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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This was an action for pre-emption brought by Musammat Sakina Bibi (the plaintiff). The defendants Amiran and Karim Bukhsh also claimed pre-emption in the share sold. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the claim. The District Judge effectively dismissed the action as against Amiran and Karim Bakhsh but gave the plaintiff a right to obtain the share if Amiran and Karim Bakhsh did not avail themselves of the decree they had obtained. The plaintiff appealed from that decree to this Court.

While the appeal was pending (after its admission to this Court), the disputed share was sold in execution of a decree in another suit. A preliminary objection was raised by Mr. Abdul Majid for the respondents, contending that the subsequent sale extinguished the plaintiff's right and precluded this Court from passing a decree in her favour. The Court heard the appeal and reserved certain issues for further consideration, ultimately setting aside the lower appellate decree, decreeing the appeal, and remanding the matter under section 562 of the Civil Procedure Code for trial on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale, during the pendency of the appeal, of the share out of which the plaintiff's right of pre-emption arose operates to extinguish her right and thereby prevents this Court from decreeing her claim on appeal.
  2. Whether the plaintiff's lack of physical possession of the pre-emptive share at the date of institution and during the lower proceedings is material to her legal entitlement to maintain a claim for pre-emption.
  3. Assuming the plaintiff is entitled to the share, whether her pre-emptive right is equal to, inferior to, or superior to the rights claimed by Amiran and Karim Bakhsh — a question affecting the nature of any decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Mr. Abdul Majid (for the respondents) raised a preliminary objection that because the pre-emptive share was sold in execution of a decree in another case after this Court's appeal had been filed, the plaintiff's right of pre-emption was extinguished and the Court could not grant a decree in her favour.
  • He relied on passages from authoritative Muhammadan law texts (Shama Churun Sircar's Muhammadan Law and passages cited from the Hedaya as printed in Hamilton's edition and Tagore Law Lectures) to support the contention that possession or continued ownership of the pre-emptive tenement up to the decree is a necessary condition for a valid shuffa (pre-emption) right.

Plaintiff's / Appellant's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the plaintiff's specific legal arguments on the merits; it records the procedural posture, the plaintiff's dispossession at relevant times, and the appellate courts' treatment, but not an itemised statement of the plaintiff's submissions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khuda Bakhsh v. Ramlautan Lal (Division Bench) Holds that a subsequent, separate adjudication during the pendency of an appeal that declares the pre-emptor not entitled to the pre-emptive tenement can deprive the pre-emptor of his/pre-emptive right and render a decree for pre-emption null and void. The Court considered the case but found it not entirely on all fours with the present facts. The judges expressed hesitation about applying Khuda Bakhsh rigidly in this situation and did not treat it as determinative; instead they remanded the matter for trial on the merits by the lower appellate court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains reasoning by Edge, C.J., and a concurring, elaborative opinion by Mahmood, J. Their analysis proceeded along the following lines, drawn strictly from the text:

  1. Preliminary objection (sale during appeal): Edge, C.J. rejected the respondents' preliminary objection that a sale of the pre-emptive share during the pendency of the appeal prevents this Court from granting relief. His core point was that, as a Court of Appeal, the proper inquiry is what decree the Court of first instance should have passed. If the first court wrongly dismissed the claim, the fact that the share was subsequently sold in execution of another decree should not prejudice the plaintiff's entitlement to a decree on appeal. He analogised to the situation where a plaintiff obtains a decree in the first instance: a subsequent sale would not affect the right to maintain that decree on review or appeal.
  2. Possession as condition: Mahmood, J. examined the authorities relied upon (the Hedaya and Tagore Law Lectures) and analysed the relevant passage concerning shuffa. He interpreted the texts as requiring that the pre-emptor possess vested ownership (not merely an expectancy, reversionary right, contingent interest, or lesser interest) in the pre-emptive tenement. In his view, the rule contended for by counsel — that actual physical possession is strictly a condition precedent — should be understood as requiring full ownership rather than mere possession for possessory reasons. He also expressed doubt about applying the quoted rule to compulsory sales (such as sales in execution), and observed that the validity of the sale might itself be contested in execution proceedings which are separate from the present appeal.
  3. Function of an appellate court: Both judges emphasised that an appellate court must consider what the decree of the first instance court ought to have been. Subsequent events that occurred after the decree in another suit do not automatically make the first court's decree wrong in law or fact; therefore those events should not be treated as defeating a proper appellate decree unless they relate to matters such as the proper array of parties.
  4. Failure to try decisive issues below: Edge, C.J. found that the lower appellate court had failed to examine whether, at the date of filing the suit, the plaintiff was entitled in law to the share (the question of title/entitlement), and had also failed to determine whether the plaintiff's pre-emptive right was equal, inferior, or superior to that of Amiran and Karim Bakhsh. These are material issues that affect the nature of any decree and had not been tried. Edge observed that the lower appellate court had not tried any issues at all.
  5. Role of precedent Khuda Bakhsh: Mahmood, J. noted the Khuda Bakhsh decision and its holding that a subsequent decree in separate litigation depriving a pre-emptor of the tenement could nullify a pre-emption decree. He acknowledged the force of lis pendens and the maxim pendente lite nihil innovetor but considered Khuda Bakhsh not directly applicable to the present facts; he expressed hesitation in accepting it as controlling here.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Because the critical issues as to legal entitlement, effect of dispossession, and relative rights among pre-emptors had not been addressed below, the proper course was to set aside the lower appellate decree, decree the appeal to the extent indicated, and remand the matter under section 562 of the Civil Procedure Code to be tried on the merits by the lower appellate court, which should frame findings and a decree consistent with those findings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside, the appeal is decreed, and the case is remanded under section 562 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The lower appellate court's decree (which had dismissed the plaintiff's claim as against Amiran and Karim Bakhsh and given limited rights conditioned on their inaction) has been set aside.
  • The matter is sent back to the lower appellate court to try the substantive issues on the merits, including (a) whether the plaintiff was, at the date of the suit, legally entitled to the share out of which her right of pre-emption arose, and (b) whether her right of pre-emption is equal, inferior, or superior to that of Amiran and Karim Bakhsh; the nature of any future decree will depend upon those findings.
  • Costs were ordered to abide the event (i.e., costs to be decided according to the ultimate outcome on remand).

