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  • schedule to Act No. IX of 1871 and of art. 141 in the schedule to Act No. XV of 1877
  • art. 142 of Act No. IX of 1871 and art. 141
  • clause 13 of s. 1 of Act No. XIV of 1859,
  • clause 12 of s. 1 of Act No. XIV of 1859,
  • Limitation Act of 1859
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • schedule to Act No. IX of 1871 and of art. 141 in the schedule to Act No. XV of 1877
  • art. 142 of Act No. IX of 1871 and art. 141
  • clause 13 of s. 1 of Act No. XIV of 1859,
  • clause 12 of s. 1 of Act No. XIV of 1859,
  • Limitation Act of 1859
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Kot Kamharya — Limitation Issue)

Factual and Procedural Background

The property in dispute is the village of Kot Kamharya. Plaintiffs (now appellants) Babu Hanuman Prasad Singh and Babu Jadu Nath Singh claim possession as grandsons (reversionary heirs) of Babu Paltan Singh (deceased). Two additional plaintiffs are transferees of portions of the plaintiffs' interest under a deed dated 16 February 1894.

Babu Paltan Singh died in 1299 Fasli (circa 1822 A.D.), leaving two widows and three daughters but no surviving son. The appellants are sons of the eldest daughter (Rachpal Kunwari). One widow, Musammat Harnam Kunwari, came into possession and, while recorded as in possession, purported to convey the property to Harnam Pathak (ancestor of the respondents). Harnam Kunwari died on 5 February (or January) 1857. The daughters succeeded in turn; the last surviving daughter died on 3 March 1890 (date relied on by the appellants as the accrual of their cause of action).

The Subordinate Judge held that the appellants' cause of action accrued on the death of Musammat Harnam Kunwari in 1857, applied Act No. XIV of 1859 to bar the claim after twelve years, and dismissed the suit. The central issue on appeal was whether the suit was barred by limitation. The suit was instituted in March 1894 (per the record cited by Burkitt, J.).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants' cause of action accrued on the death of Musammat Harnam Kunwari (1857) or on the death of the last surviving daughter (3 March 1890).
  2. Which limitation provision governs the suit — Act No. XIV of 1859 or art. 141 of the schedule to Act No. XV of 1877 — for a reversioner claiming on the death of a female heir.
  3. Whether any alienation by the widow or possession by the respondents during the intervening period operated as adverse possession (or produced a decree) sufficient to bar the reversioners' claim.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Under Hindu law the widows and daughters had only a qualified (life) interest; the inheritance vested in reversionary heirs but was interposed by the lives of the widows/daughters.
  • The respondents' possession could not be adverse to appellants until the last female heir died (3 March 1890); therefore art. 141 of schedule ii of Act No. XV of 1877 (twelve years from the female's death) governs the limitation period.
  • An alienation by the widow could convey at most the widow's life interest and could not bind reversioners absent some overt adverse possession by the grantee; Act No. XIV of 1859 did not extinguish the substantive reversionary right.
  • Cited authorities in support included Sambasiva v. Ragava, Cursandas Govindji v. Vundravandas Purshotam, and Mukta v. Dada valad Supadu.

