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  • Act VIII of 1859, under the provisions of S. 6 of Act I of 1868.
  • provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act
  • 6th section of the General Clauses Act
  • Acts VIII of 1859 and XXIII of 1861
  • S. 6 of the General Clauses Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • S. 2 of Act X
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citation codes
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Acts
  • Act VIII of 1859, under the provisions of S. 6 of Act I of 1868.
  • provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act
  • 6th section of the General Clauses Act
  • Acts VIII of 1859 and XXIII of 1861
  • S. 6 of the General Clauses Act
  • GENERAL CLAUSES ACT
  • S. 2 of Act X
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The decree-holder sought execution of a decree by attaching moneys deposited in Court to the credit of the judgment-debtor. On 4 June 1877 the Court of first instance refused the attachment because the decree directed the sale of certain immoveable property and awarded no other relief. That order was affirmed by the lower appellate Court on 4 August 1877. Act X of 1877 (the new Code of Civil Procedure) came into force on 1 October 1877. On 13 November 1877 the decree-holder applied for admission of a special appeal from the lower appellate Court's order, alleging that the decree had been misconstrued. The Judge referred the question to the Full Bench.

Two specific questions were posed to the Full Bench: (1) whether the application is governed by the provisions of the repealed Code of Civil Procedure or by those of the existing Code (Act X of 1877); and (2) if governed by the existing Code, whether a second appeal (i.e., an appeal) lies from the order of the lower appellate Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether proceedings in execution of decree instituted before the commencement of Act X of 1877 are governed by the repealed Code of Civil Procedure or by Act X of 1877.
  2. If governed by Act X of 1877, whether an appeal lies from the order of the lower appellate Court in the present circumstances (i.e., whether the order is appealable under the new Code).

Arguments of the Parties

Decree-holder / Appellant

  • Applied for admission of a special appeal on the ground that the decree had been misconstrued.
  • Sought to have the appellate order reviewed by the Full Bench (i.e., permission for a further appeal or special appeal).

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any specific arguments advanced by the respondent or of adversarial submissions beyond the decree-holder's stated ground for the special appeal and the legal issues referred to the Full Bench.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ratanchand Srichand v. Hanmantrav Shivbakas Authority that the saving of "proceedings commenced" by a repealing Act extends to appeals from such proceedings (i.e., an appeal is a stage of a proceeding and is preserved by the saving). The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that appeals which were available under the repealed Code continue to be available for proceedings commenced before the new Code came into force, unless the repealing Act clearly excludes that saving.
High Court of Bombay (reported decision) — cited in the opinion as supporting application of S.6 of the General Clauses Act to execution proceedings Holds that the provisions of S.6 of the General Clauses Act operate on proceedings in execution of decree (i.e., repeal does not affect proceedings commenced prior to the repealing Act). The Full Bench agreed with the opinion of the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Bombay (Sir Michael Westropp) that the chapter of the Code dealing with execution of decree is prospective and does not affect proceedings already commenced; this supporting the conclusion that execution proceedings begun before Act X are governed by the repealed Code.
Decision of this Court (referenced with regard to S. 38, Act XXIII of 1861) — cited in the opinion Holds that an analogous provision in the previous law (S.38, Act XXIII of 1861) was applicable to proceedings in execution of decree. The Court invoked this prior judicial application of an analogous provision to justify treating S.647 of Act X as applicable to proceedings in execution of decree (i.e., because otherwise no procedure would have been provided for such proceedings).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded in two main stages: first, whether the repeal effected by Act X of 1877 left execution proceedings already commenced to be governed by the previous Code; and second, if Act X applies, whether the particular appellate remedy was available under the new Code.

