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  • II, Section 10, vv. 1, 3
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  • II, Section 10, vv. 1, 3
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns property derived from Chuturee Bhagat, who left two sons, Ram Sahye and Sheo Sahye, each holding separate inherited properties. About 1838 Ram Sahye became insane. He left three sons: Abilakh and Dukhit (who survived) and Dilchand (who died without issue). Abilakh's sons were Jugdeo and Denonath; Dukhit's sons were Again and Brijbehari.

In 1871 Jugdeo and Again were appointed committees (in lunacy) for Ram Sahye under Act XXXV of 1858. With prior sanction of the Judge they mortgaged the property in suit in favour of the defendant. The mortgage appears to have been executed on behalf of the lunatic, but the mortgagee subsequently sued Jugdeo and Again on the mortgage; a decree was obtained in 1882 against them both in their personal capacity and as guardians/committees. In execution of that decree the mortgaged property was sold and purchased by the defendant in July 1885.

The present suit was instituted in 1891 by the sons and grandsons of Ram Sahye and their respective wives seeking a declaration that, by reason of Ram Sahye's insanity, he had no right in the property and that the 1885 sale passed no title to the defendant. The lower courts found (a) insanity occurred after succession vested in Ram Sahye; (b) no partition had occurred between Ram Sahye and his sons; (c) the loan secured by the mortgage was for the benefit of the joint family; and (d) the sale in execution passed the property to the defendant. The plaintiffs appealed, and this opinion concerns the second appeal to this Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the subsequent insanity of Ram Sahye (i.e., insanity occurring after succession vested in him) disentitled him to the property so that the sale in execution passed no title to the defendant.
  2. Whether the mortgage and the decree obtained on it bound the whole joint family or only the lunatic's separate interest, i.e., whether the loan was contracted on behalf of the family or only on behalf of the lunatic.
  3. Whether the committee in lunacy (Jugdeo and Again), with the District Judge's sanction, could bind the whole family by executing the mortgage and procuring a decree which was confessed in their personal capacity as well as in their capacity as committees.
  4. Whether the sale in execution of the mortgage decree passed valid title to the defendant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • That upon the happening of insanity Ram Sahye became disentitled to the property and therefore the sale in 1885 passed no title to the defendants.
  • That the loan was contracted on behalf of Ram Sahye only (and not on behalf of the family), so the decree could not bind joint family property and the sale was ineffectual.
  • That although a sane father could bind his sons and grandsons by a debt contracted by him (if not immoral), that right was personal to the father and not exercisable by his committee in lunacy.
  • The appellants principally relied upon two decisions of a Divisional Bench of this Court (I.L.R. 8 Cal. 149 and I.L.R. 8 Cal. 919) and the Mitakshara, ch. II, s.10 vv.1–6, as authority for their contention that insanity disentitles in the relevant sense.

