenged the amounts awarded).
  • The appellant relied on precedents from the Karnataka High Court (Channappa v. Laxman; United Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gangamma) that were argued to support insurer liability.
  • At the time of judgment the appellant also cited a Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court (Nasibar v. Adhia & Co.)—which the appellant's counsel relied upon during arguments.

Insurance Company / Respondents' Position (as recorded)

  • The insurance company's stance (which the Tribunal accepted) was that the policy does not cover persons like the injured and the deceased who were travelling in a lorry accompanying their goods; the policy (Ex. B4) contains a clause excluding liability for persons carried in a goods vehicle except passengers carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment, subject to S.95 requirements.
  • The Tribunal (and the Court) treated the evidence as establishing that the injured and the deceased boarded the lorry midway and were accompanying their own goods rather than being employees of the owner—so they were not "passengers" covered by the policy as required by S.95.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Channappa v. Laxman (Karnataka High Court) Held (per Karnataka decisions relied on) that certain rules (R.161(1) of that State) justified treating owners/hirers of goods carried in a goods vehicle as persons covered by policy limitations; used to support insurer liability in those facts. The court noted the Karnataka decision but declined to follow it because Tamil Nadu does not have the equivalent rule (R.161(1)) and because the Karnataka ruling was followed there without detailed reasoning. Consequently, that decision did not assist the appellant in Tamil Nadu.
United Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gangamma, A.I.R. 1982 Kar. 261 (Karnataka High Court) Followed the earlier Karnataka ruling (Channappa) and treated the proviso to R.161(1) as authorising carriage of owners of goods in certain goods vehicles, affecting insurer liability. The court observed that the Karnataka High Court simply followed its prior decision but without reasoning; because Tamil Nadu rules lack the corresponding rule, the court refused to adopt that approach for these appeals.
Narayanan v. Madras State Palm Gur Sammelan, 87 L.W. 395 (Division Bench of this Court) Held that a passenger carried by a lorry is not covered by the insurance policy unless proved to be travelling by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment; if travelling without authorisation there is no provision in the Act to protect such a person. The court expressly followed this Division Bench decision and treated it as controlling: it supported the conclusion that the insurance company is not liable where persons travelled in a goods vehicle without being employees under a contract of employment.
Commonwealth Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rahim Khan Sahib (single Judge decision) Single Judge decision whose view was accepted by the Division Bench (Narayanan) and which took the position that unauthorised passengers in a goods vehicle are not covered by the policy. The Division Bench agreed with this single Judge view; the present court relied on that line of authority in concluding insurer non-liability.
Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Chinnammal (reported; citation linked in text) A learned Judge had held that "contract of employment" could include persons on the vehicle pursuant to a contract of employment with the owner of the goods carried in it (i.e., a broader view that could cover some persons on goods vehicles). The present court noted this view but held it was no longer good law in view of Division Bench authority to the contrary; the court rejected Vanguard as contrary to the Division Bench precedents it followed.
A.I.R. 1967 Punj. 486 F.B (referred to by Vanguard) Relied on in Vanguard to support a broader construction of "contract of employment" to include persons on the vehicle pursuant to employment with the owner of goods carried. The present court referenced that reliance but treated the Vanguard approach as displaced by Division Bench authority of this Court.
Nasibar v. Adhia & Co. (Bombay High Court) Relied upon by appellant at time of judgment; the Bombay Court relied upon a local rule (Rule No. 118) that authorised carriage of owner/hirer/police/bona fide employees and thereby supported insurer liability in those facts. The court refused to follow the Bombay decision because Tamil Nadu does not have the Rule No. 118 relied upon by the Bombay Court; accordingly, the Bombay decision did not influence the outcome here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two stages—first considering quantum of compensation and then the insurer's liability under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Quantum

  • The Tribunal's factual findings were accepted on appeal regarding the injury: the injured claimant (about 32 years old) had his left forearm amputated, spent nearly two months in hospital (discharged 20 April 1979), and suffered permanent disability. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 10,000 for permanent disability, Rs. 3,000 for pain and suffering, and Rs. 300 for two months' loss of income (assessing wage at Rs. 5 per day).
  • The court examined the awards and concluded that the compensation for permanent disability was not excessive considering the age and the nature of injury; the Rs. 3,000 for pain and suffering was not excessive given the hospitalisation and suffering; and the factual finding of Rs. 5 per day wage was a matter of fact that the court would not disturb.
  • For the deceased (an agricultural labourer), the Tribunal fixed average income at Rs. 6 per day (monthly Rs. 180), allowed Rs. 70 for maintenance, leaving Rs. 100 per month (annual Rs. 1,200) as dependency; dependency period fixed at 15 years (deceased's age fixed at 50 with expectancy to 65), yielding Rs. 18,000 for loss of dependency plus Rs. 4,500 for the wife's loss of society. The court found no error in these factual assessments and refused to interfere.

