The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dr. Vineet Kothari, J.:— These two appeals have been filed by defendant Madan Singh under Section 96 of CPC being aggrieved of the judgment and decree passed against him dated 28/1/1986 by which the civil suit no. 76/80 — Smt. Suraj Kanwar v. Madan Singh filed for cancellation of sale deed dated 22/4/1958 has been decreed by the learned trial court of ADJ, Raisinghnagar, Sriganganagar. The connected appeal No. 478/2006 is directed against the judgment and decree of the same court in civil suit no. 15/99 — Rajendra Singh v. Madan Singh by which the learned trial court decreed the suit for possession in favour of the plaintiff-respondents holding that the plaintiffs were in possession prior to 11/4/1975 for two years prior to the said date of the land in question situated at 26 GB, Muraba No. 14 and 39 (New No. 15 and 37) and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to receive possession of the land in question from the Receiver appointed in the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C

2. The fate of connected appeal no. 478/2006 would abide by the First Appeal no. 16/1986 regarding cancellation of sale deed and, therefore, facts as given in the judgment under appeal dated 28/1/1986 while decreeing the suit no. 76/80 — Smt. Suraj Kanwar v. Madan Singh are stated here under.

3. The plaintiff Suraj Kanwar w/o Thakur Raghuveer Singh executed the sale deed on 22/4/1958 in favour of defendant Madan Singh, her cousin (son of her maternal uncle) and by the said sale deed dated 22/4/1958 for a consideration of Rs. 5000/- 24 bighas of land in Square No. 39 in Chak No. 26 GB Tehsil Anoopgarh was transferred in favour of said defendant and possession of the said 24 bighas was also handed over to him. The said sale deed was registered on 30/4/1958 with Sub Registrar, Anoopgarh. The suit for cancellation of this sale deed was filed by the plaintiff Suraj Kanwar on 6/1/1978 after 20 years. The plaintiff — Suraj Kanwar claimed that the sale of land in question vide registered sale deed dated 22/4/1958 was a ‘benami’ transaction and sale deed was without any consideration and such sale deed was executed in favour of defendant Madan Singh, who being her relative urged that such sale deed in his favour would increase his status and he would be able to take loan against such land for his business. The plaintiff was never in the need of money and, therefore, no such consideration was taken and upon disputes arising, in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C, the possession of the said land was handed over to the Receiver, which continues to be with him even now. The plaintiff stated that in the letter dated 6/9/1964 written by defendant Madan Singh, he had admitted that the said sale was ‘benami’ transaction and the plaintiff was the real owner of the said land and similarly wife of defendant Madan Singh, Smt. Gunraj Kanwar had also admitted in her letter dated 21/12/1967 that plaintiff was the real owner of the said land.

4. The written statement on behalf of defendant Madan Singh was filed by his power of attorney holder, Shri Ranveer Singh s/o Thakur Hamir Singh in which it was stated that the consideration of Rs. 5000/- was paid to the husband of plaintiff Shri Raghuveer Singh and the sale deed was executed in favour of defendant Madan Singh on 22/4/1958, which was duly registered with Sub Registrar on 30/4/1958. It was also stated by the defendant that the total land with the plaintiff Smt. Suraj Kanwar was in excess of the limits prescribed under the Ceiling Law and, therefore, to avoid reversion back of the excess land to the State under the Ceiling Law, the plaintiff had sold 24 bighas of land to defendant Madan Singh and three other sale deeds were also executed in favour of other persons and on the basis of such four sale deeds, the land holding of the plaintiff was reduced below the ceiling limit to 49 bighas and the declaration in this regard was filed by her before the competent authority and on the basis of which, orders were passed in her favour on 20/1/1971 by the competent authority under the Ceiling Law vide Ex. A-9 not resuming any land in favour of State.

5. On the basis of pleadings, after framing issues and consideration of relevant evidence, the learned trial court has decreed the said suit on 28/1/1986 in favour of the plaintiff and cancelled the sale deed dated 22/4/1958 in favour of defendant Madan Singh.