On the effect of repeal and the General Clauses Act: The Court examined s.3 of Act X of 1877, which repealed earlier enactments (including parts of Acts VIII of 1859 and XXIII of 1861) but contained a proviso that nothing in the section should affect procedure prior to decree in any suit instituted or appeal presented before the new Code came into force. The Court observed that, while the proviso does not expressly mention the General Clauses Act, it implicitly excludes the operation of s.6 of the General Clauses Act only in respect of procedure prior to decree; it does not displace the broader protection of s.6 for proceedings already commenced.

The Court relied on s.6 of the General Clauses Act, which provides that repeal of any Act shall not affect proceedings commenced before the repealing Act came into operation. The Court accepted and followed a decision of the High Court of Bombay to the effect that s.6 operates on proceedings in execution of decree and adopted the view that the chapter of the new Code dealing with execution is prospective and should not affect proceedings already begun.

The Bench supported this prospectivity conclusion by reference to several sections of the new Code (Act X): s.311, s.312, s.283 and s.588. These sections made express provision for orders, objections and appeals "under this Code" and did not reference analogous matters arising under the repealed Code, indicating a legislative intent that the execution chapter be given prospective effect.

On the interplay of S.647 and the last paragraph of S.3: The Court considered the argument that s.647 — which prescribes that the procedure of Act X is to be followed, so far as applicable, in "proceedings other than suits and appeals" — means the last paragraph of s.3 (protecting procedure prior to decree) should be extended to execution proceedings. The Court accepted that S.647 applies to execution proceedings (because otherwise no procedure would be provided), but rejected the extension of the last paragraph of s.3 to those proceedings, noting that the legislature could have made such an intention clear if that had been intended and that the prospective character of the execution provisions provided cogent evidence against such an extension.

On whether the new Code allows appeals from orders in execution proceedings: The Court examined s.588, read with clause (j) and with s.244. Clause (j) permits appeals from orders under s.244 as to questions relating to execution of decrees of the same nature as appealable orders made in the course of a suit. The Bench analysed whether "orders" in that clause should be limited to interlocutory orders prior to decree or include determinations that are analogous to decrees.

The Court's textual and purposive analysis concluded that: - The term "order" in s.244 covers both minor interlocutory matters and determinations that may dispose of a proceeding (i.e., matters of great importance). - Orders passed after decree may still be "orders passed in the course of a suit" and the decree itself can be regarded, in one sense, as an order. - It would be unreasonable to read clause (j) as limiting appeals to pre-decree interlocutory orders only, because the wording and structure do not support such a restriction. - Under s.647 the procedure of the Code applies, so far as applicable, to proceedings other than suits; consequently, an order in execution proceedings which is analogous to a decree in a suit should be treated as a "decree" and be appealable in the same way as decrees.

The Court invoked the Code's definition of "decree" — "the formal order of the Court in which the result of the decision of the suit or other judicial proceeding is embodied" — and applied it to execution proceedings, holding that the formal order embodying the result of an execution proceeding is a "decree" within the Code's meaning and thus appealable wherever a decree is appealable.

Final analytical outcome: The Bench concluded that proceedings in execution of decrees instituted under Act VIII of 1859 are to be governed by the provisions of that repealed Code (because of the saving in s.6 of the General Clauses Act and the prospective character of the execution provisions of Act X). However, the Bench also held that if Act X of 1877 were to govern the application in question, the order would in any event be appealable under the new Code because it falls within the definition of a decree or is analogous to a decree in a suit.

Concurring opinion of Pearson, J.: He agreed that the appealed order falls within the definition of "decree" contained in s.2 of Act X of 1877 and is appealable under s.584 of that Act. He also noted that the appeal appears to be admissible under the repealed Act VIII of 1859, under the provisions of s.6 of Act I of 1868.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Full Bench answered the reference by holding that the application is governed by the provisions of the repealed Code (Act VIII of 1859) for execution proceedings instituted before Act X of 1877 came into force; alternatively, if Act X of 1877 were to govern, the order in question would be appealable under the new Code.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The execution proceedings which were initiated before Act X of 1877 are to be continued and concluded under the repealed Code's provisions, by virtue of the saving in the General Clauses Act s.6 and the prospective operation of the execution chapter of Act X.
  • Even if Act X of 1877 applied, the appellate remedy sought by the decree-holder would be available because the order is of a nature to be treated as a decree and is therefore appealable under the relevant provisions of the new Code (as emphasized by Pearson, J.).

