The point that arises for consideration here is whether the application for special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal for which a period of 60 days has been prescribed under s. 417 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Code excludes the application of s. 5 of the Limitation Act if there is delay in filing such an application within the period of 60 days. The office has pointed out in its note that s. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act would apply to the case and therefore s 5 would not be available to the complainant when he is out of time. But s. 29 (2) comes into operation only when the special law prescribes a period different from the period prescribed by the First schedule to the Limitation Act. In this case of special leave against acquittal the schedule to the Limitation Act does not prescribe any period at all. Such being the case only where there is difference between the period prescribed by this schedule and the period prescribed by the special law would s. 29 (2) be applicable. So far as the present case is concerned, there is no such difference between the period prescribed by the law of limitation and the Criminal Procedure Code. For the first time it appears that under s. 417 (4.) a period of 60 days has been prescribed for filing an application for special leave against acquittal. S. 1, sub-sec. 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code makes all laws applicable to the Criminal Procedure Code including the law of limitation and nothing could prevent the appellant from taking advantage of s. 5 of the Limitation Act.
The question then is whether the complainant has satisfied that there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the special leave application. It transpires in this case that there was just a delay of one day after the reopening of the court before which the application should have been filed. Ordinarily one day's delay is always excused and in this case I am satisfied there is sufficient cause shown for the delay. So this delay will be excused.
Post the appeal for admission.
N.T.R