Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Thomas, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from an incident at the "Preethi" cinema theatre at Kalamassery at about 10:30 P.M. on 4-12-1986. According to the prosecution story, two ticketless persons (referred to in the judgment as accused 2 and 6) attempted to enter the auditorium; a gateman (PW.3) resisted and a scuffle followed. Three theatre employees (PWs.1, 2 and the deceased Moosa) intervened and the two ticketless men were initially overpowered and left the compound. During an interval, accused 2 and 6 returned with three additional persons (accused 1, 3 and 5), renewed the attack and jointly assaulted PW.2, PW.3 and the deceased. Another person (A4) joined later. Accused 1 obtained a knife and chased and stabbed PW.2 and subsequently stabbed the deceased Moosa at the ticket-counter. PW.2 survived after surgery; the deceased died before or on arrival at hospital.

Six persons were arraigned before the Sessions Court. The Sessions Judge convicted five of them of various offences, including murder in relation to the deceased, and sentenced them to different terms of imprisonment. Separate appeals were filed by the convicted persons. The present opinion reviews those convictions and sentences on appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the prosecution established the identity of the accused who committed the stabbing (i.e., whether the witnesses' identification evidence was reliable and sufficient).
  2. Whether the evidence supports a finding that the accused persons formed an unlawful assembly with a common object to cause death or to commit offences beyond mere beating (i.e., whether the common object included causing fatal injuries).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defence) Arguments

  • Primary contention: prosecution failed to establish the identity of the accused responsible for the stabbing.
  • Alternatively, even if the witnesses' evidence were accepted, it was insufficient to show that the accused shared a common object to cause injuries beyond beating (i.e., to commit murder).
  • Specific criticisms raised in respect of identification evidence by PW.1 and PW.2 included: no test identification parade was held; the police supplied names of the accused to those witnesses; the witnesses may have seen photographs of the accused in newspapers; and the witnesses could not describe any special marks or features of the stabber.

Prosecution's Position (as presented in the record)

  • The prosecution presented a narrative that the appellants jointly attacked PW.2, PW.3 and the deceased and that accused 1 (A1) stabbed PW.2 and the deceased.
  • The prosecution relied on testimony of several witnesses (PWs.1,2,3,4 and others) who described the occurrence and supported the prosecution's account of assault and stabbing.
  • It is recorded that the Public Prosecutor in the trial court did not elicit formal identification from two important eyewitnesses (PWs.3 and 4) as to whether the man who used the knife was one of the accused; those witnesses nevertheless supported the prosecution narrative of events without formally identifying the assailants in court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
L. Choraria v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 938 Cited for the proposition (by defence counsel) that showing a photograph prior to identification makes the identification worthless. The court noted the authority but distinguished showing a photograph by investigating agencies from publication of photographs in the press; it expressed reluctance to reject identification evidence simply because newspaper photos might have been seen by witnesses.
Mohanlal v. State of Maharashtra ((1982) 1 SCC 700 : AIR 1982 SC 839) Authority cited (by defence counsel) where the evidence of one eyewitness was treated as valueless because no test identification parade was held. The court examined the decision and rejected a categorical rule that absence of a test identification parade requires outright rejection of eyewitness testimony; the court held that absence of a parade is not fatal in all cases and other assurances/corroboration may suffice.
Appu v. State, 1990 (1) KLT SN 13 Observation that accidental seeing of photographs in newspapers, without evidence of captions/descriptions, cannot per se lead to rejection of identification evidence. The court relied on this observation to support its approach that mere possibility of newspaper publication does not automatically discredit identification evidence; the court must decide whether a witness was influenced.
Chandran v. State of Kerala, 1987 (1) KLT 391 Discussed the legal position on test identification parades and the significance of Bhat, J.'s observations about substantive identification evidence in court vs. test parades. The court quoted and adopted the reasoning that substantive identification is the identification made in court, that parade is useful but not always mandatory, and that assurance can come from other corroborative circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first recounting the prosecution narrative and the trial court's findings that (except for A4) the accused formed an unlawful assembly with a common object of murdering the deceased and his colleagues and in prosecution of that object trespassed and attacked the victims.

On the identification issue the court examined the evidence of multiple witnesses:

  • PWs.3 and 4: These eyewitnesses supported the prosecution narrative regarding the occurrence and described the person who chased PW.2 with a drawn knife and who came out with blood on the knife and stabbed the deceased. However, they did not formally identify any of the accused in court and were not asked by the Public Prosecutor to do so. The court accepted their testimony about what they saw, though it acknowledged that those witnesses did not establish in-court identification of A1 specifically.
  • PW.1 and PW.2: These witnesses identified A1 (and other accused) in court and narrated the sequence of events as per the prosecution version. The defence raised four specific criticisms of their identification evidence: absence of a test identification parade, police having supplied names to witnesses, prior viewing of photographs in newspapers, and lack of special identifying marks mentioned by them.

