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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from a suit by the plaintiffs in the lower Court for recovery of certain properties or, alternatively, for partition. The first plaintiff had been a lunatic since 1920. The second plaintiff was born in March 1924 (in utero at the death of the testator), and the third plaintiff was born after the suit was commenced. The testator, Krishna Josier, died on 26 September 1923. He left, besides the first plaintiff (his son), two daughters who are defendants 1 and 2; defendants 3 and 4 are the husbands of those daughters.

Prior to his death Krishna Josier executed a sequence of instrumentalities relevant to this litigation: (a) Ex. A — a will dated 6 July 1920; (b) Ex. B — a will dated 31 December 1922; (c) Ex. I — a deed dated 9 January 1923 purporting to be a deed of partition; (d) Ex. II — a testamentary disposition dated 9 January 1923; and (e) Ex. VI — a deed of trust dated 9 January 1923 setting apart certain properties for charities. The plaintiffs challenged the validity and effect of Exs. I, II and VI in the lower Court.

The Subordinate Judge found against the plaintiffs on the material issues but directed limited relief in respect of properties placed under the third defendant's management for the benefit of the first plaintiff and his children. Plaintiffs appealed. The appeal principally raised questions about whether Ex. I effected a partition or a severance of status, whether the documents were the product of undue influence, and the legal status of the first plaintiff (and his offspring) as co-parceners.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ex. I (the deed of 9 January 1923) effected a valid partition between Krishna Josier and the first plaintiff, or whether it effected a severance of status (division of status) without allotting a share to the first plaintiff.
  2. Whether Ex. II (the testamentary disposition) and Ex. VI (the deed of trust) are valid and operative in the light of Ex. I and the plaintiffs' contentions.
  3. Whether the first plaintiff (insane since 1920) retained such co-parcenary rights (in particular the right by survivorship) as to make a partition with him possible or to affect the validity of Exs. I and II.
  4. Whether Exs. I, II and VI were procured by undue influence or executed when Krishna Josier lacked sufficient capacity.
  5. Whether, in bringing about a severance of status by declaration or deed, the father (Krishna Josier) was required to give notice to the co-parcener under disability or his natural guardian, and whether the absence of such notice invalidates the severance.
  6. Remedial questions: whether plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits for the relevant period, and the proper allocation of costs.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • Ex. I did not effect a partition between Krishna Josier and the first plaintiff; it is in substance a disposition by Krishna Josier as absolute owner and allocates no share to the first plaintiff.
  • If Ex. I is invalid as a partition, the second plaintiff (posthumous/ in utero at the time of death) is a co-parcener and entitled to a share of Krishna Josier's properties.
  • The first plaintiff, by reason of his insanity from 1920, had ceased to be a co-parcener in the relevant sense such that Krishna Josier's dispositions cannot exclude the later-born or posthumous son's rights.
  • Alternative pleading that, if Ex. I were construed as a severance, the division into Schedules A and B was unfair and unequal and plaintiffs sought an equal division.
  • Allegations that Exs. I, II and VI were brought about by undue influence and that Krishna Josier lacked the requisite condition (age, illness, other causes) to execute those documents of his own free will.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Exs. I, II and VI are operative; Ex. I effected a severance of status and embodied a fair and equal division of the family properties, with provision for the first plaintiff's management because of his mental condition.
  • The daughters (defendants 1 and 2) and their husbands had legitimate interests and were appointed trustees in some instruments; the documents should be sustained.
  • Denial of undue influence and of any incapacity preventing Krishna Josier from understanding and executing the instruments.
  • At one stage the defendants contended congenital disqualification of the first plaintiff, but later relied on the position that the first plaintiff's defect in capacity was not disqualifying until his insanity in 1920.
  • Before the Appellate Court, respondents' counsel argued that Ex. I should be read as a deed of partition and that the father had legitimately used his powers (including a father's power to sever status) in the terms manifested by Ex. I.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal (1918/1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 464 : 38 M.L.J. 291 Holds that there may be a co-parcener who can take by survivorship but cannot necessarily demand partition; establishes that vested interests should not lightly be divested. The Court declined to dissent from this decision and relied on it as authoritative in concluding that a disqualified person may still be a co-parcener entitled to survivorship, and as guiding interpretation of Ex. I.
Krishna v. Sami (1885) I.L.R. 9 Mad. 64 (Full Bench) Underlying principle that an interest once vested ought not lightly to be divested; used as a supporting authority for Muthusami Gurukkal. Cited as consonant authority; used to justify reluctance to divest vested rights and to support acceptance of Muthusami Gurukkal.
Narasimha Razu v. Veerabhadra Razu (1893) I.L.R. 17 Mad. 287 at 292 Shows that the doctrine of restoration or analogous doctrines have no scope as between co-heirs because inheritance vests once succession opens. Referred to by way of comparison to confine the application of restoration doctrines and to distinguish cases of partition from strict inheritance (Sapratibandha).
Chengama Nayudu v. Munisami Nayudu (1896) I.L.R. 20 Mad. 75 Addresses what happens when a father has not reserved a share for himself with reference to after-born sons. Cited in analogy concerning the law applicable to after-born/posthumous sons and the possibility of re-opening partitions in certain circumstances.
Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar (1905) I.L.R. 28 All. 247 High Court decision emphasising that the right by birth once vested cannot be divested by supervening disqualification; Court upheld right to recovery by disqualified man. The Court criticised aspects of that decision to the extent it upheld recovery; treated it as departing from other authorities on remedial relief though accepting the general proposition about vesting.
Abilakh Bhagat v. Bhekhi Mahto (1895) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 864; Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Lalla Laljee Sahye (1881) I.L.R. 8 Cal. 149 Discussed in context of interpretation that a disqualified man may remain owner of his share though unable to obtain a decree involving partition with him. Referred to in discussion of earlier authorities and judicial approaches; used analytically but not treated as overriding the Court's conclusion.
Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma (1902) L.R. 29 I.A. 156 : I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 Observation (Lord Lindley) that where there is no right to partition there may be no right to take by survivorship. The Court observed that this was a general remark and that there are exceptions; the Court declined to treat it as decisive in the present case.
Shibaprasad Singh v. Prayagkumari Debee (1931) I.L.R. 59 Cal. 1399; Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal (1934) 67 M.L.J. 274 Illustrate exceptions (impartible Zamindaris) where succession by survivorship operates notwithstanding other general remarks. Cited as examples of exceptions to the general proposition in Venkayyamma; used to show that Lindley's remark is not without exceptions.
Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur (1918) L.R. 45 I.A. 148 Contains obiter remarks distinguishing 'birth status' from 'full status' and suggesting excluded persons may get maintenance in lieu of coparcenary rights. Described by the Court as obiter and too cryptic for use; the Court did not place reliance on it for a decisive rule.
Pudiava Nadar v. Pavanasa Nadar (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 949 : 43 M.L.J. 596 (Full Bench) Full Bench dealt with whether rules as to exclusion were obsolete; the disability in that case was congenital (not supervening). The Court said the case throws no light on the present question (which involves supervening disability) and did not apply it to change the result.