Respondent / Defendant (and Lower Courts) Position

  • Lower courts found that at the time succession vested in Ram Sahye he was sane, and his subsequent insanity did not divest him of the property.
  • Lower courts found there was no partition between Ram Sahye and his sons, and that the mortgage loan was contracted for the benefit of the whole family.
  • The mortgage had been executed with the sanction of the District Judge under Act XXXV of 1858 and the decree was obtained against Jugdeo and Again both as committees and personally (by confession), indicating the debt was for family benefit and binding on the entire family; accordingly, the sale passed the entire property to the defendant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Lalla Lahee Sahye, I.L.R. 8 Cal. 149 Held that an insane person loses his right to a share on partition; on partition the insane father would not get any share and sons would receive whole property. The Court regarded this and the related case as limited: they do not support the broader contention that subsequent insanity disentitles a person whose estate has already vested. The case was read as not going further than exclusion on partition.
Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut, I.L.R. 8 Cal. 919 Followed the earlier case: when on partition the insane father would receive no share, and sons' rights extinguished by limitation, the father could not maintain suit to restore property to joint family. The Court treated this decision similarly — as establishing exclusion on partition but not as establishing that subsequent insanity revests or divests property already vested.
Balgobinda v. Lal Bahadur S.D.A. 1854, p. 244 Principle that although an insane person cannot succeed to inheritance, a person who has once succeeded to property is not dispossessed if he subsequently becomes insane. The Court affirmed this principle as applicable: when property has once vested by succession, subsequent insanity will not be a ground for resumption. This principle supported the decision to dismiss the appeal.
Deokishen v. Budhprakash, I.L.R. 5 All. 509 (Full Bench, Allahabad High Court) Held that when property has once vested by succession in a person, his subsequent insanity does not justify resumption of the property. The Court cited this case as corroborative authority for the proposition that subsequent insanity does not divest a vested estate.
Sanku v. Puttamma, I.L.R. 14 Mad. 289 (Madras High Court) Affirms that property once vested remains with the person notwithstanding subsequent insanity. Used as further supporting authority for the proposition that subsequent insanity does not divest already vested rights.
Moniram Kolita v. Kery Kolitani, I.L.R. 5 Cal. 776; L.R. 7 I.A. 115 (Judicial Committee) Expounds substantially the same principle that subsequent insanity does not defeat vested succession rights. The Court treated this Judicial Committee decision as underlying and consistent with the principle recognized in the other cases, supporting the dismissal of the appeal.
Mitakshara, chapter II, s.10 vv.1–6 (legal text) Addressed by appellants as authority for exclusion from inheritance; text includes language on exclusion from inheritance when disqualification occurs before partition/succession. The Court rejected the appellants' broad interpretation, noting verse 6 expressly indicates a person already separated (i.e., already allotted) is not deprived of his allotment. The Court held the Mitakshara did not support the contention that subsequent insanity deprives a person of property already vested.
Viramitrodaya, ch. VIII, v.4 (legal text) States exclusion takes place if disqualification occurs prior to partition or succession, but not if it occurs subsequently, since there is no authority for resumption of allotted shares. The Court cited this text to reinforce its conclusion that subsequent insanity does not justify resuming allotted shares; it supported refusal to accept the appellants' interpretation of the Mitakshara.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. The Court reviewed the two Divisional Bench decisions (I.L.R. 8 Cal. 149 and I.L.R. 8 Cal. 919) relied on by appellants and concluded those decisions do not support the appellants' broad contention. Those cases were confined to the proposition that upon a partition taking place an insane father would receive no share; they did not hold that an estate already vested is lost by subsequent insanity.
  2. The Court identified and affirmed a contrary line of authority (Balgobinda v. Lal Bahadur; Deokishen v. Budhprakash; Sanku v. Puttamma; Moniram Kolita v. Kery Kolitani) establishing the principle that, under Hindu law, while an insane person cannot succeed to an inheritance, a person who has once succeeded to property is not dispossessed of it by subsequent insanity. The Court considered these authorities to be directly applicable.
  3. The Court considered the Mitakshara and rejected the appellants' interpretation that the text required deprivation of property if insanity occurred after succession. The Court observed verse 6's language ("but one already separated from his co-heirs is not deprived of his allotment") and cited Viramitrodaya to show the tradition excludes resumption of allotted shares where disqualification occurs after partition or succession.
  4. Having concluded that vesting of the estate in Ram Sahye was not defeated by his subsequent insanity (and noting there was no partition between him and his sons), the Court turned to whether the defendant acquired title under the sale in execution.
  5. The Court analysed the mortgage and the decree: although the mortgage did not purport expressly to be on behalf of the whole family, it was given with the District Judge's sanction under Act XXXV of 1858 and was found to be for the benefit of the whole family. The decree was obtained against Jugdeo and Again both as committees and in their personal capacity, and was passed upon confession. The Court interpreted this as indicating Jugdeo and Again intended to bind the family in their personal capacity as family members as well as committees.
  6. On that basis — that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the whole family, that the committee's act with judicial sanction could be regarded as the act of the father/head of the family, and that the decree bound the family — the Court concluded the sale passed the entire property to the defendant.
  7. The Court therefore found no merit in the appeal and ordered dismissal with costs. A concurring opinion by Prinsep, J. agreed in the result but noted doubts about the correctness of the law in the earlier cited Calcutta decisions; he said it was unnecessary to decide that point because the suit could be disposed of on other grounds.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeals are dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The Court held that where an estate has once vested by succession in a person, subsequent insanity does not divest that estate; the two Divisional Bench decisions cited by the appellants were treated as limited to exclusion upon partition and not as establishing that subsequent insanity defeats vested rights.
  • The Court held the mortgage (executed with the District Judge's sanction under Act XXXV of 1858) and the decree against Jugdeo and Again (in both capacities, and by confession) bound the whole family because the debt was found to have been contracted for the benefit of the family; consequently, the sale in execution passed the entire property to the defendant.
  • Direct effect on the parties: the plaintiffs (male plaintiffs and their representatives) are bound by the mortgage and cannot overturn the sale; the Court noted that the female plaintiffs have no right to contest the matter (as stated by Prinsep, J.).
  • The Court did not set a new, broad precedent that would overturn prior authorities; rather, it relied on established authorities to affirm the principle that subsequent insanity does not defeat a vested estate and decided the case on the particular facts regarding the mortgage, decree and sale.