The court analyzed those criticisms and the applicable legal principles:

  • Test identification parade: The court explained, citing Chandran and related authorities, that a test identification parade is meant to test a witness's ability to identify a person, and that while a successful parade furnishes reassurance and corroboration, absence of a parade is not automatically fatal. The court emphasized that substantive identification evidence is the in-court identification and parade is a useful but not indispensable corroborative measure.
  • Publication of photographs in the press: The court distinguished between an investigating officer showing a photograph to a witness (which could make identification worthless) and independent publication of photographs by the press. The court observed that the police normally cannot control press publications and that mere possibility of witnesses having seen photographs in newspapers should not lead to wholesale rejection of their identification evidence; the court left open the question of influence for determination based on facts in each case.
  • Police supplying names to witnesses: The court held that if a police officer revealed to a witness the names of assailants whom the witness had earlier pointed out or described, no impropriety is necessarily imputed and that fact alone does not by itself vitiate the in-court identification, because the witness identifies the person in court by looking at him even if the witness knows his name.
  • Absence of special identifying marks: The court rejected the argument that inability to mention special marks renders identification unsafe, observing that memory of a face can persist without a special mark and that many witnesses remember faces without being able to enumerate distinctive features.

The court then considered corroboration: PWs.3 and 4 corroborated the occurrence though they did not give formal in-court identifications; PWs.6, 7 and 8 also provided corroborative evidence (for example, PW.6 saw A1 chasing PW.2 and could see his face in the light; PW.8 identified A1 though hostile on other points; PW.7 saw A1 among those who left on a scooter). On the whole the court found no reason to disbelieve the witnesses and concluded that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants jointly assaulted the victims and that A1 stabbed PW.2 and the deceased.

On the issue of common object, while the trial court found a common object to murder, the appellate court disagreed that the common object extended beyond committing assaults (beating). The appellate court reasoned there was no factual basis to infer that the common object of the unlawful assembly was to commit anything more than beating the victims. The court held that A1 undertook more aggravated acts (the stabbings) during the evolution of the occurrence on his own initiative, rather than as part of a pre-formed common object to murder.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • A1: The conviction and sentence passed by the trial court against accused 1 (A1) for all offences found against him were CONFIRMED, and his criminal appeal (Crl. A. No. 384/89) was dismissed.
  • A2, A3, A5 and A6: The convictions and sentences passed on accused 2, 3, 5 and 6 were CONFIRMED only insofar as offences under Sections 143, 147, 323 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code were concerned. Their convictions and sentences for other offences were set aside and their appeals were partly allowed.

Implications / Consequential Orders:

  • Because accused 2, 3, 5 and 6 had already undergone imprisonment exceeding the period covered by the sentences maintained for Ss.143,147,323 and 447, the court directed the jail authorities to release them forthwith unless they were required in some other case.
  • The court's disposition clarified that the common object of the unlawful assembly, on the facts of this case, was limited to beating the victims; the more serious act of stabbing was attributable to A1's individual conduct during the incident rather than to a pre-formed common object to commit murder by the entire assembly.
  • No broad new legal principle or precedent was announced beyond the court's application of existing authorities to the facts; the decision's immediate effect is to confirm A1's convictions fully and to limit and partially set aside the convictions of A2, A3, A5 and A6 (with directions for their release subject to other liabilities).

    Sajeevan v. State Of Kerala

    Thomas, J.:— This is a case in which the story of a murder committed in a cinema theatre at Kalamassery has been told by the prosecution. The nub of the story is that the gate keepers of the theatre had to pay heavily for thwarting the attempts made by two ticketless cinema goers to get into the auditorium of the theatre, as one of them lost his life and the other was mauled brutally. Six persons were arraigned before the Sessions Court for the offences and five of them were convicted of different offences and sentenced to different terms of imprisonment including murder. Separate appeals have been filed by them.