Broader precedent-setting: The opinion explains and applies statutory provisions (including the General Clauses Act s.6 and provisions of Act X of 1877 such as ss.2, 244, 588 and 647) to conclude that execution proceedings begun before the new Code are governed by the old Code and, independently, clarifies when orders in execution proceedings may be treated as decrees for appeal purposes under the new Code. The opinion does not state that it is creating a novel rule beyond these statutory interpretations; it primarily applies and reconciles existing statutory provisions and earlier authorities to the facts before the Court.

    Thakur Prasad (Decree-Holder) v. Ahsan Ali And Another (Judgment-Debtors).

    [669] Turner, O.C.J, and Spankie and Oldfield, JJ.:— concurring.—In the, case in which this application is presented, the decree-holder applied for execution of his decree by the attachment of moneys deposited in the Court to the credit of the judgment-debtor. On the 4th June, 1877, the Court of first instance refused attachment on the ground that the decree directed the sale of certain immoveable property for the satisfaction of the sum decreed, and awarded no other relief. The order of the Court of first instance was affirmed by the lower appellate Court on the 4th August, 1877. The new Code of Civil Procedure came into operation on the 1st October, 1877. On the 13th November, 1877, the decree-holder applied for the admission of a special appeal from the order of the lower appellate-Court on the ground that the decree had been misconstrued. The Judge to whom the application was made referred it to the Full Bench. Two questions are raised in this reference: whether the application is governed by the provisions of the repealed Code of Civil Procedure or by those of the existing Code; and if by those of the existing Code, whether the second appeal lies from the order of the lower appellate Court.

    [670] The 3rd section of the Code now in force, Act X of 1877, declares that the enactments mentioned in the second schedule in that Act (which includes so much of Acts VIII of 1859 and XXIII of 1861 as had not been theretofore repealed) were thereby repealed, subject to the proviso that nothing in that section contained should, affect the procedure prior to decree in any suit instituted or any appeal presented before that Code came into force. The proviso does not go on to exclude in express terms the operation of the General Clauses Act, but by implication it does exclude the operation of the 6th section of that Act in respect of the procedure after decree in suits or appeals. While then it is not denied that proceedings in execution of decree initiated after the existing Code came into operation must be governed by the provisions of that Code, the question remains whether such proceedings initiated before the Act came into operation are affected by that law, so that thereafter they must be governed by it, or whether they are not to be prosecuted and brought to a conclusion as if the law under which they were instituted were still in force. By the 6th section of the General Clauses Act it was enacted that the repeal of any. Act should not affect any proceedings commenced before the repealing Act shall have come into, operation.

    That the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act operate on proceedings in execution of decree has been already held by the High Court of Bombay (1), and we agree with the Opinion expressed by the learned Chief Justice, Sir Michael Westropp, that the chapter of the Code which deals with execution of decree is prospective and does not affect proceedings already commenced. We may refer to several sections in Support of the view. S. 311 empowers the decree-holder or any person whose property has been sold under that chapter to take objection to the sale on the ground of a material irregularity in publishing or conducting it, but it makes no reference to sales which have taken place under the repealed Code, though the period allowed for such objections under that Code might not have expired when Act X of 1877 came into operation. S. 312 declares orders passed under the preceding section final, but it does not refer to similar orders [671] passed under the repealed Code. S. 283 declares any party affected by an order passed under Ss. 280, 281, 282, entitled to institute a suit to establish his right to the property in dispute, but it is silent as to similar orders passed under the provisions of the repealed Code. Lastly, S. 588 declares that an appeal shall lie from certain orders “under this Code.” Among the orders specified as appealable are some which would be passed after decree, and which, if passed under the repealed Code, would under that Code have been appealable. It is not unreasonable then to conclude that, in abstaining from making provision for cases arising under the repealed Code in the instances to which we have alluded, and in giving prospective effect to the chapter relating to execution of decrees, the Legislature had in view the provisions of the General Clauses Act.