Disposition: The appeals were dismissed with costs (see paras. 13 and 16 of the opinion). Prinsep, J. delivered a concurring opinion expressing doubt about certain prior Calcutta decisions but agreeing that it was unnecessary to decide that point for this appeal.

    Abilakh Bhagat And Ors. v. Bhekhi Mahto And Anr.

    1. The facts out of which this appeal arise are shortly these : One Chuturee Bhagat died, leaving two sons, Ram Sahye and Sheo Sahye, who succeeded to his estate; and there is no question in this case that they held separately the properties inherited by them. Subsequently, in or about the year 1838, Ram Sahye became insane. He left three sons, Abilakh, Dukhit and Dilchand. The last died without any issue, and the surviving sons had each two sons, Jugdeo and Denonath (sons of Abilakh), Again and Brijbehari (sons of Dukhit).

    2. In the year 1871, Jugdeo and Again were appointed to be Ram Sahye's committee in lunacy under the provisions of Act XXXV of 1858; and these two persons, with the sanction of the Judge previously obtained, mortgaged the property in. suit in favour of the defendant. This mortgage does not appear to have been executed in their own behalf, but on behalf of the lunatic only; but however that may be, the mortgagee sued them on the mortgage, and a decree was obtained in 1882 against them both in their own capacity and as guardians of their grandfather. And in execution of this decree, the mortgaged property was brought to sale and purchased by the defendant in July 1885.

    3. The present suit was instituted in 1891 by the sons and grandsons of Earn Sahye, and their respective wives; and the object of their suit was to have it declared that Ram Sahye, by reason of insanity, had no right in the property, and that the sale in July 1885 passed no title to the defendants. And among other matters it was alleged in the plaint that Abilakh and Dukhit, the two sons of Earn Sahye, divided between themselves the whole of the paternal estate of Ram. Sahye and entered into possession of their respective shares.

    4. It has been found by both the Courts below that at the time when the succession opened out to Ram Sahye, be was not insane, and that the insanity occurred after the estate had vested in him; that there was no partition of the estate between the two sons of Ram Sahye, and that the debt contracted under the mortgage was for the benefit of the joint family. And the lower Courts have held that the estate having once legally vested in Ram Sahye, he could not be divested of it by reason of subsequent insanity; that the sale in question rightfully passed the property in suit to the defendants; and that neither the sons nor the grandsons of Ram Sahye, nor their respective wives, were in a position to question this sale.

    5. On second appeal to this Court, it has been broadly contended on behalf of the plaintiff's that, upon the happening of insanity, Ram Sahye became disentitled to the property, and that therefore the sale in question passed no title to the defendants. It has been further argued that the loan having been contracted on behalf of Earn Sahye only, and not on behalf of the family, the decree could not bind the joint family property, and that, therefore, the sale was ineffectual; and further, that, though the father Ram Sahye could bind the sons and grandsons by any debt contracted by him, not being of an immoral character, that right was personal to himself and not in his committee in lunacy.

    6. The only authorities for the broad contention of the appellants that the learned Vakil on his behalf relied upon in the course of his argument are two decisions of a Divisional Bench of this Court-Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Lalla Lahee Sahye I.L.R. 8 Cal. 149 and Ram Soonder Roy v. Ram Sahye Bhugut I.L.R. 8 Cal. 919 and the Mitakshara, chapter XII, Section 10, vv. 1 to 6.

    7. Both the cases quoted related to this family. In the first mentioned case, Ram Sahye, or rather his committee, sued to recover possession of certain property which had passed to the defendants under a sale in execution of a decree for mesne profits passed against the sons of Ram Sahye and Sheo Sahye consequent upon a mortgage executed by them. This Court on a consideration of the Mitakshara, chapter II, Section 10, vv. 1, 3 and 6 held that an insane person loses his right to a share on partition of the family property, and that no decree for recovery of the property could be passed in favour of Ram Sahye which would contemplate a partition between himself and the purchasers of the interest of his co-parceners (i. e., his sons); and they accordingly dismissed the suit. At the same time, they expressed the opinion that the position assumed in the mortgage executed by the sons that by reason of insanity Ram Sahye was disqualified from claiming the property, could not "probably" be maintained and "that he was still the owner of the property."