6. Being aggrieved of the same, the defendant has approached this Court by way of present appeal.

7. Mr. L.M Lodha, learned counsel for the defendant appellant raised the following contentions in support of the appeal;

(i) That the Sale Deed dated 22/4/1958 cannot be said to be a ‘benami’ transaction and the sale deed was valid and legal and by the sale deed 24 bighas of land in question was sold in favour of defendant Madan Singh for consideration of Rs. 5000/-, which was paid in cash and, therefore, the plaintiff could not claim any title over the land in question and the sale deed could not be cancelled by the learned trial court.

(ii) In the alternative, learned counsel for the appellant defendant submitted that if it is held to be a ‘benami’ or sham transaction, in view of coming into force of the Benami Transaction (Prohibition) Act, 1988 (Act No. 45 of 1988), which came into force on 5th September, 1988 and in view of prohibition contained in Section 4 of the said Act, no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. He relied on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash v. Jai Prakash — (1992) 1 SCC 710 : AIR 1992 SC 885 in support of this contention.

(iii) That the plaintiff had taken benefit of the sale in question under the Ceiling Law and on the basis of said sale along with three other sale deeds, the land holdings of the plaintiff had fallen below the ceiling limit to 49 bighas and, therefore, the plaintiff was estopped from raising the plea and claiming that the sale in question was only a ‘benami’ transaction and land in question should be declared to be belonging to her by cancelling the sale deed dated 22/4/1958.

(iv) That since plaintiff Suraj Kanwar herself did not appaer in the witness box before the learned trial court and power of attorney holder on her behalf, namely; her husband Shri Raghuveer Singh could not depose before the learned trial court in view of Order 3 Rule 1 CPC and, therefore, the suit could not decreed in the absence of any evidence led by her. Learned counsel for the appellant defendant relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. Indusind Bank Ltd. - (2005) 2 SCC 217 : AIR 2005 SC 439 in support of this contention.

(v) That the defendant Madan Singh had explained his letter dated 6/9/1964 in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Madan Singh had admitted that sale transaction dated 22/4/1958 was a benami transaction by saying that under the assurance of the plaintiff Suraj Kanwar to further advance to him Rs. 20,000/- for his business needs provided the defendant gives in writing that the said disputed sale transaction of 22/4/1958 was a benami transaction and under bonafide belief, the defendant gave that letter. However, since the plaintiff never gave this assured sum of Rs. 20,000/-, the letter dated 6/9/1964 is not the admission of the defendant Madan Singh and suit could not be decreed on that basis.

(vi) That the defendant did actual cultivation on the land in question upto 1974-1975. However, using his influence, husband of the plaintiff, Thakur Raghuveer Singh got the ‘Girdawari’ entries made in favour of his son Manvendra Singh, whereas, he was a student at that point of time and on account of this dispute in proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P.C the possession of the land in question came to be handed over to Receiver. Thereafter, said Rajendra Singh and Manvendra Singh, both the sons of plaintiff, filed another suit against defendant, namely; suit no. 15/1999, which came to be decreed on 5.8.2006 in their favour against which the connected appeal of the defendant, namely; Civil First Appeal No. 478/2006 has been filed in this Court, which has been argued with this appeal.

8. Per contra, Mr. G.R Goyal, learned counsel for the respondent plaintiffs raised following contentions opposing the said appeals;

(i) That the sale deed dated 22/4/1958 was a benami transaction and since no consideration was actually paid to the plaintiff by the defendant Madan Singh, therefore, sale deed dated 22/4/958 has been rightly cancelled by the learned trial court.

(ii) The plaintiff's right to challenge the said benami transaction is not hit by the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the defendant appellant in the case of Om Prakash v. Jai Prakash — (1992) 1 SCC 710 : AIR 1992 SC 885, which was delivered relying upon the earlier decision of two Judges of Supreme Court in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare — AIR 1989 SC 1247 : (1989) 2 SCC 95, which judgment being later on over ruled by three Judges' Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy through L.Rs v. Padmini Chandrasekharan through L.Rs — (1995) 2 SCC 630 in which the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly over ruled the judgment of two Judges in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare and held that said Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 was not retrospective in operation and, therefore, Section 4 of the said Act did not affect the suits filed prior to 19/5/1988 when the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988 was promulgated, which was later on replaced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 w.e.f 5/9/1988. He also relied upon the decisions of Supreme Court in the cases of Vijay Kumar v. Dharmpal - (2009) 3 SCC 319 & Surasaibalini Debi (Smt) v. Phanindra Mohan Majumdar — AIR 1965 SC 1354 in support of his contentions.