Respondents' Arguments

  • They relied on the Subordinate Judge's finding that the cause of action accrued on the death of Musammat Harnam Kunwari in 1857 and that Act No. XIV of 1859 barred the suit after twelve years.
  • Therefore, by the beginning of 1869 no suit to recover could be maintained in any Court of Judicature.
  • They cited several authorities to support the view that rights could become extinct under Act No. XIV of 1859 and not be revived by later Limitation Acts, including Babu valad Sheik Ibrahim v. Bhikaji, Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty, Amirto Lall v. Rajonee Kant Mitter, Srinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar Ghose, and Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun Goswami.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sambasiva v. Ragava Principle that when a defendant gets into possession under an invalid alienation made by a widow his possession is not adverse to the reversioner until the widow's death; if possession is by trespass, it may be good as against the representative for the time and thus against the reversioner. The opinion (Burkitt, J.) treats this case as part of the second class of authorities supporting the view that possession under an invalid alienation by a female in possession is not adverse to a reversioner until the female's death; used to support appellants' position.
Cursandas Govindji v. Vundravandas Purshotam Statement (attributed to Parsons, J.) that the right of the heir cannot be taken away by the conduct of the widow but only by the act of the owner of the paramount estate; as long as a widow lives the reversioner has no right of action. Both Knox, J. and Burkitt, J. cite and rely on this decision to the extent that it supports the idea that a widow in possession represents the inheritance for the time and that adverse acts by others (not the widow herself) are required to divest the reversioner.
Mukta v. Dada valad Supadu The opinion references this case as one following the principle in Cursandas Govindji (that the reversioner who sues within twelve years from the death of the female is not time-barred). Noted by the Court (Burkitt, J.) as following the rule that a reversioner who sues within the period from the female's death is not barred; cited in support of the appellants' position.
Babu valad Sheik Ibrahim v. Bhikaji Case where possession by a mother-in-law and her alienees was held adverse to the widow and to the reversioners; adverse possession for more than twelve years was a bar to reversioners. Distinguished by Knox, J. because in the present case there was no trace of adverse possession by the respondents during the lifetime of the widows or daughters. Burkitt, J. treats it as an example of the first class where adverse possession by a stranger binds reversioners.
Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty Full Bench decision: if property never reaches the female heir's hands because a stranger entered by trespass, the cause of action accrues at the commencement of the adverse possession; adverse possession against the female binds the reversioners. Both judges discuss this case; Knox, J. says its view supports appellants when properly looked at because it recognizes when cause accrues; Burkitt, J. places it in the first class showing that where a stranger's adverse possession begins a reversioner's cause of action may accrue at that date.
Amirto Lal(e) Bose v. Rajonee Kant Mitter Approved principle that where a widow's life-estate has been extinguished by dispossession and adverse possession maintained, that adverse possession can extinguish the title of both the widow and the reversioners. Knox, J. cites this Privy Council approval to show that where adverse possession existed against the female heir and was maintained, it could extinguish the reversioner's right; the court found no such adverse possession here.
Srinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar Ghose Cited as deciding that the Limitation Act of 1859 rules are no longer the law under the later Acts (1871 and 1877), and that a reversioner now has twelve years from the time his estate falls into possession. Knox, J. relies on this to support that the accrual for the reversioners in the present case was when the estate fell into possession (on death of last daughter in 1890) under the later Limitation Acts.
Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun Goswami Privy Council held that where a plaintiff's predecessor (female heir) had been finally defeated on limitation grounds, the reversioner could not claim a new cause of action merely because art. 141 gave a period measured from the female's death; art. 141 does not give a right where none existed. Discussed by both judges: cited by respondents; Knox distinguishes it on facts (there the right had been extinguished earlier), while Burkitt explains it as a case where an adverse decree prevented the reversioner from suing later.
Mussummat Lachhan Kunwar v. Anant Singh Referenced alongside similar cases to show decisions about the effect of adverse possession or decrees on female heirs and reversioners. Knox, J. cites it as part of authorities showing the distinction between mere life-estates and cases where adverse possession or decrees removed the estate from the female heir and reversioners.
Mussummat Lachhan Kunwar v. Manorath Ram Similar authority mentioned concerning the effect of adverse possession or decrees where the female heir's position was extinguished. Used by Knox, J. in grouping authorities that clarify when reversioners are barred by prior adverse possession or decrees affecting female heirs.
Appasami Odayar v. Subramanya Odayar Held that rights barred by clause 13 of s.1 of Act No. XIV of 1859 were not revived by later Limitation Acts; illustrates the limitation question even where not a reversioner suit. Burkitt, J. cites it to show that later Limitation Acts did not revive rights already extinguished under the earlier Act; used in broader analysis of limitation law evolution.
Ram Kali v. Kedar Nath (Ramkali v. Kedar Nath) Case in which art. 141 was applied and the reversioner was held not time-barred because limitation began to run from the death of the widow; noted as possibly difficult to reconcile with other authorities. Burkitt, J. notes it as an instance where a court applied art. 141 to allow a reversioner twelve years from the female's death; he observes it may require reconsideration but places it among second-class cases.
Lachhan Kunwar v. Anant Singh Authority where a widow's absolute possession for a long period was treated as adverse and sufficient to bar reversioners; a trespasser with prolonged adverse possession could acquire absolute title. Burkitt, J. treats it in the first class of cases demonstrating that long adverse possession by a usurper can extinguish the rights of reversioners; distinguished from the present facts.
Drobomoyi Gupta v. Davis Case where daughters had unsuccessfully challenged a tenure and reversioners were held barred by limitation; discussed the question of whether possession was adverse to female heirs. Burkitt, J. cites the case for the proposition that if female heirs act to impugn a settlement they may be taken to assert their rights, and if possession is shown to be adverse to them, reversioners may be barred; used in contextual analysis.
Shiva Ganga case Referred to as authority for the proposition that an adverse decree against a female heir in respect of the subject-matter of inheritance binds the reversioner. Burkitt, J. cites the Shiva Ganga principle when explaining why decrees or adverse possession against the female heir can bind reversioners; used as foundational authority in the classification of cases.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains detailed reasoning from two judges (Knox, J. and Burkitt, J.) who addressed the same principal question (limitation) with largely concordant conclusions but complementary analyses.