Lala Muddun Gopal Lal v. Mt. Khikhinda Koer (1890) L.R. I.A. 9 : I.L.R. 18 Cal. 341 (P.C.) Privy Council observations suggesting co-parceners may waive rights and allot a share to a disqualified member; might be considered a 'gift' in some passages. Cited as analogous authority supporting the possibility of allotment or severance by co-parceners; Court referenced it but found it unnecessary to decide that precise point here.
Kandasami v. Doraisami Aiyar (1880) I.L.R. 2 Mad. 317 Authority that a partition may validly be made even without anyone representing a minor or absent co-parcener; recognizes a father's power to separate his children from himself. The Court relied on this authority to support the view that a father can, under his special power, bring about a division of status between himself and his sons even where a co-parcener under disability has no natural guardian to receive notice.
Jamna Ram v. Munsah Rai (A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 473); Lakshmamma v. Sreeramalu (A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1066); Lakshmi Achi v. Narayanasami Naicker (1929) I.L.R. 53 Mad. 188; Rama Aiyar v. Meenakshi (A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 278); Ademma v. Seshayya (1935 M.W.N. 191) Cases concerning the question of notice to other co-parceners or knowledge of partition/declaration of intention. Referred to in argument about whether the declaration should be brought to the knowledge of other co-parceners; Court declined to decide the general rule and did not rest decision solely on these authorities.
Balwant Singh v. R. Clancy (1912) L.R. 36 I.A. 109 : I.L.R. 34 All. 296 : 23 M.L.J. 18 (P.C.) Authority cited for the proposition that when a person asserts exclusive ownership it is not permissible to attribute that act to a different capacity (e.g., fatherly power) inconsistent with the assertion. Cited by appellants to argue Krishna Josier could not be treated as acting in his capacity as father when he asserted exclusive ownership; Court responded that in the circumstances the assertion of ownership was not incompatible with treating the instrument as exercising father's power.
Bijraj Nopani v. Pura Sundary Dasee (1914) L.R. 41 I.A. 189 : I.L.R. 42 C. 56 : 27 M.L.J. 93 (P.C.); Audimula Mudali v. Alamelammal (1916) 2 M.W.N. 115; Sadayappa Asari v. Raghava Asari (1919) 62 I.C. 220; Seetharamamurthi v. Rangayya A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 293 Group of cases recognising the principle of attributing a transfer to the capacity most favourable to a bona fide purchaser or otherwise construing capacity in a favourable manner. The Court said this class of cases was of doubtful applicability here (no purchaser involved) though the respondents invoked the principle in support of reading Ex. I as effecting a division of status rather than a pure assertion of exclusive ownership.
Aiyavier v. Subramania Aiyar (1917) 32 M.L.J. 439; Natesa Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1918) M.W.N. 703 Authorities cited as supporting respondents' position that assertion of full ownership is not incompatible with recognition of a kind of coparcenary/severance of status. The Court regarded these decisions as clear authorities favouring the respondents and used them in the analysis that Ex. I could properly be read to effect a severance of status even where the father asserted ownership.
Partap Singh v. Dalip Singh (1930) I.L.R. 52 All. 596 Authority indicating that the fact of an allotment being invalid need not take away the division of status intended to be brought about. Applied to support the proposition that even if the allotment/allocation under Ex. I is invalid as a partition, the intended severance of status can remain effective.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of legal and factual analyses, limited to the materials and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. Undue influence and capacity: The Court examined the allegations of undue influence and lack of capacity. It found the changes between Exs. A, B and I to be adequately explained by surrounding family circumstances (changes in living arrangements, strained relations, desire to make provision for daughters and obsequies, and provision for the lunatic son). Evidence (including D.W.10) did not establish undue influence. The Court accepted the Subordinate Judge's conclusion on this point.
  2. Legal status of disqualified co-parcener: The Court discussed authorities and Sanskrit texts (Mitakshara, Manu, Yagnavalkya, Vijnaneswara) and their commentarial development to analyse the legal status of a co-parcener subject to supervening disqualification (as distinct from congenital disqualification). The Court noted that the Mitakshara and commentators do not decisively fix the legal status in all cases and that there is room to distinguish congenital from supervening disqualification.
  3. Precedent adherence: The Court explicitly declined to overrule or depart from the decision in Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal, accepting its reasoning and the underlying policy that vested interests should not lightly be divested.
  4. Possibility of severance of status without allotment: The Court accepted that even if a disqualified person may be a co-parcener for survivorship, the father may still effect a severance of status between himself and his son under his special power (drawing on Kandasami and related authorities). The Court considered whether Ex. I should be construed as a partition allotting property to the first plaintiff or as effecting severance of status.
  5. Construction of Ex. I: The Court closely read Ex. I. It found that although Ex. I contains statements asserting the father's absolute ownership and denying the son's right to share, the document also described itself as a deed of partition and contained an express declaration that "I have settled that I (No. 1) am in a partitioned and divided state from No. 2 (the son)". Given that Ex. I allotted nothing to the first plaintiff (only maintenance) and directed that in default of sons the B schedule properties pass to the daughters, the Court concluded Ex. I could not be upheld as a partition constituting an allotment of share to the first plaintiff. Nonetheless, it was sufficiently clear and definite to be effective to bring about a severance of status between the father and the first plaintiff.
  6. Notice/guardian requirement: The appellants argued that a declaration of severance required intimation to the other co-parcener or his natural guardian. The Court reviewed authorities and noted practical difficulties in the present case (the only possible other person being the first plaintiff's wife, who was neither a natural nor de facto guardian and was herself a minor at the time). The Court observed established principles permitting partitions without representation of minors/absent co-parceners (Kandasami) and accepted the reasoning that the father's special power may operate independently of the doctrine of severance by unilateral declaration of intention.
  7. Effect on Ex. II and Ex. VI: Because Ex. I did not allot any property to the first plaintiff but did effect a division of status, the Court held Ex. II (the will) could stand as a devise of specific properties (given the presence of general words of devise in Ex. II). However Ex. VI, executed by Krishna Josier only "as a divided member", could not bind the plaintiffs (since they were not bound by a trust executed by Krishna Josier as a divided member before the severance as effective in the manner claimed).
  8. Relief and remedial consequences: The Court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a division of the properties (except item 126 of the plaint schedule, which had been found to be family property) into two equal shares and delivery of one share to the plaintiffs. The Court also held plaintiffs entitled to mesne profits in respect of their share between the date of Ex. I and the date of Krishna Josier's death, subject to legitimate deductions (e.g., disbursements for maintenance). Directions were given for the lower Court to effect division or, if parties could not agree, to appoint a Commissioner to make the division. The Court left issue No. 12 undecided as unnecessary in view of its conclusions.
  9. Costs: The Court found the plaintiffs somewhat justified to have litigated but held that having fully argued the matter in the lower Court and failing there, the appellants bore the risk of appeal. It directed the parties to bear their costs in the lower Court but ordered the appellants to pay the respondents' costs in the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that Ex. I effected a severance of status between Krishna Josier and the first plaintiff (i.e., the first plaintiff "became divided" from Krishna Josier by reason of Ex. I), but Ex. I could not be upheld as a partition constituting an allotment of a share to the first plaintiff.