    However this may be, unless the 6th section of the General Clauses Act is excluded by the Code, and as we shall presently show it is not in our judgment excluded, in respect of proceedings in execution, it cannot be disregarded, and its effect is to leave such proceedings initiated before the repealing Act came into force to be dealt with under the provisions of the repealed Code. For the position that the saving of “proceedings commenced” from the operation of a repealing Act extends also to appeals from such proceedings, we find authority in Ratanchand Srichand v. Hanmantrav Shivbakas . An appeal is in fact a stage of a proceeding, and if, as it might happen, the right of appeal was taken away by a repealing Act, and a proceeding theretofore appealable converted into a final proceeding, it cannot be doubted that the proceeding would be affected by the alteration of the law. If in such a case it be intended to deprive the parties of the right of appeal, the intention to exclude the operation of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act should appear clearly in the repealing Act.

    For the reasons we have stated, we arrive at the conclusion that proceedings in execution of decrees instituted under Act VIII of 1859 are to be governed by the provisions of that Code, and that an appeal should be entertained from all orders passed in such proceedings which under the provisions of that Act were appealable. [672] But it has been suggested that, inasmuch as by S. 647, Act X of 1877, the procedure in that Act prescribed is to be followed, so far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings other than suits and appeals, the provisions of the last paragraph of S. 3 declaring that nothing in the Act contained shall affect the procedure prior to decree in any suit instituted, &c., apply also to proceedings in execution, so that the procedure in such proceedings (whether instituted before the passing of the Act or not) subsequently to the formal order of the Court wherein the result of the proceeding is embodied is governed by the provisions of Act X of 1877.

    That proceedings in execution of decree are among the proceedings other than suits or appeals to which S. 647 applies may be admitted. The Code, following the usage in this country, does not treat appeals as mere stages in a suit; and similarly, under Act VIII of 1859, proceedings in execution of decree have in accordance with the same usage been treated, not as stages in a suit, but as miscellaneous proceedings. The provisions of the analogous section in the former law, S. 38, Act XXIII of 1861, were held by this Court applicable to proceedings in execution of decree (2), on the same ground on which it must be held that the provisions of S. 647 are applicable to such proceedings, namely, that otherwise no procedure is provided for such proceedings. It does not, however, follow from the admission that the provisions of S. 647 are applicable to proceedings in execution of decree, that we must be compelled to the conclusion that the last paragraph of S. 3 is also applicable to the proceedings, or to all the proceedings, to which S. 647 applies. While had such been the intention of the Legislature, it could have been made to appear clearly by the introduction of a few words in S. 3, we find cogent evidence to the contrary in the prospective character of the sections relating to execution of decree to which we have already adverted. We would then reply that the last paragraph of S. 3 is not to be extended to proceedings in execution of decree. Should, however, our opinion on this point be erroneous, it would be necessary to consider what are the orders passed in execution of decree referred to in S. 588, cl. (j), and whether other orders passed in execution of decree are appealable under the Code [673] save such as are referred to in S. 588, cl. (j); and inasmuch as these questions are necessarily raised in a number of references which are now before the Court arising out of proceedings instituted after the Act came into operation, it will be convenient to dispose of them on the reference now before us. By the provisions of the first paragraph of S. 588 read with cl. (j) appeals are allowed from orders under S. 244 as to questions relating to the execution of decrees of the same nature with appealable orders made in the course of a suit. The first observation that arises on this section is that, if, as we have held, the provisions of S. 647 apply to proceedings in execution of decree, cl. (j) is unnecessary, unless it was intended to restrain the larger right of appeal that would be given by S. 647. Yet unless we import a limitation which the terms do not warrant, the clause declares no more than is implied in S. 647, for, under S. 647 the procedure prescribed by the Act is to be followed in proceedings other than suits, and consequently the orders passed in such proceedings would be open to appeal when of the same nature as appealable orders made in the course of a suit. It is then argued that the term “orders” made in the course of a suit is to be restricted to orders passed in the course of a suit prior to decree, and that, inasmuch as the Code distinguishes between appeals from orders and appeals from decrees, the Court is constrained by the declaration that an appeal shall lie from those orders and no other such orders, to hold that no orders passed under S. 244 are open to appeal save such as are of the same nature with appealable orders passed in the course of a suit prior to decree.

