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  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants seeking a permanent injunction restraining them from using the mark ‘Flying Horse’ with or without the device of a white horse, wings, or any deceptively similar mark in relation to whisky or other alcoholic beverages. This was alleged to infringe the plaintiff's registered trade marks No. 83169, 267396, and 128880, and to constitute passing off. An ex parte temporary injunction was granted on June 29, 1984, restraining the defendants from such use. The defendants opposed the application, leading to the present order disposing of the plaintiff's application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an ad-interim injunction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants' use of the mark ‘Flying Horse’ with the device of a flying horse infringes the plaintiff's registered trade marks ‘White Horse’ and associated devices.
  2. Whether the defendants' use amounts to passing off the plaintiff's goods.
  3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the grant of an ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the impugned marks pending trial.
  4. The relevance of delay by the plaintiff in instituting the suit on the question of granting temporary injunction.
  5. The effect of prior rejection of the defendants' trade mark applications by the Registrar of Trade Marks on the issue of infringement and res judicata.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff)

  • The plaintiff's registered trade marks ‘White Horse’ per se and with the device of a white horse on black background are valid and operative since 1943.
  • The defendants’ mark ‘Flying Horse’ with a flying horse device infringes the plaintiff's marks by using the common word ‘Horse’ and adopting a horse device, thus causing confusion and passing off.
  • The defendants’ applications for registration of their marks were rejected by the Registrar of Trade Marks on opposition by the plaintiff, which operates as res judicata on infringement.
  • The defendants cannot now claim that the plaintiff's marks have lost distinctiveness as they did not seek rectification of the plaintiff's registrations.
  • The plaintiff has a strong prima facie case and is entitled to an interim injunction to prevent irreparable harm.

Respondent's Arguments (Defendants)

  • The plaintiff’s marks have lost distinctiveness as the word ‘Horse’ and horse devices have become common in the liquor trade.
  • The Registrar of Trade Marks has opined that ‘White Horse’ and the device of a horse have become common to the trade in class 33.
  • The defendants rely on the existence of other marks such as ‘Black Horse’ to show common usage of ‘Horse’ marks.
  • The plaintiff's delay of about six years from the time it knew of the defendants’ mark until filing the suit undermines the claim for interim relief.
  • The defendants contend that the question of distinctiveness and infringement is a matter for trial and cannot be decided at the interim stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co., 1970 (2) SCR 222 In trademark infringement, if the defendant’s mark is identical, no enquiry into likelihood of confusion is needed; if similar, the test is likelihood of confusion as in passing off. The court applied this principle to determine that since the marks were not identical but similar, the test of likelihood of confusion applies to both infringement and passing off claims.
K.R Chinnakrishna Chetty v. Sri Ambal & Co. Madras, AIR 1979 Mysore 74 Res judicata effect of Registrar of Trade Marks’ opposition decisions on infringement issues. The plaintiff argued this precedent supports that the Registrar’s rejection of defendants’ registration applications is conclusive on infringement, but the court noted the issue remains contentious.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the marks in question and found substantial dissimilarities between the plaintiff's ‘White Horse’ marks and the defendants' ‘Flying Horse’ marks in words, devices, posture of the horse, and label presentation. The court noted that the conflicting marks were not identical, invoking the principle from Ruston & Hornsby that the test for infringement and passing off in such cases is the likelihood of confusion.

The court acknowledged the plaintiff may have a prima facie case but found it was not clear-cut, with contentious issues on distinctiveness and infringement to be decided at trial. The plaintiff's delay in filing the suit after knowledge of the defendants’ mark was deemed significant against granting interim relief. The court observed that granting the injunction would effectively decide the suit prematurely and cause irreparable harm to the defendants’ business, which had existed for 17 years.

The court also considered the Registrar of Trade Marks’ opinions indicating that the word ‘Horse’ and horse devices had become common in the liquor trade, undermining the plaintiff's exclusivity claims. The absence of any alleged instance of actual passing off by the defendants further weakened the plaintiff's case for an injunction.

Balancing the factors of irreparable injury and balance of convenience, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to the interim injunction, vacated the ex parte injunction previously granted, and clarified that its observations were limited to the present application without prejudice to the trial.

Holding and Implications

The plaintiff's application for an ad-interim injunction is dismissed.

The ex parte temporary injunction granted on June 29, 1984, is vacated. This decision directly affects the parties by allowing the defendants to continue using their marks pending trial. The court did not set any new precedent and expressly stated that the observations made are confined to the present application and will not prejudice the rights of the parties at trial.

    White Horse Distillers Ltd. v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd.

    H.C Goel, J.:— By this Order I shall dispose of the application of the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the grant of an ad-interim injunction against the defendants restraining them, their servants, agents etc. from using in relation to whisky or any other alcoholic beverage the mark ‘Flying Horse’ with or without the device of a white horse, with or without the wings or any identical or deceptively similar mark or device as would amount to infringement of the plaintiff's registered trade marks No. 83169, 267396 and 128880, as also from passing off their goods by adopting any of the said marks as the goods of the plaintiff till the decision of the suit.