(iii) In view of the own admission of defendant Madan Singh in the letter dated 6/9/1964 — Ex. 72 and his wife Gunkanwar's letter dated 21/12/1967, the defendant had clearly admitted that the said sale transaction dated 22/4/1958 was a benami transaction and, therefore, since said transaction and challenge thereto by filing present suit on 6/1/1978 much prior to coming into force of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 had no effect on the said transaction, the real owner, plaintiff Suraj Kanwar, could very well prove and has proved that the transaction in question was a benami sale and she being the real owner was entitled to get the said sale deed cancelled.

(iv) It was also contented that the power of attorney holder on behalf of plaintiff Suraj Kanwar, her husband Raghuveer Singh could very well depose before the learned trial court as he was in personal knowledge of entire transaction and, therefore, in view of Supreme Court decision in the case of Man Kaur… v. Hartar Singh…. — (2010) 10 SCC 512 : 2010 (4) RLW 3663 (SC) the statement given by her power of attorney — her husband could be read in evidence and suit has rightly been decreed in favour of the plaintiff. He also contented that even the defendant Madan Singh himself has not appeared in the witness box and his power of attorney holder, one Shri Narpat Singh has appeared before the learned trial court.

9. I have heard learned counsels at length and perused the impugned judgment and decree, evidence on record and case laws cited at the bar.

10. In the opinion of this Court, the present appeals filed by the defendant Madan Singh deserve to be allowed. The reasons are as follows.

11. It is true that Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988, which came into force 19/5/1988 and was replaced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 on 5/9/1988 would not hit the present sale transaction in question on 22/4/1958 for cancellation of which the plaintiff filed the suit on 6/1/1978, much prior to 19/5/1988 in view of three Judges' Bench decision of Apex Court in the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy through L.Rs v. Padmini Chandrasekharan through L.Rs (supra) overruling the earlier decision in the case of Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behari Khare (supra), therefore, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant defendant, Mr. L.M Lodha that the prohibition contained in Section 4 of the said Act that no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of the said property will not apply in the present case, but the question is whether the plaintiff Suraj Kanwar clamining herself to be the real owner has really proved before the trial court that the sale in question was benami because no consideration for sale had passed from defendant Madan Singh to herself for the said sale dated 22/4/1958. Without such proof in the form of evidence before the learned trial court, the sale in question could not be declared to be sham transaction or a benami sale.

12. The concept of benami transaction was explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Surasaibalini Debi (Smt) v. Phanindra Mohan Majumdar — AIR 1965 SC 1354, wherein, writing his separate but concurring view with Justice J.C Shah (for himself and Gajendragadkar, C.J) & quoting from Mayne's Hindu Law (7th Edition, P. 595, para 446) Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar held that where a transaction is once made out to be a mere benami it is evident that the benamidar absolutely disappears from the title. His name is simply an alias for that of the person beneficially interested. No doubt, for the purpose of deciding whether property could be recovered by the assertion of a real title there is a clear distinction between cases where only an attempt to evade a statute or to commit a fraud has taken place and cases where the evasion or the fraud has succeeded and the impermissible object has been achieved. Para 28 of the said judgment is quoted below for ready reference:—

“No doubt, for the purpose of deciding whether property could be recovered by the assertion of a real title there is a clear distinction between cases where only an attempt to evade a statute or to commit a fraud has taken place and cases where the evasion or the fraud has succeeded and the impermissible object has been achieved. The leading decision upon this point is that of’ the Privy, Council in Petherpermal: Chetty v. Muniandi Servai, 35 Ind App 98 (PC), where Lord Atkinson dealing with the effect of benami conveyances which are motivated by the design to achieve an illegal or fraudulent purpose, quoted from Mayne's Hindu Law (7th ed. p. 595, para 466) the following as correctly setting out the law:

“Where a transaction is once made out to be a mere benami it is evident that the benamidar absolutely disappears from the title. His name is simply an alias for that of the person beneficially interested. The fact that A has assumed the name of B in order to cheat X can be no reason whatever why a Court should assist or permit B to cheat A. But if A requires the help of the Court to get the estate back into his own possession, or to get the title into his own name, it may be very material to consider whether A has actually cheated X or not. If he has done so by means of his alias, then it has ceased to be a mere mask, and has become a reality. It may be very proper for a Court to say that it will not allow him to resume the individuality which he has once cast off in order to defraud others. If, however, he has not defrauded any one, there can be no reason why the Court should punish his intention by giving his estate away to B, whose roguery is even more complicated than his own…… For instance, persons have been allowed to recover property which they had assigned away…. where they had intended to defraud creditors, who, in fact were never injured…… But where the fraudulent or illegal purpose has actually been effected by means of the colourable grant, then the maxim applies, ‘In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis’. The Court will help neither party’. Let the estate lie where it falls’.”

13. In R. Rajagopal Reddy's case (supra) dealing with the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, the three Judges' bench of Hon'ble Apex Court overruling the previous decision of two Judges' bench in the case of Mithilesh Kumari (supra) which was further relied upon in the cited judgment in Om Prakash v. Jai Prakash (supra) held that the Act was enacted to efface the then existing right of the real owners of properties held by others benami. Such an Act was not given any retrospective effect by the legislature. In this respect clear legislative intention is seen from the words “no such claim, suit or action shall lie” in Section 4(1) of the Act meaning thereby no such suit, claim or action shall be permitted to be filed or entertained or admitted to the portals of the court for seeking such a relief after the coming into force of Section 4(1) of the Act. The Division Bench view in Mithilesh Kumari's case that Section 4(1) would apply even to such pending suits which were already filed and entertained prior to the date when the section came into force and which has the effect of destroying the then existing right of plaintiff in connection with the suit property, cannot be sustained in the face of the clear language of Section 4(1). The relevant portion from the Head Notes of the said judgment in R. Rajagopal Reddy [(1995) 2 SCC 630)] is quoted below for ready reference:—

“(1) The Act was enacted to efface the then existing right of the real owners of properties held by other benami. Such an Act was not given any retrospective effect by the legislature. In this respect clear legislative intention is seen from the words “no such claim, suit or action shall lie” in Section 4(1) meaning thereby no such suit, claim or action shall be permitted to be filed or entertained or admitted to the portals of any court for seeking such a relief after the coming into force of Section 4(1). The word ‘lie’ in connection with the suit, claim or action having not not defined by the Act, going by the dictionary meaning it would mean that such suit claim or action to get any property declared benami will not be admitted on behalf of such plaintiff or applicant against the defendant concerned in whose name the property is held on and from the date on which this prohibition against entertaining of such suits comes into force. The view that Section 4(1) would apply even to such pending suits which were already filed and entertained prior to the date when the Section came into force and which has the effect of destroying the then existing right of plaintiff in connection with the suit property cannot be sustained in the face of the clear language of Section 4(1). The legislature in its wisdom has not expressly made Section 4 retrospective. Then to imply by necessary implication that Section 4 would have retrospective effect and would cover pending litigations filed prior to coming into force of the Section would amount to taking a view which would run counter to the legislative scheme and intent projected by various provisions of the Act. It is, however, true as held by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari case that on the express language of Section 4(1) any right inhering in the real owner in respect of any property held benami would get effaced once Section 4(1) operated, even if such transaction had been entered into prior to the coming into operation of Section 4(1), and hence-after Section 4(1) applied no suit can lie in respect to such a past benami transaction. To that extent the Section may be retroactive. But from this it does not logically follow that the then existing rights got destroyed and even though suits by real owners were filed prior to coming into operation of Section 4(1) they would not survive.