Direct consequences and relief ordered (as stated in the opinion):

  • The plaintiffs are entitled to a division of the properties (except item 126 of the plaint schedule) into two equal shares and to delivery of one share to themselves.
  • The Court added a direction for payment of mesne profits to the plaintiffs in respect of their share for the period from the date of Ex. I to the date of Krishna Josier's death, subject to legitimate deductions (e.g., maintenance expenses).
  • If parties cannot agree on division, the lower Court was directed to take steps (including appointment of a Commissioner) to effect the division and pass a final decree; Ex. VIII assets will be taken into account in the division.
  • Ex. VI (the deed of trust executed by Krishna Josier "only as a divided member") cannot bind the plaintiffs.
  • Costs: parties to bear their respective costs in the lower Court; appellants (plaintiffs) to pay respondents' costs in the appeal.

Broader implications:

  • The Court followed existing precedent (notably Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal) and applied established doctrines concerning vesting and the father's power to separate himself from his sons. The decision analyses the distinction between congenital and supervening disqualification but does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond the application of cited authorities to the facts of the case.
  • No expansive new rule of law was announced in the opinion beyond the detailed application of the authorities and the construction of Ex. I in the facts before the Court; the decision resolves the rights and remedies between the parties consistent with cited authorities and the Court's interpretative conclusions.