Knox, J. — Key analytical steps

  1. Identified the competing limitation provisions: Act No. XIV of 1859 (twelve years from accrual under earlier law) versus art. 141 of sch. ii of Act No. XV of 1877 (twelve years from the death of the female in suits by a person entitled on the death of a Hindu female).
  2. Explained the legal nature of the widow's/daughter's interest under Hindu law as a life (qualified) estate; accordingly, a conveyance by the widow could pass at most a life interest in the property and could not bind reversioners unless there was some overt adverse possession or other act by the grantee evidencing a higher title.
  3. Distinguished authorities relied on by respondents (e.g., Babu valad Sheik Ibrahim; Nobin Chunder) by observing that those cases involved established adverse possession by strangers or dispositions that in fact deprived the female heirs of possession; in the present case there was no evidence of adverse possession by respondents against the widows or daughters during their lives.
  4. Accepted the appellants' contention that the reversioners' cause of action could not accrue while lives of widows/daughters interposed — the right remained dormant and revived on the death of the last surviving daughter (3 March 1890).
  5. Relied on authorities (including Srinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar Ghose) to conclude that under the Limitation Acts of 1871 and 1877 a reversioner has twelve years from the time the estate falls into possession; thus the appellants' suit (instituted after 1890 but within twelve years) is in time.
  6. Concluded there was no adverse possession by the respondents during the lifetime of the female heirs and therefore no bar; allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court's decree, and remanded the case under s.562 CPC to be entered on the list of pending cases and disposed of according to law. Costs to abide the event.

Burkitt, J. — Key analytical steps

  1. Surveyed and classified authorities into two broad classes: (A) cases where the female heir had been dispossessed or the property was held adversely by a stranger (which often produced a bar to both the female heir and reversioners), and (B) cases where the reversioner sued within twelve years from the death of the female heir and was held not time-barred.
  2. Summarised four rules distilled from the case-law (as stated in the opinion):
    1. Decrees affecting immoveable property obtained against a female heir are binding on the reversioner (if obtained without fraud/collusion).
    2. An alienation by a female heir in possession is good against her for her life but not necessarily binding on the reversioner; a cause of action accrues on her death.
    3. Where property never reaches the female heir because a stranger holds it adversely from the outset, the cause of action accrues at the commencement of the adverse possession, and after the statutory period the stranger may acquire indefeasible title binding on reversioners.
    4. The subsequent Limitation Acts (art. 142 of Act IX of 1871 and art. 141 of Act XV of 1877) did not alter the substance of the rule in (3).
  3. Applied these rules to the present facts: found no adverse possession by a stranger during the lifetimes of the widow/daughters and no adverse decree; characterized the transaction by the widow as an alienation while in lawful possession and concluded that the daughters' later inaction amounted to acquiescence but did not render the alienation adverse to the reversioners.
  4. Concluded that the reversioners had no right to sue while the female heirs lived, and that the suit by the appellants was not barred because their cause of action accrued on the death of the last surviving daughter (1890); remanded the case under s.562 CPC for trial on the remaining issues and decreed the appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the appellants' cause of action accrued on the death of the last surviving daughter (3 March 1890) and that the suit, as instituted in March 1894, was within time under the Limitation Acts; the decree of the lower Court dismissing the suit for being barred by limitation was set aside and the matter remanded to the Subordinate Judge under section 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure for further trial of issues.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellants' suit is revived for adjudication; the appeal is allowed and the case is remanded for trial on merits of remaining issues. Costs were ordered to abide the event (Knox, J.).
  • Scope of legal holding: The Court emphasized distinctions in the case-law between (a) adverse possession or final decrees affecting the female heir (which may bind reversioners), and (b) alienations by a female heir while in possession that convey only a life interest and do not, by themselves, bar reversioners unless accompanied by adverse possession or a binding decree. The Court did not purport to create a novel general principle beyond those distinctions but applied established authorities to the facts before it.
  • On precedent: The judgments distinguish prior decisions where reversioners were barred by adverse possession or final decrees and confirm that, where no such adverse possession or decree exists and the estate only falls into possession upon the female heir's death, art. 141 (Act XV of 1877) governs the reversioner's limitation period.

    Hanuman Prasad Singh v. Bhagauti Prasad

    Knox, J.:— The property in dispute in the present appeal is the village of Kot Kamharya. The plaintiffs, Babu Hanuman Prasad Singh and Babu Jadu Nath Singh, who are now appellants, claim to be entitled to, and ask to be put in possession of, it as being the grandsons of Babu Paltan Singh, deceased. There are two other persons arrayed as plaintiffs who are transferees in respect of 8 annas of the property under a deed executed in their favour by Babu Hanuman Prasad Singh and Babu Jadu Nath Singh, dated the 16th of February, 1894.

    Babu Paltan Singh died in 1299 Fasli, which corresponds with 1822 A.D He left him surviving two widows and three daughters, but no male issue. The appellants are the sons of Rachpal Kunwari, the eldest of the three said daughters.

    The appellants contend that under the Hindu Law each of the widows and of the daughters was entitled to nothing further than a life interest in the property. Both the widows according to them came into possession of the entire estate upon the death of Babu Paltan Singh. Upon the death of one of the two, Musammat Harnam Kunwari, the surviving widow continued to be recorded in the Collector's records as in possession. While thus in possession she, without right or legal necessity, made a gift of the property to one Harnam Pathak, the ancestor of the respondents, and got mutation of names recorded in his favour. The respondents are still in possession, and the present suit is for their ejectment in favour of the appellants.