Insurer Liability under Sections 95 and 96

  • The court examined the textual provisions of Sections 95(1)(b)(i)-(ii) and 96(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act as reproduced in the judgment.
  • It observed that Section 96 fixes the insurer's liability where a policy is in place and a judgment is obtained in respect of a liability required to be covered under Section 95(1)(b), but S.96 does not itself determine whether passengers in a goods vehicle are covered by the policy—this is governed by S.95.
  • The plain meaning of S.95(1) shows that an insurer is liable in certain cases (employees carried in course of employment, subject to exclusions under the Workmen's Compensation Act) and specifically provides coverage for passengers of a public service vehicle under S.95(1)(b)(ii). The provision does not, on its face, extend coverage to persons travelling in a goods vehicle unless they are carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment.
  • On the facts, the evidence established that the injured and the deceased boarded the lorry midway, loaded their own bags of chillies at Alathur gate, were travelling in the cabin accompanying their goods, and proposed to alight at Madapattu; there was no evidence of employment by the lorry owner nor of an implied contract of employment. The court held it was not possible to infer they were employees of the lorry owner or that the injury/death arose out of and in the course of employment.
  • The wording of the insurer's policy (Ex. B4) echoed S.95—expressly excluding liability "except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of S.95 ... in relation to liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923" and excluding persons "other than a passenger carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment"—and therefore supported the Tribunal's legal conclusion.
  • The court declined to give weight to decisions from other jurisdictions (Karnataka, Bombay) that were based on state-specific rules (R.161(1) in Karnataka; Rule No. 118 in Bombay) which are not in force in Tamil Nadu. Accordingly, the court followed the Division Bench authority of this Court (Narayanan) and related precedents which held that unauthorised passengers in a goods vehicle are not covered by the insurance policy.
  • Because both points (quantum and insurer liability) failed, the appeals were dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeals are dismissed with costs.

Direct consequences and implications (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The Tribunal's awards in favour of the injured claimant and the heirs of the deceased are upheld; the compensation amounts as assessed by the Tribunal are not disturbed.
  • The insurance company is held not liable for the claims because the injured and the deceased were not shown to be travelling by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment with the vehicle owner; thus the Tribunal correctly dismissed claims against the insurer and correctly applied the policy clause consistent with S.95 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
  • The owner of the lorry remains liable to pay the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
  • The court refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, stating the case did not involve a substantial question of law of general importance nor was it a question that needed determination by the Supreme Court.

The opinion does not state or establish a new, general precedent beyond applying and following existing Division Bench authority of this Court and distinguishing decisions from other States on the basis of differing State Rules.

    M. Kandaswamy Pillai v. Chinnasamy And Another

    JUDGMENT

    Shanmukham, J.

    1. The motor accident that took place on 22nd February, 1979 near Pillur village, south of Ulundurpet in Grand Trunk Road, had given rise to three claim petitions, O.P Nos. 85, 133 and 137 of 1979 before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Cuddalore. The Tribunal rendered a common judgment in all the three proceedings. The two appeals are directed against the award passed by the Tribunal in O.P Nos. 85 and 137 of 1979 respectively. The appellant in both the appeals is the owner of the lorry which was involved in the accident and first respondent in the former is the claimant before the Tribunal, while respondents 1 to 7 are the claimants in the latter. The 2nd respondent is the insurance company which ranked as second respondent even before the Tribunal.

    2. The Tribunal found that the accident happened due to rash and negligent driving of the lorry MDG 1609. It awarded Rs. 13,300 to the first respondent in C.M.A 645 of 1980, because his hand was crushed and ultimately his left hand had to be amputated and also he suffered multiple injuries, made up of Rs. 10,000 as compensation for the permanent disability suffered by the injured, Rs. 300 towards loss of income for a period of two months at Rs. 150 per month, Rs. 3,000 as compensation for pain and sufferings. In the other proceedings, the Tribunal gave an award for Rs. 20,600, made up of Rs. 16,100 being compensation for loss of dependancy and Rs. 4,500 as compensation to the deceased's wife. The Tribunal directed the owner of the vehicle—the appellant before us—to pay compensation to the injured and to the heirs of the deceased respectively, but dismissed the claim as against the insurance company.