    2. The scene of occurrence was “Preethi” theatre at Kalamassery. Time was around 10.30 P.M on 4-12-1986. The occurrence commenced like this: When the second show of the cinema started two persons (2nd and 6th accused) made a bid to get into the auditorium without tickets. The gateman (PW. 3) resisted the attempts and there ensued a scuffle between them. Three other employees of the theatre (PWs. 1, 2 and the deceased Moosa) on seeing it, rushed to the rescue of their colleague. Both sides went at hammer and tongs and eventually the two bumpkins were overpowered. Hence they retreated from the scene and went out of the theatre compound. But it was only an interval during the occurrence. A little later, accused 2 and 6 came back with three more persons which caused recrudescence of the attack. Accused 1, 3 and 5 were the new arrivals with accused 2 and 6. All the five jointly made a blitz on PW. 2 and PW. 3 and also the deceased by beating them with hands. The victims resisted the attack and it turned into a tussle. Then another person (A4) who came out of the auditorium joined the assailants. At that stage 1st accused collected a knife from 3rd accused. Sensing the danger ahead PW. 2 ran into the reserved class of the auditorium. But A1 chased him and intercepted him and stabbed him on the chest as well as neck. A1 came out of the auditorium and dashed into the ticket-counter wherein deceased Moosa had, by then, taken shelter and stabbed him also two or three times. As the victims were vanguished the assailants left the place.

    3. Both the injured were removed to the City hospital, but the deceased reached there dead. PW. 2 was subjected to an emergent surgery and despite very serious injuries sustained by him, he survived as he was not destined to die.

    4. None of the accused disputed that PW. 2 and the deceased sustained injuries at the time and place suggested by the prosecution. But they all denied having involved themselves in the incident. Learned Sessions Judge found that all the accused (except A4) formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with the common object of murdering the deceased and his colleagues in retaliation and in prosecution thereof they trespassed into the theatre compound and attacked the victims in the manner narrated above.

    5. The main argument raised by Shri. M.N Sukumaran Nayar, Senior Counsel, is that prosecution failed to establish the identity of the accused. Alternatively he contended that the evidence, even if accepted in toto, is insufficient to establish any common object for the accused to cause injuries to any person.

    6. It is unfortunate that the Public Prosecutor who conducted the case in the trial court did not ascertain from two important eye witnesses (PWs. 3 and 4 who remained loyal to the prosecution) whether the man who stabbed with the knife was any one of the accused arrayed in the court. Nor did those two witnesses identify any of the accused in court. In fact, no attempt whatsoever, was made by the Public Prosecutor to elicit answers from PW. 3 and PW 4 regarding that aspect. We felt that in such circumstances there is nothing wrong if the Sessions Judge elicits such facts from the witnesses. After all it is only a formal evidence, but absence of such a formal evidene in criminal cases has serious consequences. No such answer was elicited from those witnesses by the Sessions Judge also.

    7. However, both PWs. 3 and 4 supported the prosecution story without formally identifying the assailants and deposed that the person who chased PW 2 into the auditorium with the drawn knife came out with blood on the knife and he stabbed the deceased who took shelter inside the ticket counter. We have no reason to disbelieve their evidence, although prosecution could not establish through them that it was A1 who did such acts.

    8. PW. 1 did not know any of the accused by name except A6 when he gave first information statement. But in court, he identified A1 and other accused. PW. 2 also identified all the accused. Both of them spoke to the occurrence with its sequences as per the prosecution version. Shri. M.N Sukumaran Nayar pointed out four blemishes in the identification evidence spoken to by PW. 1 and PW. 2. First is that no Test Identification parade was held and hence their evidence is worthless. Second is that the police supplied the names of the accused to those two witnesses and this has affected the credibility of their evidence. Third is that they had the opportunity to see the photograph of the accused published in the newspapers and this would vitiate the identification evidence. Fourth is that neither PW. 1 nor PW. 2 could mention any special mark or feature of the person who inflicted stab injuries and hence it is not safe to act on their evidence regarding identification.

    9. Learned counsel invited our attention to the observations of Hidayathulla, J. (as he then was) in L. Choraria v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968 SC 938) that “showing a photograph prior to the identification makes the identification worthless”. He also cited the decision in Mohanlal v. State of Maharashtra ((1982) 1 SCC 700 : AIR 1982 SC 839) in which the evidence of one eye witness was treated as valueless since no test identification parade was held by the investigating officer.

    10. If the idea of conducting a test identification parade is to test the ability of a witness to identify a particular person, then photograph of the suspect should not be shown to him in advance. Otherwise the parade becomes only a farce. But that is different from the Press publishing photos of the accused in newspapers. It is not the work of the investigating agency, but the exercise of journalistic calibre. Investigating agency has, normally, no control over such journalistic adventures. Hence such publication cannot be prevented by the police in a society where freedom of press is guaranteed. It has become very usual that in sensational criminal cases newspapers would display enthusiasm to publish photos of different facets including photos of the accused. It is not necessary that witnesses should see such photos in the newspapers. Even if a witness happens to see the photo of a particular accused in a newspaper we are not inclined to sideline his evidence regarding identification on that score alone. It ???ust be remembered that Kerala is a State where there is proliferation of newspapers. How can a witness be made responsible if newspapers publish the photographs of the accused? If we are to lay down a proposition that identification evidence of a witness is liable to be thrown overboard in cases where newspapers published the photo of the accused, a good number of witnesses in Kerala would be exposed to the peril of being disbelieved on account of the journalistic adventure and high density of print media in this State. Of course, it is open to the court to decide whether a witness's evidence regarding identification was really influenced by such publication.