    On the 5th of February, 1857, Musammat Harnam Kunwari died and was succeeded by the three daughters. Each of these died in turn; the date on which the last of them died is the 3rd of [360] March 1890, and it is on this date that the appellants maintain that their cause of action accrued, as it was on this date that they first became entitled to succeed as heirs to Babu Paltan Singh.

    One of the pleas raised in defence was that the claim was barred by limitation.

    The Subordinate Judge held that the cause of action accrued to the appellants on the expiry of twelve years from the date of the death of Musammat Harnam Kunwari and that the suit was governed by Act No. XIV of 1859. The suit had therefore to be brought within twelve years from the time when the cause of action arose. The twelve years of dispossession which followed upon the death of Musammat Harnam Kunwari barred the daughter's right and also barred the plaintiffs, and he therefore dismissed the claim.

    The only question which was argued, and which arises for decision, is whether the suit was or was not barred by limitation.

    It is contended on behalf of the appellants that the case is not governed by Act XIV of 1859, but by art. 141 of sch. ii of Act No. XV of 1877. This article provides that in the case of suits by a Hindu entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a Hindu female, the period of limitation prescribed within which the suit can be brought is twelve years from the date when the female in question dies. The possession of the respondents could not begin to run adversely to the appellants until the 3rd of March, 1890, the date on which the last surviving daughter of Babu Paltan Singh died.

    It is further contended that under the Hindu Law widows and daughters take a qualified estate, which is interposed between that of the last male owner and the next male reversioner, and that as between the family and a stranger each such widow or daughter represents the inheritance for the time being. The appellants, who are sons of one of the daughters, do not claim from or under their mother, but they claim as the next male sapindas of their maternal grandfather, into possession of whose estate, however, they could not come until all the widows and daughters had passed away. So [361] far as Act No. XIV of 1859 is concerned it is contended that it contained no provision which could bar such a right as that of the appellants. At the outside all that it did was to take away the remedy under that Act. The right survived and under it the appellants could maintain their present claim.

    In support of their contention we were referred to Sambasiva v. Ragava, to Cursandas Govindji v. Vundravandas Purshotam and to Mukta v. Dada valad Supadu.

    The respondents on the other hand support the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge. They take their stand upon the ground that any right the appellants may have had became extinct under Act No. XIV of 1859, and could not and cannot now be revived. In support of this view they cited Babu valad Sheik Ibrahim v. Bhikaji, Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty, Amirto Lall v. Rajonee Kant Mitter, Srinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar Ghose, a Full Bench case,, and Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun Goswami.

    “No suit,” so runs Act No. XIV of 1859, s. 1, “shall be maintained in any Court of Judicature unless the same is instituted within the period of limitation hereinafter made applicable to a suit of that nature, any Law or Regulation to the contrary notwithstanding.” According to them the cause of action arose on the death of Musammat Harnam Kunwari on the 5th of January, 1857. Within twelve years from that date the daughters of Paltan Singh should have instituted their suit to recover the property out of the hands of Harnam Pathak. They did not do so, and by the beginning of 1869 no suit to recover could be maintained in any Court of Judicature.

    In this contention, however, the respondents ignore entirely the nature of the transfer made by Musammat Harnam Kunwari, and they also with it ignore the circumstances which constitute the cause of action upon which the appellants have come to Court. [362] Assuming for the moment the contention of the appellants that Musammat Harnam Kunwari was acting under the press of no legal necessity, she had no power to bind the inheritance as against the reversioners. All that she could do was to give to Harnam Pathak such an interest as she herself possessed, viz., an interest conterminous with her own life. Whatever might be the language of the deed by which she purported to convey the property, this is all she could convey. The respondents in their written statements have set out nothing from which it could be inferred that as against her Harnam Pathak set up any position from which any higher title or adverse possession could be inferred.

    Again, the appellants set out as their cause of action the death of Musammat Dilraj Kunwari, and say that it did not arise until then. Their position is that they are the heirs of Babu Paltan Singh, and that they now seek to succeed to his estate. They could not do so as long as there lay interposed between them the lives of Paltan Singh's widows and daughters. During that period their right remained dormant but, upon the death of the last survivor of these ladies the right at once revived and accrued against all who might seek to keep them out of their right. In this view the neglect or omission of the daughters of Paltan Singh to bring any suit against the respondents can in no way affect the appellants' interests. Their cause of action was not the appellants' cause of action, and, as already stated, there was no direct assertion of any adverse possession as against the appellants made during this interval. The respondents could not in the lifetime of the daughters acquire any higher interest than they had already acquired, except by some overt act of adverse possession. The view taken in I.L.R, 13 Mad. 512, is the view which I am prepared to take.

    There is much force, too, in what was said by Parsons, J., in Cursandas Govindji v. Vundravandas Purshotam, that the right of the heir cannot be taken away by the conduct of the widow, but by the act of the owner of the paramount estate; [363] only his act or some act of the respondents evidencing adverse possession would operate to divest him of the estate which is conferred upon him by inheritance.