    2. The application has arisen out of the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendants in which the plaintiff has prayed for a decree for permanent injunction in the same terms as in the present application. An ex parte temporary injunction was granted by S.B Wad J. in this application, being I.A No. 3077/84 on June 29, 1984, restraining the defendants from using in relation to any alcoholic beverage the mark ‘Flying Horse’ with or without the device of horse or any other deceptively similar mark. The application has been opposed by the defendant.

    3. I have heard Mr. N.K Anand, learned counsel for the plaintiff, and Mr. A.K Goel, learned counsel for the defendants, and have been taken through the material as placed by the parties on the record. The plaintiffs trade marks ‘White Horse’ Per Se and ‘White Horse’ with the device of a horse in white on black background as per its label were registered for the first time by the Registrar of Trade Marks on July 20, 1943. The registrations of the plaintiff viz. ‘White Horse’ Per Se and ‘White Horse’ with the device of a horse in white on black background have been continued from time to time and are still operative. The defendants started manufacturing whisky in the year 1967 under the mark ‘Flying Horse’ with the device of a flying horse. The case of the plaintiff is that the trade marks of the defendants namely, ‘Flying Horse’ and the device of a flying horse infringe the said trade marks of the plaintiff. It is also alleged that the defendants have been passing off their goods and are likely to pass off their good as the goods of the plaintiff by the adoption and use of the infringing trade mark of theirs.

    4. It is obvious that the conflicting trade marks in question are not identical and there are substantial points of dissimilarity in the two marks. The few distinguishing features in the two marks that may be pointed out here are that only one of the two words making the trade mark of each of the parties namely ‘Horse’ is common, whereas the other two words ‘White’ and ‘Flying’ are obviously dissimilar. There are great dissimilarities in the devices of the marks of the two parties. The device of the plaintiff consists of the picture of a white horse on a black background. As against that the device of the defendants consists of a horse with quite large and conspicuous wings and the horse is shown in a flying posture as against a standing horse in the device of the plaintiff. There is also a conspicuous difference in the labels of the parties as regards their colour scheme, the manner in which the marks i.e ‘White Horse’ of the plaintiff and ‘Flying Horse’ of the defendants are given therein, as also of the pictures of the horses in the two labels.

    5. The other thing to note is that in the label of the plaintiff the words ‘Fine Old Scotch Whisky’ are given in very bold letters. In the label of the defendants the words “PRODUCE OF INDIA” are given, although not in very bold letters. In the labels of the two parties the names of the respective manufacturers are also given in detail. Further a bottle of White Horse Scotch Whisky is sold in India to a retailer for over Rs. 300/- whereas on the label of the defendants itself the price is given as Rs. 42/- per bottle. There is also admittedly a restriction on the import, as also on the sale of Scotch Whisky. Keeping in view the fact that Scotch Whisky costs over Rs. 300/- per bottle, it will be the affluent and elite class of persons in India who only are likely to purchase Scotch Whisky. Keeping all these facts in view it may be an uphill task on the part of the plaintiff to succeed in its passing off action against the defendants. Further the Supreme Court in the case Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co.†., 1970 (2) SCR 222 held as below:

    “In an action for infringement when the defendant's trade mark is identical with the plaintiffs mark, the court will not enquire whether the infringement is such as is likely to deceive or cause confusion. But where the alleged infringement consists of using not the exact mark on the Register but something similar to it, the test of infringement is the same as in an action for passing off. In other words, the test as to the likelihood of confusion or deception arising from similarity of marks is the same both in infringement and passing off actions.”