    3. Learned counsel for the appellant made two submissions. The first is that the Tribunal erred in exonerating the Insurance company from liability. In this context, the learned counsel submitted that the Tribunal had not made a proper construction of S. 95, particularly the proviso attached thereto and S. 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, while the second is directed against the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.

    4. Let us take up the second point in the first instance. The injured (first respondent in C.M.A 645 of 1980) was discharged from Government Hospital, Perambalur only on 20th April, 1979 as seen from Ex. A7. Thus, it is established that for nearly two months, he was lying in the hospital undergoing treatment. It is not in dispute that his left forearm had been amputated in the Government Hospital at Cuddalore and consequently, he had suffered a permanent disability. The Tribunal had fixed only Rs. 3,000 as compensation for his suffering and mental agony, while it fixed Rs. 10,000 as compensation for permanent disability. Except contending that the compensation awarded is excessive, the learned counsel could not make any effective argument. It is found that this claimant is aged about 32 years and on account of the accident, lost his left hand below his elbow. Considering his age, we hold the compensation awarded for permanent disability cannot be said to be excessive; so too, considering the duration of his suffering and his stay in the hospital, we are unable to hold that the sum of Rs. 3,000 awarded as compensation for mental agony and suffering is excessive. The third item related to the loss of income for the period of two months during which this claimant was laid up in the hospital for treatment.

    The Tribunal assessed the salary of the claimant at Rs. 5 per day and thus fixed the compensation in the sum of Rs. 300 for two months. It is no gainsay that even in 1979, any ordinary coolie was earning more than Rs. 5 a day even in village. Thus we see no justification to interfere with such a factual finding rendered by the Tribunal.

    5. As regards the quantum awarded to the heirs of the deceased Sengan who lost his life in the accident, we have to hold that such assessment by the Tribunal can hardly be assailed on the evidence placed before it. The deceased was an agricultural labourer. The Tribunal fixed his average income at Rs. 6 per day and therefore, evaluated his monthly income at Rs. 180. Allowing a margin of Rs. 70 for his maintenance and expenses, it assessed that he would have spared the balance of Rs. 100 to his family. Thus, his annual income was fixed at Rs. 1,700. The duration of the loss of dependency was fixed at 15 years. As the evidence in this case revealed that his age was varying from 45 to 52, the Tribunal fixed his age at 50 years. Assessing the expectancy of the deceased as 65 years it fixed the compensation at Rs. 18,000 (15 years Rs. 1,200 per year), as loss of dependency. It awarded Rs. 4,500 to his wife for the loss of her husband's society. We had earlier indicated that the earning capacity of an agricultural labourer even in 1979 was not less than Rs. 5 par day. Then, we do not find any error in the Tribunal fixing the daily income of the deceased at Rs. 6 per day; so too, as regards the expentancy of life, the assessment made by the Tribunal is bayond challenge. Thus, we hold that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal can hardly be interfered with. We may add that the appellant is rather fortunate in that neither the injured nor the heirs of the deceased had challenged the quantum by preferring an independent appeal or cross objections.

    6. To appreciate the first point, certain admitted facts have to be noticed. The injured and the deceased had got into the lorry midway, loaded their goods in the lorry and also travelled in that lorry being seated in the cabin near the driver. The contention of the Insurance Company which found favour with the Tribunal is that the policy of insurance does not cover persons like the injured and the deceased travelling in a lorry. In this context, it relied upon Ex. B4, the policy of insurance bearing No. 426314518. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that a proper construction of S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act will reveal that the approach made by the Tribunal is erroneous. A great emphasis is laid on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Channappa v. Laxman,1 and United Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gangamma . A.I.R 1982 Kar. 261. which followed the former ruling of that Court without no further detailed discussion.

    7. Before we examine the said contention, we must state that a Division Bench of this Court in Narayanan v. Madras State Palm Gur Sammelan . 87 L.W 395. had held that—

    “A passenger carried by a lorry will not be covered by the Insurance policy unless he is proved to be a passenger travelling by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment. If the person was not in employment, and if he was travelling without authorisation, there is no provision in the Act to protect such a person. The Rules framed under the Motor Vehicles Act prohibit travel by any person as a passenger in a goods vehicle. Under the circumstances, there is no ground for fastening any liability on the insurer or on the owner of the vehicle for the injuries sustained by a person who was travelling without authority in the lorry and who sustained injuries due to the negligence of the driver.”

