Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 65 of the Indian Contract Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 65 of the Indian Contract Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant (plaintiff) sued on two promissory notes for amounts he advanced in respect of the Annadhana kattalai to provide provisions and other necessaries for the temple services. The first defendant was the trustee of the kattalai; the second defendant was the receiver of the kattalai property (later replaced by the executive officer of the temple). The plaint shows the advances were not made directly to the kattalai fund. The plaintiff held a power of attorney from the trustee, managed the kattalai on the trustee's behalf, received income from the property and made purchases. The sum claimed corresponded to an amount the first defendant admitted to be due to the plaintiff for supplies made in excess of the income.

The defendants disputed some items of expenditure; however the trial fact-finder (District Munsif of Tiruvarur) found the plaintiff had properly accounted for the money and that it was properly expended on the temple. The second defendant additionally pleaded that the trustee had no power to borrow money, that the plaintiff knew of this lack of power, and therefore the plaintiff could not recover even if he had advanced funds. The District Munsif rejected the second defendant's defences. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge agreed the plaintiff had properly accounted for the advances but held that the High Court framed scheme, specifically S. 23, absolutely prohibited such advances; the Subordinate Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. The present opinion reviews that outcome and disposes of the appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S. 23 of the scheme (which prohibits "borrowing from" and "lending on interest to" the funds of the trust) barred the plaintiff from recovering on the promissory notes for sums advanced in respect of the kattalai.
  2. Whether a person who supplies articles or money for necessary services of a trust is entitled to reimbursement when the trustee lacked power to borrow and both trustee and supplier knew the trustee was acting contrary to the scheme.
  3. Whether equitable principles such as quantum meruit or the doctrines applied in cited English cases permit recovery where the trustee acted beyond powers to preserve trust property or to carry out necessary services.
  4. Whether a decree could be obtained against the first defendant personally where the promissory note was executed by him in his capacity as trustee.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Plaintiff (as presented in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff had advanced sums for provisions and other necessaries for the daily services of the Annadhana kattalai and had accounted for those advances; therefore he was entitled to recover on the promissory notes.
  • Relied on authority (English and Privy Council decisions) and the principle of quantum meruit to show that a person who bona fide advances money for the purposes of the trust (not for the trustee's private use) should be entitled to reimbursement even if the trustee exceeded powers.
  • The appellant's counsel cited Ex parte Chippendale: Re German Mining Co., Troup's case, Lawford v. Billericay Rural District Council and Vibhudapriya Thirtha Swamiar v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar to support recovery or compensation on a quantum meruit basis, and also invoked S. 65 of the Indian Contract Act in argument.

Respondents (as presented in the opinion)

  • The defendants contested the truth of some alleged items of expenditure (i.e., that some expenditures were not genuine).
  • The second defendant specifically argued that the trustee (first defendant) had no power to borrow money under the scheme, that the plaintiff knew of that lack of power, and therefore the plaintiff could not recover sums advanced even if they had in fact been advanced.
  • The lower appellate court relied on S. 23 of the scheme to say that such advances were prohibited and that the trustee had deliberately disobeyed the scheme; the respondents relied on that finding to resist recovery.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ex parte Chippendale: Re German Mining Co. Directors/trustees who act beyond powers but do so to prevent loss of trust property may be treated as having acted in the interests of the trust; creditors who advanced money to prevent loss could be entitled to repayment notwithstanding procedural restrictions. The court acknowledged the case as supporting reimbursement where trustees acted to preserve trust property. However, the court held it did not apply here because the trustee acted expressly against the rules and the plaintiff knew of that disobedience.
Troup's case Where directors have no power to borrow, repayment cannot be enforced against the company; yet a bona fide lender who lent for the company’s purposes may be entitled to repayment if the money was bona fide applied to the company's purposes. The court considered it analogous authority for lenders entitled to repayment when money is bona fide applied, but found it inapplicable because the trustee here acted contrary to the trust and the creditor (plaintiff) knew of that fact.
Lawford v. Billericay Rural District Council Where a corporation requests necessary work, it cannot refuse payment merely because a formal requirement (such as sealing) was not complied with; an implied obligation to reimburse exists (quantum meruit). The court noted this principle but distinguished it: that doctrine applies where the corporation/ trustee requires work in discharge of duties. It was not applied because the trustee here acted contrary to expressly imposed rules and the plaintiff knew of the breach.
Vibhudapriya Thirtha Swamiar v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar (Privy Council) Where a creditor advances money to a trust and the money is used for the trust (not for trustee's private purposes) and is definitely applied, the creditor cannot be defeated by arguing that the duties could have been performed on a less elaborate scale. The court accepted the principle but limited its application to cases where the trustee acts in discharge of duties. It concluded the principle cannot be applied where the trustee acts contrary to the trust and the creditor is aware that the money ought not to be spent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following sequence, applying the scheme, statutory language and equitable principles to the facts before it:

  1. Interpretation of S. 23: The court examined S. 23 of the scheme, which provides that "All borrowing from and all lending on interest to the funds of the trust is absolutely prohibited." The court parsed the wording: "borrowing" followed by "from" indicates the prohibition primarily targets borrowing from the trust's funds; the section also bars lending on interest to the trust's funds. The court held that lending on interest to the trust would fall within the prohibition, but S. 23 was not meant to categorically prohibit the supplying of articles necessary for services.
  2. Purpose and operation of the scheme: Reading the scheme as a whole, the court observed the scheme's manifest purpose was to prevent trustees from retaining or using money outside the prescribed controls: trustees must deposit collections with the treasurer, submit budgets in advance, and spend only according to approved budgets and the treasurer's account. The scheme's structure was designed to prevent trustees from circumventing the controls by contracting liabilities on behalf of the trust.
  3. Finding of deliberate breach: The court accepted the lower appellate court's finding that the first defendant deliberately ignored the scheme (did not submit budgets, continued to manage properties and thereby forced the Board to seek a receiver). That deliberate disobedience was central to the analysis.
  4. Knowledge of the plaintiff: The court emphasized that the plaintiff knew of the prohibition and was aware that the first defendant was disobeying the scheme (he attended Board of Control meetings and knew management was under S. 3 of the scheme). That knowledge affected whether the plaintiff could claim equitable relief.
  5. Application of equitable/restorative principles and precedents: The court examined English authority (Ex parte Chippendale; Troup; Lawford) and the Privy Council decision. It recognized that when trustees act to preserve trust property, creditors who advance money bona fide may be entitled to repayment. But the court distinguished those authorities because they involve trustees acting in the interests of the trust; here the trustee acted contrary to the scheme and the creditor (plaintiff) knew of the breach. Thus those precedents did not entitle recovery in this case.
  6. Quantum meruit and necessity: The court acknowledged that if there were absolutely no funds available for essential services, an individual who spent money for absolutely necessary services might be entitled to compensation. However the plaintiff did not plead necessity in those limited terms, and the record lacked material to decide what expenditures, if any, were "absolutely necessary" in such an extreme scenario. The court distinguished "necessary for full and proper conduct" (what is desirable) from "absolutely necessary" when funds are unavailable or rules prohibit spending.
  7. Indian Contract Act, S. 65: The court considered S. 65 but concluded that its language does not apply to contracts into which parties deliberately enter knowing the contract cannot be valid under the rules; where the parties knowingly enter into an agreement in express contravention of scheme restrictions, S. 65 does not validate that transaction.
  8. Character of the alleged contract and relief against trustee personally: The court concluded there was no true contract with the trust (valid or void) but rather a dishonest device by the plaintiff and the trustee to defeat the scheme. Because the promissory note was executed by the first defendant only in his capacity as trustee, the court held the plaintiff could not obtain a personal decree against him for reasons given.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED.

More specifically, the court held that:

  • The plaintiff is not entitled to recover from the trust the amount claimed on the promissory notes because the sums were advanced in the context of a deliberate breach of the scheme's restrictions, and the plaintiff was aware of that breach.
  • The equitable principles and authorities invoked (including Ex parte Chippendale, Troup's case, Lawford v. Billericay and the Privy Council decision) do not permit recovery in these circumstances where the trustee acted contrary to the scheme and the creditor had knowledge of that misconduct.
  • Quantum meruit might have been available had a proper plea of absolute necessity been made and evidence led, but no such pleadings or evidence were before the court; accordingly the court did not grant relief on that basis and did not decide the point.
  • A decree could not be entered against the first defendant personally because the promissory note was executed in his capacity as trustee and the circumstances do not permit personal liability to be imposed for the reasons stated.

Direct consequences: The plaintiff's suit was dismissed and the appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the second respondent. The opinion confines its conclusion to the facts and pleadings before the court and does not purport to establish a broader novel rule beyond the application of existing principles to the present facts.

End of summary.