End of summary. The contents above are derived exclusively from the provided opinion and do not add information that was not present in the opinion.

    Venkateswara Pattar (Insane) And Others . v. K. Mankayammal And Others

    1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, who sued in the lower Court for the recovery of certain properties or in the alternative, for partition. The first plaintiff has admittedly been a lunatic since 1920. The second plaintiff is his son, born in March, 1924. The third plaintiff is another son, born pending the suit. The first plaintiff's father (Krishna Josier) died on the 26th of September, 1923, leaving him surviving (besides the first plaintiff) two daughters who are defendants 1 and 2 in the case. The third and fourth defendants respectively are their husbands.

    2. In view of first plaintiff's unfortunate condition, Krishna Josier, who was possessed of a decent extent of property, was naturally anxious to make some satisfactory arrangement for the management of his property after his death. His first attempt in this direction was Ex. A a will dated 6th of July, 1920. The first plaintiff had then an infant son about a year old, and the scheme of Ex. A is based on that circumstance. That child died sometime later, and to add to the misfortune of the parties, relations between Krishna Josier and first plaintiff's father-in-law became strained, so much so that, early in 1922, Krishna Josier left his old house and thereafter lived in a new house of his own. The result of this step was that Krishna Josier's daughters were more with him than before, while the first plaintiff's wife and her father stayed in the old house. The wife had not even attained majority by that time, and as the first plaintiff required care and attention, he would appear to have been living generally with his father and sisters. These circumstances necessitated a change of the scheme of the original will (Ex. A) and Krishna Josier accordingly executed a new will, Ex. B on 31st December, 1922. The relations between Krishna Josier and the first plaintiff's father-in-law grew worse day by day, and at the time of the registration of Ex. B there seem to have been very unpleasant manifestations of protest on the part of the first plaintiff's wife. It is also not unlikely that Krishna Josier was made to feel, in an increasing degree, the reasonableness of making some provision for his daughters, and for the performance of his obsequies and shraddhas. There was also the continuing problem of making provision for the lunatic son and his wife, and also for the contingency of their having sons and daughters. The old man took legal advice and according to that advice, executed two documents Exs. I and II on the 9th of January, 1923, the first purporting to be a deed of partition, and the second a testamentary disposition of most of the properties which under Ex. I Krishna Josier reserved for his shares. The validity and effect of these documents is the principal question for determination in the appeal. On the same day Krishna Josier also executed Ex. VI, a deed of trust setting apart certain properties, out of his share, for certain charities. The validity of this document is also in question.

    3. The second plaintiff, was born in March, 1924, and was thus in the mother's womb at the date of Krishna Josier's death (September, 1923). This makes it possible for the second plaintiff to contend that if there had been no valid partition under Ex. I he would be a co-parcener, and that the will Ex. II would be invalid as also the trust deed. This suit was therefore instituted on his behalf, within a few months of his birth, to have it declared that Ex. I could not and did not effect a partition between Krishna Josier and the first plaintiff, that the second plaintiff is accordingly a co-parcener, and is as such entitled to all the properties of Krishna Josier. It suited his case to say, that the first plaintiff, by reason of his insanity, had ceased to be a co-parcener at least from 1920, and to rely on the fact that Krishna Josier himself distinctly asserted in Ex. I that the first plaintiff was not entitled to any share. The plaint also made a point of the fact that Ex. I, though purporting to be a deed of partition, is in substance a disposition by Krishna Josier, on the footing of his being absolute owner of all the properties, and no share is in fact allotted to the first plaintiff himself. Anticipating however, the possibility that Ex. I may be construed as an exercise of the father's power to effect a severance of status between himself and the son, the plaint also alleged that the division of properties into Schedules A and B in Ex. I was not fair and equal, and it contained an alternative prayer that all the family properties might be divided into two equal shares and one share might be given to the plaintiffs.

    4. Krishna Josier's two daughters, their husbands and their children were impleaded as the main defendants, as they took benefits under Exs. I and II, and some of them had been appointed trustees under Ex. VI. They contended that Exs. I, II and VI were operative and that Ex. I, brought about a severance of status and also embodied a fair and equal division of the family properties, though, in view of first plaintiff's mental condition, the property set apart for his share was placed under competent management to be handed over to first plaintiff's sons, if any. The contentions thus raised formed the subject-matter of issues 6, 7,8 and 11.

    5. The plaint also adopted another line of attack on Exs. I, II and VI, by suggesting that they were brought about by undue influence and that owing to age, illness and other causes, Krishna Josier was not, at the time, in a fit condition to conceive of such an arrangement and execute the documents of his own accord or with sufficient knowledge of their nature and effect. These allegations were denied by the defendants and this question formed the subject-matter of issues 10 and 11.

    6. For some reason, the defendants thought fit at one stage to contend that the first plaintiff was congenitally disqualified, but in the course of the suit they were better advised and preferred to rest their case on the ground that though the first plaintiff was from early years defective in mental capacity, it was not such as to disqualify him in law till he became insane in 1920. The argument before us had proceeded on this basis.