    The cases cited by the respondents differ materially. In the first, viz., Babu valad Sheik Ibrahim v. Bhikaji, which was a second appeal, one Ram Chandra, a separated Hindu, had died leaving him surviving his widow Janki and a son Ganu. Ganu succeeded to the property and then died leaving him surviving his widow Sarasvatibai and his mother Janki. Sarasvatibai lived with her brother Janki remained in possession of the property left by Ram Chandra. Janki mortgaged the property to her brother in 1854–1855, and in 1862 she sold it free from mortgage to the defendants, who at once took possession. Janki died on March 6th, 1874, and afterwards Sarasvatibai died without ever having had possession of the property. In this case, therefore, as both the Courts found that the possession of Janki and of her alienees was adverse to the widow Sarasvatibai, they could not do otherwise than hold that the adverse possession of Janki and her alienees for more than twelve years was a bar, not only to Sarasvatibai but also to the claim of the reversionary heirs on her death; but as already noted above, in the present case, I can find no trace of any adverse possession with the respondents during the lifetime of either Paltan Singh's widows or daughters as against the appellants. Much stress was laid upon the case of Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty. It was a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court, and was relied upon in support of the contention that where the cause of action had been extinguished under Act No. XIV of 1859, no new cause of action could accrue by virtue of any of the provisions contained in the succeeding Limitation cts. But looked at carefully the precedent, is one which tells strongly in favour of the appellants. As pointed out by Sir Barnes Peacock in that case, and concurred in by the other Judges, it is settled Hindu law that the wife takes as heir to her husband in default of issue, and upon her death [364] those persons succeed as reversionary heirs who would have been the heirs of the husband if he had died at that time. “It is a very anomalous position that a person should take as heir, and that his right to take as heir should be determined, according to a state of facts not existing at the time of the death of the ancestor, but caused by events which may have occurred many years after his death.”

    “These considerations,” he adds, “lead me to the conclusion that a reversionary heir, who is bound by a decision against a widow respecting the subject matter of inheritance, is also barred by limitation, if, without fraud or collusion, the widow is barred by limitation.”

    Applying that rule to the present case, as no adverse possession is established against the widows or the daughters, the appellants are not to be held as injuriously affected by the mere fact that throughout this period the respondents have held this land under a title which could not convey to them anything further than the life-estate of a Hindu widow. This was their only title, and as they never asserted adverse possession they must be deemed to have held it under that title. This principle was approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Amirto Lal Bose v. Rajonee Kant Mitter. That was a case by a reversionary heir claiming succession, but also a case in which it had been found that the widow, whose life-estate intervened between him and his inheritance, had been dispossessed by trespassers who set up and maintained adverse possession under which the title of the widow to a life-estate, and therefore of the reversioners, both became extinguished. The case of Srinath Kur v. Prosunno Kumar Ghose decides nothing more than this, that the rule laid down under the Limitation Act of 1859 is no longer the law under the Acts of 1871 and 1877, and that a reversioner who succeeds to immoveable property has now twelve years to bring his suit from the time when his estate falls into possession. In this case, the estate did not fall into possession till the last daughter [365] died, viz., on March 3rd, 1890. In the case of Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun Goswami Sampurna, whose position the Privy Council held was similar to the position of a Hindu widow, had been found to be never in possession of the estate under dispute, and that her claim to it was already barred by limitation at a time when Act No. XIV of 1859 was in force. The contention that the Act of 1877 gave the reversionary heir a new cause of action simply because Sampurna died in 1884 was naturally rejected; he was held bound by the decree which had been passed against Sampurna, and their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that the intention of the law of limitation is not to give a right where there is not one but to interpose a bar after a certain period to a suit to enforce the existing right. In the present case, the right had continued to exist until 1890, and was subject to no bar created by the Act of 1859. The same distinction runs through, and is very clearly brought out in, the case of Mussummat Lachhan Kunwar v. Anant Singh and Mussummat Lachhan Kunwar v. Manorath Ram.

    For the above reasons I hold that the cause of action in the present case accrued to appellants on the death of the last surviving daughter, and that their suit is amply within time. I would therefore allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the lower Court, and remand the case under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the lower Court with directions to enter it on its list of pending cases and dispose of it according to law. Costs to abide the event.

    Burkitt, J.:— This is an appeal from a decree of the Subordinate Judge of Gorakhpur, by which he dismissed the plaintiffs' suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The suit was for the possession of a village to which the plaintiffs Hanuman Prasad and Jadu Nath Prasad (the other plaintiffs are their assignees) asserted title as reversionary heirs of their maternal grandfather, one Paltan Singh. There is no dispute about the preliminary facts. The village in suit was part of the estate left [366] by Paltan Singh, who died about 1822, A.D, leaving him surviving two widows, namely, (1) Harnam Kunwari, who died in January 1857, and (2) Asman Kunwari, who predeceased her co-wife. Sometime before 1857 Harnam Kunwari sold the village in dispute—the sale which is impugned in this suit—to the predecessor in interest of the defendants-respondents. Paltan Singh also left him surviving three daughters, namely, (1) Musammat Bachpali (mother of the first two plaintiffs), who died in June 1858, (2) Musammat Jairaji, who died without issue in May 1879, and (3) Musammat Dilraji, who died without issue in November 1890. This suit was instituted in March 1894.