    6. Judged from this angle the infringement act on of the plaintiff also is not free from difficulty, Mr. Anand, learned counsel for the plaintiff, advanced lengthy arguments to show that the plaintiff has got a strong prima facie case. Similarly, Mr. A.K Goel, learned counsel for the defendants, addressed at length in support of his contention that the plaintiff has no case worth trial. The contention of Mr. Anand is that the emphasis in the plaintiffs trade mark is on the word ‘Horse’ with the device of a horse and that the defendants by using the word ‘Horse’ in their trade mark and also by adopting a horse in a flying posture have infringed the plaintiffs trade marks. It was submitted that the defendants had filed applications for registration of their trade marks in question for the mark of ‘Flying Horse’ per se and the other for a label having the words ‘Flying Horse’ with the device of a flying horse therein and that both these applications were rejected by the Registrar of Trade Marks on opposition filed by the plaintiff thereto. These applications were rejected in April, 1981. Mr. Anand has contended that these orders of the Registrar operate as res judicata in favour of the plaintiff on the issue as to whether the said trade marks of the defendants infringe the trade marks of the plaintiff. Reliance was placed by him in this regard on a decision of the Mysore High Court in K.R Chinnakrishna Chetty v. Sri Ambal & Co. Madras, AIR 1979 Mysore 74. Mr. Anand also submitted that the said applications of the defendants having been rejected by the Registrar, the only course open to the defendants was to make an application for rectification of the registration of the trade marks in favour of the plaintiffs, but that the defendants have not moved any such application so far to the High Court and that they cannot now take up the plea in defence to the plaintiff's suit that the plaintiff's mark has lost distinctiveness which, according to the plaintiff, is the main ground on which the defendants are resisting the suit of the plaintiff. The defendants' counsel, on the other hand, has contended that the plea of the defendants that the plaintiffs mark has lost distinctiveness can be raised by the defendants in defence to the suit of the plaintiff and has to be decided by the Court when so raised. In support of their contention that the plaintiff's mark has lost distinctiveness, the defendants heavily rely on the fact that on their recent application for registration of the trade mark ‘Flying Horse’ per se the Registrar, Trade Marks, Bombay, has already opined that the word ‘Horse’ and the device of Horse have become common to the trade regarding liquors which includes whisky. The defendants have filed a copy of the additional representation as submitted by them to the Registrar on January 12, 1982 (which is at page 117 of the defendants' documents). At pages 118-122 are the objections as made by the Registrar to the said application of the defendants. In this the Registrar, among others, stated that their claim could not be allowed as ‘White Horse’ having the device of a horse was registered with M/s. White Horse on their application No. 267396. This objection was later waived by the Registrar as per his communication dated September 28, 1984 appended at page 5 of the defendant's documents. The Senior Examiner of Trade Marks, Delhi, also in reply to the enquiry submitted by the defendants, stated on October 5, 1984 that the mark ‘White Horse’ and the device of horse had become common to the trade in class 33. It was contended by the learned counsel for the defendants that the Registrar of Trade Marks has now given the aforesaid opinion in view of the changed circumstances on account of many manufacturers of liquors and whisky having adopted marks having the word ‘Horse’ as also having the device of horse in their labels. The defendants produced one quarter bottle of whisky having the trade mark ‘Black Horse’ manufactured by Khasa Distillery Company, Amritsar along with a cash memo for the purchase of the same on November 28, 1984. Another thing to note is that the plaintiff has not even alleged any single instance of passing off the goods by the defendants as the goods of the plaintiff. Keeping in view the respective submissions of the parties' learned counsel and the materials as placed by the parties on record the position that turns out to be is this that whereas the plaintiff may be said to have a prima facie case worth trial, it cannot be said that they have got a clear-cut case in its favour. There are contentious issues involved in the case on a final decision of which alone rests the fate of the case of the plaintiff. The grant of the temporary injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff would amount to virtually decreeing the suit of the plaintiff without its trial. Such an ad-interim injunction is not ordinarily to be allowed. Further, in such a situation the question as to whether the plaintiff will suffer an irreparable loss if the injunction as prayed for by it is not allowed and the question as to in whose favour does the balance of convenience lie assume a great importance. In the event of the plantiff's success in the suit the damages to which the plaintiff may be entitled on account of the passing off of the defendants' goods can be measured and the plaintiff can be compensated by the award of such damages. On the other hand in case the temporary injunction as prayed for is granted, that is bound to destroy the entire business of the defendants which is in existence for the last about 17 years' and in case the defendants succeed in non-suiting the plaintiff it would almost be impossible to assess the damage caused to the defendants by the grant of the temporary injunction against them.

    7. There is yet another important fact which also goes against the plaintiff for its being allowed the relief of the temporary injunction as prayed for by it. As per the plaintiffs own case it had come to know of the impugned mark of the defendants ‘Flying Horse’ with the device of a horse when the defendants filed their two applications for the registration of the mark ‘Flying Horse’ per se and the label having the words ‘Flying Horse’ with the device of a horse therein. These applications were moved by the defendants as far back as in the year 1973. The plaintiff filed its opposition to the same in the year 1978. The plaintiff had thus clearly come to know of the adoption of the impugned mark by the defendants in the year 1978 at the latest. The plaintiff, however, did not file any action restraining the defendants from adopting or using the impugned trade mark ever since then and the present suit was filed by the plaintiff only in June, 1984. This inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiff to bring an action against the defendants for restraining them from adopting or using the impugned trade mark itself is a ground on which the discretionary relief of temporary injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff should be declined. Mr. Anand, learned counsel for the plaintiff, submitted that so far as the infringement action as prayed for by the plaintiff is concerned, that is the statutory right of the plaintiff and the question of delay in filing that action is inconsequential and is no circumstance on which the relief of temporary injunction may be declined to the plaintiff. I am not inclined to agree with this view. As pointed out by me already above, it is not a case of copying of the entire mark as such. It is a case of partial adoption of the mark of the plaintiff by the defendants and there is a serious contest between the parties as to whether the adoption of the infringing trade marks in question by the defendants at all amounts to infringement of the registered trade marks of the plaintiff and/or the defendants are capable of passing off their goods as the goods of the plaintiff. I think under such a situation the question of delay has got great relevance with regard to the question as to whether the plaintiff should or should not be allowed the relief of the temporary injunction as prayed for by it. In conclusion, in view of what has been said above it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled to the grant of the temporary injunction as prayed for by it. The application of the plaintiff is accordingly dismissed. The ex parte temporary injunction as granted to the plaintiff on June 29, 1984 is hereby vacated. I need hardly say that the observations made in this order are only for the purpose of disposing of the present application and would not prejudice the rights of the parties at the trial of the suit.

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    Comments

    White Horse Distillers Ltd. v. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd.
    (Dec 5, 1984)