    Bava C. Gopalaswami Mudaliar v. The Annadhana Kattalai Of Sri Tyagarajaswami Temple, Tiruvarur By Trustee, Vaithilinga Pandarasannadhi And Another

    The appellant brought a suit on two promissory notes for amounts advanced to the Annadhana kattalai for the necessary performance of the duties imposed on the trust. The first defendant was the trustee of the kattalai and the second defendant was the receiver of the kattalai property, who has since been replaced by the executive officer of the temple. It appears from the plaint that the money was not advanced direct to the kattalai. The plaintiff, who had received a power of attorney from the trustee, was managing the kattalai on the first defendant's behalf, receiving income from the property, and making purchases; and the sum claimed is that admitted by the first defendant to be due to the plaintiff on account of provisions and other necessaries supplied to the kattalai in excess of the income. The defendants contended that some of the alleged items of expenditure were not true; but it was found that the plaintiff had properly accounted for the money mentioned in the promissory notes and that it was properly expended on the temple. The second defendant raised another plea and that was that the first defendant had no power to borrow money, that the plaintiff knew of it, and that he was not therefore entitled to recover any of the money, even though it might have been true that he advanced it. The District Munsif of Tiruvarur found both points against the second defendant. In appeal, the Subordinate Judge of Tiruvarur agreed with the District Munsif that the plaintiff had properly accounted for all the money advanced: but he held that the scheme which had been framed for the temple by the High Court absolutely prohibited such an advance being made. He therefore found himself constrained to allow the appeal and dismissed the suit.

    The attention of the Courts below seems to have been focussed on S. 23 of the scheme, which is to this effect:

    “All borrowing from and all lending on interest to the funds of the trust is absolutely prohibited.”

    The rest of the section deals with the punishments to be inflicted in case of a disobedience of this injunction. It has to be noticed that the word ‘borrowing’ is followed by ‘from’, which shows that the prohibition is against borrowing from the funds of the trust. That was not done here; but the section also prohibits lending on interest to the funds of the trust. If the plaintiff, as the terms of his promissory note suggest, had lent money on interest to the trust—even though it was for necessary purposes—I think such a loan would have fallen within the scope of the prohibition under S. 23. But I do not think that S. 23 as it stands meant to work a prohibition of the supplying of articles for the carrying on of the services of the kattalai. Nevertheless, from a reading of the scheme as a whole, there can be no doubt that the purpose of the scheme is that the trustees should not be left in possession of any money at all. As soon as they collect money, they have to deposit it with the treasurer of the temple, they have to submit a budget to the Board of Control three months before the beginning of each year, and they can only spend money in accordance with the budget as accepted. They are then allowed to draw on the amount standing to their credit in the accounts kept by the treasurer for each kattalai and they may not exceed the budget allotment. There can also be no doubt, on a general reading of the scheme, that it was directly against the principle of the scheme that the trustee of the kattalai should try to circumvent certain sections of the scheme by taking supplies from a person and contracting some liability on behalf of the trust. That this disobedience of the scheme was not accidental has been proved by the defendant; and the lower appellate Court has found very clearly that the first defendant deliberately ignored the scheme. He says in paragraph 13 of his judgment:

    “It would appear that notwithstanding the scheme, the first defendant as trustee of Annadana kattalai, was never in the habit of submitting his budget to the treasurer. He himself continued to manage the properties of the Annadhana kattalai as though his powers had not been in any way curtailed or restricted. In consequence of the defiant attitude of the first defendant it became necessary for the board of control to apply for the appointment of a receiver for the purpose of collecting the income of the properties of the Annadhana kattalai and remitting the same to the treasurer.”

    The plaintiff was also aware of the prohibition and he knew that the first defendant was disobeying the terms of the scheme. He had attended the meetings of the Board of Control and he knew that the temple and the kattalais were being managed under S. 3 of the scheme.

    Although a trustee may not have power to incur debts, yet if a person supplies articles which are necessary for carrying on the services under the trust, then he is entitled to be reimbursed. Two English cases have been quoted. In Ex parte Chippendale: Re German Mining Co. (1) the directors of a coal-mining company had no powers of raising money except by certain restricted means. They however during the course of the management of some mines in Germany found that they had no money to pay the wages of the miners. If the wages had not been paid, the mines, under the law of the country, would have been closed down and the property of the company would have been lost. It was held that as they had acted beyond their powers as directors and agents in borrowing money, the creditors who had advanced money in order that the miners might be paid, would not be able to have recourse against the company under the Companies Act. Nevertheless, the directors were not merely agents but were trustees of the property of which they were in management; and as trustees they were bound to take all reasonable steps to prevent the property of the company from being wasted. They were therefore not only permitted but bound to borrow money to pay the miners' wages and thus save the property of the company which would otherwise have been lost. In Troup's case (2), a somewhat similar case, where directors had no borrowing powers, it was laid down that:

    “Where the directors of a company have no power to borrow money, the repayment of money borrowed cannot be enforced by the lender against the company. Yet if the money has been bona fide applied to the purposes of the company, the bona fide lender is entitled to payment as against the company.”