    11. A Division Bench of this court (U.L Bhat, J. [as he then was] and Balakrishnan, J.) in Appu v. State (1990 (1) KLT SN 13) observed that “at any rate, the mere fact that a witness might have accidentally seen photographs of accused in newspapers, particularly in the absence of evidence regarding captions or descriptions given in newspapers, cannot lead to rejection of identification of accused made by witnesses”.

    12. We did not find anything from the judgment in Mohanlal's case (cited supra) as laying down a principle of law that eye witnesse's testimony deserves outright rejection in all cases where test identification parade was not conducted. A Division Bench has considered in detail the decisions on the subject and the implications of not holding a test identification parade (Chandran v. State of Kerala, 1987 (1) KLT 391). Legal position on that aspect cannot be better stated than what Bhat, J. (as he then was) has observed therein. The relevant portion reads thus: “Substantive evidence of identification of an accused is the evidence given and identification made by a witness in Court. If an accused is known to a witness it would be a futile exercise to put him up for identification. If, however, an accused is not previously known to a witness, the investigating agency has to consider whether test identification parade should be arranged. Such a step has dual significance. It furnishes to the investigating agency an assurance that the investigation is proceeding on correct lines. It also furnishes corroboration of the evidence to be given by the witness in court at the trial stage Successful identification parade renders it safe for the court to act upon the identification made in Court. However, it cannot be said that absence of test identification parade is fatal in all cases. Assurance could be available from other sources and circumstances.

    13. If the police officer has revealed to a witness names of the assailants whom the witness pointed out or described to the police no impropriety can be imputed to the police on account of it. That cannot affect the evidence of identification because the witness is identifying the accused in court by looking at him although the witness came to know of his name in the meanwhile. We are, therefore, not impressed by the said argument.

    14. It is true that PW. 1 or 2 could not point out any special identification mark of the accused. Nobody has a case thatany of the accused has any special feature to be observed. Persons possessing special identification features are far and few between-one is able to remember another man's face not always because of any special mark or features. The image of an assailant or a thief or a burgler can leave the impression in the mind of the viewer or the victim which can remain in the mind without fading out for a reasonable period. There are untranslatable factors by which such retention is possible. The viewer need not count or notice any special mark or feature for retaining the image of the assailant in his mind. Hence we are not disposed to reject the testimony of PW. 1 and PW. 2 merely because they did not enumerate the features or marks of the accused.

    15. The evidence of PW. 1 and PW 2 is corroborated by the evidence of PWs. 3 and 4. That part of their testimony relating to the occurrence remains unshaken though they did not identify the assailants in court. PWs. 6, 7 and 8 have also corroborated the said identification evidence. PW. 6 said that while he was seeing the cinema he saw A1 chasing PW. 2 inside the auditorium and he could see the face of A1 in the light focussed on the screen. PW. 8 was treated as hostile since he failed to identify the other accused. But he has clearly identified A1 as the person who ran out of the theatre. PW. 7 is of course the brother of the deceased. Though he did not see the occurrence he said that he saw A1 among the persons who left the place on a scooter. We have considered their evidence in all its aspects and we do not come across any reason to disbelieve them.

    16. Prosecution has thus proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants went together to the theature and beat PWs. 2 and 3 and the deceased. Prosecution further proved that it was A1 who stabbed PW. 2 and the deceased. While we have no doubt that the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court on A1 regarding various offences are liable to be confirmed, the common object of the unlawful assembly cannot be said to be anything beyond beating the victims. There is no factual justification to draw the inference that common object of the assembly was anything more than that. A1 played the more aggravated role on his own as he felt doing so perhaps during the development of the occurrence. In the result the appeals are disposed of as under:

    17. Regarding accused 2, 3, 5 and 6 we confirm the conviction and sentence passed on them by the trial court as for offences under Ss. 143,147,323 and 447 of the Indian Penal Code (It is deemed that for the offence under S. 447 the maximum provided by law has been imposed on each of them). But we set aside their conviction and sentence as for the other offences. Since those accused (A2, A3, A5 and A6) have been in jail for more than the period covered by the sentence imposed on them for the said offences, we direct the jail authorities to release them forthwith unless they are required in any other case. Their appeals are hence partly allowed. However, we confirm the conviction and sentence passed on A1 as for all the offences found against him by the trial court and dismiss his Crl. A. No. 384/89.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Sajeevan v. State Of Kerala
    (Mar 2, 1993)