    On the first of the many issues fixed by him for trial, the Subordinate Judge held that the cause of action to contest the sale accrued on the death of the widow Harnam Kunwari in January 1857, and that it became barred by limitation sometime in 1869 under the limitation contained in clause 12 of s. 1 of Act No. XIV of 1859, which prescribes a period of twelve years from the time when the cause of action arose as the limitation period within which a suit to recover immoveable property must be brought.

    For the plaintiffs, it was contended, and the contention is repeated in this appeal, that the limitation rule applicable is that prescribed by art. 141 of the second schedule to the present Limitation Act (Act No. XV of 1877), which, in the case of a suit by a Hindu or Muhammadan entitled to the possession of immoveable property on the death of a female, prescribes a limitation period of twelve years from the time when, the female dies. The appellant's contention is that, as the estate came into possession only on the death of the last survivor of Paltan Singh's daughters in 1890, they have a period of twelve years from her death within which they can sue. The respondents support the decision of the Court below.

    A large number of cases were cited at bar and by the Court during the argument at the hearing of this appeal, viz., Sambasiva [367] v. Ragava Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun Goswami Cursanalas Govindji v. Vundravandas Purshotam, Mukla v. Dada valad Supadu, Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty, Appasami Odayar v. Subramanya Odayar, Babu valad Sheik Ibrahim v. Bhikaji, Amirto Lal Bose Rajonee Kant Mitter, Ram Kali v. Kedar Nath. Lachhan Kunwar v. Manorath Ram and Drobomoyi Gupta v. Davis.

    The above cases may be roughly divided into two classes, the first being that in which the widow or other female, in succession to (but not through) whom the reversioner claimed, had been dispossessed or had been kept out of and had not obtained possession of the property, e.g, by a trespasser, by a decree of Court or the like.

    The case of Nobin Chunder Chuckerbutty v. Issur Chunder Chuckerbutty, was one in which a separated Hindu died leaving him surviving two sons, two daughters and a widow. The sons died without issue in the life-time of their mother, upon whom their respective estates then descended as heir. The mother, however, never got possession, as on the death of the sons a stranger, a trespasser, entered on the property and took and retained possession. On suit by the daughters' sous for possession after the death of the mother (the limitation law applicable being Act No. XIV of 1859) it was contended for the reversioners that they had acquired a fresh cause of action on the death of the mother. It was held on the authority of the Shiva Ganga case, that, if the mother had sued the trespasser for possession and (without fraud or collusion) had failed to make out her case, the reversionary heirs would have been bound by the decision, and that on the same principle the adverse possession against her was adverse also to the reversioners, the reason being “that the widow [368] fully represents the estate, and it is also settled law that adverse possession which bars her bars the heir also after her.” As to an alienation made by a female heir it was held that no cause of action would accrue to her against her grantee, who would not be a wrong-doer, during her life, but that the alienation would not be binding against the reversioner. The cause of action would not arise till her death, when the reversioner's cause of action for the first time accrues. As to the case in which the female never got possession of the property, it having been held adversely to her and never having reached her hands, it was held that the suit to recover the property by ejectment of the wrongdoer must be brought within twelve years from the commencement of the adverse possession. The meaning of the learned Judges who decided this case clearly was that in such a case the cause of action arose once and for all on the commencement of the trespass. This case was cited with approval by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Amirto Lal Bose v. Rajonee Kant Mitter