    7. The learned Subordinate Judge found against the plaintiffs on all material issues, and merely directed the defendants to surrender to the plaintiffs the properties which by the terms of Ex. I had been placed under the third defendant's management for the benefit of the first plaintiff and his children. He directed the third defendant to account to the plaintiffs for the income of these properties from the date of Krishna Josier's death. As the plaintiffs practically failed in their suit, he directed them to pay 1 and 2 defendants three-fourths of their costs. The argument in the appeal mainly related to the questions raised by issues 6, 7 and 8. The point of undue influence was also touched on, but in the face of the evidence, especially of D.W. 10 Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar (for the appellants) could only say that the changes in the dispositions and arrangements respectively made by Exs. A, B and I, sufficiently indicated that the old man must have come more and more under the influence of the daughters and their husbands. It is sufficient to say, in answer, that the changes in the scheme of the documents are legitimately explained by the changes in the circumstances of the family and in the relations between the various members, as already set out, and need not be attributed to any improper influence exercised over Krishna Josier. Even assuming that the daughters had pleaded with the old man for some benefits for themselves and he had yielded to their importunity, Mr. Sastriar conceded that that would not amount to undue influence. Whatever may be the legal effect of Ex. I, there is nothing in it that is so unnatural or unreasonable as, by itself, to suggest undue influence. We see no reason to differ from the lower Court's conclusion on this point. Incidentally, we would only correct a slight error in para. 9 of the lower Court's judgment. It is not to the daughter's house that Krishna Josier went in January 1922, but to a new house of his own, and there the second defendant seems to have come and lived with him.

    8. In dealing with the question of partition, Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar stated his argument as follows: (i) If Krishna Josier was anxious to obviate the possibility of any future sons of the first plaintiff asserting rights by survivorship, he could not successfully do so by the device of a partition, because there could be no partition as against future coparceners except through living co-parceners, (ii) At the date of Ex. I, the first plaintiff was not in any sense a co-parcener, and therefore there could be no partition between him and his father, (iii) Even if a partition between the first plaintiff and his father were legally possible Ex. I could not, in view of its terms, be construed as a partition or even as effecting a severance of status between them.

    9. The first proposition is unexceptionable. As to the second, the learned Counsel admitted that the decision of a Bench of this Court reported in Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 464 : 38 M.L.J. 291 is against him. But he contended that it rests upon a misapprehension of certain passages in the Mitakshara and therefore ought not to be followed. He also maintained that, taking Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal (1919) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 464 : 38 M.L.J. 291 to lay down that there may be a 'co-parcener' who can take by survivorship but cannot demand partition, such a person cannot be held entitled to a share and there could be no partition with him.

    10. The alternative interpretations of the relevant passages of the Mitakshara are set out in the judgment of Seshagiri Aiyar, J., in Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal (1918) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 464 : 38 M.L.J. 291. As pointed out by the learned Judge himself, a great deal could be said in favour of either contention. Having heard the matter fully argued in view of its importance, we do not see sufficient reason to dissent from that decision. It is certainly more in consonance with the principle underlying the decision of the Full Bench in Krishna v. Sami (1885) I.L.R. 9 Mad. 64 (F.B.) and the well-established rule that an interest once vested ought not lightly to be held to be divested. We do not propose to cover the same ground over again.

    11. Looking at the matter from another point of view, the following considerations seem to us to lead to the same conclusion. Both in Manu and in Yagnavalkya, the texts relating to exclusion from inheritance occur after the verses dealing with ' obstructed ' heritage in the Mitakshara sense. The original texts themselves do not provide for a case in which the disability may subsequently cease. It is therefore no wonder that they give us no guidance in determining the exact legal status of a man under disability, with reference to joint family property. Further, though a text of Yagnavalkya postulates equal rights of father and son in the paternal grandfather's estate, the development of this conception into the doctrine of right by birth, with the incidents of right to demand partition and the right to interdict alienation is found only in the Mitakshara; and even under the Mitakshara the right of survivorship is more a result than an expressed incident. Introducing the sloka of Yagnavalkya relating to exclusion, Vignaneswara (by way of Avatarika) premises that it is an exception to what was already been stated respecting the succession of (1) the son, (2) the widow and other heirs, (3) the reunited parcener. It is obvious that the principles of succession are different as amongst these three groups. In the first, it is by survivorship (even in respect of the father's self-acquired property, according to the scheme of the Mitakshara). In the second it is by inheritance pure and simple. In the third group it is an anomalous rule of successsion which has now been assimilated to the principle of survivorship. When in placitum 6, Vijnaneswara goes on to draw a distinction between disqualification prior to division and disqualification subsequent to division, he is developing something like the modern theory of vesting and divesting, which is only latent in the original texts. But the statement in placitum 7, as regards the right of a person whose disqualification subsequently disappears, is wholly the author's own; there is nothing corresponding to it even in the Dayabhaga system of Jimutavahana. The Mitakshara bases this rule on the analogy of the after-born son. Having introduced this conception, Vignaneswara does not pause to make it clear whether this doctrine of restoration is to be applied, even to cases of strict inheritance (Sapratibandha) by co-heirs or only to cases of partition among co-parceners. Consistently with other well-established theories in the law of inheritance there is no scope for applying this doctrine as between co-heirs, because the inheritance is once for all vested at the moment the succession opens. Cf. Narasimha Razu v. Veerabhadra Razu (1893) I.L.R. 17 Mad. 287 at 292. A Similarly, the rule in placita 9 and 10 as to the right of the sons of disqualified persons, must be confined to cases of unobstructed heritage, for in the other case the doctrine of representation will not apply and the sons of the disqualified persons will be excluded by their uncles on the ground of remoteness. Among members of the joint family, placitum 7 of the Mitakshara does not in terms draw a distinction between cases of congenital disqualification and cases of supervening disqualification. But, here again, the logical application of the theory of right by birth, may justify a differentiation between the two cases, because the congenitally disqualified man would not have acquired a right by birth at all. The mere fact that the right of maintenance is equally available in both cases does not compel the view that the legal status must be taken to be the same in both cases.