    Accordingly, the Bench observed, under the circumstances, we see no ground for fastening any liability on the insurer or on the owner of the vehicle for the injuries sustained by the person who was travelling without authority in the lorry and sustained injuries due to negligence of the driver. As a matter of fact, the Division Bench had agreed with the view of a learned single Judge who had considered this question elaborately in Commonwealth Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rahim Khan Sahib. It may be useful to refer to another decision of this Court rendered by a learned Judge reported in Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Chinnammal. No doubt, the learned Judge has held—

    “Though on a superficial view of S. 95 it might appear that the words ‘contract of employment would cover only a contract of employment with the owner of the insured vehicle it would cover not only such persons but also persons who are on the vehicle in pursuance of a contract of employment with the owner of the goods carried in it. What is necessary is that for sufficient reasons, the person must be on the vehicle in pursuance of a contract of employment. If he is such a person, any injury caused to him would also be covered by the section. A.I.R 1967 Punj. 486 F.B, relied on”.

    It is needless to state that in view of the Bench decisions of this Court referred to supra, the learned Judge's view in Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Chinnammal, is no longer good law Secondly, the Full Bench decision relied on by the learned Judge held to the contrary, because the ratio that was laid therein is that—

    “The deceased persons as hirers-cum-owners of the goods did not come under Cl. (ii) of the proviso to S. 95(1)(b). So the policy was not one that was required to cover liability under Cl. (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 95. It was open to the insurer to prove that. This is not barred by any provision of S. 96 and in fact, S. 96 proceeds on the basis that such a policy under S. 95(1)(b) is required.

    That the hirers were not on the truck by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment because they were not employed by anybody to go on the truck but were on it as owners of the goods carried in it.”

    8. As the argument related to the construction of Ss. 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, we extract such relevant parts that are necessary for our present consideration—

    “95(1). In order to comply with the requirements of this Chapter, a policy of insurance must be a policy which—

    (b) insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-S. (2)(i) against any liability which may be incurred by him in respect of the death of or bodily injury to any person or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

    (ii) against the death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place;

    Provided that a policy shall not be required— (i) to cover liability in respect of death, arising out of and in the course of his employment, of the employee of a person insured by the policy or in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment other than a liability arising out of or under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the death of, or bodily injury to, any such employee;—

    (c) if it is goods vehicle, being carried in the vehicle.

    (2) Subject to the proviso to sub-S. (1), a policy of insurance shall cover any liability incurred in respect of any one accident upto the following limits, namely—

    (a) Where the vehicle is a goods vehicle, a limit of fifty thousand rupees in all, including the liabilities, if any arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, in respect of the death of or bodily injury to employees (other than the driver), not exceeding six in number, being carried in the vehicle;

    96(1). If, after a certificate of Insurance has been issued under sub-S. (4) of S. 95 in favour of the person by whom a policy has been effected, judgment in respect of any such liability as is required to be covered by a policy under Cl. (b) of sub-S. (1) of S. 95 (being a liability covered by the terms of the policy) is obtained against any person insured by the policy, then, notwithstanding that the insuer may be entitled to avoid or cancel or may have avoided or cancelled the policy the insurer shall, subject to the provisions of this section, pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree any sum not exceeding the sum assured payable thereunder, as if he were the judgment-debtor, in respect of the liability together with any amount payable in respect of costs and any sum payable in respect of interest on that sum by virtue of any contract relating to interest on judgements.”