Broader legal implications:

The opinion does not establish a novel, binding precedent on the precise questions raised; instead the Court declined to treat subsequent sale during pendency as automatically fatal to an appeal and emphasised that appellate courts must determine what the first instance decree should have been. The Court also highlighted that factual and legal questions about entitlement and comparative pre-emptive rights remain to be adjudicated on the merits.

Final procedural disposition: Cause remanded for trial on the merits; costs to abide the result.

    Sakina Bibi v. Amiran

    Edge, C.J:— This was an action for pre-emption. The defendants Amiran and Karim Bukhsh were also claimants for pre-emption in the share sold. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the claim. The District Judge in effect dismissed the action as against Amiran and Karim Bakhah, but gave the plaintiff a right to obtain the share if Amiran and Karim Bakhsh did not avail themselves of the decree which they had obtained in the action. From that decree this appeal has been brought.

    Mr. Abdul Majid for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection. The objection is this:—He says, and it is not denied on behalf of the appellant, that pending the appeal to this Court, that is to say, since the appeal to this Court was filed, the share out of which the plaintiff alleged that her right arose was sold in the execution of a decree in some other case. He contends that under these circumstances we cannot pass a decree in her favour. He bases his contention on a passage cited to us from Shama Churun Sircar's Muhammadan Law in which it is stated that “if the shuffi previous to the decree of the kazi sell the house from which he derives his right of shuffa, the reasons or grounds of his right being thereby extinguished, the right itself is invalidated, notwithstanding he be ignorant of the sale of the house to which it related.”

    I do not accede to Mr. Abdul Majid's contention. It appears to me that sitting here as a Court of Appeal, we have got to see what was the decree which the Court of first instance should have passed, and if the Court of first instance wrongly dismissed the claim, the plaintiff cannot be prejudiced by her share having been subsequently sold in execution of a decree in another suit. It could not be contended, I think, if the plaintiff had obtained a decree in the Court of first instance, that her right to maintain the decree either on review or appeal could possibly be affected by a subsequent sale of the share out of which her right of pre-emption arose. The subsequent sale could not have been alleged as a ground of appeal for instance. It was not a matter which could have made the decree of the Court of first instance, in such a case, wrong in law or in fact; and I can see no distinction between the case in which the plaintiff obtains a decree for pre-emption in the Court of first instance, and a case in which she proves to a Court of appeal that she was entitled to a decree in the Court of first instance which she did not obtain. In consequence of this view the preliminary objection fails.

    Now, as to the actual appeal before us, it appears that the plaintiff, at the date of the institution of the suit, was not in physical possession of the share out of which the right of pre-emption arose, and that she continued dispossessed up to the time of the judgment in the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court appears to have considered her case as one in which she had not proved her right against the other pre-emptive claimants on the ground that she was not in possession of the share out of which her right was alleged to have arisen. Now as to these circumstances, I think it was the duty of the lower appellate Court to ascertain whether the plaintiff was, at the date of the suit, entitled in law to the share out of which her right of pre-emption was alleged to have arisen. The mere fact of her not being in possession of it was immaterial except in so far as that fact might be urged as showing that she was not entitled to it. Now this is the question which the lower appellate Court has not tried. There is another material question in the case which has not been tried, and it is as to whether, assuming that the plaintiff is entitled to the share out of which the right is alleged to have arisen, she has only an equal right of pre-emption with Amiran and Karim Bakhsh or whether she has an inferior or superior right. The nature of the decree, if the plaintiff is entitled to one, will depend upon the findings on those points. I merely refer to these issues not as expressing exhaustively the issues that have not been tried, because the lower appellate Court has not tried any issues at all.