    12. In understanding the analogy of the after born son, the distinction between two such cases must be kept in view. There is one provision for the ' after-born ' son in the sense of a son born after partition to a father who is alive and has taken a share at the partition between himself and his sons. In this case, there is no re-opening of the partition but the after born son lakes what belongs to the father. (For what happens when the father has not reserved a share for himself see Chengama Nayudu v. Munisami Nayudu (1896) I.L.R. 20 Mad. 75. There is another provision for the ' after-born ' son, in the sense of a posthumous son, of a father or brother who did not live to take a share at a partition between the other co-parceners but whose wife (pregnant at the time) gives birth to a son after the partition. It is only in this case that there is a re-opening of the partition (see the Vyavaharamayuka, Ch. IV, S. IV, pl. 33-37) see also Krishna v. Sami (1885) I.L.R. 9 Mad. 64 at 70 and 71 (F.B.). In the present context, the Mitakshara must be referring to the latter case alone by way of analogy because it involves a reopening of the partition. If so, the analogy is not inconsistent with a dormant co-parcenership in the disqualified co-parcener just as in the case of the son in the mother's womb at the time of the partition. But it is after all only an analogy and ought not to be pushed to what may seem to be its logical results, especially when the placitum covers cases even of congenital disqualification. It is any how reasonable to assume that the passages in the Mitakshara do not by their terms decide the exact legal status of a co-parcener, who has come under a disqualification subsequent to his birth. If, then, the logical application of the theory of right by birth justifies a differentiation between a man, who is congenitally disqualified and one subject to a supervening disqualification, there is nothing in the Mitakshara which precludes the recognition of such a distinction. Such a course is warranted by the fact that similar, if not identical, distinctions have been developed by some of the commentators of the Mitakshara school; for instance, by the Sarasvati Vilasa, between disqualified persons who are fit for marriage and those who are not.

    13. Before passing on to the next point we may perhaps observe that we have had some difficulty in following the comment of Seshagiri Aiyar, J., in Muthusami Gurukkal v. Meenammal (1918) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 464 at 474 : 38 M.L.J. 291 on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar (1905) I.L.R. 28 All. 247. We do not find any statement in that judgment where succession in a Mitakshara joint family is said to open on the death of the father. On the other hand, the learned Judges clearly lay down that the right by birth once vested cannot be divested by supervening disqualification. The real criticism against the decision in Tirbeni Sahai v. Muhammad Umar (1905) I.L.R. 28 All. 247 is that the High Court upheld the disqualified man's right to claim recovery of his share. To that extent it departs from the suggestion made by Ghose, J., in Abilakh Bhagat v. Bhekhi Mahto (1895) I.L.R. 22 Cal. 864 that the two decisions in Ram Sahye Bhukkut v. Lalla Laljee Sahye (1881) I.L.R. 8 Cal. 149 may be explained on the footing that the disqualified man remained owner of his share though he could not get a decree which would involve a partition with him.

    14. Founding himself on an observation of Lord Lindley in Venkayyamma Garu v. Venkataramanayyamma (1902) L.R. 29 I.A. 156 : I.L.R. 25 Mad. 678 at 687 : 12 M.L.J. 299 (P.C.) Mr. Sastriar contended that where there is no right to partition there can be no right to take by survivorship. It is sufficient answer to this to say that these general remarks are not without exceptions and recent decisions of the Judicial Committee as to succession by survivorship in the case of impartible Zamindaris furnish an instance of such exceptions. See particularly the observations in Shibaprasad Singh v. Prayagkumari Debee (1931) I.L.R. 59 Cal. 1399 at 1413 (P.C.) and The Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar Mal (1934) 67 M.L.J. 274 at 284 An argument was also founded on the observations of their Lordships at the bottom of page 784 in Rama Rao v. Raja of Pittapur (1918) L.R. 45 I.A. 148 where, referring to the case of excluded persons, by way of illustration, it was said 'such persons are debarred from the rights of coparcenary but are given maintenance in lieu'. Besides being obiter, the statement is much too cryptic to be of any use in the present connection. It may be explained away as negativing full rights of coparcenary in such cases-and such a construction would seem to be justified by the succeeding sentences which contrast 'birth status' with 'full status' and speak of the disqualification as only 'preventing enjoyment'. Mr. Sastriar drew our attention to certain passages in Pudiava Nadar v. Pavanasa Nadar (1922) I.L.R. 45 Mad. 949 : 43 M.L.J. 596 (F.B.) but there is nothing in that case that throws light on the question now before us. Apart from the fact that the Full Bench was only concerned with the question whether the rules as to exclusion were to be held obsolete or not, the disability of the excluded person in that case was congenital and there was no occasion for discussing the status of a person suffering from a supervening disability.

