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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 INSC 820
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • the said Act
  • Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act
  • Constitution of India
  • Section 19 of the Act
  • Section 6(3) of the Right to Information Act, 2005
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2010 INSC 820
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • the said Act
  • Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act
  • Constitution of India
  • Section 19 of the Act
  • Section 6(3) of the Right to Information Act, 2005
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Subhash Chandra Agrawal, invoking the Right to Information Act, 2005, requested the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO) of the Supreme Court of India to supply the “complete file(s)” and related correspondence concerning the appointments of Justices H.L. Dattu, A.K. Ganguly and R.M. Lodha, which allegedly involved objections from the Prime Minister’s Office. The CPIO replied that the Registry does not handle or possess records regarding judicial appointments and therefore could not supply the information. Mr Agrawal’s first-stage appeal within the Supreme Court Registry was dismissed on identical grounds.

Pursuant to Section 19 of the Act, the respondent then approached the Central Information Commission (CIC). The CIC relied chiefly on a Delhi High Court judgment (W.P. No. 288 of 2009) and on S.P. Gupta v. Union of India to direct the CPIO to furnish the requested information. The CPIO and the Supreme Court of India challenged that CIC order by filing Special Leave Petitions which, upon grant of leave, matured into the present civil appeals before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the concept of judicial independence prohibits disclosure of the requested information regarding judicial appointments, and whether such disclosure would amount to interference with the judiciary’s functioning.
  2. Whether non-disclosure is necessary “to avoid any erosion in the credibility of the decisions and to ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by all the constitutional functionaries” involved in the appointments process.
  3. Whether the information sought is exempt from disclosure under Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments (CPIO & Supreme Court of India, represented by the Attorney General)

  • Relied on Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441, contending that S.P. Gupta must be read in light of this larger-Bench ruling which underscores the need to keep the appointments process free from “needless intrusion by strangers and busybodies”.
  • Maintained that disclosure is not in the public interest because it would undermine candid and effective consultation among constitutional authorities and thereby erode judicial independence.
  • Submitted, with reference to Subhash Sharma v. Union of India 1991 Supp (1) SCC 574, that information supplied to the Chief Justice of India regarding appointments is held in trust and in a fiduciary capacity, attracting protection from disclosure.
  • Noted that most High Courts (except Gauhati) supported the view that such information is held in a fiduciary capacity and should remain confidential.

Respondent’s Arguments (Subhash Chandra Agrawal, represented by Mr Prashant Bhushan)

  • Placed heavy reliance on paragraphs 83–85 of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87, which favour disclosure of appointment-related correspondence when relevant to public scrutiny.
  • Argued that the Right to Information Act embodies citizens’ fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, and therefore the requested information should be disclosed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 Advocates disclosure of documents related to judicial appointments where relevant and rejects blanket immunity from production. Relied upon by the CIC and by the respondent; the Supreme Court noted it but indicated its applicability under the RTI Act requires fresh examination.
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (1993) 4 SCC 441 Emphasises independence of the judiciary and the need to shield the appointment process from external interference. Cited by the appellants to argue against disclosure; the Court extracted paragraph 482 highlighting public interest in confidentiality.
Subhash Sharma v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 574 Describes judicial appointments as a constitutional trust, with information held in a fiduciary capacity. Invoked by the appellants to support the claim that the requested information is protected by fiduciary privilege.
Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal (Delhi HC, W.P. No. 288 of 2009) Delhi High Court ruling that favoured disclosure under the RTI Act. Formed a principal basis for the CIC’s order that is under challenge.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1909) Articulates the doctrine that constitutional principles must be capable of adaptation to contemporary needs. Quoted by the Supreme Court to frame the interpretive approach it must adopt while addressing the present constitutional questions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench observed that the matter raises “great and fundamental issues” at the intersection of two constitutional values: the independence of the judiciary, a basic-structure principle, and the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression, of which the right to information is an integral component. After hearing both sides, the Court concluded that:

  • A “substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution” arises regarding whether disclosure of appointment-related information would compromise judicial independence or amount to undue interference.
  • The applicability of S.P. Gupta to requests under the RTI Act must be reconsidered in light of later constitutional jurisprudence, particularly the 1993 nine-judge decision in Supreme Court Advocates -on- Record Assn.
  • Given the constitutional magnitude of the issues, the matter should be adjudicated by a Constitution Bench of appropriate strength.