    The learned Advocate for the appellant has also referred to the principle laid down in the leading case Lawford v. Billericay Rural District Council (3) that where a corporation asked a contractor to perform certain works which were necessary for the carrying out of the duties of the corporation, the corporation could not afterwards refuse to pay the contractor for the work he had done, merely because the contract had not been sealed as required by law and so was void. The principle of quantum meruit was applied, and it was held that the corporation were not entitled to rely on this fact. It was found that there was an implied contract to reimburse the contractor for any work done by him which was necessary to be done and was required by the corporation to be done. Clearly, Ex parte Chippendale: Re German Mining Co. and Troup's case would not apply to a case where a trustee, far from acting in the interests of the trust and for the trust, acted expressly against the rules which had been laid down for his conduct. In borrowing this money, the trustee committed a breach of trust and the plaintiff knew it. The plaintiff cannot therefore be heard to say that he was enabling the trustee to perform his duty to the trust and was therefore entitled to be compensated for what he has supplied.

    With regard to the application of the principle of quantum meruit, it may of course be true that if there was no money left to the credit of this particular kattalai and certain services were absolutely necessary, then the plaintiff would be entitled to receive compensation for such money spent as was absolutely necessary. But we do not know what expenditure would have been absolutely necessary in such an extreme case. The plaintiff did not plead this, and the attention of the Courts below and of the parties was not directed to this aspect of the question; and so we have no material on which to come to a decision as to what expenditure by the trustee, if any, was absolutely necessary. The learned District Munsif whose judgment is generally followed by that of the Subordinate Judge, says in paragraph 7 of his judgment:

    “So then there is clear proof in this case that as a matter of fact the plaintiff advanced several sums of money as found in the accounts, Exs. A and B, for the supply of articles absolutely necessary for the purpose of the trust in connection with the daily puja, abhishekam, naivedyam, etc.”

    He draws this conclusion from certain findings of his in paragraph 6 of his judgment which he gives in the words used by the clerk of the receiver:

    “Until the receiver took charge from plaintiff all the kalapujas were being done properly, all the functions of the annadhana and abhisheka kattalais having been regularly and properly done.”

    I cannot see how it follows from this that the supply of the articles by the plaintiff was absolutely necessary for the purpose of the trust. A distinction must be drawn between what is necessary for a full and proper conduct of the services, that is, what is desirable, and what is absolutely necessary when there are no funds available to meet the full expenses or where the rules prohibit the spending of money unauthorisedly. All these various duties could have been performed on a less elaborate scale; and if the first defendant had done his duty and had applied to the treasurer for money and the matter had been referred to the Board of Control, the Board would probably have supplied a smaller amount of money which would have permitted the carrying out of these services on a smaller scale. The learned Advocate for the appellant has sought to get over this difficulty by quoting the Privy Council decision, Vibhudapriya Thirtha Swamiar v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar , which is to the effect that where it appears to a creditor advancing money to a trust that the money is being used for the trust and not for the trustee's private purposes and where the money is definitely applied, the creditor cannot be defeated by a contention that the duties could have been performed on a less elaborate scale. That is true only where a trustee acts in the discharge of his duties as trustee. That principle could not be applied where a trustee is acting contrary to the trust or to the rules imposed on him by a scheme. In such a case both the trustee and the creditor know that the money ought not to be spent.

    It has been pointed out that this contract has to be viewed in the light of the express words used in S. 65 of the Indian Contract Act and not by the principles laid down in certain English cases which are less liberal. But the language used in S. 65 shows that it does not apply to contracts into which persons deliberately enter, knowing that the contract cannot have any validity and is in express contravention of the rules and restrictions imposed on them. Moreover, it is difficult to see how in this case there ever was a contract—void or otherwise—with the trust. The so called contract was nothing more than a dishonest device of the plaintiff and the first defendant to defeat the scheme. In making this promise to pay, the first defendant cannot be said to have been acting for the trust; and the plaintiff knew it.

    It follows from what has been said above that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover from the trust the amount claimed by him on the suit pronotes. There is no equitable principle that can be invoked by him which will enable the Court to grant a decree. If he had raised a plea of quantum meruit and suitable evidence had been let in, it is just possible that he might have succeeded in obtaining a decree for some part of the sum he advanced; but it is not necessary for me to express any opinion on this point.

    It is contended that a decree should be given against the first defendant; but the first defendant did not execute the pronote in his personal capacity, but only as trustee of the institution. A petition has been put in to amend the plaint so that the plaintiff may be given some relief against the 1st defendant; but even if the amendment were made, the plaintiff could not for reasons given, be given a decree against the first defendant.

    The appeal is dismissed with the costs of the second respondent.

    Appeal dismissed.

    N.R.R

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Bava C. Gopalaswami ... v. The Annadhana Kattal...
    (Jan 12, 1940)