    15. Once the conclusion is reached that a disqualified person may be a 'co-parcener' enough to take by survivorship, there is no reason why we should deny the possibility of such a severance of the joint status as would put an end to the right of succession by survivorship. Here again, the law relating to impartible estates furnishes some analogy, though there may be a difference as to the methods by which the severance of the joint status may be brought about. Relying on some observations in Lala Muddun Gopal Lal v. Mt. Khikhinda Koer (1890) L.R. I.A. 9 : I.L.R. 18 Cal. 341 (P.C.) Mr.. Srinivasa Aiyangar suggested that the other co-parceners may waive their right to insist on the disqualification and allot a share to the disqualified member. Whether an allotment if so made, will amount to a partition is not free from doubt. In one portion of their judgment, the Privy Council speak of it as a 'gift'. But it is unnecessary to examine this possibility here, because Ex. I in the present case far from waiving the disqualification, insists on it and no property is allotted to the first plaintiff himself. This brings us to the consideration of the nature and effect of Ex. I.

    16. On behalf of the appellants, much stress was laid on such statements in Ex. I as assert the absolute right of the father to the whole property and the absence of any right in the son to a share. On the other hand, respondent's learned Counsel emphasized the description of the document as a deed of partition the reference to the existence of an undivided family and the clear assertion of an intention to become divided in status, with a view to avoid possible litigation in the future. There are, no doubt, apparent incongruities in the document but it seems to us that there can equally be no doubt as to its general intention and effect. In understanding it, we must remember that it was drafted under legal advice, which presumably was given with reference to the law as laid down in Muthusami Gurkkal v. Meenammal (1918) I.L.R. 43 Mad. 464 : 38 M.L.J. 291. This explains the assumption of a right of survivorship and the necessity for effecting a severance of the joint status, even while emphatically denying a right to a share to the first plaintiff. In view however of the fact that no property has been allotted under Ex. I to the first plaintiff, that he gets nothing more than maintenance and that in default of sons surviving the first plaintiff, the B schedule properties are directed to go over to the daughters and their sons, we are unable to uphold Ex. I as a 'partition' in the sense of an allotment of properties to the first plaintiff. But we see no reason why it should not be held effective to bring about a severance of status between the first plaintiff and his father. There is a clear and definite statement in it by the father that the undivided nature of the family should be cut off and a divided state brought about and he goes on to say "I have settled that I (No. 1) am in a partitioned and divided state from No. 2 (the son)". At one stage we felt a doubt whether on this footing alone, the title of the defendants under the will Ex. II could be sustained, because it is a gift of specific properties and not of an undivided share see Natesa Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1918) M.W.N. 703 but as there are also general words of devise in Ex. II Mr. Sastriar did not think fit to press that kind of objection.

    17. Mr. Sastriar's main contention with reference to this view of Ex. I was that no division of status could be brought about by such a declaration of intention, except on intimation of the same to the other co-parcener or his natural guardian, see Kamepalli Ayilamma v. Mannem Venkalaswami (1917) 33 M.L.J. 746 and Saraswatamma v. Paddayya (1922) I.L.R. 46 Mad. 349 : 44 M.L.J. 45 that in a transaction with himself, the father could not be guardian for his disqualified son Rangasayi v. Nagarathnamma (1933) 65 M.L.J. 630 at 639 (F.B.) and that in this case there has been no communication to any other guardian. In dealing with this contention we have to remember that the only other person to whom there could have been any communication was the first plaintiff's wife, who could not in any sense be called the husband's 'natural' guardian. She was not even his 'de facto' guardian because he was living with the father, who was also in possession of all the properties of the family. Further, the first plaintiff's wife had not even attained majority at the date of Ex. I. When these considerations were pressed against him, Mr. Sastriar could only say that in such circumstances the other co-parcener could not avail himself of the privilege of becoming divided by a declaration of his intention. But is this not recognised as a right of every co-parcener? Why should he suffer because there is no lawful guardian to receive notice on behalf of the co-parcener under disability. In Kandasami v. Doraisami Aiyar (1880) I.L.R. 2 Mad. 317 at 323, 324 the learned Judges refer to authorities which show that a partition may validly be made even without anybody representing a minor or absent co-parcener (subject of course to the question of its fairness being open to examination). Why should that principle be confined to cases in which there is a plurality of co-parceners besides the disqualified or absent co-parcener? Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar maintained that once it is established that severance of status is a matter of right and of individual volition, there is no significance in the requirement as to notice, because the other co-parceners have no voice in the matter. If, however, all that is necessary is that the other co-parcener or somebody on his behalf should become aware of such declaration of intention Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar relied on the evidence of D. W. 13 to show that first plaintiff's wife and her father were aware of Ex. I. Reference was made in this connection to Jamna Ram v. Munsah Rai A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 473, Lakshmamma v. Sreeramalu A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 1066, Lakshmi Achi v. Narayanasami Naicker (1929) I.L.R. 53 Mad. 188 and Rama Aiyar v. Meenakshi A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 278 and to a recent judgment of Madhavan Nair. and Jackson, JJ., in Ademma v. Seshayya 1935 M.W.N. 191. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this case to express any definite opinion as to the principle on which notice to the other co-parceners should be insisted on or as to the manner or circumstances in which the declaration of intention should or could be brought to their knowledge. Nor need we decide what should be done if the co-parcener under disability should happen to have no natural guardian. The conclusion in favour of a division of status in the present case could be rested on the ground that when a father brings about a division between himself and his sons as recognised in Kandasami v. Dorasami Aiyar 1935 M.W.N. 191 such an act is done in the exercise of a special power which he has under the texts and is independent of the doctrine of severance of status among co-parceners generally by a declaration of intention to become divided.