    In Babu valad Sheik Ibrahim v. Bhikaji, a separated Hindu died leaving him surviving his widow and a son. The son succeeded to the property and died leaving, a widow, on whom his estate descended as heir. The son's widow, however, was kept out of possession by her mother-in-law (the father's widow), who had no title to the property, but who retained possession of it and ultimately sold it. Subsequently, on suit brought by the son's reversioners after the death of the son's widow, it was held (following the two cases above cited) that the possession of the usurping mother-in-law and of her alienees was adverse, not only to the true heir, the son's widow, but also to the son's reversioners. The case was one under Act No. XIV of 1859, and the Court considered it unnecessary to discuss the effect of art. 142 of Act No. IX of 1871 and art. 141 of No. XV of 1877. In Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun Goswami the plaintiff as son of the survivor of five daughters of his [369] maternal grandfather, who herself died in 1884, sued in April 1887, to recover his share, in his maternal grandfather's property, from the sons and grandson of his mother's sisters. The defence was that his suit was barred by a decree obtained against his mother, who had sued for possession in 1879 against a son of one of her sisters and had been defeated. Their Lordships of the Privy Council, after referring to the changes in the law of limitation from Act No. XIV of 1859 to Act No. IX of 1871 and Act No. XV of 1877, cited the judgment in the Shiva Ganga case, in which it had been held that an adverse decree in a suit brought by a Hindu widow for possession of a zamindari as heir to her husband would, if it had become final in her life-time, have bound those claiming in succession to her, and would have barred any new suit by any person claiming in succession to ber unless the decree could be successfully impeached on some special ground. Their Lordships then went on to remark that the judgments in Nobin Chunder v. Issur Chunder and in Amirto Lal Bose v. Rajonee Kant were not directly applicable (no doubt because those cases turned on adverse possession against the female heir and not on a decree of Court), and held that the estate to which the plaintiff's mother had succeeded was similar to the estate of a widow, and that the principle of those decisions would apply to it. Their Lordships then considered the contention that (the law being as described in the three cases cited above when Act No. IX of 1871 was passed), the effect of art. 142 in the sch. to Act No. IX of 1871 and of art. 141 in the sch. to Act No. XV of 1877 was that a decree founded on the law of limitation was now exempted from the rule laid down in the Shiva Ganga case, and that the decree in the plaintiff's mother's suit of 1879 only bound her, and that the plaintiff had under art. 141 a period of twelve years from her death to bring a suit. For that contention their Lordships could see no ground. They held that the words in art. 141 “entitled to the possession of immoveable [370] property” referred to the then existing law, under which the plaintiff would not, (by reason of the adverse decree) be entitled to bring a suit for possession, the intention of the law of limitation being not to give a right where there is not one, but to interpose a bar, after a certain period, to bar a suit to enforce an: existing right; and finally their Lordships say that art. 141 cannot be construed as altering the law respecting the effect of a decree. In Lachhan Kunwar v. Anant Singh the facts are the same as in Babu naiad Sheik Ibrahim v. Bhikaji cited above. A Hindu widow took possession of her husband's property to the exclusion of her son's widow, the true heir, and held possession for twenty-five years. Their Lordships held that if she took possession absolutely and without any qualification, her possession would be a bar to the title of all persons who could claim as reversioners. Their Lordships approved of the decision then under appeal, in which it was held that the trespasser by virtue of her adverse possession had acquired an absolute indefeasible title to the property, extinguishing not merely the title of the next heir (the son and after him his widow), but also that of the reversioners expectant on the death of the son's widow. The last of this class of cases to which I would refer is that of Appasami Odayar v. Subramanya Odayar. The suit in it was brought to recover the plaintiffs share in joint ancestral property from which the plaintiff alleged he had been excluded by the defendants. It was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the plaintiff's suit had been barred by clause 13 of s. 1 of Act No. XIV of 1859, which prescribed twelve years from the date of the last participation in the profits of the estate as the limitation period, and their Lordships further held that the right to sue could not have been revived by the later limitation Acts. They also held [as in Hari Nath Chatterjee v. Mothurmohun] that if the limitation Acts had altered the law (of limitation), they had not revived the right of suit. This case therefore, though it is not one of a suit by a [371] reversioner claiming on the death of a female, is of importance on the limitation question.

    From a consideration of the above cases it seems to me that the following rules can be deduced, namely, (1) that decrees affecting immoveable property obtained against a female heir in respect of the subject-matter of the inheritance (if obtained without fraud or collusion or the like) are binding on the reversioner:—(2) that an alienation made by a female heir in possession is good against her for her life, but is not necessarily binding on the reversioner, to whom, if it be invalid, a cause of action accrues on the death of the female heir:—(3) that where property, the estate in which has descended to a female heir, never reaches her hands, but is held adversely to her by a stranger, the cause of action for a suit for the recovery of the property accrues at the commencement of the adverse possession by the stranger, and a suit to enforce that cause of action will be barred both against the female heir and against the reversioner after the expiration of the statutory period of limitation counting from the commencement of the adverse possession, the stranger having after the expiration of that period acquired an absolute indefeasible title to the property, and (4) that the enactment of art. 142 in the schedule to Act No. IX of 1871 and of art. 141 in the schedule to Act No. XV of 1877 has not made any alteration in the law laid down in the last preceding rule.

    In the second class of cases the first I would cite is Sambasiva v. Ragava. In it the facts are that a separated Hindu died in 1845, leaving him surviving, a widow, who died in 1846, and two daughters, the survivor of whom died is 1883. The plaintiff, a son of the last-mentioned daughter, sued in 1887 to set aside an alienation made by the other daughter in 1850 while she was in possession of her father's property. The District Judge held that the suit became barred by limitation in 1862 under Act No. XIV of 1859. The High Court, however, on appeal took a different view, remarking:—“We take it therefore as settled law that when [372] the defendant gets into possession under an invalid alienation made by a widow his possession is not adverse against the reversioner until the widow's death, but when the defendant comes Into possession by an act of trespass that the title he acquires is good as against the representative of the inheritance for the time and consequently against the reversioner.”. The Court further considered the argument that a suit by the plaintiff's mother to impeach the alienation would have been barred after twelve years from her sister's death and that therefore the plaintiff would be barred. The Court, however, rejected that argument, holding that the title which the alienee acquired against the plaintiff's mother by the lapse of twelve years would not be higher than that which might have been created by a conveyance from her which would not be binding on the plaintiff. It was therefore held that there was no bar of limitation against the plaintiff.