(2) Section 4(2) provides that if a suit is filed by a plaintiff who claims to be the owner of the property under the document in his favour and holds the property in his name, once Section 4(2) applies, no defence will be permitted or allowed in any such suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property held benami. The disallowing of such a defence which earlier was available, itself suggests that a new liability or restriction is imposed by Section 4(2) on a preexisting right of the defendant. Such a provision also cannot be said to be retrospective or retroactive by necessary implication. Section 4(2) does not expressly seek to apply retrospectively. So far as such a suit which is covered by the sweep of Section 4(2) is concerned, the prohibition of Section 4(1) cannot apply to it as it is not a claim or action filed by the plaintiff to enforce right in respect of any property held benami. On the contrary, it is a suit, claim or action flowing from the sale deed or title deed in the name of the plaintiff. Even though such a suit might have been filed prior to 19.5.1988, if before the stage of filing of defence by the real owner is reached, Section 4(2) becomes operative from 19.5.1988, then such a defence, as laid down by Section 4(2) will not be allowed to such a defendant. However, that would not mean that Section 4(1) and 4(2) only on that score can be treated to be impliedly retrospective so as to cover all the pending litigations in connection with enforcement of such rights of real owners who are parties to benami transactions entered into prior to the coming into operation of the Act and specially Section 4 thereof. Section 4(2) enjoins that no such defence ‘shall be allowed’ in any claim, suit or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. That is to say no such defence shall be allowed for the first time after coming into operation of Section 4(2). If such a defence is already allowed in a pending suit prior to the coming into operation of Section 4(2), enabling an issue to be raised on such a defence, then the Court is bound to decide the issue arising from such an already allowed defence as at the relevant time when such defence was allowed Section 4(2) was out of picture. It was wrongly assumed by the Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari case that an already allowed defence in a pending suit would also get destroyed after coming into operation of Section 4(2).

It is not possible to accept the contention that if the bar in Section 4 is not applicable when a suit pleading ‘benami’ is already filed prior to the prescribed date, and it is treated as applicable only to the suit which he filed thereafter, it would have the effect of classifying the so-called ‘real’ owners into two classes — those who stand in the position of plaintiffs and those who stand in the position of defendants under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 4. This difficulty is inbuilt in Section 4(2) and does not provide the rationale to hold that this Section applies retrospectively. The legislature itself thought it fit to do so and there is no challenge to the vires on the ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It is not open to us to re-write the section also. Even otherwise, in the operation of Section 4(1) and (2), no discrimination can be said to have been made amongst different real owners of property. In fact, those cases in which suits are filed by real owners or defences are allowed prior to coming into operation of Section 4(2), would form a separate class as compared to those cases where a state for filling such suits or defences has still not reached by the time Section 4(1) and (2) starts operating. Consequently, latter type of cases would form a distinct category of cases. There is no question of discrimination being meted out while dealing with these two classes of cases differently. A real owner who has already been allowed defence on that ground prior to coming into operation of Section 4(2) cannot be said to have been given a better treatment as compared to the real owner who has still to take up such a defence and in the meantime he is hit by the prohibition of Section 4(2). Equally there cannot be any comparison between a real owner who has filed such suit earlier and one who does not file such suit till Section 4(1) comes into operation. All real owners who stake their claims regarding benami transactions after Section 4(1) and (2) came into operation are given uniform treatment by these provisions, whether they come as plaintiffs or as defendants.

The Act by Section 7 has effected a repeal of Section 82 of the Indian Trusts Act and while repealing this provision no different intention appears from the Act to affect any right privilege or liability acquired under Section 82 by either side or any pending proceedings regarding such obligation or liability. Therefore, such pending proceedings will have to be continued or enforced as if the repealing Act had not been passed. A conjoint reading of Section 82 of the Indian Trusts Act and Section 6(b), (d) and (e) of the General Clauses Act clearly enjoins that if suits are pending wherein the plaintiff have put forward claims under the then existing Section 82 of the Indian Trusts Act such proceedings are to be continued by assuming that the repealing of Section 82 of the Indian Trusts Act has not been effected in connection with such pending proceedings. Where a statutory provision which is not expressly made retrospective by the legislature seeks to affect vested rights and corresponding obligations of parties, such provision cannot be said to have any retrospective effect by necessary implication.”