    The decree of the lower appellate Court is set aside, the appeal decreed and the case remanded under s. 562 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    Costs to abide the event.

    Mahmood, J.:— I am of the same opinion, but as the Judge who referred the case to a Bench, I wish to say that the reasons and the facts which rendered it necessary for me to refer the case are stated in my order of the 1st February, 1838. The central reason of the reference was, whether the sale of the pre-emptive share, that is to say, of the rights and interests of Musammat Sakina Bibi during the pendency of the appeal would render the dismissal of the appeal a necessary result. The appeal was admitted on the 12th January, 1887, and its aim and object of course was to have it decreed by this Court that, in respect of the sale of the 25th July, 1885, the plaintiff should have, on the 12th June, 1886, when the first Court dismissed her suit, had her suit decreed instead.

    Mr. Abdul Majid argued that the sale of Musammat Sakina's rights and interests, which sale took place exactly eight days after the admission of this second appeal, namely, on the 20th January, 1887, was sufficient to deprive her of her pre-emptive right, and for this contention he relied upon the passage to which the learned Chief Justice has referred, namely, the passage at page 535 of the Tagore Law Lectures for 1873, and the passage from the Hedaya to be found at page 562 of Grady's edition of Hamilton's Hedaya, which runs as follows:—

    “Besides, it is an express condition of shuffa, that a man be firmly possessed of the property from which he derives his right of shuffa at the time when the subject of it is sold—a condition which does not hold on the part of the heirs. It is, moreover, a condition that the property of the shuffa, remain firm until the decree of the kazi be passed, and as this does not hold on the part of the deceased shuffa, the shuffa is therefore not established with respect to any one of his descendants, because of the failure of its conditions.”

    The learned counsel argued that the passage in the Hedaya meant that actual physical possession of a share, that is to say, of the pre-emptive share, was a condition precedent to the exercise of the right of pre-emption. The translation as made by Mr. Hamilton is somewhat loose, but it is clear that what is intended to be conveyed by the author of the Hedaya was, that, in what I may call the pre-emptive tenement, the pre-emptor should have vested ownership and not a mere expectancy of inheritance or a reversionary right, or any other kind of contingent right, or any interest which falls short of full ownership. For instance, in the case of a usufructuary mortgagee who is in possession the application of the passage would require holding that no right is possessed by such a mortgagee. I do not thick that any other interpretation can be placed upon the passage, and I hold also that such is the case-law as shown by some of the reported cases.

    Then as to the question, whether a sale such as the sale of the 20th January, 1887, falls within the rule contended for by Mr. Abdul Majid, I agree with the learned Chief Justice in holding that we, as a Court of Appeal, are concerned with the question what the decree of the first Court should have been, and not with the matters which have happened since the decree was passed, other than those relating to the array of parties which occurred subsequent to the decree of the Court of first instance. I may say, as I understand the test of the Hednya, namely, the text at pages 601 and 602, that I have no doubt that although the Muhammadan Law requires that, if by reason of a voluntary sale or other circumstance the pre-emptor before the passing of the decree of the first Court ceases to be the owner of the pre-emptive tenement, then the decree cannot be given in his favour; yet the rule cannot be carried to Courts of Appeal, or Courts of Error, as the Courts concerned with rectification of the decrees of the Courts below. There is also some doubt in my mind whether the passage so far as it relates to sale by a pre-emptor of his pre-emptive tenement before the decree of the kazi, is applicable to compulsory sales such as the sale of the 20th January 1887. The sale may or may not have been validly made. It may possibly be the subject of a separate litigation in the execution department to which execution proceedings the present defendants, Mr. Abdul Majid's clients, would possibly be no parties, and the fate of the litigation may be in favour of Musammat Sakina Bibi or against her. Such facts cannot be taken notice of at this stage in a litigation, which, if the pre-emptor case is established, was rightly commenced and should have ended in the decretal of her claim.

    In connection, with the latter point I think it my duty to refer to the case of Khuda Bakhsh v. Ramlautan Lal in which a Division Bench of this Court held that, because subsequent to a decree for pre-emption, and during the pendency of the appeal, in a totally separate litigation a decree had been passed which directed that the pre-emptor was not entitled to the pre-emptive tenement, namely, the tenement which gave him the right to sue, therefore such adjudication deprived such pre-emptor of his preemptive right and rendered the decree for pre-emption null and void. The case is not on all fours with the present case. If the case were applicable to this case I should have very great hesitation in holding that it was correct law. The rule of lis pendens is a broad doctrine, and the maxim pendente lite nihil innovetor is sufficiently broad to invest this question with some difficulty.

    This case has not been tried upon the merits, and there are other questions in the case to which I have not referred, because I agree in the order of the learned Chief Justice that the case should go back under s. 562, of the Civil Procedure Code and be tried on the merits by the lower appellate Court, which Court should frame a decree such as the findings may require.

    Costs to abide the result.

    Cause remanded.

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    Comments

    Sakina Bibi v. Amiran
    (Apr 6, 1888)