    9. S. 96 fastens a liability on the insurance company and also fixes its liability as equivalent to the liability suffered by the person by whom a policy has been effected with the said insurance company as required by (1)(b), but not exceeding the sum assured. Thus S. 96 does not throw any light as to the liability of the Insurance Company in a case where passengers are carried in a goods vehicle besides goods. It is S. 95(1) which provides the requirements of policies and limits of liabilities. The plain meaning of S. 95(1) extracted supra will unmistakably convey that the insurance company will be liable in the following cases notwithstanding the terms in the insurance policy to the contrary. They are…(a) The Insurance company will be liable in respect of death arising out of and in the course of his employment of the employee of a person insured by the policy. (b) The Insurance company would be liable in respect of bodily injury sustained by such an employee arising out of and in the course of his employee, if it is goods vehicle being carried in the vehicle. In either case, the liability arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of death of, or bodily injury to any such employee is excluded. In this case, it is a lorry exclusively intended to carry goods. The immediate question is whether either the injured or the deceased who travelled in the lorry along with their goods can be said to be employed by a person insured by the policy and either the injury or death arose out of and in the course of his employment. On the evidence in this case, it is not possible to hold that either the insured or the deceased was an employee of the appellant lorry owner who had insured is lorry with the insurance company and that either the injury or the death arose out of and in the course of his employment. We shall emphasis here that on the evidence, it is established that both the injured and the deceased got into the lorry midway. The evidence of P.W 1 only establishes that both sides loaded the 10 ½ bags and 3 bags of chillies respectively in the lorry at Alathur gate on the date of the accident, that they were also travelling in the cabin accompanying their goods, that they proposed to get down at Madapattu, but then the lorry met with accident due to rash and negligent driving near Pillur village. On the above evidence, it is too difficult too infer even an implied contract of employment between the appellant owner of the lorry and either of the injured or the deceased. S. 95(1)(b)(i) refers to cases where the accident involves the death or bodily injury of any person or damage to any property of a third party and is also caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place; it is needless to state that the vehicle may be a generic term and will include all types of vehicles visualised under the Act inclusive of goods vehicle or lorry and public service vehicle. The said provision does not cover the death of a person travelling in the vehicle itself. A reference to S. 95(1)(b)(ii) will justify our above view. For, the same specifically refers to death of or bodily injury to any passenger of a public service vehicle caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle in a public place. Thus, we find that the provisions in the Act do not by themselves support the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant.

    10. We must add here that the covenant contained in the policy of insurance marked as Ex. B4 is in consonance with the above provisions. The particular clause provides—

    “Except so far as is necessary to meet the requirements of S. 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in relation to liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the Company shall not be liable in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person (other than a passenger carried by reason of or in pursuance of a contract of employment) being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the motor vehicle at the time of the occurrence of the event out of which only the claim arises.”

    Quite rightly therefore the Tribunal held both in law and under the policy of insurance that the insurance company is not liable to the claims made in these proceedings.

    11. Regarding the decision of the Karnataka High Court, we have to point out that the learned Judges were principally influenced by R. 161(1) which was perhaps applicable to the Karnataka State. We must immediately state that the Tamil Nadu Rules do not contain any such rules. R. 161(1) applicable to Karnataka State runs thus—

    “161. Carriage of persons in goods vehicles—(1) Subject to the provisions of this rule, no person shall be carried in a goods vehicle;

    Provided that the owner or the hirer or a bona fide employee of the owner or the hirer of the vehicle may be carried in a goods vehicle the total number of persons so carried in a light transport goods vehicle not being more than three and in any other goods vehicle, not being more than seven including the driver.”

    That is obvious from the following observations found in that judgment:—

    “The proviso to R. 161(1) of the Rules since specifically authorises the use of the goods vehicle for carrying the owners of goods carried in the vehicle as passengers, it cannot be said that the vehicle which carries such passengers is not the one covered by a permit to play for hire or reward. In the said view of the matter, the term relating to the limitation of liability contained in the policy adverted to by us, does not enable the insurer to a escape its liability for the risk of the owner of the goods”

    Learned counsel for the appellant just at the time of delivering the judgment cited a decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reported in Nasibar v. Adhia & Co., First of all on our construction we found that the provisions by themselves do not support the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. Secondly, we had followed a Division Bench of this Court, which has held the field all the while. These therefore, refrain us from following the decision of the Bombay High Court. Even in this case, it is relevant to notice that the Bombay High Court relied upon Rule No. 118. According to the said rule, if any of the following persons travelling by a goods vehicle (a) the owner, (b) the hirer, (c) the police officers in uniform travelling on duty, and (d) the bona fide employees of the owner or hirer who are being carried by the goods vehicles free of charge, should suffer inury or meet with his death, the injured or the heirs of the deceased as the case may be, are entitled to claim compensation even from the insurance company. No such rule is in force in Tamil Nadu.

    12. In the circumstances, we are unable to take any guidance from the decision referred to supra. The recent decision of the Karnataka High Court has simply followed its previous decisions but without any reasoning whatever. Thus, the appellant cannot call to his aid the rulings of the Karnataka High Court as supporting his contentions.

    13. In the result both the points fail. The appeals are therefore dismissed with costs.……The oral request made by the learned counsel for the appellant for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is turned down because this case does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance nor does the question, in our opinion, need to be decided by the Supreme Court.

    VCS.

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    M. Kandaswamy Pillai v. Chinnasamy And Another
    (Mar 19, 1984)