14. Recently, the Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Samittri Devi v. Sampuran Singh - AIR 2011 SC 773 : 2011 (2) RLW 1030 (SC) has again followed the three Judges' Bench decision in the case of R. Rajagopal Reddy ((1995) 2 SCC 630) and held that the suits filed prior to 19/5/1988 by the real owners would be maintainable and would not be hit by Section 4 of the said Act and to quote from para 11 & 16:

“11………By the time the first appeal was being heard, the judgment of the two Judges bench in Mithilesh Kumari (supra) had been over-ruled by a bench of three Judges of this Court in R. Rajagopal Reddy v. Padmini Chandrasekharan decided on 31.1.1995 and reported in (AIR 1996 SC 238): ((1995) 2 SCC 630). This Court had held that Section 4 or for that matter the Act as a whole was not a piece of declaratory or curative legislation. It creates substantive rights in favour of benamidars and destroys substantive rights in favour of the real owners. It creates a new offence of entering into such benami transactions. It had therefore, been held that when a statutory provision creates a new liability and a new offence, it would naturally have a prospective operation, and Section 4 will not apply to pending suits which were already filed and entertained prior to the Act coming into force. The first appellate Court therefore, held that the suit filed by appellant No. 1 was not prohibited by the said Act.

16. The High Court has clearly erred in ignoring the binding judgment of a Bench of three Judges of this Court in R. Rajagopal Reddy (supra). By this decision, this Court had reversed its earlier judgment in Mithilesh Kumari (supra) and had held in terms that suits filed prior to the application of the act would not be hit by the prohibition under Section 4 of that Act……”

15. In view of these binding precedents overruling the previous decision in Mithilesh Kumari's case and impliedly overruling the cited decision in Jai Prakash v. Om Prakash (supra), the contention of learned counsel for the appellant-defendant Mr. L.M Lodha that transaction in question was hit by the provisions of Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and, therefore, the plaintiff could not claim title or file a suit for cancellation of sale deed is not acceptable and the same is liable to be rejected and is, accordingly, rejected. However, as stated above, the question for consideration, which still survives is as to whether the sale deed dated 22/4/1958 could be cancelled by the learned trial court and was there sufficient evidence to establish that the sale transaction was a mere sham transaction and no consideration had passed from defendant Madan Singh to plaintiff Suraj Kanwar.

16. It is undisputed that the sale deed Ex. 1 itself is a registered document with the Sub Registrar and the factum of passing of consideration is duly mentioned therein so also that Rs. 5000/- has been received by the seller Smt. Suraj Kanwar. The same also states that possession of 24 bighas of land has been handed over to the purchaser defendant Madan Singh and said sale deed bears the signature of husband of plaintiff, Thakur Raghuveer Singh also as witness. The entry made on sale deed by the Sub Registrar while registering the said document is also there that the seller has received the consideration of Rs. 5000/-. This coupled with the fact that defendant Madan Singh after such sale has actually carried out the agricultural operations on said 24 bighas of land for almost 20 years has also not been disputed by the plaintiff anywhere. The revenue record shows that such agricultural operations by him. The fact also remains that suit for cancellation of the sale deed has been filed by the plaintiff after good 20 years of said sale transaction. The most important fact which cannot be lost sight is that on the basis of this sale of 24 bighas by the plaintiff to defendant and by other three sale deeds in favour of other persons, the plaintiff and her husband took benefit under the Ceiling Law and on the basis of declaration furnished by them, the competent authority under the Ceiling Law vide order dated 20/12/1971, certified copy of which is Ex. A-9, held that the land holding of plaintiff Suraj Kanwar w/o Thakur Raghuveer Singh was 49 bighas 2 biswas and the excess 03 bighas 02 biswas over the limit prescribed of 46 bighas 1 biswas was a fragment, which was not liable to be taken over by the State. The said order dated 20/12/1971 passed by Sub Divisional Officer, Raisinghnagar was passed on the basis of declaration furnished by the plaintiff before the said competent authority only after excluding the sales of land made by plaintiff including the present sale in dispute made to the defendant of 24 bighas. Thus, the plaintiff had taken advantage of sale made in favour of defendant Mandan Singh for the purpose of saving her land from Ceiling Law. This fact being undisputed and not controverted, it cannot be said that the plaintiff made the aforesaid sale on 22/4/1958 as a mere sham transaction or benami transaction. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt. Surasaibalini Debi (supra), it was not merely an attempt to evade a statute or to commit a fraud but the plaintiff had succeeded in evading the Ceiling Law and has, thus, achieved the impermissible object on the strength of said sale in question and, therefore, the court will not come to her rescue to restore back the title and possession of the said land.