    On referring to S. 244, it will be seen that all the questions therein mentioned are to be determined by the “order” of the Court. They embrace not only the minor questions which may arise prior to determination of a proceeding, but the determination of a proceeding itself, which may be a matter of the utmost, importance to the parties. It is scarcely to be supposed that no appeal would be provided from such orders, while an appeal is given from interlocutory orders of comparatively minor importance.

    Again, orders passed after decree as well as orders passed before decree may be properly termed orders passed in the course of a suit, and indeed the decree itself is in one sense an order, [674] and is so defined in the Code. By adopting the construction which has been urged, we import a limitation which, as we have said, the terms of the clause do not warrant. We are then compelled to the conclusion, that the provisions of S. 588 do not embrace all the directions on the determination of proceedings which are termed in the Code “orders,” and that, in declaring that an appeal should lie from the orders therein mentioned and from no other such orders, we must understand orders of a similar nature to those specified, and not to all “orders” that might be passed under the Code. The expression “orders” under S. 244 as to questions relating to execution of decree of a similar nature to appealable orders made in the course of a suit would be awkward if it were intended to apply to orders determining such questions; and again orders made in the course of a suit may fairly be understood as not embracing the order which is also the decree. While then the provisions of cl. (j) allow an appeal from the orders made in the course of execution-proceedings where an appeal is allowed from similar orders passed in the course of a suit, the provisions of S. 647 declare that the procedure prescribed by the Act shall be followed (so far as it is applicable) in all proceedings other than suits and appeals. It follows that an appeal will lie in such proceedings from the order which is analogous to a decree in a suit.

    The definition of the term “decree” supports the conclusion at which we have arrived. “A ‘decree’ means the formal order of the Court in which the result of the decision of the suit or other judicial proceeding is embodied.” Applying this definition to proceedings in execution of decree, we feel ourselves at liberty to hold that the formal order of the Court in which the result of the proceeding is embodied, is a decree within the meaning of that term in the Code. It is therefore appealable in all cases in which a decree is appealable, and the procedure must in such cases be governed by the provisions of the chapters which relate to appeals from decrees.

    It is true that the definition of the term “decree” is so large as to embrace some of the orders which are appealable under S. 588, but we are not on that account at liberty to reject it. It is also true, as we have shown, that cl. (j) is on our construction of S. 647, superfluous, but the clause does not appear in any draft of the [675] Code submitted to the Council save the last Bill, No. 5, and it may be that the effect of S. 647 escaped attention.

    We reply to this reference that the application is governed by the provisions of the repealed Code, but that, if it be governed by Act X of 1877, an appeal would lie from the order.

    Pearson, J.:— The appealed order falling within the definition of a decree contained in S. 2 of Act X of 1877, is, in my opinion, appealable under S. 584 of that Act.

    The appeal appears to be admissible also under the repealed Act VIII of 1859, under the provisions of S. 6 of Act I of 1868.

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    Thakur Prasad (Decree-Holder) v. Ahsan Ali And Another (Judgment-Debtors).
    (May 27, 1878)