    In Cursandas Govindji v. Vundravandas Purshotam there was no complication of any kind. The plaintiff reversioner sued within twelve years from the death of the survivor of the two widows of the last male owner, and the Court held he was not time-barred, remarking that as long as either of the widows lived, the plaintiff had no right of action and could not sue for possession. This case was followed and approved in Mukta v. Dada valad Supadu.

    Ramkali v. Kedar Nath, is undoubtedly a strong case. The facts in it resemble very much those in Lachhan Kunwar v. Anant Singh, and are that a separated Hindu died in 1862 leaving a widow and daughter, but no son. The estate descended to the widow, but possession never reached her, as a nephew of her husband (who had no title whatever as long as the widow and daughter lived) took possession of the property, and retained possession for twenty-five years up to the death of the widow in 1887. The daughter then sued for possession, and it was held by the Court that art. 141 of the second schedule to the Act No. XV of 1877 applied, that the plaintiff had twelve years from [373] the death of the widow in 1887 within which to sue, and that the suit was not time-barred, as the limitation period began to run from the death of the widow. It is not easy to reconcile the decision in this case with that in Hari Nath Chatterjee and in Lachhan Kunwar and others of the cases cited above, and possibly the decision may have to be reconsidered.

    In Drobomoyi Gupta v. Davis, the facts are that a Hindu widow created a peculiar kind of tenure in favour of certain tenants and died in 1861. She was succeeded by her two daughters, the survivor of whom died in December 1880. The plaintiffs sued as reversioners (daughter's sons) in 1884 for possession of the land by ejectment of the tenure holders. It appeared that the plaintiff's predecessors, the two daughters, had in 1873 taken proceedings against the tenure holders, seeking to oust them on the ground that the instruments which constituted the tenure were forged. That suit failed. It was held that the reversioners were barred by limitation. There was also a question of res judicata, but the Court refused to adjudicate on it. On the question of limitation—and this is the reason why the case was cited here by the appellant—the Court observed that the possession of the tenure holders was not adverse to the widow, and if it could be shown that the daughters had ratified the settlement, the possession would not have been adverse to them either. But as the daughters, instead of ratifying the settlement, did everything they could to upset it, and impugned the documents constituting it as forgeries and denied that they were bound by them even if genuine, the Court held that the possession of these tenure holders was adverse to the daughters and to their successors the plaintiffs.

    From the above it will be seen that, with the exception of the case of Ram Kali v. Kedarnath, all the cases of this second class have been decided in accordance with some one or other of the four rules set forth above.

    Now, applying the rules of law laid down in the cases above cited to the appeal before me, I remark that there is not in [374] this case any adverse possession by a stranger or trespasser against the true heir, as there was in the cases of Nobin Chunder, Babu valad Ibrahim, Lachhan Kunwar and Ram Kali. Nor is there any adverse decree, as in the case of Hari Nath Chatterjee and Drobomoyi Gupta. There is here an alienation, possibly invalid, created by the widow shortly before her death in 1857, and there is the fact that the next set of female heirs, the daughters, between 1857 and the death of the survivor of them in 1890, made no attempt to set aside the alienation. Had they made such an attempt and failed, I certainly should hold that the decree in their suit would, in the absence of fraud or collusion or the like, be binding on the reversioners, the plaintiffs. It may be that a suit by the daughters would have been barred by limitation after 1869. It is unnecessary for me to decide that point. But, assuming that it would have been so barred, is the suit by the present reversioners also barred? The contention is that the reversioner's cause of action was barred under Act XIY of 1859. If that were so, it would not be revived by art. 141 of the second schedule to the Limitation Act, 1877. I am of opinion that the suit is not so barred. This is not a case in which, as in Nobin Chunder's case, it could be held that the cause of action accrued once and for all on the commencement of a wrongful possession, but is one of an alienation created by a female heir while in lawful possession. I take it that during the period between 1857 and 1890 the daughters, not having taken any steps to set aside the alienation, must be considered to have acquiesced in and ratified it, and the title which the alienee might acquire against them by twelve years' adverse possession of their interests in the property under such acquiescence or ratification, being possession only of the limited interest of a Hindu female heir, would not in my opinion be adverse to nor bar the reversioners. The reversioners had do title to sue for possession of the property during the life-time of the female heirs, and there is no law compelling reversioners to sue to set aside invalid alienations made by a female heir in possession, [375] such alienation not being binding on the reversioners. It would be different on the authorities if the female heir while in possession was dispossessed by a trespasser, or if such heir never got possession. In such a case the reversioner would be bound by the adverse possession obtained by the trespasser, if prolonged beyond the statutory limit, as also he would be bound by a decree adverse to the female heir affecting the property. But in the present case I am clearly of opinion that the suit is not barred by any rule, there being no adverse possession by a trespasser nor any adverse decree of Court affecting the property. I would therefore set aside the finding of the Subordinate Judge on the first issue and also his decree founded on that finding dismissing the suit, and, as his decree proceeds on a preliminary point, I would, under s. 562 of the Code of Civil Procedure, remand the record to him for trial of the remaining issues.

    Appeal decreed and cause remanded.

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