    8. In the other case, the committee of Ram Sahye similarly sued for recovery of. a certain share in a property which had been alienated by one of his sons. This Court followed the earlier case, and, upon a consideration of the Mitakshara, held that, inasmuch as on a partition between the plaintiff and his sons he would not get any share, and his sons would receive the whole property, and inasmuch as the rights of the sons had been extinguished under the law of limitation, Ram Sahye could not maintain the suit for the purpose of restoring it to the joint family.

    9. It seems to us that these two cases do not support the broad contention of the appellant that upon the happening of insanity, Ram Sahye became disentitled to the property. They do not go any further than to hold that upon the event of a partition taking place, the insane father would not get any share, but that the whole property would be received by the sons. On the other hand, it will be observed that this Court in the first mentioned case practically affirmed the principle laid down in the case of Balgobinda v. Lal Bahadur S.D.A. 1854, p. 244 which was to the effect that, under the Hindu law, though an insane person cannot succeed to the inheritance of property, a person who has once succeeded to property cannot be dispossessed of it if he subsequently becomes insane. The same view was adopted by a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Deokishen v. Budhprakash I.L.R. 5 All. 509, and it was held that when property has once vested by succession in a person, his subsequent insanity will not be a ground for its resumption. To the same effect is the case of Sanku v. Puttamma I.L.R. 14 Mad. 289 decided by the Madras High Court. The principle which underlies these cases is practically the same which was expounded by the Judicial Committee in the well known case of Moniram Kolita v. Kery Kolitani I.L.R. 5 Cal. 776 : L.R. 7 I.A. 115.

    10. As to the argument based upon the Mitakshara itself, we think it is equally untenable. We do not think that the rules laid down in it go any further than the two decisions of this Court already referred to, nor do we consider that the fact of Section 10, chapter II of the Mitakshara, being headed "on exclusion from inheritance" in any way indicates, as it was argued before us, that the author meant to lay it down that if a person alter he has inherited a property becomes insane, he should be excluded from, or deprived of it. On the contrary, the last portion of verse 6 shows that it could not be so. It says, but one already separated from his co-heirs is not deprived of his allotment." To the same effect is a text of Viramitrodaya, chapter VIII, verse 4, which runs as follows: "The exclusion again of these takes place if their disqualification occur previously to partition (or succession); but not also if subsequently to partition (or succession), for there is no authority for the resumption of allotted shares." (Babu Golap Chandra Sarkar's Translation).

    11. We may take it, therefore, that the property having once vested in Earn Sanyo under the law of inheritance, it remained with him notwithstanding his subsequent insanity, there being no partition between himself and his sons and grandsons. The question we have then to consider is whether the defendant acquired a good title to the property under the sale held in execution of the mortgage decree, to which we have already referred.

    12. The mortgage does not purport to be expressly on behalf of the whole family but it was given on behalf of the father and head of the family under the sanction of the District Judge previously obtained under the provisions of Act XXXV of 1858; and it has been found that this was for the benefit of the whole family. The decree that was obtained by the mortgagee was, as has already been mentioned, against Jugdeo and Agam, both in their capacity of committee to the lunatic and in their personal capacity. The decree was passed upon confession of judgment, and this indicates that Jugdeo and Agam meant to execute the mortgage, not simply as committee of the lunatic, but as members of the family. And the debt having been contracted for the benefit of the whole family, we are of opinion that the whole family was bound by the mortgage and the decree obtained thereupon, and that at the sale which took place the entire property passed to the defendant. We do not feel pressed by the argument that the committee of the lunatic could not bind the whole family, for the act of the committee, with the sanction of the Judge, may well be regarded as the act of the father and head of the family; and the debt having been contracted for the benefit of the family, it seems to bo clear enough that it is binding upon all.

    13. Upon all these grounds we are of opinion that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

    Prinsep, J.

    14. I agree in the judgment delivered by my learned colleague that the plaintiffs are bound by the mortgage which has been found to be on account of debts contracted by the father and grandfather of the male plaintiff, accepted by the manager of the family and sanctioned by the District Judge on behalf of the former, while the female plaintiffs have no right to contest the matter; but I desire to add that 1 have doubts as to the correctness of the law laid down in the cases cited I.L.R. 8 Cal. 149, and again in p 919, for I am inclined to doubt whether, as there held, an estate having once vested in Ram Sahye as a member of a joint Hindu family he can be deprived of his rights in it, because at the time of the determination of his specific right, title and interest by partition he happened to be a lunatic.

    15. It is, however, unnecessary for the purposes of this appeal to determine this point, because the decision of this suit can be properly' arrived at otherwise.

    16. The two appeals are dismissed with costs.

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    Comments

    Abilakh Bhagat And Ors. v. Bhekhi Mahto And Anr.
    (Jun 25, 1895)