    18. Against this last mentioned ground, Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar raised two points (i) that in executing Ex. I Krishna Josier did not purport to act in the exercise of the power that he had as a father, and it is not permissible to attribute it to that capacity when he has acted in assertion of an inconsistent right of exclusive ownership Balwant Singh v. R. Clancy (1912) L.R. 36 I.A. 109 : I.L.R. 34 All. 296 : 23 M.L.J. 18 (P.C.) and (ii) that the power recognised in Kandasami v. Dorasami Aiyar (1880) I.L.R. 2 Mad. 317 relates to an actual allotment of shares by a fair and equal division and not to a mere division of status. In answer to the first contention Mr. Srinivasa Aiyangar tried to invoke the principle recognised in another group of cases, e.g., Bijraj Nopani v. Pura Sundary Dasee (1914) L.R. 41 I.A. 189 : I.L.R. 42 C. 56 : 27 M.L.J. 93 (P.C.) Audimula Mudali v. Alamelammal (1916) 2 M.W.N. 115 Sadayappa Asari v. Raghava Asari (1919) 62 I.C. 220 and Seetharamamurthi v. Rangayya A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 293 of effectuating a transfer by attributing it to the capacity most favourable to a bona fide purchaser; but there being no question of purchaser here, it is doubtful if that class of cases can properly be pressed into service. But the argument may be met in another way, viz., that for the reasons already explained, the assertion of full ownership is not in the circumstances of this case incompatible with the recognition of the first plaintiff as a kind of coparcener and in Ex. I Krishna Josier expressly purports to act also as family manager. The decisions in Aiyavier v. Subramania Aiyar (1917) 32 M.L.J. 439 and Natesa Aiyar v. Subramania Aiyar (1918) M.W.N. 703 are certainly clear authorities in favour of the Respondents.

    19. As to the second contention, we would point out that though the case in Kandasami v. Dorasami Aiyar (1880) I.L.R. 2 Mad. 317 was one of actual allotment, there is no reason why the same principle should not, at the present day, be applied to a division of status as well. The father's power comprises two things (a) division between himself and his sons (b) division between the sons inter se. Whether, in the latter case, there may be a mere division of status at the father's choice, we need not now decide, but we see no objection to the recognition of the possibility of a severance of status in the former case, for (apart from the facts of this case) it is well-established that the father need not take a share for himself. The language of placitum ii of Ch. I, Section ii of the Mitakshara is quite general, to the effect 'when a father wishes to make a partition, he may at his pleasure separate his children from himself. The fact that the actual allotment made by him turns out to be invalid need not take away the division of status intended to be brought about cf. Partap Singh v. Dalip Singh (1930) I.L.R. 52 All. 596.

    20. We accordingly hold that the first plaintiff became divided from Krishna Josier by reason of Ex. I and as the transaction cannot be upheld as a partition, the plaintiffs are entitled to a division of the properties, except item 126 of the plaint schedule, which the lower Court has found to be family properties, into two equal shares and delivery of one share to themselves. In this view, it is unnecessary to decide issue No. 12. We have left it to the parties to consider whether it is necessary to go through the trouble and expense of a division by a Commissioner; but if they cannot agree upon some arrangement, the lower Court will take the necessary steps for effecting a division and pass a final decree. In making the division, the two items of assets specified in Ex. VIII (a) will also be taken into account. Ex. VI was executed by Krishna Josier only as a divided member. It cannot therefore bind the plaintiffs.

    21. On the footing that the first plaintiff and his father became divided in status as from the date of Ex. I the plaintiffs are entitled to mesne profits, in respect of their share, between that date and the date of Krishna Josier's death, subject of course to legitimate deductions, as for instance, in respect of disbursements made for the maintenance of the first plaintiff or his wife or for expenses binding upon the plaintiff's share of the family property. A direction for payment of mesne profits for the said period out of the assets of Krishna Josier will be added in para. 2 of the lower Court's decree. It is not necessary to disturb the direction in that decree as regards mesne profits subsequent to the date of Krishna Josier's death.

    22. As regards costs, we cannot help thinking that the plaintiffs were in some degree justified in coming to Court, in view of the lines on which Ex. I has been framed. But after the matter has been fully discussed and decided before the first Court, the plaintiffs could only be taken to have come up on appeal at their own risk. We therefore direct that the parties shall bear their respective costs in the Court below but the appellants must pay the Respondent's costs in the appeal.

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    Venkateswara Pattar (Insane) And Others . v. K. Mankayammal And Others
    (Aug 31, 1934)