17. The reliance placed by the plaintiff on so called admission of the defendant Madan Singh in the form of letter dated 6/9/1964 and his wife's letter dated 21/12/1967 also does not demolish the case of defendant. The statement of defence witness DW-1, Narpat Singh, the power of attorney holder of defendant, has explained the said so called admission that the same was given on the assurance of the plaintiff that she would advance a sum of Rs. 20,000/- for business need of the defendant provided he gives this kind of letter. Said power of attorney — Narpat Singh is Madan Singh's wife's brother and he has also stated that consideration of Rs. 5,000/- was paid to the plaintiff Suraj Kanwar at her ‘dera’ (residence). The said money was brought by him from Firozpur from agents of their business. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, such an admission is not sufficient to hold that the sale was without consideration and to decree the suit of the present plaintiff, which is sufficiently explained with the circumstances in which it was so made. The strong presumption of actual passing of consideration as stipulated in the registered sale deed itself is not rebutted. Thakur Raghuveer Singh, husband of plaintiff Suraj Kanwar, also does not dispel this presumption of receipt of Rs. 5,000/- consideration & he merely says that Rs. 5000/- was not received by him. He does not specifically deny that said sum of Rs. 5000/- was received by his wife, plaintiff — Suraj Kanwar. In his statement he has also admitted that prior to execution of sale deed in question, he had 123.14 bighas of land and besides disputed sale deed, he had also executed three sale deeds in favour of Sajjan Kumar, Ranchore and Phool Singh. However, those were the sale deeds, which were not benami transactions. He has also stated in the cross examination that after the said three sale deeds and disputed sale deed dated 22/4/1958, the land holding remained with him (in the name of his wife Suraj Kanwar) was 49.10 bighas of land and he has also admitted that if these four sale deeds were not executed, his land would have been in excess of the limit under the Ceiling Law.

18. In view of this statement of plaintiff's power of attorney holder — her husband, this Court is of the opinion that the sale deed dated 22/4/1958 along with other three sale deeds, to which no challenge appears to have been made by the plaintiff in any court of law were the genuine sale deeds and the sale in question was made for consideration of Rs. 5000/- and same could not be held to be benami or sham transaction.

19. As far as question of statements of power of attorney given for the side of plaintiff as well as for defendant is concerned, this Court is of the view that in view of judgment of Surpeme Court in the case of Maan Kaur (supra) the statements of power of attorney on both sides as P.W 1 Raghuveer Singh and D.W 1 Narpat Singh — brotherin-law of defendant Madan Singh could be read in evidence as the facts relating to the said sale transaction having taken place in front of them were in their personal knowledge and, therefore, nonappearance of plaintiff and defendant themselves in the witness box could not vitiate their respective cases.

20. Consequently, this Court is of the opinion that the learned trial court has erred in decreeing the suit and cancelling the sale deed dated 22/4/1958 registered on 30/4/1958 and the present appeal of defendant Madan Singh deserves to be allowed and same is accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment and decree of the learned trial court dated 28/1/1986 is set aside. The plaintiff shall pay cost of Rs. 1000/- to the defendant.

21. In view of appeal no. 16/1986 having been allowed by this Court, the connected appeal no. 478/2006 of the defendant Madan Singh is also liable to be allowed for the reasons discussed above and same is accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree dated 5/8/2006 passed in civil suit no. 15/1999 is also set aside.

22. The Receiver shall hand over the possession of the land in question to the defendant Madan Singh within a period of two months from today.