Holding and Implications

ORDER: The Registry is directed to place the matter before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate-strength Constitution Bench; the connected appeals are tagged accordingly.

Implications: No final decision on disclosure was rendered. The immediate effect is that the controversy is escalated to a larger Bench for authoritative resolution. Consequently, the CIC’s direction remains in abeyance, and no new precedent on RTI and judicial appointments has yet been set.

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    Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court Of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal .

    B. Sudershan Reddy, J.—

    Special Leave Petition (C) No. 32855 of 2009

    1. Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the impugned order dated 24-11-2009 passed by the Central Information Commission (CIC) whereby and whereunder CIC having allowed the appeal preferred by Subhash Chandra Agrawal, the respondent herein, directed the Central Public Information Officer (CPIO), Supreme Court of India to furnish information as sought by him.

    2. The respondent Subhash Chandra Agrawal requested the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to arrange to send him a copy of “complete file(s) (only as available in the Supreme Court) inclusive of copies of complete correspondence exchanged between the constitutional authorities concerned with file notings relating to said appointment of Mr Justice H.L Dattu, Mr Justice A.K Ganguly and Mr Justice R.M Lodha superseding seniority of Mr Justice P. Shah, Mr Justice A.K Patnaik and Mr Justice V.K Gupta as allegedly objected to by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) also”. He further requested the CPIO not to invoke Section 6(3) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 (for short “the Act”).

    3. The CPIO, Supreme Court of India promptly replied to the application so filed under the said Act duly informing the respondent that the Registry does not deal with the matters pertaining to the appointment of Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court of India. Appointments of Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts are made by the President of India as per the procedure prescribed by law and the matters relating thereto are not dealt with and handled by the Registry of the Supreme Court of India. The CPIO accordingly informed the respondent that the information sought by him is “neither maintained nor available in the Registry”.

    4. The respondent Subhash Chandra Agrawal preferred an appeal before the appellate authority of the Supreme Court of India challenging the said order. The appellate authority dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the CPIO. Thereafter, the respondent preferred a further appeal before CIC purported it to be under Section 19 of the Act. CIC having set aside the orders passed by the authorities, directed the CPIO, Supreme Court to furnish the information sought by the respondent. It is that order which is under challenge before us.

    5. CIC mainly relied upon the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No. 288 of 2009 titled Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal. Of course, CIC also relied on the decision of this Court in S.P Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87.

    6. The learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of the appellants while placing strong reliance upon the decision of this Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 inter alia submitted that the ratio of the decision in S.P Gupta 1981 Supp SCC 87 is required to be understood and appreciated in the light of the observations made by this Court in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. (1993) 4 SCC 441 inasmuch as S.P Gupta case 1981 Supp SCC 87 has been explained by the larger Bench. The submission was that disclosure of the information sought for by the respondent cannot be furnished in public interest. It is in the public interest to keep the appointments and transfers free from “needless intrusions by strangers and busybodies in the functioning of the judiciary”. The learned Attorney General placed particular reliance on the following paragraph of the said decision: (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. case (1993) 4 SCC 441)

    “482. This is also in accord with the public interest of excluding these appointments and transfers from litigative debate, to avoid any erosion in the credibility of the decisions and to ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by all the constitutional functionaries, which is essential for effective consultation and for taking the right decision. The growing tendency of needless intrusion by strangers and busybodies in the functioning of the judiciary under the garb of public interest litigation….”

    7. It was further submitted that the appointment of Judges is essentially a discharge of constitutional trust as laid down by this Court in Subhash Sharma v. Union of India 1991 Supp (1) SCC 574. The submission was that the information made available to the Chief Justice of India in respect of appointment of Judges of the High Courts and as well as the Supreme Court is held by him in trust and in fiduciary capacity. This submission of the learned Attorney General received considerable support from the various High Courts of the country except the High Court of Gauhati as is evident from their response filed pursuant to the notices issued by this Court.

    8. The learned counsel for the respondent Mr Prashant Bhushan placed heavy reliance on paras 83, 84 and 85 of the decision of this Court in S.P Gupta 1981 Supp SCC 87.

    9. That on a holistic reading of the said judgment, it appears to us that the Court was mainly dealing with the question as to whether any immunity could be claimed from production of the records in respect of the correspondence between the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notings made by them in regard to the transfer of a High Court Judge including the Chief Justices of the High Court which were extremely material for deciding whether there was full and effective consultation? It is observed at more than one place that the non-disclosure of the said documents would seriously handicap the petitioner therein in showing that there was no full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice of India or that the transfer was by way of punishment and not in public interest. It is observed: (S.P Gupta case 1981 Supp SCC 87)

    “83. … It would become almost impossible for the petitioner, without the aid of these documents, to establish his case, even if it be true.”
    The Court felt that (S.P Gupta case 1981 Supp SCC 87)
    “all relevant documents should be produced before the court so that the full facts may come before the people, who in a democracy are the ultimate arbiters”.
    The Court further observed: (S.P Gupta case 1981 Supp SCC 87 & 302, para 85)
    “85. … We do not see any reason why, if the correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India and the relevant notes made by them, in regard to discontinuance of an Additional Judge are relevant to the issues arising in a judicial proceeding, they should not be disclosed. … Where it becomes relevant in a judicial proceeding, why should the Court and the opposite party and through them, the people not know what are the reasons for which a particular appointment is made or a particular Additional Judge is discontinued or a particular transfer is effected. We fail to see what harm can be caused by the disclosure of true facts when they become relevant in a judicial proceeding.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    10. Whether the said decision would be applicable when such information is sought under the provisions of the Right to Information Act is an important question that is required to be gone into.

    11. Having heard the learned Attorney General and the learned counsel for the respondent, we are of the considered opinion that a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution is involved in the present case which is required to be heard by a Constitution Bench. The case on hand raises important questions of constitutional importance relating to the position of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India under the Constitution and the independence of the judiciary in the scheme of the Constitution on the one hand and on the other, the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression. Right to information is an integral part of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the Constitution. The Right to Information Act merely recognises the constitutional right of citizens to freedom of speech and expression. Independence of judiciary forms part of basic structure of the Constitution of India. The independence of judiciary and the fundamental right to free speech and expression are of a great value and both of them are required to be balanced.

    12. The Constitution is fundamentally a public text—the monumental character of a government and the people—and the Supreme Court is required to apply it to resolve public controversies. For, from our beginnings, a most important consequence of the constitutionally created separation of powers has been the Indian habit, extraordinary to other democracies, of casting social, economic, philosophical and political questions in the form of public law remedies, in an attempt to secure ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court. In this way, important aspects of the most fundamental issues confronting our democracy finally arrive in the Supreme Court for judicial determination. Not infrequently, these are the issues upon which contemporary society is most deeply divided. They arouse our deepest emotions. This is one such controversy. William J. Bennan, Jr. in one of his public discourse observed:

    “We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as twentieth-century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time? For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs. What the constitutional fundamentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be the measure to the vision of our time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn, cannot be the measure to the vision of their time. This realisation is not, I assure you, a novel one of my own creation. Permit me to quote from one of the opinions of our Court, Weems v. United States 217 US 349 (1909), written nearly a century ago: (US p. 373)
    ‘… Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it”. The future is their care, and provision for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophesy can be made. In the application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.’ ”

    13. The current debate is a sign of a healthy nation. This debate on the Constitution involves great and fundamental issues. Most of the times we reel under the pressure of precedents. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the intervening history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time?

    14. Following substantial questions of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution arise for consideration:

    1. Whether the concept of independence of the judiciary requires and demands the prohibition of furnishing of the information sought? Whether the information sought for amounts to interference in the functioning of the judiciary?
    2. Whether the information sought for cannot be furnished to avoid any erosion in the credibility of the decisions and to ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by all the constitutional functionaries, which is essential for effective consultation and for taking the right decision?
    3. Whether the information sought for is exempt under Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act?

    15. The above questions involve the interpretation of the Constitution and raise great and fundamental issues.

    16. For the aforesaid reasons, we direct the Registry to place this matter before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constitution of a Bench of appropriate strength. Let the papers be accordingly placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India.

    Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 32856 of 2009

    17. Leave granted. Tag with civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 32855 of 2009.

    Civil Appeal No. 2683 of 2010

    18. Tag with civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 32855 of 2009.

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    Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court Of India v. Subhash Chandra Agrawal .
    (Nov 26, 2010)